

How We Stopped War, 1990-2021:

180 Historical Cases of Successful
Efforts to Reduce Armed Conflict



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ABOUT

This report documents 180 historical cases of successful efforts to stop war that have taken place since 1990. It builds on decades of work by scholars, policy analysts, and journalists to provide this expansive and diverse selection. With this information, we plan to develop insights that can inform global efforts to reduce armed conflict, convince donors and governments to focus more resources on stopping war, and expedite the research of scholars and policy analysts on the subject. All of the cases in this report are hosted on the How We Stop War website (www.howwestopwar.com) in an easily search able format designed to facilitate the comparative analysis of our cases. More information, updates, and research outputs based on the analysis of this material can all be found there.

For the purposes of this report, the cases are listed alphabetically in terms of the state involved. In the case that a state has multiple entries, these are presented chronologically.

Our approach

Each case we have represents a unique historical process in which the initiatives of people or organisations directly contributed to preventing, containing, or ending an armed conflict. For the time being, the entire index is drawn from the period 1990-present. Each case has been coded along multiple axes to offer the search functionality on this website and provide opportunities for the comparative analysis of relevant cases.

We have been creative with the source base of our work, employing any credible documentation and information to make the case that each example did in fact stop a war and illustrate how this was done. As a result, our sources include but are not limited to:

- Armed conflict databases, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), the Armed Conflict Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, and the Correlates of War Project.
- Other databases such as UN Peacemaker, the Peace Accords Matrix at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, the Peace Agreements Database at the University of Edinburgh, and the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project at the University of Central Arkansas.
- The online archives and published documentation (including impact assessments, financial records, public-facing outputs, etc) from practitioner organisations ranging from the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, European

Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the United Nations to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Community of Sant'Egidio, and a host of other NGOs.

- An expansive selection of academic literature representing a wide range of disciplines, including rare and recently published works.
- Coverage of armed conflict and peace initiatives by reputable journalists and media outlets from around the world.
- Jurisprudence from legal institutions such as the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and ad-hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Who we are

Elliot

All the research thus far has been carried out by [Dr Elliot Short](#), a British historian and research consultant. He is expert in building integrated armed forces in post-conflict states and the military history of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe more broadly. Based on years of fieldwork and interviews with major diplomatic and military figures, his latest book [*Building a Multiethnic Military in Post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina*](#) is available from Bloomsbury. Other publications and a curriculum vitae can be found on his website.

Milt

[Milt Lauenstein](#) is an American donor and veteran peacebuilder with decades of experience supporting efforts to reduce armed conflict. In addition to funding a broad range of research (most of which can be found on his website, [Lesswar.org](#)), he has sponsored initiatives to directly reduce armed conflict on the ground across the world. His most recent effort is focused on South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.

DEFINITIONS

All the cases in the index have been classified in terms of the UN Regional Group of the relevant state(s), the type of armed conflict, the type of peace initiative, and the extent to which those initiatives have been successful. As most wars take place either between or within states, each case has been categorised according to the UN Regional Group of the state(s) involved to expedite comparative analysis. The UN Regional Groups are:

- **Africa.**
- **Asia-Pacific.**
- **Eastern Europe.**
- **Latin America and the Caribbean.**
- **Western Europe and Others.**

As the index includes measures to prevent war, we have employed the four categories of armed conflict defined by the UCDP in addition to five more reflecting potential conflicts, for a total of nine classifications:

- **Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.** The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state.
- **Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.** An armed conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries.
- **Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.** An armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive direct military support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict.
- **Interstate Conflict.** A conflict between two or more governments.
- **Risk of a Conflict Relapse.** Most countries that suffer from an intrastate conflict experience at least one conflict relapse during or after the implementation of a peace process.
- **Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.** Demonstrable risk that armed force was going to be employed by two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state.

- **Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.** Demonstrable risk of an armed conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries.
- **Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.** Demonstrable risk of an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive direct military support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict.
- **Risk of an Interstate Conflict.** Demonstrable risk of an armed conflict between two or more governments.

Each of the cases is tagged with at least one of the 12 types of peace initiative that we have identified at this stage:

- **Diplomacy.** A range of methods employed by governments involved in or external to an armed conflict to influence the decisions and behaviour of one or more of the belligerent parties through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of military intervention.
- **International transitional administration.** The temporary assumption of responsibility of the principal governance functions of a state or territory by one or more international organisations.
- **Legal prosecutions.** Removing political and military leaders who are committed to continued conflict from their societies and holding them to account for their actions in a national or international court of law.
- **Local action.** The efforts of local people and organisations (including civil society groups, trade unions, religious groups, councils of elders, and ad hoc initiatives, as well as specialist non-governmental organisations) to stop war.
- **Mediation of a peace agreement.** An individual, organisation, or government that is not party to the conflict successfully oversees the negotiation of a peace agreement between the belligerents.
- **Military intervention.** The use of armed force by a government that was previously not involved in an armed conflict with the express intention of incapacitating one or more of the belligerents to end the conflict.

- **Monitoring, observation, political, and verification missions.** Civilian or unarmed military personnel from governments and organisations that are not party to the conflict are deployed to support a peace process without the use of force.
- **Peace infrastructure.** The creation and maintenance of a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to reducing armed conflict.
- **Peacekeeping mission.** The deployment of military personnel from one or more countries that are not party to the conflict, either at the invitation of one or more of the belligerents or at the request of the United Nations Security Council. (Note: As most of the cases in the index took place prior to the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations published its June 2015 report, which stressed the need to stop bifurcating armed peacekeeping missions and special political missions and instead view them as an integral spectrum of peace operations, the index separates these approaches.)
- **Resolution of militarised territorial dispute.** Developing a peaceful solution to a territorial dispute through bilateral negotiations or third-party arbitration.
- **Stabilising international borders.** Taking measures to reduce the likelihood of cross-border crises and disputes (displaced populations, attacks by exiled opposition groups, intercommunal conflicts, raiding, etc) from sparking armed conflict.
- **Other.** Unique efforts which defy classification.

Cognizant of the fact that the concept of success is slippery and difficult to pin down in policy analysis, the extent to which the efforts to stop war have been successful are simply divided into two categories:

- **Lasting.** The processes documented in the respective case contributed to creating a peace which has held until the time of writing.
- **Limited.** The processes documented in the respective case stopped the fighting for a limited amount of time or within a specific area; contained an armed conflict but failed to resolve it; or demonstrably mitigated the impact of an armed conflict but did not stop the fighting itself.

Year(s): 1997.

Location: Albania.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, a peacekeeping mission, and a political mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Italy, Multinational Protection Force, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the EU.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Multinational Protection Force, an Italian-led peacekeeping mission mandated by the UN to restore order in Albania in 1997, succeeded in ending the armed conflict and restoring stability to Albania following a severe political crisis.

Albania emerged from an isolationist communist regime in 1991, with the country's first elections taking place and economic reforms being introduced. Many Albanians invested in various pyramid schemes throughout the 1990s until, at the end of November 1996, they began to collapse. Over \$1 billion (almost half of Albania's GDP at the time) was lost, leading to mass protests and riots in January 1997.¹ In the unrest, thousands of weapons were looted from government stores and armed groups emerged across the country.² Violence soon followed, with some groups launching attacks on government infrastructure and others engaging each other for criminal or political reasons. By February 1997, the government had lost control of much of the country to the armed groups. In March, the government collapsed entirely, leading to a state of emergency being declared. However, the desertion of much of the police and military meant that this was unenforceable.³

With thousands dead and the violence increasing, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appointed a Special Envoy to develop a solution with the political parties of Albania. The talks concluded with 10 political parties agreeing to form an

¹ Christopher Jarvis. "The Rise and Fall of Albania's Pyramid Schemes." *Finance Development*, Vol. 37, No. 1. (2000) Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

² Jane Perlez. "Bitter Albanians, Facing Anarchy, Arm Themselves." *The New York Times*. (1997) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/14/world/bitter-albanians-facing-anarchy-arm-themselves.html> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

³ Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.13

interim administration and schedule elections to produce a new government.⁴ The unrest across the country continued, leading the EU and OSCE to deploy a joint fact-finding mission to investigate. On 27 March 1997, the OSCE Permanent Council called for the deployment of an international protection force to stabilise the situation, and the following day the UN Security Council approved the response.⁵ The Government of Italy took responsibility for establishing the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) and by the middle of April, over 7,000 military personnel were restoring order around the capital, Tirana.⁶ This allowed a host of international organisations to begin supplying humanitarian assistance to the population and the Albanian government to recover its grip on the country. While the MPF fulfilled its objectives, the OSCE and EU coordinated their efforts to support the upcoming elections. When the Albanian people went to the polls in June 1997, it was in a safe environment and the contest was deemed credible by international observers.⁷ The period of instability and armed conflict in Albania, which cost the lives of over 2,000 people, was ended by the deployment of the MPF and the effective diplomacy of the EU and OSCE.

⁴ Everts. *Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo*. p.3

⁵ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1101*. (UN, 1997) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1101> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

⁶ P. Tripodi. "Operation Alba: A Necessary and Successful Preventive Deployment." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 9, No. 4. (2010)

⁷ Everts. *Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo*. p.11

Year(s): 1997 – 1998.

Location: Albania.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and a political mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Italy, Multinational Protection Force, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Multinational Protection Force and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Presence in Albania helped to restore order, monitored the border with Kosovo, and mediated a peaceful end to an attempted coup d'état in 1998.

The initial deployment of the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) restored order in much of Albania. However, many challenges remained which posed a threat to the fragile peace. The looting of military equipment during the fighting had left up to a million firearms circulating in Albanian society, which not only threatened to disrupt the peace but became a cause for concern when allegations of arms shipments into Kosovo heightened tensions with the Government of Serbia. Furthermore, although the elections that were held following the conflict produced a new government, the ousted president contested the result. Determining these factors to amount to a threat to peace and security in the region, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MPF for an additional 45 days to consolidate the peace.¹ With its mandate complete, MPF was withdrawn on 11 August 1997 and responsibility for upholding the rule of law was handed over to the reorganised Albanian police.²

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led the international effort to build stability in Albania after the departure of the MNF. The outbreak of war in neighbouring Kosovo in 1998 threatened Albania with renewed instability, particularly as the administration in Belgrade suspected that Kosovo Liberation Army combatants had logistics

¹ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1114*. (UN, 1997) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1114> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

² UN. "Security Council Marks Withdrawal of Multinational Force from Albania; Need for Continuing Global Support is Needed." *UN Security Council Press Release SC/6410*. (1997) Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970814.SC6410.html> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

and training bases on Albanian territory. Fearing an outbreak of violence on the border could have sparked an interstate conflict, the OSCE carried out an assessment of the frontier, deployed more teams to the area, and brought in equipment to build the capacity of Albanian border patrols.³ The reassertion of state authority over parts of southern Albania also risked sparking conflict in 1998, with government security forces meeting resistance from armed groups. The OSCE teams helped to ensure this process went relatively peacefully, mediating many such disputes as the primary representatives of the international community.⁴ The greatest challenge to peace in Albania came in September 1998. Protests organised by the party which lost the 1997 elections escalated, with government buildings being attacked and many officials fleeing Tirana. In the chaos, an armed group (equipped with stolen tanks) attempted to seize power. Their bid was unsuccessful, and thanks to OSCE mediation, the leaders of the coup surrendered peacefully within hours.⁵ Another armed conflict in Albania was averted.

³ Everts. *Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo*. p.14-5

⁴ *Ibid.* p.17

⁵ *Ibid.* pp.22-3

Year(s): 1994 – 1999.

Location: Angola.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the governments of Portugal, USA, and USSR.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The fighting in Angola was significantly reduced for approximately five years thanks to the mediation efforts of the UN and the governments of Portugal and USA.

After a lengthy armed struggle to throw off colonial rule, Angola descended into war just months after becoming independent from Portugal in 1974. Two armed groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fought each other for control of the country, with the former receiving extensive assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union and the latter being supported by South Africa and the USA. This devastating conflict raged until 1988, when a ceasefire set the scene for the withdrawal of foreign troops the following year.¹

Representatives of the MPLA and UNITA then attended talks in Zaire in 1989, before entering into an 18-month period of negotiations supported by the UN and the governments of the USA and USSR in Portugal in 1990. These talks culminated with the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement, which established a fresh ceasefire, set the framework for the creation of an integrated national army, scheduled elections to take place within 16 months of the signing of the agreement, and called for an extremely limited peacekeeping mission (the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, UNAVEM) to monitor implementation.²

The election resulted in a victory for the MPLA. UNITA disputed the result, reformed their armed forces (which had disarmed much less than the MPLA's), and launched a blistering

¹ UCDP. *Government of Angola – UNITA*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/714> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

² Peace Accords for Angola (Bicesse Accords), 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/143> (Accessed 26/10/2021); Virginia Page Fortna. "A Lost Chance for Peace: The Bicesse Accords in Angola." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003) p.74

offensive. By the beginning of 1993, UNITA held 75 per cent of the country. In May 1993, the US government withdrew its support for UNITA and recognised the embattled MPLA administration. Combined with losses on the battlefield, this forced UNITA leaders back to the negotiating table. On 20 November 1994, talks in Zambia supported by Portugal, the UN, and the USA culminated with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.³ This agreement established power-sharing mechanisms, again attempted to disarm or integrate combatants, and again included the deployment of a severely under-strength peacekeeping mission. The agreements signed in Bicesse and Lusaka succeeded in stopping the war for approximately five years but failed to create the framework for a lasting peace to develop in Angola.

³ Lusaka Protocol, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/145> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

Year(s): 2001 – 2002.

Location: Angola.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Angola.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: An agreement negotiated by the belligerents ended the conflict in Angola.

Efforts to definitively end the war in Angola during the 1990s ultimately failed. Despite theoretically sharing power in a coalition government, both the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*, MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, UNITA) continued to arm during the uneasy peace established in Lusaka. In 1998, UNITA was suspended from its roles in government for continuing to maintain and arm considerable numbers of troops by smuggling diamonds. With the prospects of renewed war escalating, the MPLA administration strengthened its forces and negotiated cooperation agreements with neighbouring governments, preventing UNITA troops from sheltering over the border.¹ In September 1999, MPLA forces launched a major offensive against UNITA, and in December Namibian troops joined the campaign. UNITA was severely weakened by the attack and resorted to guerrilla warfare until, in February 2002, the long-standing leader of UNITA was killed along with several other generals.² The following month, after consulting the UN and the governments of Portugal and the USA, the MPLA administration announced a unilateral ceasefire and invited the remaining UNITA leadership to negotiate.

UNITA leaders held preliminary talks with their erstwhile adversaries on 15 March, agreeing to a 'pre-accord' ceasefire on 18 March. While splits quickly emerged within the hierarchy of UNITA, the representatives at the talks managed to hold enough of the organisation together while the negotiations took place in the city of Luena. These talks resulted in a ceasefire

¹ UCDP. *Government of Angola – UNITA*.

² Casimiro Siona & Victoria Brittain. "Unita leader Savimbi killed by Angolan army." *The Guardian*. (23 February 2002) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/23/victoriabrittain> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

agreement on 30 March 2002, which was formally signed at a ceremony in the capital, Luanda, on 4 April.³ The agreement reiterated the parties' commitments under the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol, calling for the resolution of all pending military issues that had been agreed such as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and the creation of the Angolan Armed Forces.⁴ In September 2002, the lengthy process of disarming or integrating UNITA's 85,000 troops began under the supervision of a joint committee (and without the UN) while the UNITA organisation itself started its transition to a political party. Unlike the agreements of the 1990s, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was respected by both signatories and established a lasting peace in Angola.

³ Aaron Griffiths. "The end of the war: the Luena Memorandum of Understanding." *Accord*, Vol. 15. (2004) pp.26-7

⁴ Memorandum of Understanding (Luena Agreement), 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/121> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

Year(s): 1991 – 2001.

Location: *The Hawar Islands, Bahrain.*

UN Regional Group: *Asia-Pacific.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of an Interstate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy, mediation of a peace agreement, and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Government of Saudi Arabia and the International Court of Justice.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The longstanding militarised territorial dispute between Bahrain and Qatar regarding the Hawar Islands was prevented by the diplomatic intervention of the Government of Saudi Arabia and resolved by the International Court of Justice in 2001.*

The Hawar Islands, an archipelago in the Persian Gulf, have been the subject of a territorial dispute between the ruling families of Bahrain and Qatar since the eighteenth century. The British formally awarded the territory to Bahrain in the 1930s, however the islands remained contested after independence. Following the British withdrawal from the region, Saudi Arabia led efforts to mediate the dispute, eventually convincing both sides to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).¹ However, before the case made it to The Hague, the dispute almost sparked an interstate conflict. In 1986, the Government of Bahrain began constructing a coastguard station on the Hawar Islands, prompting the Government of Qatar government to dispatch helicopter gunships and soldiers to the area and arrest the construction workers. Bahrain responded by deploying its own troops to the Islands, and the two countries were on the cusp of war until the Saudi government intervened once again.²

Saudi-led efforts continued until 1991, and although they succeeded in defusing the immediate crisis, little progress was made in finding a resolution to the dispute. The Qatari government submitted its case to the ICJ in July 1991, although it took until November 1995

¹ Krista Wiegand. "Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 1. (2012)

² Ramin Seddiq. "Border Disputes on the Arabian Peninsula." *The Washington Institute Policy Watch*, No. 525. (2001) Available at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/border-disputes-on-the-arabian-peninsula> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

and some preliminary judgements from the ICJ for both parties to agree to the terms by which the case would be judged.³ While the case was assessed in The Hague, the Saudi government continued its efforts to reconcile the Bahraini and Qatari administrations, mediating talks between both governments until diplomatic relations between them were re-established in 1997.⁴ In 2001, the ICJ declared that the Hawar Islands were indeed the territory of Bahrain due to previous treaties with the British, although a smaller dispute over the town of Zubarah was settled in favour of Qatar.⁵ Both states endorsed the ruling, closing the longest and most complex case in the history of the ICJ.⁶ The concerted, two-decade mediation effort of the Saudi Arabian government helped to contain a major crisis and prevent a war between Bahrain and Qatar, however the territorial dispute between the two countries remained a potential source of armed conflict until the adjudication of the ICJ provided a permanent resolution to the conflict.

³ ICJ. *Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain)*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/87> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

⁴ Wiegand. "Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands." p.14

⁵ ICJ. *Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain)*.

⁶ BBC. "Gulf islands row settled." *BBC News*. (2001) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1225398.stm (Accessed 26/11/2020)

Year(s): 1992 – 1997.

Location: Chittagong Hill Tracts, Chittagong Division, Bangladesh.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Bangladesh.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord brought an end to two decades of armed conflict and formally recognised the special status of the indigenous population.

The armed conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh, began in 1972. The CHT had enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy under British rule, however this status was revoked when the region became part of Pakistan in 1947. Following Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan in 1971, state-sponsored migration into the CHT increased, inspiring the indigenous population of the region to launch an insurgency against migrant communities and government security forces. In 1982, the Bangladeshi military seized power in a coup d'état. After meeting continuing resistance from the population of the CHT, the military government entered into dialogue with CHT representatives in 1985. While some armed groups agreed to put down their weapons in exchange for increased autonomy, the peace process ultimately collapsed, and the fighting continued.¹

In 1992, the first democratically elected government of Bangladesh came into office.² Almost immediately, the new administration worked to resolve the conflict in the CHT. Agreements were made with India regarding refugees from the conflict, a parliamentary committee was established to investigate the issue, and fresh talks were held with representatives from the CHT.³ On 11 August 1992, a ceasefire was signed which essentially ended the conflict. As talks continued over the ensuing five years, fighting between the former belligerents remained extremely limited. On 2 December 1997, the negotiations culminated with the

¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. *Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts*. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/322> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

² S. M. Shamsul Alam. "Democratic politics and the fall of the military regime in Bangladesh." *Bulleting of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (1995)

³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. *Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts*.

signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord.⁴ In addition to ending the conflict, the Accord established an autonomous administration (known as the Regional Council) for the CHT along with a central government Ministry for CHT Affairs, which would be led by an individual from the CHT.⁵ The Accord has succeeded in ending the armed conflict, despite opposition from hard-line groups within CHT communities and certain Bangladeshi political parties, as well as the recalcitrance of the military to withdraw from the area.

⁴ Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1449> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

⁵ M. Rashiduzzaman. "Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 7. (1998)

Year(s): 2000 – 2019.

Location: Belize/Guatemala.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, an observation mission, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A diplomatic intervention by the Organisation of American States helped to prevent an interstate conflict between Belize and Guatemala in 1999-2000.

The dispute between the governments of Guatemala and Belize stemmed from opposing interpretations of an 1859 treaty signed by the Guatemalan administration and the UK, in which Guatemala recognised the sovereignty of British Honduras (as Belize was formerly known). In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Government of Guatemala argued that the British had reneged on certain clauses of the treaty, making it invalid, and therefore British Honduras was in fact a province of Guatemala.¹ Tensions flared many times in the ensuing decades, most notably in 1982, when Argentina and the UK went to war following the occupation of the Falkland Islands. In 1991, Guatemala formally recognised Belize and the two states established diplomatic relations. Three years later, British forces left Belize after a lengthy operation to protect the sovereignty of its former colony.² Seemingly resolved, the dispute escalated again in 1999 when the Government of Guatemala made fresh claims, based on historic treaties, on approximately half of Belizean territory. Hundreds of Guatemalan troops were deployed along the contested border, leading to several armed clashes between the armed forces of each state which brought them to the verge of war.³

In March 2000, the Organisation of American States (OAS) hosted representatives from Belize and Guatemala for negotiations in Washington, DC. In November, both sides signed

¹ P.K. Menon. "The Anglo-Guatemalan Territorial Dispute over the Colony of Belize (British Honduras)." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2. (1979)

² Ash Rossiter. "Getting out of Belize: Britain's Intractable Military Exit from Central America." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 46, No. 4. (2018)

³ Krista E. Wiegand. "Nationalist Discourse and Domestic Incentives to Prevent Settlement of the Territorial Dispute Between Guatemala and Belize." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2005) p.374

the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures, which included the establishment of an “Adjacency Zone” which would separate the armed forces of each state by 2km.⁴ In 2003, the Guatemalan and Belizean foreign ministers signed the Agreement to Establish a Transition Process and Confidence-Building Measures.⁵ One such measure was the deployment of an OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone to oversee the implementation of confidence-building measures, monitor activities in the Zone, and facilitate dialogue.⁶ In addition, a “Group of Friends” consisting of significant regional and international governments was formed to support the OAS effort to prevent an armed conflict. These mechanisms served to calm the immediate crisis and prevent a war. On 8 December 2008, both governments agreed to settle the dispute at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should the populations of both states approve such a course in referenda. Despite some minor clashes, war was prevented, the border has remained peaceful since the OAS diplomatic intervention in 2000, and both populations approved taking the dispute to the ICJ in referenda held in 2018-2019.⁷

⁴ Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures between Belize and Guatemala, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/belizeguatemalaCBMs2000> (Accessed 29/11/2020)

⁵ OAS. *Belize and Guatemala Process: 2000-Present*. (OAS, 2019) Available at: <http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/belizeandguatemala/> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁶ OAS Peace Fund. *OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone*. (OAS, 2009) Available at: <http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/belizeandguatemala/AdjacencyZone.html> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁷ AP. “Guatemalan troops mass near Belize border after shooting incident.” *The Guardian*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/22/guatemalan-troops-mass-belize-border-shooting-incident> (Accessed 05/11/2020); OAS. *Belize and Guatemala Process*.

Year(s): 2016 – 2018.

Location: Withheld.

UN Regional Group: Withheld.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the NGO Peace Direct.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The construction of a local peace infrastructure in the country known as “Boendoe” helped to reduce violence in the area and minimised the risk of an armed conflict.

“Boendoe” is the fictional name for an area in which a peacebuilding network have successfully reduced armed conflict. However, owing to the politically sensitive climate of the country in question, scholarship on the area employs the Boendoe pseudonym. The Network, formed of 18 civil society organisations, was established in 2013 and coordinates the actions of individuals across the country. It works at the provincial level or below due to the political context in which it operates, however it is at this level that it has had a significant impact. Its primary function is to collate reports from its citizen reporters, vetted individuals who are trusted to convey information about a conflict, atrocity, or human rights abuse.¹ This data is aggregated and mapped, providing a vital insight into conflict in the society. The Network’s findings are then circulated to international actors. This system of early warning, it argues, facilitates early response, thereby resolving disputes before they escalate into armed conflict.² When appropriate, the Network employs the expertise and resources of its members to undertake activities such as human rights monitoring or dialogue and cooperation projects, preventing or resolving many conflicts at the community level.³

Over a period of two years, 5,597 reports were filed by the Network’s citizen reporters and verified by its members. The reports have been hailed as highly valuable by international

¹ Kiely Barnard-Webster. ‘Strength is from a union: working together you go far’: *Understanding Collective Impact Using an Analytical Framework*. (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2018) p.10

² Ibid. pp.11-12

³ Phil Vernon. *Local peacebuilding: What works and why*. (Peace Direct & Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019) p.42

organisations, directly informing policy discussions in the European Parliament, for example. Another vital role that the Network fills is during the frequent media blackouts experienced in Boendoe. In one such blackout that was imposed during an election, the Network provided intelligence about a conflict that was escalating much more quickly than international observers expected, expediting a rapid response. During these periods, the Network also serves as a key source of information to the general public, who can be warned of nearby violence or informed of atrocities carried out in secret.⁴ Underlying all the work of the Network is the shared goal of building a more cohesive and peaceful society in a place with a recent history marred by division and armed conflict. By mobilising their resources and working together, members of the Network have maximised their impact and reduced armed conflict.

⁴ Barnard-Webster. *'Strength is from a union.'* pp.16-17

Year(s): 1994 – 1995.

Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of the USA.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Government of the USA successfully mediated a series of peace agreements which ended the multifaceted armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia on 1 March 1992, following the secession of Slovenia and Croatia the previous year. Much like the those former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina soon fell into armed conflict as the President of Serbia and *de facto* leader of rump Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, orchestrated a campaign with parts of the Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia to seize as much territory as was possible and ultimately build a “Greater Serbia” from the ashes of Yugoslavia.¹ A complex conflict ensued, initially between Bosnian Serb forces backed by Yugoslavia and a broad coalition of armed groups serving under the banner of the Bosnian government. In 1993, this coalition fractured, with a predominantly Croat armed group, the Croat Defence Council, coming into conflict with the Bosnian government, making the war a three-sided struggle.²

A succession of peace processes led by the European Community failed to halt the fighting or resolve the conflict.³ In 1994, the US government took the lead in efforts to bring peace to Western Balkans. Its first success was mediating talks between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its former ally turned adversary, the Croat Defence Council. In March 1994, this initiative culminated with the Washington Framework Agreement for the

¹ James Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. (London: Hurst, 2003)

² UCDP. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serb*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/389> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

³ The Vance-Owen Plan, 1993. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/606/The%20Vance-Owen%20Plan> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

Federation, which not only ended one facet of the war, but also renewed the former alliance between them.⁴ The war continued into 1995, when atrocities and acts of genocide carried out by Bosnian Serb forces inspired a much more forceful response from the international community. Following an extensive bombing campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and a Croatian offensive into the Bosnian theatre, Milošević attended peace talks hosted by the Government of the USA in Dayton, Ohio.⁵ Richard Holbrook led negotiations alongside representatives from the US, EU, and Russia.⁶ After three weeks of talks, Milošević agreed to sign the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷ A formal ceremony was held in Paris on 14 December 1995, marking the official end to a conflict in which 100,000 people were killed and millions were displaced from their homes.

⁴ Framework Agreement for the Federation (Washington Agreement), 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniawashingtonagreement94> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

⁵ Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. p.192

⁶ Richard Holbrooke. *To End A War*. (New York: Modern Library, 1999)

⁷ General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/bih/126173> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

Year(s): 1995 – present.

Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Legal prosecutions, a peacekeeping mission, and a monitoring mission

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The European Community/European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The legal prosecution of political and military leaders who posed a threat to peace, the deployment of NATO and later EU peacekeepers, and the work of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and EU advisory and monitoring missions has helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Established in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) revived aspects of international law that had lain dormant since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals that were convened after the Second World War. Over 24 years, 161 people were indicted for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide.¹ This figure included the first serving head of state in history to be indicted, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, as well as the wartime political and military leadership of a range of armed forces which fought during the collapse of Yugoslavia. The ICTY found that the armed conflicts across the Western Balkans during the 1990s were the result of a planned and systematic campaign orchestrated by a joint criminal enterprise. The enterprise, the tribunals concluded, was effectively controlled or substantially influenced by Milošević and encompassed individuals across former

¹ ICTY. *About the ICTY*. (ICTY, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icty.org/en/about> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

Yugoslavia.² In addition, some Croat leaders were found guilty of taking part in a separate joint criminal enterprise to persecute Bosnian Muslims during the war.³

The work of the ICTY helped to prevent conflict relapse in the Western Balkans in several ways. Most directly, this was done by removing powerful political figures suspected of war crimes from office. If such individuals attempted to go into hiding, they were hunted down by the special forces of a range of states (predominantly, the UK and Poland) who were contributing to the post-conflict peacekeeping presence in the Western Balkans and arrested.⁴ This process served to remove most hard-liners who may have risked a return to war from society, allowing the post-conflict transition to begin. In the long term, by identifying the individuals responsible for the crimes of the 1990s, the ICTY also helped to prevent communities from being labelled as collectively responsible for wartime atrocities and demonstrated that even the most powerful elites in the region could not act with impunity. The trials themselves also represent a comprehensive historical record of events based on considerable documentation and hundreds of witness testimonies. This record helps to dispel myths, particularly when, in 1999, the Tribunal's Outreach Programme began providing lectures at schools and public events across the region, as well as producing films and other media.⁵ After 10,800 days of hearings and ninety guilty verdicts, the ICTY was formally dissolved in 2017.⁶

Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, a host of international organisations deployed troops and civilian personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the express intention of preventing renewed war. The European Community maintained its wartime monitoring mission (the European Community Monitoring Mission) into the post-war period as an early warning system for potential conflict across the region. After being renamed the European Union Monitoring Mission in 2000, the unarmed observers continued

² ICTY. *Slobodan Milošević Trial - the Prosecution's case*. (ICTY, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icty.org/en/content/slobodan-milo%C5%A1evi%C4%87-trial-prosecutions-case> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

³ ICTY. *Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor in relation to the judgement in the case Prosecutor vs. Jadranko Prlić et al.* (ICTY, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icty.org/en/press/statement-of-the-office-of-the-prosecutor-in-relation-to-the-judgement-in-the-case-prosecutor> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁴ Julian Borger. "14 years a fugitive: the hunt for Ratko Mladić, the Butcher of Bosnia." *The Guardian*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/14-years-fugitive-hunt-for-ratko-mladic-butcher-of-bosnia> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁵ ICTY. *Outreach Programme*. (ICTY, 2002) Available at: <https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-programme> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

⁶ Owen Bowcott. "Yugoslavia tribunal closes, leaving a powerful legacy of war crimes justice." *The Guardian*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/dec/20/former-yugoslavia-war-crimes-tribunal-leaves-powerful-legacy-milosevic-karadzic-mladic> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

operating in the region until 2007.⁷ The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe also opened offices in every Balkan state in the aftermath of the armed conflict. Its personnel were tasked with helping to maintain peace and stability, particularly during elections, and worked with host governments on democratisation, improving human rights, and protecting minority groups.⁸

In the largest peacetime deployment of armed forces since the end of the Second World War, 60,000 NATO troops moved into Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after the war ended. The Implementation Force was mandated to assist the former combatants with implementing various terms of the Agreement and ultimately be in a position to prevent further conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹ In 1996, the mission was renamed Stabilisation Force, and in 2004, the European Union took responsibility for mission and renamed it the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea.¹⁰ These peacekeeping missions separated the belligerents, monitored implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, conducted inspections of the three armies left in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, hunted suspects for the ICTY, and serve as an ongoing presence in the country until the present day. The comprehensive and coordinated range of international efforts helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war.

⁷ Netherlands Ministry of Defence. *European Community Monitoring Mission - European Union Monitoring Mission (ECMM - EUMM): the Dutch contribution*. (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2020) Available at: <https://english.defensie.nl/topics/historical-missions/mission-overview/1991/european-community-monitoring-mission---european-union-monitoring-mission-ecmm---eumm/dutch-contribution> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

⁸ OSCE. *Where we are*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/where-we-are> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

⁹ General William W. Crouch. "IFOR becomes SFOR." *SFOR Informer Online*. (1997) Available at: <https://www.nato.int/sfor/historic-moments/ifor-to-sfor/ifor-sfor.htm> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

¹⁰ SFOR. *SFOR Mission*. (SFOR, 2003) Available at: <https://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm> (Accessed 27/10/2020) EUFOR. *About EUFOR*. (2020) Available at: <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background> (Accessed 27/10/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2018.

Location: Botswana/Namibia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Resolution of a militarised territorial dispute and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The International Court of Justice, the African Union, and the Government of Zimbabwe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The territorial dispute between Botswana and Namibia, the result of an 1890 treaty between Germany and the UK, was peacefully resolved by the arbitration of the International Court of Justice in 1999 after a series of border clashes.

The border between modern-day Botswana and Namibia was established along the “main channels” of the rivers along the mutual frontier by an 1890 treaty between the UK and Germany, the respective colonial powers at the time.¹ The ambiguity of this delineation has led the governments of both countries to issue competing claims on territory in the border rivers, with the Sedudu Islands representing a particularly contested prize. While the Islands themselves have some value as tourist destinations, the primary concern was the division of water reserves that legal jurisdiction over the territory would offer.² Tensions between the administrations of each state were heightened when the Namibian government proposed building a 250km water pipeline from the Okavango River to feed its growing needs.³ Such a development would have potentially threatened the Okavango Delta in Botswana with desertification. In 1991, Botswana deployed troops to the region, and in 1993, soldiers from both countries exchanged fire in the area. In the ensuing years, both countries built up their military forces along the border. Tensions continued to rise in 1996, when Botswana acquired

¹ Salman M. A. Salman. “International Rivers as Boundaries: The Dispute over Kasikili/Seduku Island and the Decision of the International Court of Justice.” *Water International*, Vol. 25, No. 4. (2000) p.582

² C.J.B. Le Roux. “The Botswana-Namibia Boundary Dispute in the Caprivi: To what extent does Botswana’s Arms Procurement Program represent a drift towards Military Confrontation in the Region?” *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1. (1999)

³ The Economist. “Thirst: Botswana and Namibia.” *The Economist*. (1997) Available at: <https://www.economist.com/international/1997/07/03/thirst> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

tanks and fighter-bombers and Namibia bought a large shipment of arms from Russia.⁴ Given the high numbers of military personnel in the region and the history of clashes along the border, the dispute ran the risk of sparking an interstate conflict and represented a pervasive threat to peace and stability in the region.

The Government of Zimbabwe provided good offices to facilitate negotiations in 1996 which, although ultimately fruitless, inspired the Botswanan and Namibian governments of both states to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice.⁵ Judges at the Court considered the case until December 1999, when they ruled that the territory was lawfully that of Botswana, but both states should enjoy freedom of navigation on the river.⁶ Although this decision resolved the conflict, Botswanan and Namibian troops almost clashed in 2015.⁷ Recognising the continued risk posed by the frontier, the governments of both states invited the African Union to mediate the negotiation of a formal boundary treaty in 2016 to not only reduce the likelihood of such clashes, but to also facilitate movement and trade. The African Union Border Programme advised the process. On 6 February 2018, representatives from both states signed the Boundary Treaty in the Namibian capital, Windhoek.⁸

⁴ The Independent. "Botswana's army chief defends purchase of tanks and combat aircraft." *The Independent*. (1996) Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/botswanas-army-chief-defends-purchase-of-tanks-and-combat-aircraft-1338858.html> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁵ Salman. "International Rivers as Boundaries." p.582

⁶ ICJ. *Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia): Overview of the Case*. (ICJ, 1999) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/98> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁷ Online Editor. "Botswana, Namibia soldiers nearly clash at border." *Sunday Standard*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.sundaystandard.info/botswana-namibia-soldiers-nearly-clash-at-border/> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁸ African Union. "The AU congratulates the Republic of Botswana and the Republic of Namibia on the signing of their Boundary Treaty." *News*. (2018) Available at: <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-au-congratulates-the-republic-of-botswana-and-the-republic-of-namibia-on-the-signing-of-their-boundary-treaty> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

Year(s): 2015.

Location: Burkina Faso.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations, and the African Union.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Preventive diplomacy by the African Union and locally led mediation efforts helped to prevent a war in Burkina Faso following a military coup d'état.

In October 2014, the president of Burkina Faso announced his intention to amend the constitution and stand for a third term as president. In response, protesters took to the streets of Ouagadougou and stormed the National Assembly amidst violent scenes in which at least one person was killed. The same day, the military staged a coup d'état and subsequently became the target of more demonstrations.¹ Although a transitional government including civilians was appointed following widespread international condemnation of the coup and weeks of negotiations mediated by the African Union (AU) Special Envoy (a former Togolese prime minister), bringing a degree of stability and the promise of fresh elections in October 2015, the crisis at the heart of Burkinabe politics was not resolved.² On 16 September 2015, less than a month before the scheduled elections, the interim president, prime minister, and two other ministers were apprehended by troops of the presidential guard – a powerful, autonomous military force built to protect and serve the ousted authoritarian leader. A panel of eminent personalities (military officers, former presidents, and clergy) attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution with the leaders of the presidential guard to no avail, and the following morning those leaders announced a coup d'état and the formation of a military council to rule the country.³ Ouagadougou once again became the scene of violent protests, and within days the regular armed forces of Burkina Faso were in position around

¹ Naila Salihu. "Burkina Faso: An Unforeseen Crisis?" *ACCORD Conflict Trends*, No. 3. (2015) Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/burkina-faso/> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

² Abdoul Karim Saidou. "We have chased Blaise, so nobody can resist us": Civil Society and the politics of ECOWAS intervention in Burkina Faso." *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 1. (2018) pp.43-4

³ Ibid. p.48

the city, ready to remove the military council from power and dismantle the presidential guard by force if necessary.⁴

The initial international response to the coup was unforgiving, with the AU immediately calling for the restoration of constitutional rule, suspending Burkina Faso's membership, and describing the military council as terrorists.⁵ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched a mediation team on 18 September which, after talks with a range of relevant parties, published a 13-point draft agreement which offered amnesty and concessions to the perpetrators of the coup. This proposal was rejected by much of the Burkinabe population (and by ECOWAS in the end), who continued demonstrating against the coup and mobilising in support of the regular armed forces. The effort to prevent war was taken up at this stage by the Mogho Naaba (King of the Mossis), a highly influential Burkinabe traditional leader, who facilitated and mediated negotiations which culminated with the surrender of the military council and presidential guard, averting an armed conflict in Burkina Faso.⁶

⁴ Rakotomalala & Nadia Karoui. "The rise and fall of Burkina Faso's coup: what you need to know." *The Guardian*. (24 September 2015) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/burkina-faso-coup-rise-and-fall-of-what-you-need-to-know> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁵ Saidou. "We have chased Blaise, so nobody can resist us'." p.49

⁶ Ibid. p.50

Year(s): 2000 – 2006.

Location: Burundi.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of South Africa, the UN, and the Organisation of African Unity/African Union.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: International mediation efforts led by South African President Nelson Mandela and the deployment of African Union and UN peacekeepers helped to end the war in Burundi after 13 years of armed conflict.

In response to growing international condemnation of government-sanctioned violence against civilians, the Government of Burundi (which had come to power in coup d'état) agreed to hold elections in 1993. The elections resulted in a victory for the opposition, however the new president was assassinated by army officers, and the country rapidly descended into civil war. By 1996, the military had retaken control of the government.¹ In 1998, representatives from the military government and one of the main opposition groups met in Tanzania for peace talks. The negotiations culminated in August 2000 with the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which formed a transitional administration and invited international observers from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to monitor the process.² The success in Tanzania encouraged South Africa to deploy 700 troops to provide security to Burundian politicians as they participated in the peace process, however a more inclusive agreement was needed before a multilateral peacekeeping mission arrived.³

The most powerful opposition group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (*Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*, CNDD–FDD), came to terms with the transitional

¹ Elliot Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence: The Cases of Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nepal.” *The Better Evidence Project*. (2020)

² Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1207> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

³ Annemarie Peen Rodt. “The African Union Mission in Burundi.” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2012) p.378

administration in 2003, following negotiations mediated by South African President Nelson Mandela which culminated with the Global Ceasefire Agreement.⁴ With the worst of the fighting over, the international community dispatched peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire and consolidate the peace. The initial effort was led by the first peacekeeping mission deployed by the AU, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).⁵ A year later, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (*Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi*, ONUB) took over from AMIB with a much broader mandate, including carrying out Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes, monitoring Burundi's international borders, and helping to strengthen the Burundian electoral process.⁶ In March 2005, a transitional administration promulgated a new constitution and a few months later, under UN supervision, nationwide elections were successfully and peacefully held. The following year, the newly elected government came to terms with a handful of armed groups that had hitherto remained outside of the peace process, bringing a formal end to the armed conflict.⁷ In December 2006, ONUB left the country. After thirteen years, the war in Burundi was over.

⁴ The Global Ceasefire Agreement, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/163> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁵ Rodt. "The African Union Mission in Burundi." pp.378-9

⁶ UN Peacekeeping. *United Nations Operation in Burundi*. (UN, 2009) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onub/> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁷ Short. "Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence."

Year(s): 2017 – 2019.

Location: Burundi/Tanzania International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The UN has helped to manage conflict and instability along the international border between Burundi and Tanzania, reducing the likelihood of armed conflict between communities and minimising the risk of an interstate conflict.

The border between Burundi and Tanzania has represented a source of conflict for decades, with hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees crossing into Tanzania during periods of unrest and rebel forces using Tanzanian territory to stage attacks on the Burundian administration.¹ In 1997, the armed forces of each state engaged each other along the frontier in a series of clashes that cost the lives of dozens of people.² The announcement that President Pierre Nkurunziza would run for an unconstitutional third term in 2015 sparked unrest across Burundi, driving over 400,000 people from their homes, half of whom fled across the border to Tanzania.³ The persistence and sheer scale of cross-border displacement represents a source of contention between the governments of each state and has a profound impact on the livelihoods of the population living near the border.⁴ A key concern highlighted by the UN was the potential for refugees returning to Burundi to ‘risk aggravating existing tensions and causing renewed violence in a country where the rule of law and the

¹ Howard Wolpe. “Making Peace After Genocide: Anatomy of the Burundi Process.” *Peaceworks*, No. 70. (2011) p.21

² Moyiga Nduru. “BURUNDI-TANZANIA: Border Clash.” *Inter Press Service*. (1997) Available at: <http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/10/burundi-tanzania-border-clash/> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

³ Christian Bugnion de Moreta. *Final Independent Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled: Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania*. (UNDP, 2019) p.10

⁴ Jaclynn Ashly. “Burundian refugees fear a hostile Tanzania.” *New Frame*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.newframe.com/burundian-refugees-fear-a-hostile-tanzania/> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

judicial system are considerably weakened,' particularly when much of the land in Burundi is contested.⁵

Recognising the potential for conflict, the UN Peacebuilding Fund developed a project to build peace and stability in the area in 2017. Based on input from UN Development Programme, the International Organisation for Migration, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, the project aimed to mitigate conflict and instability associated with forced displacement and provide protection for displaced persons.⁶ The focus of the project was to build the capacity of border officials from both states in areas such as protective border management and human rights. In addition, joint trainings were carried out with officials from both states to improve cooperation. The project also worked with displaced persons, returnees, and host communities to ensure socio-economic opportunities were available for all, and embedded conflict resolution mechanisms (alternative dispute resolution, paralegal, mediation, counselling, and referral services) to ensure disputes within and between the communities remained peaceful.⁷ An independent evaluation found the conflict prevention aspects of the project to be the most successful and recommends its expansion.⁸

⁵ UN Peacebuilding Support Office. *Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania*. (UN, 2018) Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00109331> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁶ UNDP. *Preventing Conflict And Building Peace*. (UNDP, 2020) Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00109331> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁷ UN Peacebuilding Support Office. *Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania*. pp.46-7

⁸ Christian Bugnion de Moreta. *Final Independent Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled: Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania*. p.32

Year(s): 1987 – 1991.

Location: Cambodia

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the governments of France, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: An October 1991 peace agreement formally ended the armed conflict in Cambodia after decades of devastation, war, and genocide.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea (commonly referred to as the Khmer Rouge) seized power in Cambodia in 1975, as the lengthy conflict in neighbouring Vietnam was coming to an end. With Chinese backing, the new government embarked on an ambitious revolutionary programme which ultimately cost the lives of up to 2 million people (approximately 25 percent of the population).¹ Furthermore, just days after Saigon was captured by Vietnamese communists, Khmer Rouge leaders launched a brutal invasion of southern Vietnam. The attack sparked a long and bloody war in which Vietnamese forces, with support from the Soviet Union, occupied Cambodia, removed the Khmer Rouge from office, and placed a sympathetic government in power in Phnom Penh.² Between 1979 and 1989, a range of armed groups sponsored by the US fought the occupying Vietnamese forces (and each other) in a complex low-intensity armed conflict. The end of the Cold War led to a sharp decline in international interest in Cambodia. Vietnam began withdrawing its forces in 1989, leaving behind a Cambodian government in place to negotiate a formal end to the conflict.³

Efforts to end the armed conflict in Cambodia began in 1987, when the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement between the two main non-communist armed groups and the Vietnamese-backed government was explored during talks in France. This proposal was

¹ David Chandler. "Cambodia's Historical Legacy." in Dylan Hendrickson, ed. *Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.12

² Stephen J. Morris. *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia.: Political Culture and the Causes of War*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) pp.219-229

³ Simon Chesterman. *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp.73-4

rejected by the Government of China as it excluded the Khmer Rouge and was also dismissed by the Government of the USA as it legitimised the Vietnamese-backed government.⁴ Further talks were held in Jakarta in July 1988 and February 1989, and although little progress was made in the Indonesian capital, the role of an international control mechanism for supervising the implementation of a future agreement was introduced to the peace process.⁵ With negotiations at a standstill, the UN Security Council proposed a framework for the resolution of the conflict in August 1989.⁶ The four Cambodian parties to the peace process agreed to the UN framework in April 1991, and held additional talks in Thailand, before signing the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict in Paris on 23 October 1991.⁷ After decades of armed conflict, Cambodia was at peace.

⁴ Chandler. "Cambodia's Historical Legacy." p.19

⁵ Elaine Sciolino. "Cambodia Peace Talks End With Positions Unchanged." *The New York Times*. (1988) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/29/world/cambodia-peace-talks-end-with-positions-unchanged.html> (Accessed 29/11/2020)

⁶ Chandler. "Cambodia's Historical Legacy." p.19

⁷ Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/cambodiaparisagreement91> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

Year(s): 1991 – 1993.

Location: Cambodia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and a transitional international administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia maintained peace and stability in post-conflict Cambodia until a national government was formed in 1993.

The Peace Agreement signed in Paris called for a transitional international administration to govern Cambodia until the appropriate national authorities could be established. Immediately after the ceremony in Paris, the United Nations Advance Mission to Cambodia (UNAMIC) was dispatched to the region to prevent a conflict relapse until a more robust presence arrived.¹ In February 1992, the UN Security Council approved the formation of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and charged it with maintaining law and order, administering the country, repatriating refugees, rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, organising nationwide elections, monitoring the military situation, and ultimately preventing renewed war in Cambodia.² The complexity of these tasks was compounded by consistent efforts of Khmer Rouge leaders to derail the peace process by renouncing the ceasefire, refusing to disarm, and boycotting elections.³

UNTAC's first tasks were monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces to Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, beginning the process of clearing landmines from across the Cambodian landscape, and beginning the process of refugee return.⁴ By July 1993, UNTAC had successfully repatriated 350,000 refugees and repaired key infrastructure across the country, however as preparations for the scheduled May 1993 elections proceeded, problems with the

¹ United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia. *Mandate*. (UN Peacekeeping, 2003) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamic.htm> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

² United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. *Mandate*. (UN Peacekeeping, 2003) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untacmandate.html> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

³ David Ashley. "Between war and peace: Cambodia 1991-1998." in Dylan Hendrickson, ed. *Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) pp.22-3

⁴ Ibid.

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process threatened to ignite a conflict.⁵ The Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the disarmament process, leading the other armed groups to reduce their own participation for strategic reasons. Thus, just 25 percent of the total number of troops scheduled for disarmament in June 1992 handed over their weapons to UNTAC.⁶ Further security issues provided additional challenges, however UNTAC was ultimately able to navigate a relatively peaceful post-conflict transition in Cambodia and, after successfully holding elections and overseeing the Cambodian Constituent Assembly adopt a new constitution in September 1993, the Mission was withdrawn.⁷ A small UN Military Liaison Team remained in Phnom Penh to report on developments in Cambodia. Although Cambodia's post-war transition was later marred by a coup d'état and an outbreak political violence in 1997, stability was restored, and the country was spared from relapsing back into armed conflict.⁸

⁵ Trevor Findlay. "Cambodia: the Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC." *Sipri Research Report*, No. 9. (1995) pp.103-4 Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/1995/cambodia-legacy-and-lessons-untac> (Accessed 01/11/2020)

⁶ UN Peacekeeping. *Cambodia – UNTAC*.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ashley. "Between war and peace." pp.28-9

Year(s): 2011 – 2013.

Location: Preah Vihear Temple, Cambodia/Thailand International Border.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, a monitoring mission, and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The International Court of Justice and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Regional diplomacy led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nation and arbitration by the International Court of Justice resolved the militarised territorial dispute between Cambodia and Thailand which threatened to escalate into a major interstate conflict following border clashes in 2011.

The twelfth century Preah Vihear Temple lies on the contemporary border of Cambodia and Thailand. During the Second World War, the Thai government joined the Japanese after initially trying to remain neutral, seizing much territory from neighbouring colonies such as French Indochina, including the Preah Vihear Temple. An initial peace agreement with the French ceded this territory to Thailand, but this was later abrogated by the total surrender of Japanese forces at the end of the war. Thus, the Temple and its surrounds returned to French Indochina and were inherited by Cambodia upon its independence in 1953. Thailand retained its claim on the temple, and after bilateral talks failed to reach an agreement in 1953 and 1958, the case was sent to the ICJ for arbitration. In 1962, the ICJ concluded that the temple was indeed on Cambodian territory.¹ The issue remained largely dormant until 2008, when the Government of Cambodia took the seemingly innocuous decision to apply for UNESCO world heritage status for the site.² After initially cooperating on the application, the rise of a new administration in Thailand led to a major escalation of the crisis. Thai troops were

¹ ICJ. *Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)*. (ICJ, 2021) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/45> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

² BBC. "Tranquil temple at centre of a storm." *BBC News*. (22 May 2008) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7352333.stm> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

deployed to the area, leading to armed clashes in October 2008 and throughout 2009. In 2011, the Thai military began deploying heavy weapons in the area and intense fighting took place, leading to dozens of deaths and the destruction of two tanks.³ Further clashes took place at other points along the border, threatening to escalate into an interstate conflict.⁴

During the ASEAN conference in May 2011, the Government of Indonesia (as host nation) held talks with the parties. After initially agreeing to a ceasefire and the deployment of Indonesian observers to monitor withdrawals to end the conflict, the Thai government backtracked.⁵ The fighting, however, did not resume, suggesting the talks were more productive than they appeared, and the dispute was again referred to the ICJ. While the case was being assessed, leading politicians from both countries played a friendly football match in Phnom Penh (Cambodia won 10-7) and declared that the era of unfriendly relations was over.⁶ The ICJ issued its ruling in 2013, deciding that Cambodia has sovereignty over all the contested territory, requiring Thai troops to withdraw from the area, and a demilitarised zone be established along the international border.⁷ Dozens of soldiers died in the conflict and 45,000 people forced from their homes, but dispute was resolved.

³ Geospatial Technologies Project. *Monitoring Border Conflicts with Satellite Imagery: Cambodia and Thailand – 2008-2011*. (Washington, DC, 2015) pp.3-4

⁴ UCDP. *Cambodia (Kampuchea) – Thailand*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/294> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

⁵ International Crisis Group. “Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict.” *Asia Report*, No. 215. (2011) p.22

⁶ AFP. “Cambodia PM scores in football diplomacy with Thailand.” *Asia One*. (24 September 2011) Available at: <https://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20110924-301309.html> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

⁷ ICJ. *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand)*. (ICJ, 2021) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/151> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

Year(s): 1994 – 2006.

Location: Cameroon/Nigeria International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, resolution of a militarised territorial dispute, mediation of a peace agreement, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN, International Court of Justice, the Organisation of African Unity, and the governments of France, Gabon, and Togo.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A militarised territorial dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria was resolved by the International Court of Justice, the Organisation of African Unity, and the UN helped to ensure the peaceful withdrawal of Nigerian forces from the contested area.

When Cameroon and Nigeria emerged as independent states in the 1960s, their mutual border remained largely unmarked and swathes of territory was claimed by the administrations of both states. During the 1980s, incidents on the border became increasingly violent, with clashes between soldiers taking place around Lake Chad and on the Bakassi Peninsula.¹ Located in the Niger Delta, the Peninsula had been governed by the British alongside much of the rest of what became Nigeria until 1913, when it was ceded to the German colony of Kamerun. The details of this exchange formed the basis of the competing contemporary claims on the territory. A 1961 plebiscite resulted in the area becoming part of Cameroon, however the discovery of oil and gas fields around the Bakassi Peninsula in the 1990s provided motivation for both states to claim the territory.² In 1993, another border clash led the Government of Nigeria (which had come to power in a coup d'état just a month earlier) to abrogate all previous agreements and march thousands of troops into the Peninsula.³

¹ Alan Cowell. "In Crisis With Cameroon, Nigeria Turns Self-Critical." *The New York Times*. (1981) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/22/world/in-crisis-with-cameroon-nigeria-turns-self-critical.html> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

² Francis Baye. "Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 20, No. 1. (2010) Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/implications-of-the-bakassi-conflict-resolution-for-cameroon/> (Accessed 17/11/2020); Obasesam Okoi. "Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict." *African Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1. (2016)

³ Hilary V. Lukong. *The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute: Management and Resolution, 1981-2011*. (Bamenda: Langaa, 2011) p.26

Rather than responding with force to the incursion on its territory, the Government of Cameroon filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994.⁴ The conflict, however, continued at a low intensity and the likelihood of escalation remained high regardless of developments in The Hague. To contain the crisis, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mediated negotiations between the parties, and separate talks were later hosted by the governments of Togo and Gabon. In September 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Government of France sponsored talks in Paris, where both parties formally committed to respecting the judgement of the ICJ.⁵ This round of talks also resulted in the UN forming a joint Cameroon-Nigerian commission, which resolved several disputes (such as that concerning the territory around Lake Chad) but failed to address Bakassi.⁶ In its judgement the following month, the ICJ granted sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and ordered the removal of all Nigerian personnel from the area.⁷ Continued Nigerian recalcitrance to withdraw led to another flare up of tensions in June 2005, leading to yet another round of negotiations hosted by the UN.⁸ These talks culminated in June 2006 with the Greentree Agreement and the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the area two months later.⁹ Thanks to the efforts of the OAU, UN, and ICJ, an interstate conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria was avoided.

⁴ ICJ. *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/94> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁵ UN. "Meeting with Annan, Cameroon and Nigeria agree to follow ICJ border decision." *UN News*. (2002) Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2002/09/44422-meeting-annan-cameroon-and-nigeria-agree-follow-icj-border-decision> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁶ UNOWAS. *The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission: A success in the resolution of boundary dispute*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unowas.unmissions.org/cameroon-nigeria-mixed-commission-success-resolution-boundary-dispute> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁷ ICJ. *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria*.

⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Program. *Cameroon – Nigeria*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/405> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁹ Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula, 2006. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/240> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Year(s): 2001 – 2018.

Location: Caspian Sea.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and resolving a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Caspian Sea littoral states.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: An interstate conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan was prevented and the risk of war between any of the littoral states on the Caspian Sea was demonstrably reduced.

The Caspian Sea is a resource-rich body of inland water. Since 1994, when the Government of Azerbaijan signed the “contract of the century” with Western oil companies to exploit offshore oil fields, the five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) have issued competing territorial claims over much of the Sea. After years of diplomatic disputes, tensions came to a head in July 2001 when two BP geological survey ships working with the Azerbaijani government ventured into the Alov oilfield, which was claimed by Iran.¹ Iranian naval and aviation assets forced the ship back (without violence), before conducting some limited attacks on Azerbaijani marine boundary buoys and conducting sorties in Azerbaijani airspace. In response, the Azerbaijani military mobilised for war and the Government of Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan (and member of NATO) dispatched a contingent of its Air Force to Baku.² A bilateral summit held in September 2001 served to resolve the immediate crisis (which became known as the Alov Crisis) and prevent an armed conflict from erupting between Azerbaijan and Iran, but the issue of contested territory remained. In the aftermath of the dispute, Azerbaijan invested heavily in strengthening its military capacity with support from the governments of Israel and the USA. In 2003, these new capabilities were demonstrated in the Caspian Sea during exercises involving 1,200 marines and a range of ships, boats, and helicopters.³ The Iranian government, for its part, also strengthened its military assets in the Sea along with every other

¹ Shannon O’Lear. “Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea.” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9, No. 1. (2004) p.161

² Musa Qasimli. “Caspian Sea Dispute.” in Ali Askerov et al, eds. *Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years’ Crisis*. (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 2020) pp.247-8

³ Anar M. Valiyev. “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: Quo Vadis, Baku?” *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No. 244. (2012) p.4

littoral state.⁴ Although war was avoided in 2001, there remained a severe risk of interstate conflict in the Caspian Sea following the Alov Crisis.⁵

The first Caspian Sea Littoral States Summit was held in 2002 in the wake of the Alov Crisis with the express intention of resolving the various territorial disputes and preventing armed conflict in the region. Although a final agreement on the status of the “inland water basin” was not reached until the fifth summit in 2018, this painstaking negotiation process served as an effective mechanism for minimising the chance of war and developing a lasting peace in the region. The final agreement represented a compromise, dividing the seabed between the littoral states while maintaining the surface as international waters.⁶ Upon signing the 2018 agreement in Ataku, Kazakhstan, the leaders of all five littoral states declared the region to be a sea of peace and good neighbourliness.

⁴ O’Lear. “Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea.” pp.177-8

⁵ Nicola Contessi. “Traditional Security in Eurasia: The Caspian Caught Between Militarisation and Diplomacy.” *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 160, No. 2. (2015) pp.50-1

⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Caspian Sea Treaty.” *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 24, No. 9. (2018) p.i

Year(s): 1996 – 2000.

Location: Central African Republic.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Regional governments and the UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The conflict in the Central African Republic was stopped for four years by a diplomatic intervention by regional governments and the deployment of a monitoring mission followed by a UN peacekeeping mission.

On 18 April 1996, soldiers of the Central African armed forces staged a mutiny in protest against poor living conditions, the dismissal of the army chief of staff, and unpaid wages. More mutinies took place in May and November.¹ Increasingly frequent clashes and a deteriorating security situation was met with the deployment of 1,500 French troops in support of the government. Although this operation did protect key infrastructure, French involvement inspired demonstrations and protests, further destabilising the situation.² Additional mutinies took place in November 1996, leading to more clashes with French troops. In response, the domestic political opposition together with a former prime minister approached delegates at the France and Africa summit in Ouagadougou on 4-6 December 1996 for help. The summit concluded with an agreement that the leaders of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali would travel to Bangui to negotiate a truce with the mutineers. This effort produced a ceasefire and created the framework for a peaceful resolution of the crisis to be negotiated. Talks were held the following year, with a weeklong conference taking place between 11 and 18 January encompassing opposition parties and civil society setting out various political and economic reforms, as well as the reorganisation of the armed forces.³ On

¹ Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga. "The Inter-African mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui agreements (MISAB)." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2001) p.22

² Howard W. French. "Anger at French Troops Grows in Central Africa." *The New York Times*. (24 May 1996) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/24/world/anger-at-french-troops-grows-in-central-africa.html> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

³ Preliminary Agreement on National Reconciliation Pact, 1997. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/burkina-faso-coup-rise-and-fall-of-what-you-need-to-know> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

25 January, these commitments were affirmed alongside an agreement to end hostilities in the Bangui Accords, which also established an international committee to oversee implementation.⁴

With support from the Government of France, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords (*Mission de surveillance des accords de Bangui*, MISAB) was stood up on 31 January to replace French forces, which were withdrawn. Composed of 800 troops and led by a Gabonese general, MISAB was mandated to verify compliance with the Accords and begin a disarmament campaign.⁵ MISAB clashed with mutinying Central African troops several times before a ceasefire was negotiated on 28 June 1997. This ended the conflict (which cost the lives of around 1,000 people) and created the framework for the Bangui Accords to be implemented.⁶ On 27 March 1998, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (*Mission des Nations Unies dans la Republique Centrafricaine*, MINURCA) replaced MISAB.⁷ These efforts helped to prevent further conflict in the Central African Republic until they were withdrawn in 2000. Within a year of the withdrawal, after almost four years of peace, more Central African troops mutinied, and the conflict resumed.⁸

⁴ Bangui Accords, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/carbanguiaccords97> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁵ Mandate of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/carinterafricanforce97> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁶ Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. *Central African Republic (1960-present)*. (DADM, 2021) Available at: <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/central-african-republic-1960-present/> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *Central African Republic – MINURCA Background*. (UN, 2001) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minurcaB.htm> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁸ Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project. *Central African Republic (1960-present)*.

Year(s): 1990 – 1994.

Location: Aouzou Strip, Chad.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Interstate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Resolution of a militarised territorial dispute, a peacekeeping mission, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of African Unity, the UN, and the International Court of Justice.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Following the International Court of Justice's judgement of the dispute, the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group monitored the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the area and helped ensure that the handover of the disputed territory to Chad went ahead peacefully.

The Aouzou Strip is a piece of mineral-rich land along the Chadian-Libyan frontier in the Sahara Desert. Although a 1955 treaty between France and Libya had stipulated that the territory was a part of Chad, the rise of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya complicated the situation. He contested the validity of the treaty, citing an unratified agreement between fascist Italy and France which would have awarded the Strip to Libya. In 1973, amidst the chaos of the 1965 - 1979 Chadian Civil War, the Government of Libya annexed and occupied the Aouzou Strip.¹ By 1978, thousands of Libyan troops were fighting in support of Chadian rebels, leading the Government of Chad to bring the occupation of the Aouzou Strip to the UN Security Council alongside its protests concerning Libyan involvement in the war. With considerable French support, the Government of Chad eventually drove Libyan forces out of the country and began mounting operations in the Strip and the Libyan hinterland. The reversal of fortunes led to a ceasefire, mediated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in September 1987. Talks continued over the next two years, and although the belligerents

¹ UCDP. *Chad – Libya*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/361> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

failed to produce a bilateral solution to the territorial dispute, they did resolve to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at OAU-mediated talks in Algiers.²

The ICJ delivered its judgement in February 1994, supporting Chad's claim on the territory.³ In the ensuing months, negotiations were held between the governments of Chad and Libya, culminating with a comprehensive agreement on Libyan withdrawal and the establishment of a joint commission to demarcate the border.⁴ As the first Libyan personnel were leaving the Strip on 15 April 1994, a UN reconnaissance team arrived to survey conditions on the ground. Two weeks later, the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) was formally established to monitor and verify the Libyan withdrawal.⁵ These tasks were carried out successfully, with the Libyan troops completing their withdrawal and formally handing over control of the Aouzou Strip to Chad at the end of May 1994. Its mandate complete, UNASOG was disbanded a week later.⁶ The mediation of the OAU helped to end the conflict, the arbitration of the ICJ provided a permanent solution to the dispute, and UNASOG observers ensured that the transition went ahead peacefully.

² Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1989. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chadlibyaframeworkagreement89> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

³ ICJ. *Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad): Overview of the Case*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/83> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁴ Agreement between Libya and Chad Concerning the Practical Modalities for the Implementation of the Judgment Delivered by the ICJ on 3 February 1994, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chadlibyaimplementationicj94> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *Aouzou Strip: Background*. (UN, 2001) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unasogB.htm#Establishment> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁶ Ibid.

Year(s): 2006 – 2010.

Location: Chad/Sudan International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Senegal, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A peace agreement mediated by the Government of Senegal helped to end years of proxy conflict between the governments of Chad and Sudan and reduce the risk of a major interstate conflict between them.

After seizing power in Chad in 1990, the administration of Idriss Déby was challenged by an array of armed opposition groups. In 1991-1995 and 1997-2002, these groups conducted an insurgency against Chadian security forces. Ongoing peace talks achieved a break in the fighting in 2002, but the conflict reignited in 2005. In this instance, the armed groups involved were linked to the conflict in the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan.¹ On 18 December 2005, one of the rebel groups attacked Adré, a strategic border town that is considered vital for the defence of Chad against attacks from Sudan, forcing Chadian forces to withdraw. This not only constituted the beginning of another conflict but left a swathe of the frontier open to raiding by Janjaweed militias. In response, the Chadian government condemned their Sudanese counterparts for sponsoring the armed groups and began mobilising its military.² Human Rights Watch documented Sudanese troops operating alongside the Janjaweed militias, as well as the presence of Sudanese helicopter gunships and spotter aircraft in Chadian airspace.³ Although the complex situation presented serious practical challenges to the conduct of any large military operations, Sudanese military forces had invaded and pillaged eastern Chad, bringing the two countries to the brink of a major interstate conflict.

¹ UCDP. *Chad*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/483> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

² Human Rights Watch. *Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad*. (HRW, 2006) pp.5-7

³ *Ibid.* p.11

The international effort to end the conflict and prevent a much larger war began almost immediately, with the Government of Libya hosting peace talks less than two months after the first clashes. These negotiations culminated with the Tripoli Agreement on 6 February 2006, which called for the normalisation of relations, the end of state sponsorship of armed opposition groups, and the deployment of an African peace operation to monitor the border.⁴ Despite this agreement, 2006 proved to be one of the bloodiest in Chadian history and the risk of a much larger war erupting remained.⁵ The following year, further talks were hosted by the Government of Saudi Arabia, resulting in an agreement that reiterated many of the terms previously agreed in Tripoli.⁶ In 2009, yet another round of negotiations hosted by the Senegalese government led to the signing of the Doha Agreement, which was witnessed by the Secretary-Generals of the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.⁷ Both Chad and Sudan continued to face armed conflict, but the Doha Agreement ended the proxy conflict between them and restored a degree of stability to the region. On 15 January 2010, bilateral relations were formally normalised with the signing of the Ndjamen Accord.⁸

⁴ Tripoli Agreement to Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Sudan, 2006. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chad-sudan-tripoli-agreement2006> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

⁵ UCDP. *Chad: Government*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/288> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

⁶ Accord bilatéral pour le développement et le renforcement des relations entre Soudan et Tchad (Accord de Riyadh), 2007. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-riyadhagreement2007> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

⁷ Doha Agreement, 2009. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-dohaagreement2009> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

⁸ Accord de Ndjamen sur la normalisation des relations entre le Tchad et le Soudan, 2010. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/chadsudan-ndjamenaagreement2010> (Accessed 24/11/2021)

Year(s): 1991 – 2008.

Location: China/Russia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Stabilising borders and resolving a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of China and Russia.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The long-standing border dispute between China and Russia (which almost sparked a war in the 1960s) was resolved, dramatically reducing the chance of an interstate conflict.

China and the Soviet Union shared a 4,300km border, much of which had been negotiated in the nineteenth century by the Russian Empire and had never been properly demarcated. Although the two states shared relatively cordial relations after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, geopolitical and ideological differences quickly soured this relationship. Beginning in the 1950s, this rivalry manifested itself in a series of increasingly deadly border clashes that culminated in March 1969 when, after Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol on Zhenbao/Damansky Island in the Ussuri/Wusuli River. In response, the Soviets launched a major counterattack using heavy weapons which it claimed cost the lives of over 800 Chinese troops.¹ Further fighting took place when Soviet troops attempted to recover equipment lost in the assault.² In August 1969, Soviet troops ambushed a Chinese patrol in another part of the frontier, while artillery barrages continued for weeks at various points on the border, highlighting the potential for the conflict to spread.³ With 34 Soviet and 59 Chinese divisions deployed along the border, agreements in place to allow Soviet forces to use Mongolian territory, and both states transporting nuclear weapons to the region, this Sino-Soviet border conflict represented one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold

¹ Benjamin Brimelow. "A bloody battle over a tiny island raised fears that China and the Soviets would start World War III." *Business Insider*. (10 March 2021) Available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-over-dispute-border-island-risked-chinese-soviet-nuclear-war-2021-3?r=US&IR=T> (Accessed 30/11/2021)

² Neville Maxwell. "How the Sino-Russian boundary conflict was finally settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969." *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2007) p.248

³ Ibid. p.249

War.⁴ Following the conflict, the border continued to be highly militarised and the potential of a similar incident sparking an unprecedented interstate conflict remained a constant danger.

Bilateral talks were held in September-October 1969 but ultimately failed to produce a resolution to the dispute. Indeed, military preparations continued apace after the negotiations and the border was closed entirely until 1982, when it was opened to low levels of trade. However, considerable military forces continued to be stationed on either side of the border and without a formal agreement in place, the risk of war remained a constant threat. In 1986, with the war in Afghanistan draining resources, Soviet leaders sought a resolution to the dispute with China and initial talks about the border began alongside incremental troop withdrawals from the frontier by both armed forces. Joint boundary commissions were put to work to demarcate the border, and on 16 May 1991 the Sino-Soviet Border Agreement was signed, settling the eastern section of the border.⁵ The western portion was resolved in 1994, and the remaining points of contention were addressed in 2005 during negotiations in Vladivostok. In 2008, the entire border was formally agreed at a ceremony in Beijing.⁶ These efforts have greatly reduced the risk of a potentially devastating interstate conflict.

⁴ Thomas W. Robinson. *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes*. (RAND, 1970) pp.35.8

⁵ Agreement on the Eastern Section of the Boundary between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China (1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement), 1991. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1740> (Accessed 30/11/2021)

⁶ Reuters Staff. "China signs border demarcation pact with Russia." *Reuters*. (31 July 2008) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia-border-idUKPEK29238620080721> (Accessed 30/11/2021)

Year(s): 1994 – present.

Location: San Jose de Apartado, Urabá, Colombia.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and an observation mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the NGO Peace Brigades International.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Peace communities created by local people caught in the crossfire during the armed conflict in Colombia (and accompanied by Peace Brigades International since 1997) have helped to mitigate the impact of the fighting on civilians.

The long-running conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, FARC) had a major impact on the lives of everyday citizens who became caught up in the fighting. Many became the victim of atrocities by one side or the other or were simply caught in the crossfire of a conflict which raged for half a century. In the face of such violence, efforts both local and international made significant progress in limiting the impact of the armed conflict on civilians. In 1987, the Regional Corporation for the Defence of Human Rights (Corporación Regional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, CREDHOS) began working to protect human rights in the city of Barrancabermeja. After beginning to investigate human rights violations and the murder of a local politician, many CREDHOS staff were killed in 1991 and 1992. A few years later, PBI established an office in Barrancabermeja and began accompanying CREDHOS activities.¹ Almost immediately, they were forced to activate their Emergency Response Network, which summoned the attention of several European states. By protecting groups that are campaigning for an end to the conflict, PBI helped to amplify the

¹ Peace Brigades International. *Regional Corporation for the Defence of Human Rights (CREDHOS)*. (2020) Available at: <https://peacebrigades.org.uk/where-we-work/colombia/regional-corporation-for-the-defence-of-human-rights> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

message of peace in Colombia while also helping to shrink the ‘impunity space’ in which people involved in the conflict could harm civilians.²

In 1996, the village of San Jose de Apartado and the surrounding area became embroiled in the ongoing armed conflict. In response, the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace (one of the oldest Colombian human rights NGOs) organised a series of workshops that culminated with the formation of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó on 23 March 1997.³ The Community pledged not to participate in the conflict and served as a model for many other areas that were affected by the violence. While the Peace Communities have suffered many attacks over the years, they helped to reduce the impact of the armed conflict on innocent civilians. PBI has provided protective accompaniment to the Peace Community since 1997. Although an armed conflict was neither prevented nor ended, the efforts helped to reduce the impact of the fighting on the Colombian population.

² Dylan Matthews. *War Prevention Works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict*. (Oxford Research Group, 2001) p.55

³ *Ibid.* p.57

Year(s): 2008.

Location: Colombia/Ecuador International Border.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States and the Rio Group.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A war between Colombia and Ecuador, which was likely to have drawn in Venezuela as well, was avoided with the help of a diplomatic intervention from the Organisation of American States and the Rio Group.

In February 2008, Colombian troops raided a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp situated in Ecuador without informing the Ecuadorian government. Dozens were killed in the attack, including citizens of Ecuador and Mexico.¹ In response, the Government of Ecuador severed relations with Colombia and called for an international investigation. The Government of Venezuela offered its support to Ecuador, denouncing the attack as a war crime, closing its border with Colombia, and mobilising thousands of troops along the frontier.² Intelligence acquired during the raid linked the Government of Venezuela with FARC, leading the Government of Colombia to ask the International Criminal Court to charge the Venezuelan president with genocide.³ With troops gathering on the border, suspicion in the air, and relations at a historic low, the crisis presented a significant risk of sparking an interstate conflict.

In response to the crisis, the Organisation of American States (OAS) convened its Permanent Council and published a declaration condemning breaches of sovereignty and acts of aggression, committing the Organisation to ensuring the pacific settlement of the dispute, and

¹ Gabriel Marcella. *War Without Borders: The Colombia-Ecuador Crisis of 2008*. (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008) pp.5-6

² Rory Carroll & Sibylla Brodzinsky. "Threat of war as Venezuela and Ecuador order troops to Colombian border." *The Guardian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/05/colombia.venezuela> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

³ BBC. "Colombia calls for Chavez charges." *BBC News*. (2008) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7277313.stm> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

activating mechanisms to bring the two conflicting nations together.⁴ This resulted in the formation of a Commission, led by the OAS Secretary-General, which was dispatched to the region to investigate the crisis and propose formulas for its resolution. These quick and decisive actions helped to diffuse the standoff.⁵ While the Commission conducted its investigation, heads of state from across Latin America (including Colombia and Ecuador) were attending the 20th Summit of the Rio Group. The meeting served to facilitate dialogue and provided a forum for representatives from across the region to encourage a peaceful resolution to the crisis.⁶ The President of Dominica, for example, engineered a face-to-face meeting between his counterparts from Colombia and Ecuador which culminated with the Colombian president issuing a formal apology.⁷ The summit concluded with a joint-statement condemning the breach of Ecuadorian sovereignty and endorsing the previous OAS declaration and investigation.⁸ Thanks to the presence of effective regional intergovernmental fora and the diplomatic efforts of member states, a potentially devastating interstate conflict was prevented from taking place.

⁴ Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS). *OEA/SER.G: CP/RES.930 (1632/08)* (2008) in Committee on Foreign Relations. *Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008)

⁵ MercoPress. "OAS resolution eases tension between Colombia and Ecuador." *MercoPress News*. (2008) Available at: <https://en.mercopress.com/2008/03/05/oas-resolution-eases-tension-between-colombia-and-ecuador> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁶ Ray Walser. "The Crisis in the Andes: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela." *Heritage Lectures*, No. 1080. (2008) p.10

⁷ BBC. "Ecuador seeks to censure Colombia." *BBC News*. (2008) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7278484.stm> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁸ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group on the Recent Events Between Ecuador and Colombia, 2008. in Committee on Foreign Relations. *Playing with Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008)

Year(s): 2012 – 2016.

Location: Colombia

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Cuba, Chile, Germany, Norway, USA, Vatican, and Venezuela, along with the EU, UN, and the Union of South American Nations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict in Colombia was finally ended after 52 years by the signing of a peace agreement during negotiations mediated by a host of national governments and intergovernmental organisations.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) launched an insurgency against the Government of Colombia in 1964. The ensuing armed conflict raged for over five decades, with a host of guerrilla groups and paramilitary formations developing across the country. By the 1970s, the armed groups were employing the sale of narcotics to fund their activities.¹ By the 1990s, most had transitioned to the political arena, but FARC remained in conflict with the government in Bogotá. On 26 August 2012, negotiations held in Cuba resulted in the creation of a framework for resolving the conflict, formalised in the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace.² Among its provisions, the General Agreement scheduled further talks, focusing on political participation (2013), illegal drugs (2014), and agrarian development (2014).³

Between 2012 and 2016, the peace process was hosted by the Government of Cuba, which served as a guarantor to the accords alongside the Norwegian government. In addition, the

¹ UCDP. *Government of Colombia – FARC*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/623> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

² General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2012. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-generalaccordendconflict2012> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

³ *Participación política: Apertura democrática para construir la paz*, 2013. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-politicalparticipation2013> (Accessed 13/12/2020); *Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas*, 2014. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-drogasilicidas2014> (Accessed 13/12/2020); *Hacia un Nuevo Campo Colombiano: Reforma Rural Integral*, 2014. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/colombia-reformarural2014> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

governments of Venezuela and Chile served as observers to the negotiations, while the Union of South American Nations, EU, UN, Vatican, and American and German governments appointed special envoys to the peace process. Significant progress was made in 2015, when the former belligerents agreed to establish the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which provided a mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to the conflict.⁴ In June 2016, the parties to the conflict agreed to a definitive ceasefire.⁵ In September, the former belligerents signed a peace treaty at a public ceremony in Cartagena which was attended by representatives from across the world, including UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.⁶ Just a week later, however, the Colombian people rejected the agreement in a referendum. Rather than return to conflict, a new deal was agreed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by the Colombian parliament on 30 November.⁷ For his efforts in bringing peace to the country, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016.⁸ The international effort to facilitate an end to the fighting helped to bring an end to one of the longest intrastate armed conflicts in the world.

⁴ Marta Valiñas. “The Colombian Special Jurisdiction for Peace: A Few Issues for Consideration When Investigating and Adjudicating Sexual and Gender-based Crimes.” *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Vol. 18, No. 2. (2020) p.449

⁵ Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities, and the Laydown of Weapons between the National Government and the FARC-EP, 2016. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ceasefire-colombia-2016> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁶ BBC. “Colombia peace deal: Historic agreement is signed.” *BBC News*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37477202> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁷ Sibylla Brodzinsky. “Colombia signs historic peace deal with Farc.” *The Guardian*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/colombia-signs-historic-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels> (Accessed 13/12/2020); *Acuerdo Final Para La Terminación Del Conflicto y La Construcción De Una Paz Estable y Duradera*, 2016. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2924> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁸ The Nobel Prize. *Juan Manuel Santos: Facts*. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/santos/lecture/> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

Year(s): 1997 – 2003.

Location: Comoros.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and an observer mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of African Unity, l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, the Government of France, and the Arab League.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Organisation of African Unity-led diplomatic intervention helped to end the armed conflict in Comoros after several rounds of talks culminated with the creation of a federal Comorian state.

Comoros is a small archipelago in the Indian Ocean composed of three main islands. Since becoming independent from France in 1975, Comorian politics has been disrupted by over 20 coup d'états. In 1995, one such coup took place, but a French intervention restored constitutional order, and a new president was elected the following year.¹ The new administration promulgated a new constitution centralising the fragmented political structure of Comoros at the expense of the autonomy of smaller islands such as Moheli and Anjouan. In August 1997, the regional administrations of these islands responded by announcing their secession from Comoros and declaring their intention to re-join France or become independent.² The government on the main island, Grand Comore (also known as Ngazidja), dispatched troops to Anjouan with the intention of reasserting control over the island, sparking an armed conflict. Government forces were initially driven off the island. In the aftermath of the offensive, fighting broke out between the separatists, further complicating the crisis.³

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) led the international response to the conflict, appointing a Special Envoy and tasking him with mediating a settlement which preserved the territorial integrity of Comoros.⁴ After making some initial progress with shuttle diplomacy,

¹ World Peace Foundation. "Comoros Short Brief." *African Politics, African Peace*. (2017) p.1

² UCDP. *Comoros: Anjouan*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/407> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

³ Ibid.

⁴ World Peace Foundation. "Comoros Short Brief." p.2

the OAU Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC) was deployed to monitor the situation and build confidence. In December 1997, the OAU hosted negotiations in Ethiopia which resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement.⁵ The Agreement represented little more than a commitment to finding a solution to the conflict and continued fighting on Anjouan soon undermined the progress it had represented. In response, the OAU appointed South African President Nelson Mandela to coordinate the effort to find a resolution to the conflict.⁶ In April 1999, the belligerents met under OAU auspices in Madagascar, with negotiations culminating with the Antananarivo Accords, which established a framework for the islands of Comoros to enjoy greater autonomy.⁷ This effort was derailed by a coup d'état that came almost immediately after the Accords were signed.⁸ The coup led to the withdrawal of OAU observers, however fresh rounds of dialogue in August 2000 and February 2001 (hosted by the OAU, *l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*, and the Arab League) culminated with the Fomboni Agreements, which ended the conflict and created the framework for the establishment of a federal Comorian state upon approval by the population in a referendum.⁹

⁵ Addis Ababa Agreement, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-addisababa97> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁶ Bruce Baker. "Comoros: The Search for Viability." *Civil Wars*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2009) p.217

⁷ Accords d'Antananarivo, 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordantananarivo99> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁸ IRIN News. "OAU military group withdraws." *The New Humanitarian*. (1999) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/6559/comoros-oau-military-group-withdraws> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁹ *Accord cadre pour la reconciliation aux Comores (Accord de Fomboni)*, 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordfomboni2001> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Year(s): 2002 – 2008.

Location: Comoros.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, an observation mission, a military intervention, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Government of France, and the Arab League.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Ongoing negotiations and the deployment of Organisation of African Unity/African Union observer missions and a military operation helped to ensure that Comoros did not experience a conflict relapse.

Engagement by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the situation in Comoros brought an end to the armed conflict, however Comorian politics remained divided, and the elections scheduled for April 2002 threatened to spark renewed conflict. To maintain stability, the OAU Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC) was redeployed in December 2001 and reinforced in March 2002.¹ The elections went ahead peacefully, although low turnout and allegations of fraud did little to stabilise the situation.² Yet another effort to stabilise Comoros took place in December 2003, this time through negotiations held under the auspices of the newly established African Union (AU). The talks culminated with an agreement which outlined a schedule for legislative elections in 2004 and a presidential contest in 2006.³ The AU established the Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) in March 2004 to monitor events and provide security for the 2004 polls, which went ahead peacefully.⁴

The presidential elections were viewed as being much more likely to inspire violence, leading the AU to mandate a much larger peacekeeping mission, the African Union Mission for

¹ World Peace Foundation. "Comoros Short Brief." pp.2-3

² Simon Massey & Bruce Baker. "Comoros: External Involvement in a Small Island State." *Chatham House Programme Paper AFP 2009/1*. (2009) p.14

³ *Accord sur les dispositions transitoires aux Comores (Accord de Maroni)*, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordmaroni2003> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁴ World Peace Foundation. "Comoros Short Brief." p.3

Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC), to maintain stability. The predominantly South African operation oversaw a peaceful election, and Comoros appeared to be emerging from the crisis.⁵ A final round of elections for the positions of Chief Executive of each island, scheduled for May 2007, represented the final challenge before the chronically unstable archipelago completed a full election cycle peacefully. Unfortunately, the leader of the island of Anjouan refused to step down at the end of his term, threatening conflict. In response, the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) was dispatched in May 2007 with support from the Government of France and the Arab League.⁶ Although the elections went ahead peacefully enough elsewhere, Anjouan remained outside of the control of the Comorian administration. Following appeals from the Government of Comoros, the AU launched Operation Democracy in Comoros in March 2008, deploying thousands of troops to remove the renegade leader.⁷ This was achieved relatively peacefully, constitutional order was restored, and the following year the AU hosted a fresh round of negotiations to clarify the political structure of Comoros, culminating with another agreement in June 2010.⁸ Despite the ongoing instability, a conflict relapse was prevented.

⁵ Global Peace Operations Review. "Comoros." *Mission Notes*, No. 4.5. (2007) p.2

⁶ World Peace Foundation. "Comoros Short Brief." p.3

⁷ Bruce Baker. "Comoros: The Search for Viability." *Civil Wars*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2009); Ahmed Ali Amir Moroni. "African Union troops quell Comoros rebellion." *The Guardian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/26/1> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁸ *Accord pour la gestion de la période intérimaire*, 2010. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/comoros-accordgestioninterimaire2010> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Year(s): 2014 – 2018.

Location: Costa Rica/Nicaragua International Border.

UN Regional Group: Latin American and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States and the International Court of Justice.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A diplomatic intervention by the Organisation of American States prevented an armed conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua from erupting in 2010 and the International Court of Justice peacefully resolved the dispute in 2018.

The 1858 Treaty of Cañas-Jerez established the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua as the San Juan River and provided stipulations for its use by both countries. However, differing interpretations of the Treaty have led to a series of disputes over territory along the border.¹ Following several relatively minor incidents, the dispute flared up again in 2010 when the Nicaraguan military began dredging the river (which the Costa Rican government claimed was altering the border and damaging Costa Rican territory) and stationing troops on territory claimed by Costa Rica. The Government of Nicaragua justified such actions with another reinterpretation of nineteenth century treaties and the fact that Google Maps listed the territory as Nicaraguan.² Although Costa Rica does not have a military, over 200 armed police were dispatched to the area in response to what the government called “an occupation.”³ In this uncertain context, there was every likelihood that an armed conflict would erupt.

¹ Carin Zissis & David Schreiner. “A River Runs through It: The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Dispute.” *Americas Society: Council of the Americas*. (2010) Available at: <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/river-runs-through-it-costa-rica-nicaragua-dispute> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

² Centre for Borders Research. “Boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua involves Google maps.” *Boundary news*. (2010) Available at: https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=11048&rehref=%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headlines (Accessed 09/11/2020)

³ *Ibid.*

Fearing the crisis would escalate, the Organisation of American States (OAS) called for both countries to withdraw their security personnel from the area and open a dialogue. When the Government of Nicaragua refused to withdraw its troops from the area, the OAS Secretary-General travelled to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to investigate the dispute and pressure the parties to resolve it peacefully.⁴ His visit was complemented by the promulgation of a formal OAS resolution requesting both countries withdraw armed personnel from the area and open a dialogue.⁵ With the Nicaraguan Government still refusing to withdraw its troops (and challenging the OAS's right to make such demands), the Costa Rican government raised another case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).⁶ The immediate crisis was mitigated in March 2011, when the ICJ ruled that both countries must refrain from sending personnel to the area.⁷ A more permanent resolution was issued in a 2018 ruling which judged much of the disputed territory to be Costa Rican (although a 3km strip of beach was awarded to Nicaragua), finalised the mutual maritime border, and stipulated that the Government of Nicaragua must pay compensation for environmental damage.⁸ Thanks in part to the preventive diplomacy efforts of the OAS and the rulings of the ICJ, a potentially volatile territorial dispute was prevented from escalating into armed conflict.

⁴ OAS. "OAS Secretary General to Travel to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to Facilitate Dialogue." *Press Release*. (2010) Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-416/10 (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁵ The Economist Intelligence Unit. "The political scene: Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute intensifies." *The Economist*. (2010) Available at: <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=547662039&Country=Costa%20Rica> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁶ ICJ. *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/150> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁷ Adam Williams. "International Court of Justice rules that Nicaraguan troops must leave Isla Calero." *The Tico Times*. (2011) Available at: <https://ticotimes.net/2011/03/08/international-court-of-justice-rules-that-nicaraguan-troops-must-leave-isla-calero> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁸ ICJ. *Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/165> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

Year(s): 2007 – 2017.

Location: Côte d'Ivoire

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A series of peacekeeping missions and a military intervention.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, Economic Community of West African States, UN, and the Government of France.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of international peacekeeping missions helped to contain the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire until a French/UN 2011 military intervention definitively ended the conflict.

An armed conflict erupted in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2002 following a mutiny by contingents of the armed forces based in the north of the country. After some initial clashes, the country was soon divided between the government-held south and the north, which was held by an armed group that emerged from the mutinying soldiers and political opposition, the *Forces Nouvelles Côte d'Ivoire* (FNCI). French troops permanently based in Côte d'Ivoire served as makeshift peacekeepers, separating the belligerents and limiting the fighting as far as their resources allowed.¹ Significant diplomatic pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Government of France convinced the belligerents to sign the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord in January 2003, which provided for a cease-fire and the formation of a transitional administration.² In support of the Accord, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (*Mission des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire*, MINUCI) were deployed alongside the French troops already in the country. In April 2004, ECOMICI and MINUCI were merged to form the 7,000-strong United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).³ With UNOCI containing the fighting, much of Côte d'Ivoire was spared from armed conflict during the peace process. Ongoing negotiations hosted by ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) resulted in the signing of several peace agreements between 2003 and 2005 (Accra II,

¹ Short. "Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence." pp.63-8

² Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/cotedivoire-linasmarcousis2003> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

³ Obi. "Economic Community of West African States on the Ground." p.129

Accra III, Pretoria, and Ouagadougou), however the transitional government and elections stipulated in the accords failed to materialise, leaving Côte d'Ivoire divided and the conflict unresolved.⁴ When elections finally took place in 2011, the disputed result led to an eruption of violence. The international community, including the AU and UN, recognised the decision of the Ivorian Electoral Commission and supported the opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara. However, the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, claimed victory himself and refused to step down. With the conflict nearing its tenth year, UNOCI supported an offensive by French-backed FNCI forces to oust Gbagbo and install Ouattara.⁵ The war came to an end with the arrest of Gbagbo on 11 April 2011.⁶ UNOCI remained in Côte d'Ivoire until 2017, supporting the reconstruction of the Ivorian state, supervising the 2015 elections, providing border security, and assisting Ouattara's administration with extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform programmes.⁷

⁴ Ibid. p.131

⁵ David Smith. "Ivory Coast: UN's intervention broke the impasse." *The Guardian*. (2011) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/05/ivory-coast-un-intervention> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁶ Xan Rice & Nicholas Watt. "Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo arrested – four months on." *The Guardian*. (2011) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/ivory-coast-former-leader-arrested> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unoci.shtml> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

Year(s): 2014 – present.

Location: Côte d'Ivoire/Liberia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Stabilising borders and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Armed conflict has been reduced in the relatively unstable borderlands between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and bilateral relations have also improved.

In November 2010, after the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire had subsided for several years, the country witnessed an eruption of conflict following a contested presidential election. By April 2011, over 150,000 refugees had crossed over the border into Liberia, which itself was recovering from the terrible conflict that had ended there less than a decade before.¹ This placed great strain on local Liberian communities, particularly regarding food security. With both states weakened by war, displaced populations sheltering in the borderlands, and the proliferation of small arms across the region, it was not long until armed groups (many of which formed from demobilised soldiers from the wars on both sides of the border) began emerging to take advantage of the situation. Beginning in July 2011, towns on either side of the border were looted and the armed groups fought amongst themselves over control of gold and diamond mines in the area.² In one such outbreak of violence in June 2012, seven Nigerian peacekeepers and a dozen civilians were killed.³ These clashes not only significantly worsened the plight of both the local and refugee populations, but also presented a major risk of breeding another powerful armed opposition group from displaced individuals (as had happened in so many unstable borderlands in West Africa) or even sparking clashes

¹ Cecile Barriere & Patricia Gray. *Cross Border Assessment between Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire: January and February 2012*. (UNDP, 2012) p.1

² Ibid. p.2

³ Conciliation Resources. *Peace and security along the Ivorian-Liberian border: The local perspective*. (London, 2014) p.4

between Liberian and Ivorian security personnel as they sought to establish authority in the area.

The UN peacekeeping missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia (the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, respectively) played a vital role in offering security to the local population after 2011, although they could not prevent the raids entirely. With the withdrawal of both missions scheduled for June 2016, the governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia held bilateral talks alongside a joint council of traditional elders from both countries in January of that year to address the issues on the border. Supported by various UN agencies, representatives from each state developed a joint approach to bringing stability to the area. This ranged from establishing more official crossing points and building infrastructure to manage the border to creating a shared technical committee and beginning joint security patrols.⁴ This sustained effort demonstrably reduced armed conflict on the Côte d'Ivoire-Liberia border and strengthened ties between the two neighbouring states.⁵ When a group of armed Liberians attacked a military base in Côte d'Ivoire in April 2021, both governments pledged to investigate the incident together and cooperate to maintain stability in the region in the face of such attacks.⁶

⁴ Raymond Onana. *Cross-Border Cooperation Project Between Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia for Sustainable Peace and Social Cohesion*. (UN Peacebuilding Fund, 2019) p.13

⁵ Ibid. p.5

⁶ Editorial Board. "Averting Regional Rebel Resurgence: A Must For Liberia, Ivory Coast." *Front Page Africa*. (3 May 2021) Available at: <https://frontpageafricaonline.com/front-slider/averting-regional-rebel-resurgence-a-must-for-liberia-ivory-coast/> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

Year(s): 1995.

Location: Croatia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Russia and the USA, and the EU and UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Contact Group (composed of Russia, EU, USA, and UN) successfully mediated the negotiation of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, which ended the armed conflict in Croatia during the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Croatia emerged from socialist Yugoslavia as an independent state in October 1991 after the result of a referendum held in May of that year was implemented following a three-month moratorium on the decision, as advised by the European Community (EC) in the hope of a peaceful outcome to the crisis. Many Croatian Serbs (who represented 12 percent of the population) rejected independence and sought to forcibly prevent Croatia from leaving Yugoslavia. When this strategy failed, Croatian Serb leaders proclaimed the formation of a new state, Republika Srpska Krajina (RS), on the territory (around one third) of Croatia that they held and declared their intention to remain a part of Yugoslavia in December 1991.¹ Ongoing talks mediated by the UN secured a series of ceasefire agreements between November 1991 and January 1992, allowing peacekeepers of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to deploy in interpositional locations and contain the fighting. This lasted until January 1993, when the armed conflict erupted again.²

The effort to end the war in Croatia was led by an informal Contact Group composed of the EC and the UN, and the governments of Russia and the USA. In March 1994, Russian officials brokered another ceasefire between the belligerents, paving the way for further

¹ James Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. (London: Hurst, 2003) pp.145-171

² Ceasefire Agreement of 23 November 1991, 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-ceasefire91> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

dialogue.³ The Contact Group then drafted the Z-4 Plan, an agreement which was intended to bring an end to the fighting and establish a framework for a lengthier peace process. The Croatian Government agreed to use Z-4 as the basis for negotiations, but the Croatian Serb leadership (backed by Slobodan Milošević) rejected it as it did not recognise RSK as an independent state.⁴ As 1995 progressed, the military situation of RSK significantly deteriorated.⁵ By August, Milošević and many within the Croatian Serb leadership were calling for the initiation of a peace process based on the Z-4 Plan. At this point in the war, however, they had been resoundingly defeated on the battlefield in Croatia, thus losing much of the leverage they had held just months earlier.⁶ The Contact Group renewed its efforts on 16 August. Just two weeks later, representatives of RSK and the Croatian government met for the first and only face-to-face negotiations of the war.⁷ The talks culminated with the signing of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium in the village of Erdut on 12 November 1995. The Agreement stipulated that Serb-held territory would remain within Croatia but would enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, while also offering provisions for the protection of minority rights and local elections.⁸ In addition, it called for the UN to administer former RSK territory during the first two years of the post-conflict transition.⁹

³ Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-ceasefire94> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

⁴ Peter W. Galbraith. "Washington, Erdut and Dayton: Negotiating and Implementing Peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 3. (1997) p.646

⁵ Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. p.192

⁶ Peter Galbraith. "Negotiating peace in Croatia." in Brad K. Blitz. *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) p.127

⁷ *Ibid.* p.128

⁸ Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), 1995. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-erdutagreement95> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

⁹ UN Peacekeeping. *Croatia – UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. (Backgrounder)*. (UN, 1997) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes_b.htm#MANDATE (Accessed 16/11/2020)

Year(s): 1996 – 2002.

Location: Croatia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission, a monitoring mission, and a transitional international administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, and United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Croatia.

The peace agreement that ended the War in Croatia called for the UN to administer the territory that had been held by the Republika Srpska Krajina until it could be peacefully incorporated into the administrative framework of the Croatian state.¹ Initially, peacekeepers of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) monitored the situation while the Security Council developed and planned a more focussed operation.² In January 1996, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) replaced UNCRO, and by May 1996 it was up to its full strength of 5,000 peacekeepers, 450 police, and 650 civilian administrators.³ UNTAES was tasked with demilitarising the areas under its control and peacefully bringing them under the jurisdiction of the Croatian government, retaining the multiethnic character of the region, assisting with reconstruction and refugee return, and organising local elections.⁴ Another UN

¹ Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Erdut Agreement), 1995.

² UN Peacekeeping. *Croatia: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation – UNCRO*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/uncro.htm> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

³ UN Peacekeeping. *Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium: Brief Chronology*. (UN, 2020) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untaes_e.htm (Accessed 16/11/2020)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1037*. (1996) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1037> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

operation, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), was deployed to the Prevlaka Peninsula to support UNCRO and prevent a conflict relapse in that region.⁵

The most urgent task faced by UNTAES was implementing a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration program. Within thirty days, all heavy weaponry was removed from the area and small arms belonging to the local Serb population were purchased by UNTAES through a buy-back program funded by the Croatian government.⁶ By the end of June 1996, UNTAES was the only military organisation in the region, severely limiting the prospects of renewed conflict. Stability was enhanced further by the establishment of a multiethnic Transitional Police Force in July 1996.⁷ With the post-conflict transition progressing well, UNTAES conducted local elections in the region under its jurisdiction in April 1997. Voter turnout exceeded expectations, no evidence of fraud was found, and there were no eruptions of election violence.⁸ UNTAES began downsizing its operations and handing over responsibilities to local institutions in July 1997 and concluded its mandate in January 1998. The United Nations Civilian Police Support Group remained in the area until October 1998 to ensure the transition continued smoothly, and UNMOP completed its operation in 2002.⁹ An international presence remained in Croatia to monitor developments until 2007, when the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia was closed.¹⁰ These efforts helped to ensure that Croatia did not experience a conflict relapse.

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka*. (UN, 2002) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmop/index.html> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

⁶ Jacques Paul Klein. "The United Nations and Administration of Territory: Lessons from the Front Line." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, Vol. 97. (2003) p.206

⁷ Derek Boothby. "The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia." *Global Governance*, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2004) p.43

⁸ UN Peacekeeping. *Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium: Brief Chronology*.

⁹ UN Peacekeeping. *Croatia – Danube Region: United Nations Civilian Police Support Group – UNPSG*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/cropol.htm> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

¹⁰ OSCE. *OSCE Mission to Croatia / OSCE Office in Zagreb (closed)*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/croatia-closed> (Accessed 16/11/2020)

Year(s): 1964 – present.

Location: Cyprus.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific (The Government of Cyprus elected to sit with the Asia-Pacific Regional Group when it joined the UN in 1960).

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus has worked to keep the peace between the Turkish-held north and the rest of Cyprus since 1964.

Cyprus emerged from the British Empire in 1960. Prior to independence, a series of treaties established a consociational democracy in which power was shared between the island's Greek and Turkish communities and provided a mandate for military personnel from Greece, Turkey, and the UK to be stationed in certain areas of Cyprus.¹ However, following independence, leaders from each community began to clash over constitutional reform and representation in state institutions. By December 1963, armed confrontations were erupting between militias. To prevent the conflict from escalating further, the British, Greek, and Turkish troops formed a joint peacekeeping force and patrolled the disengagement line once a ceasefire was negotiated at the end of the month, however the ensuing talks in London failed to resolve the crisis.² As a result, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964.³ Led by the British troops already in Cyprus, UNFICYP was deployed as an interpositionary force, physically separating the two communities while talks were held between the respective political leaderships.⁴

¹ UNFICYP. *History: Tripartite Conference & Geneva Declaration*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/tripartite-conference-geneva-declaration> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

² United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*. (New York: United Nations, 1990) pp.283-4

³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 186*. (1964) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/186> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

⁴ Norrie Macqueen. *The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War*. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999) p.48

Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict failed. Following an attempted coup d'état in Greek Cyprus in July 1974, the Government of Turkey occupied the north of the island in a major military operation. The UN Security Council called for a ceasefire following the initial offensive, and although clashes continued in certain areas, UNFICYP was able to gradually reduce the fighting until, on 16 August 1974, the ceasefire finally came into force.⁵ This allowed UNFICYP to document the positions held by each military as it verified the ceasefire. In the absence of a negotiated boundary, the intelligence gathered by the peacekeepers at this time serves as the basis for demarcation to this day.⁶ Since 1974, the Mission has patrolled the ceasefire line, monitored the military situation, and facilitated dialogue between the belligerents. In 1989, UNFICYP personnel convinced both sides to withdraw their forces from the frontlines in a significant act of de-escalation.⁷ UNFICYP has been gradually reduced in size since the 1980s but remains active at the time of writing. The Mission played a key role in limiting the 1974 conflict and has ensured that intercommunal violence has not been repeated on the island for 56 years.

⁵ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*. p.302

⁶ *Ibid.* p.305

⁷ *Ibid.* p.309

Year(s): 1999 – 2003.

Location: Butembo, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement;
Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The city of Butembo and its population was spared from much of the fighting that took place across the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1999-2003 thanks to the efforts of local people and organisations.

The regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) came to a violent end in 1997. In the uncertain aftermath of his downfall, the Second Congo War erupted. The province of North Kivu, which is located on the international border with Uganda and Rwanda, has been at the heart of many of the conflicts that have plagued the DRC ever since. Indeed, the region served as the staging ground for rebel offensives against the forces of Mobutu and North Kivu was once again employed to launch attacks against the administration of his successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In 1999, the main rebel group operating out of North Kivu, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (*Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie*, RCD), splintered, dividing the province into two. This complex security situation was complicated further by the presence of smaller armed groups, ranging from Mai-Mai militias loosely affiliated to the government to exiled Hutu forces from Rwanda.¹ In this context, armed conflict was widespread. However, in the historic trading city of Butembo, religious leaders and the business community managed to forge an island of relative peace which not only helped to protect the local population, but also provided shelter for tens of thousands of displaced people.

¹ Jason Stearns. "North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo." *Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project*. (2012) pp.32-3

The Catholic Church emerged as a key agent for peace in North Kivu in 1994, when the local bishop negotiated a truce between armed groups on the Ugandan border. When war broke out, the local clergy publicly denounced abuses committed by various armed groups, frequently met with political and military leaders, and played a key role in the establishment of Crisis Committees which, in the absence of state institutions, served to maintain public order, oversee the allocation of humanitarian assistance, and manage, as far as was possible, the armed conflicts in the area.² Meanwhile, business leaders used their collective bargaining power to extract concessions (such as ending the harassment of civilians) from the armed groups.³ When prime agricultural land was fortified by armed groups in 2001, the local Bishop was able to extract a public apology for threatening the city's food security and a withdrawal of the forces in question. In later years, the Bishop also mediated several ceasefires. Remarkably, these efforts succeeded in sparing the city from much of the violence plaguing the region and demonstrably mitigated the impact of armed conflict on civilians. While the rest of the DRC suffered famine and war, residents of Butembo built a hydro-electric dam, maintained relatively high standards of education and healthcare, and maintained law and order in their city.⁴

² Mike Jobbins. "Community-Driven Civilian Protection in the DRC: Preventing Violence and Mitigating Harm." *Exploring Civilian Protection: Community Self-Protection Strategies*, Brookings Institution Seminar. (2010) Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/events/exploring-civilian-protection-community-self-protection-strategies/> (Accessed 05/01/2022) p.10

³ Ibid. pp.8-9

⁴ Laura Seay. "Why one city in Congo is astonishingly stable and prosperous." *The Washington Post*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/31/why-one-city-in-congo-is-astonishingly-stable-and-prosperous/> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Year(s): 2002 – 2003.

Location: Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of South Africa and the UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The Second Congo War (1998-2003) was ended by negotiations hosted by the South African government and the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

In August 1998, fifteen months after a broad opposition coalition backed by Rwanda and Uganda ousted Mobutu Sese Seko from power during the First Congo War, another major conflict erupted. Yet another broad opposition coalition, again backed by troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, launched offensives from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the goal of replacing Mobutu's successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The Government of Rwanda played a major role in the conflict, with senior Rwandan military officers commanding this coalition of armed groups. Just as victory seemed within reach for the opposition following a daring airborne operation to capture Kitona on the mouth of the Congo river to the west of Kinshasa, allies of the Government of Congo mobilised in support of Kabila. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia deployed troops in support of the embattled administration, who were later joined by contingents from Sudan, Libya, and Chad.¹ Divisions between the governments of Uganda and Rwanda emerged, leading to further conflict and adding another dimension to the conflict. By 2001, the DRC was devastated by conflict, millions had died, and half the country was controlled by opposition groups backed by the governments of Uganda or Rwanda.² The extent of foreign involvement earned the Second Congo War the monikers "the Great African War" and "Africa's World War."

¹ Kris Berwouts. *Congo's Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*. (Zed Books: London, 2017) pp.19-20

² Jason K. Stearns. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of Congo and the Great War of Africa*. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012) p.188

Efforts to end the armed conflict in DRC began in June 1999, when negotiations mediated by the Zambian president resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.³ Although many aspects of the accord (the deployment of UN peacekeepers, for example) were later incorporated into the peace process, Lusaka itself failed to end the war. In January 2001, Kabila was assassinated, considerably changing the political dynamics of the situation. His son, Joseph, succeeded him and began preparing the ground for a comprehensive peace process and Inter-Congolese Dialogue to take place.⁴ Combined with the belated arrival of UN peacekeepers and the backing that Western governments and institutions offered the younger Kabila, this led the foreign governments embroiled in the conflict to begin withdrawing their forces.⁵ After several false starts, a breakthrough was finally made during negotiations hosted by the Government of South Africa in 2002, leading to further troop withdrawals from DRC and the de-escalation of the conflict.⁶ The talks culminated on 2 April 2003 with the signing of the Sun City Agreement in South Africa, which formally ended the Second Congolese War.⁷

³ Ceasefire Agreement (Lusaka Agreement), 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-lusaka-agreement99> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

⁴ Acte d'Engagement Gaborone, 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-engagementgaborone2001> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

⁵ Gérard Prunier. *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.265-9

⁶ Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement), 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

⁷ Inter-Congolese Negotiations: The Final Act (Sun City Agreement), 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-suncity-agreement2003> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Year(s): 2003.

Location: Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU and UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Operation Artemis prevented a much larger conflict which could have contributed to a major famine from happening in Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2003.

At the height of the Second Congo War, most of the country was divided into three areas controlled by the governments of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda. As the peace process started showing signs of progress and personnel of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*, MONUC) began deploying, the presence of uninvited foreign troops on Congolese soil came under increasing scrutiny by institutions such as the International Court of Justice. The province of Ituri, on the border of Uganda, was the scene of considerable fighting during the war but was ultimately under the control of the Ugandan government by the end of the conflict. In 2002, during talks hosted by the Government of Angola, the Ugandan and Congolese administrations negotiated a plan for the withdrawal of all Ugandan forces from DRC and formally normalised relations as part of the Luanda Agreement.¹ The plan included provisions for the creation of an Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). Composed of local citizens, MONUC, representatives of the international community, and the governments of DRC and Uganda, the IPC developed a roadmap for peace and laid the foundations for an interim administration to be established in Ituri following the Ugandan withdrawal.² However, rather than restoring stability, the departure of 7,000 Ugandan troops on 6 May 2003 opened the door to an eruption of violence between the various militias operating in the province over control of key towns such as

¹ Agreement between the DRC and Uganda on withdrawal of Ugandan Troops, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations between the two countries (Luanda Agreement), 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-luandaagreement2002> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

² Kees Homan. "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo." in European Commission. *Faster and More United? The Debate About Europe's Crisis Response Capacity*. (Brussels: EC, 2007) p.151

Bunia. DRC security forces were unable to assert control of the area, and a lone battalion of Uruguayan MONUC personnel could not protect the thousands of civilians fleeing the violence.³ In addition to the dangers posed by conflict, the crisis threatened to spark a major humanitarian disaster in a region already devastated by conflict and famine.

In response to the worsening situation, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a rapid intervention to protect civilians in Ituri until MONUC forces in the area could be reinforced later that year. Just seven days later, the first soldiers of a force composed mostly of French troops (90 percent) supported by other (mostly) European states landed in Bunia as part of the EU's Operation Artemis.⁴ This mission succeeded in restoring security to the town and preventing a wider conflict from taking place in Ituri after the Ugandan withdrawal, provided protection and aid to tens of thousands of refugees, and offered a vital window for the overstretched MONUC to gather its strength.⁵ In September 2003, Artemis was withdrawn, and the UN assumed responsibility for security in Bunia and Ituri. The intervention did not end armed conflict in Eastern DRC, but it did prevent a major conflict from erupting.

³ Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, & Catriona Mace. "Operation *Artemis*: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2004) pp.511-2

⁴ *Ibid.* pp.516-7

⁵ Homan. "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo." p.3

Year(s): 2006.

Location: Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Armed Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU, UN, and the Congolese government.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: An armed conflict was prevented during the 2006 general elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo thanks to the concerted efforts of local people and organisation, the Congolese administration, and donors such as the EU.

The July 2006 general election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) posed a wide range of challenges to peace in the country. A democratic contest had not been held in DRC since 1965, leaving electoral processes and infrastructure untested, and the sheer number of armed groups that had emerged over the preceding decade posed a major threat to the peaceful conduct and outcome of the elections. The elections themselves were the result of the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which called for the establishment of a transitional Congolese government for a period of 24 months until an elected administration could be installed in Kinshasa.¹ During this period, the international community maintained the Committee in Support of the Transition (*Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition*, CIAT) as a mechanism to support the peace process and the creation of a new Congolese administration. The EU was the main donor and helped to establish five new institutions (including the electoral commission, a media oversight body, and an anti-corruption organisation) in preparation for the general elections in addition to its ongoing efforts to strengthen and professionalise Congolese police and security forces.² Despite these efforts, the UN Security Council still judged the risk of electoral violence and armed conflict to be severe. As a result, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

¹ Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement), 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

² Kris Berwouts. *Congo's Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.48

(*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*, MONUC) was significantly reinforced (from 5,537 personnel to over 16,000) and the EU was asked to send additional support in December 2005.³ After months of deliberations, the EU Council approved another European mission to DRC, the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo), to support MONUC during the election process.⁴ A total of 2,300 European troops (43 percent German, 33 percent French, with smaller contributions from 17 other nations) deployed to DRC prior to the elections.⁵ These forces were supplemented by 1,700 international and 35,000 Congolese election observers who worked to preserve the integrity of the contest.

The first round of elections proceeded peacefully but failed to provide an outright winner. In the aftermath, allegations of fraud and outbreaks of violence between political constituencies threatened to spark another armed conflict in DRC. In Kinshasa, Congolese troops clashed with armed opposition supporters in a confrontation that required the intervention of MONUC and EUFOR to contain it.⁶ These efforts were successful, and the final result was announced in November 2006 before being confirmed by the Supreme Court, marking the completion of the first peaceful election in DRC in over four decades.

³ United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *MONUC Facts and Figures*. (UN Peacekeeping, 2021) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/facts.shtml> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

⁴ Helmut Fritsch. *EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?* (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2008) p.33

⁵ Ibid. p.43

⁶ Hans Hoebeke. "The EU and "Conflict Peacebuilding" in the DRC." *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. 60, No. 1. (2007) p.46

Year(s): 2008 – 2009.

Location: North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: An observation mission, diplomacy, legal prosecution, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the governments of Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The armed conflict between the Congress for the Defence of the People and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo in North Kivu was ended with a peace agreement following a UN investigation.

The series of peace initiatives implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2002-2006 ended the Second Congo War, established mechanisms to prevent further interstate conflict in the region, and successfully prevented electoral violence during the 2006 general election from sparking renewed fighting. Despite such efforts, however, armed conflict continued to plague considerable areas of the DRC, such as the province of North Kivu on the international border with Rwanda and Uganda. Rather than joining the ongoing peace process, Congolese armed groups in Eastern DRC such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*, CNDP), whose personnel had fought alongside Rwandan forces during the preceding decade, favoured maintaining their autonomy and operational links with the Government of Rwanda.¹ Beginning in 2004, the CNDP began launching attacks on DRC security forces in Eastern DRC and established itself as the *de facto* administration of a parallel state in territory along the border with Rwanda. In 2006, the CNDP ran as a political party in the DRC general election, but in the aftermath (after it and its allies failed to win many votes) the organisation continued its armed insurgency against the government. By 2008, the CNDP controlled approximately one third of North Kivu, commanded over 5,000 troops, and had created a

¹ UCDP. *DR Congo (Zaire): Government*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/283> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

civil service, police force, tax collection apparatus, radio station, and military hospital in the area they controlled.² With consistent support from Kigali, there was little incentive for CNDP leaders to give up the power and territory that they had accumulated during the recent turbulent history of the region.

In 2008, a UN panel of experts published a long-awaited report on conflict in the DRC.³ For the first time, the extent of the Rwandan government's ongoing support of the CNDP was revealed, leading to widespread condemnation and the suspension of aid from some donors.⁴ Anticipating such developments, the DRC and Rwandan governments had already held talks on the issue and, in January 2009, launched a joint operation to arrest the leader of the CNDP (Laurent Nkunda) and end the conflict in North Kivu.⁵ Two months later, on 23 March 2009, the groups' new leader signed a peace treaty with the Government of DRC and integrated their troops into the national armed forces.⁶ Nkunda remains under house arrest in Rwanda, but a faction of the CNDP rejected the peace process and launched a fresh insurgency, leaving the conflict not entirely resolved.

² UCDP. *CNDP*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/426> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

³ Group of Experts on the DRC. *Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph 18(d) of Security Council resolution 1807*. (UN, 2008) Available at:

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/panel-of-experts/expert-reports> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

⁴ Ben Shepherd. "Congo, Rwanda and the National Congress for the Defence of the People." *Accord*, Vol. 22. (2011) p.45

⁵ Kris Berwouts. *Congo's Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.74

⁶ Peace Agreement between the Government and the CNDP (and the Implementation Plan), 2009. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-peace-agreement-cndp2009> (Accessed 06/01/2022); Jason Stearns. "From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo." *Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project*. (2012) p.35

Year(s): 2012 – 2013.

Location: North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, diplomacy, and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), UN, and the governments of Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The armed conflict in North Kivu between the Congolese government and the M23 armed group was ended by the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, regional diplomacy, and a peace agreement.

Three years after the Congress for the Defence of the People (*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*, CNDP) and the Congolese government ended the armed conflict between them in North Kivu, some disaffected former CNDP officers with support from the Rwandan government staged a mutiny in the aftermath of the contested 2011 general election. Citing the failure of the government to implement the terms of the 2009 agreement with the CNDP, the mutineers created a new armed group and named it the 23 March Movement (*Mouvement du 23 mars*, M23) before launching an insurgency against DRC security forces. By July 2012, M23 had raised a force of up to 2,000 troops and controlled territory in North Kivu along the border with Rwanda.¹ Like the CNDP before it, M23 created the basic structures of a state, collected revenue, and established a political wing. The M23 campaign relied on support from the governments of Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Uganda. Both supplied military and logistical support despite their previous commitments to respect the Congolese border. In November 2012, M23 forces captured Goma, the capital city of North Kivu, in a large offensive that was supported (and possibly directed) by the Rwandan armed forces.²

¹ Jason Stearns. "From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo." *Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project*. (2012) p.45

² Kris Berwouts. *Congo's Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*. (Zed Books: London, 2017) p.120

The inability of DRC security forces to defend Goma not only led to another humanitarian crisis as the civilian population fled the town, but also opened the door to more conflict, such as attacks on civilians by Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.³

The effort to end the rebellion began at the end of November 2012, when M23 forces withdrew from Goma to kick-start negotiations. Talks were subsequently held in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and resulted in the signing of a framework agreement on 16 January 2013.⁴ This failed to end the conflict and following a violent split of the M23 organisation in February, fighting between the movement and government security forces resumed in May 2013. By this point, international concern over the worsening situation in North Kivu began to manifest into action. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon mediated the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Great Lakes, which revitalised earlier commitments to regional peace, while the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created and deployed the Force Intervention Brigade to North Kivu to improve the security situation.⁵ Alongside Congolese troops, this intervention ended external support for M23 and force its leaders to the negotiating table. In November-December 2013, the Government of Democratic Republic of Congo and M23 issued declarations which formally ended the conflict.⁶

³ Ibid. p.121

⁴ UCDP. *Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - M23*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/11982> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

⁵ Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, 2013. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013> (Accessed 06/01/2022); United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo. *Background*. (UN Peacekeeping, 2022) Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

⁶ BBC. "DR Congo government 'signs deal with M23 in Kenya'." *BBC News*. (12 December 2013) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25357821> (Accessed 06/01/2022)

Year(s): 1991 – 2001.

Location: Djibouti.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of France.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of peace agreements mediated by the Government of France ended the armed conflict in Djibouti and French peacekeepers helped to verify implementation.

After gaining independence from France in 1977, an authoritarian president ruled Djibouti. Increasing tensions between the regime and the political opposition throughout the 1980s inspired three predominantly Afar groups to form an armed group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), in 1991. In November 1991, FRUD launched an insurgency in northern Djibouti and soon controlled several cities.¹ The conflict quickly escalated, with fighting spreading across the country and government forces committing atrocities against civilians.² At the end of November, the Government of France (which maintained a military presence in Djibouti) dispatched military observers to the north of the country to monitor events.³ This marked the beginning of a lengthy French effort to end the conflict.

In February 1992, the French government dispatched a diplomatic mission to facilitate dialogue between the belligerents.⁴ Within weeks, a ceasefire was negotiated, and French peacekeepers were deployed to verify compliance. Further talks led to the promulgation of a multiparty constitution in 1992. However, the incumbent administration refused to allow FRUD to run in elections, derailing the peace process and sparking a resumption of fighting

¹ UCDP. *Djibouti: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/379> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Jane Perlez. "Soldiers Fire Into Crowd in Djibouti Tribal Strife." *The New York Times*. (1991) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/20/world/soldiers-fire-into-crowd-in-djibouti-tribal-strife.html> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

³ Mohamed Kadamy. "Djibouti: Between War and Peace." *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 7. (1996) p.518

⁴ Minorities at Risk Project. *Chronology of Afars in Djibouti*. (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004) Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3882c.html> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

in November 1992, leading to the withdrawal of French forces.⁵ Fighting continued throughout 1993, with a large government offensive capturing much FRUD-held territory and driving 100,000 people from their homes. A split in FRUD in 1994 led to renewed efforts to resolve the conflict, with one faction entering into negotiations (again mediated by French diplomats) with the Government of Djibouti. The talks bore fruit in June 1994, with an agreement to cease hostilities and allow FRUD to participate in politics.⁶ In December 1994, the Accord of Peace and National Reconciliation was signed, formalising the end of the conflict, revising the constitution, and incorporating FRUD representatives into a power-sharing government.⁷ FRUC-C, the remaining faction of the group, elected to continue fighting until entering negotiations in 1999. These talks produced two more peace agreements in 2000-2001, which not only ended the fighting but also stipulated a comprehensive package of reforms focusing on constitutional reform, the electoral process, and decentralisation.⁸

⁵ UCDP. Djibouti: Government.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ *Accord de paix et de réconciliation nationale*, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-accordpaix94> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁸ *Accord cadre de réforme et de concorde civile*, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-cadreforme2000> (Accessed 01/12/2020); *Accord de réforme et de concorde civile*, 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/djibouti-concordecivile2001> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Year(s): 2008 – 2011.

Location: Djibouti/Eritrea International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Qatar.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A low-intensity interstate conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea was prevented from escalating into a major war thanks to the mediation efforts of the Government of Qatar and the deployment of a Qatari peacekeeping mission.

The 110km border between Djibouti and Eritrea was ill-defined in the colonial treaties between France and Italy that established the territory of each state. When Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, consolidating the country's borders became a priority for the new administration. Djibouti and Eritrea almost went to war in 1996 over a territorial dispute, and relations worsened further during the 1998 – 2000 War between Eritrea and Ethiopia.¹ In February 2008, the Eritrean military began building up its forces along the disputed border and fortifying positions. The Djiboutian armed forces responded in kind, while the Government of France dispatched reinforcements to bases already established in Djibouti in support of the government there.² Tensions rose even further when the Government of Ethiopia pledged to use any means necessary to maintain its access to the Port of Djibouti.³ In June, the desertion of some Eritrean soldiers, frequent skirmishing, and the destruction of an Eritrean gunboat marked further escalations of the conflict.⁴ Thus, the dispute over a relatively minor piece of territory stood ready to spark an armed conflict between the huge Eritrean military and the Djiboutian armed forces (backed by France), with the Government of Ethiopia seemingly ready to join the fray.

¹ UCDP. *Djibouti – Eritrea*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/902> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

² Kevin Frank. "Ripeness and the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute." *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2015) pp.122-4

³ Berouk Mesfin. "The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute." *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report*. (2008) p.7

⁴ UCDP. *Djibouti – Eritrea*.

Faced with a growing crisis, the Arab League dispatched a fact-finding mission in May 2008. The Government of Eritrea refused to cooperate, rejecting African Union and UN delegations in June as well.⁵ The situation remained deadlocked for the rest of the year, prompting the UN Security Council to demand that the Eritrean military withdraw its forces from the disputed area in January 2009. Ongoing Eritrean recalcitrance kept tensions high until, in June 2010, the Government of Qatar succeeded in facilitating and mediating talks between the belligerents after prolonged shuttle diplomacy.⁶ The talks concluded with the signing of an agreement which ended the conflict and established the Government of Qatar as the formal arbiter of the territorial dispute.⁷ A boundary commission, led by the Qatari prime minister, was mandated to investigate and issue a verdict while 700 Qatari peacekeepers monitored compliance with the ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from the disputed area.⁸ The efforts of the Government of Qatar succeeded in preventing an interstate conflict and calmed a tense situation which threatened regional stability.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Frank. "Ripeness and the 2008 Djibouti-Eritrea Border Dispute." pp.125-6

⁷ Agreement between the State of Eritrea and the Republic of Djibouti, 2011. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/djiboutieritrea-agreement2010> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁸ Somalilandpress. "Qatar to deploy troops to Djibouti and Eritrea." *Defence Web*. (2010) Available at: <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/logistics/qatar-to-deploy-troops-to-djibouti-and-eritrea/> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

Year(s): 2018.

Location: Djibouti/Eritrea International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, stabilising borders, and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, UN, and the Government of Saudi Arabia.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The militarised territorial dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea was prevented from escalating in 2017 by the timely diplomatic intervention of the African Union and was ultimately resolved after the Government of Saudi Arabia mediated a peace agreement.

The mediation services and peacekeeping mission provided by the Government of Qatar served to prevent an outbreak of armed conflict following the clashes on the Djibouti-Eritrea border in 2008. Despite the imposition of sanctions on the Government of Eritrea in 2009, the conflict remained unresolved and highly militarised, with both countries maintaining large military forces in the area. During the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the governments of both Djibouti and Eritrea backed the decision to isolate the Gulf state in solidarity with powerful regional actors, most notably Saudi Arabia. In response, Qatar withdrew its peacekeeping force from the disputed territory after seven years of operating.¹ Eritrean armed forces returned to the contested area almost immediately, bringing the former belligerents back to the verge of war.²

The African Union (AU) immediately called for calm and dispatched a fact-finding mission to the area to discover what was happening but refused to deploy a peacekeeping mission, as

¹ Reuters Staff. "Qatar withdraws troops from Djibouti-Eritrea border mission." *Reuters*. (2017) Available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-djibouti/qatar-withdraws-troops-from-djibouti-eritrea-border-mission-idUSKBN1950W5> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

² Aaron Maasho. "Djibouti, Eritrea in territorial dispute after Qatar peacekeepers leave." *Reuters*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-djibouti-eritrea-border-idUSKBN1971JR> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

requested by the Government of Djibouti.³ The dispute remained unresolved and a potential source of armed conflict until the 8 June 2018, when the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia met to resolve their own long-standing territorial dispute. In addition to formally ending the dispute and normalising relations between their two countries, the meeting sparked a rapprochement with other governments in the region. The Government of Somalia soon reconciled its own differences with the Eritrean leadership, sending a delegation along with the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia (the Joint High-Level Committee) to Djibouti in September 2018. The Committee was tasked with opening a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa by resolving the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. After initial talks, the governments of the three states signed the Djibouti Agreement, formally entering a period of cooperation.⁴ The following week, representatives from across the Horn of Africa were invited to the Saudi Arabian city of Jeddah to formalise their commitments to peace.⁵ On 16 September, the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders signed their deal. The following day, the Government of Saudi Arabia hosted the first face-to-face meeting between the Djiboutian and Eritrean leaders in over a decade.⁶ These efforts have greatly reduced the risk of interstate conflict not just between Djibouti and Eritrea, but across the entire Horn of Africa.

³ African Union. "AU Commission calls for Restraint on the Djibouti-Eritrea Border." *AU Press Release*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-au-commission-calls-for-restraint-on-the-djibouti-eritrea-border> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

⁴ UN. "Horn of Africa: UN chief welcomes Djibouti agreement between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia." *UN News*. (2018) Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018811> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

⁵ Fatah Arahman Youssef. "President of Djibouti: Saudi Arabia Helped Us Open a New Page with Eritrea." *Asharq Al-Awsat*. (2018) Available at: <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1406371/president-djibouti-saudi-arabia-helped-us-open-new-page-eritrea> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

⁶ Camille Lons. "Saudi Arabira and UAE Look to Africa." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. (2018) Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77561> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Year(s): 1995.

Location: Ecuador/Peru International Border.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and an observation mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The mediation of four regional governments (the Guarantors of the Rio De Janeiro Protocol) led by Brazil ended the interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 after just over one month of fighting.

The frontier between Ecuador and Peru has been a source of conflict for centuries, with competing claims for territory along the border going back to the sixteenth century. An eruption of violence in 1941 was ended with the signing of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol.¹ The Protocol, mediated by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA, established the four states as Guarantors. Efforts to implement the territorial provisions of the Protocol revealed cartographic errors which, the Government of Ecuador argued, nullified the agreement.² In 1981, another border clash led to an extensive military build-up in the region. Tensions increased until the end of 1994, when a fresh series of clashes occurred. In January 1995, Ecuadorian and Peruvian armed forces were deploying thousands of troops along with the full force of their air forces and navies against each other in an interstate conflict known as the Cenepa War.³ Over 400 troops died in the fighting.

Efforts to prevent any further escalation began immediately, with the Guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol convening a meeting in Brasilia in January 1995. Following careful mediation by representatives of the Guarantors, the belligerents agreed to a ceasefire, a framework for further talks, and committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the territorial

¹ Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries between Peru and Ecuador (Rio Protocol), 1942. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-rioprotocol42> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

² UCDP. *Ecuador – Peru*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/403> (Accessed 05/12/2020)

³ Beth A. Simms. “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru.” *Peaceworks*, No. 27. (1999) p.12

dispute.⁴ The negotiations culminated with the signing of Itamaraty Declaration on 17 February 1995.⁵ A predominantly military agreement, the Declaration contained stipulations about troop withdrawals and the establishment of a demilitarised zone which was to be verified by an international military observation mission. Another round of talks was held two weeks later in Uruguay, culminating in the Montevideo Declaration, where both sides reiterated their commitment to an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the dispute, while the Guarantors agreed to deploy the observation mission.⁶ Skirmishes along the border in March, May, and September 1995 threatened to derail the peace process entirely, however in February 1996, military officials from Ecuador and Peru met at the contested border (under supervision from international observers) while government representatives from each state met in Argentina, where they resolved to find a peaceful solution to conflict.⁷ The interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru was over.

⁴ Ronald Bruce St. John. "The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to Settlement." *Boundary & Territory Briefing*, Vol. 3, No. 1. (1999) pp.34-5

⁵ *Declaración de paz de Itamaraty*, 1995. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-itamaratydeclaration95> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

⁶ Montevideo Declaration, 1995. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuador-peru-montevideo-declaration95> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

⁷ Simms. "Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution." pp.12-3

Year(s): 1995 – 1998.

Location: Ecuador/Peru International Border.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: An observation mission, diplomacy, and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru and the Guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A return to armed conflict on the volatile border was prevented and the territorial dispute that had caused so many wars over the centuries was resolved.

The accords signed in Brasilia and Montevideo in 1995 stopped the fighting between Ecuador and Peru, yet several fatal clashes occurred in the ensuing months and the territorial dispute remained unresolved. The accords did, however, establish mechanisms to prevent a return to conflict until a political solution to the dispute could be found. The Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE) was the product of the Itamaraty Declaration and could have been on the ground immediately thanks to the logistical capabilities of the US military, which led the operation. However, breaches of the ceasefire delayed the arrival of the 112 observers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the USA until 12 March 1995.¹ MOMEPE worked to verify compliance with the ceasefire, monitoring the withdrawal of 3,000 Ecuadorian and 2,000 Peruvian combatants through difficult jungle terrain. MOMEPE also facilitated the negotiations which concluded with the establishment of the demilitarised zone stipulated in the Itamaraty Declaration on 1 August 1995.² Implementation was largely successful; however, the dispute did threaten to escalate again when both states invested heavily in strengthening their armed forces, increasing tensions in the region.³ MOMEPE

¹ Kevin M. Higgins. *Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE): Doing A Lot With a Little*. (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1999) p.8

² Joseph L. Homza. "Special Operators: A Key Ingredient for Successful Peacekeeping Operations Management." *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 12, No. 1. (2004) pp.101-2

³ Simms. "Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution." p.13-4

remained in place until May 1997, during which time it continued to verify the ceasefire and hold meetings and joint patrols with personnel from both countries.⁴

While MOMEPE addressed the military aspects of consolidating the peace, representatives from the Guarantors mediated negotiations between the belligerents. In November 1997, the parties agreed to a timetable for further talks and, in January 1998, established four binational commissions to develop solutions to the main impasses in the peace process, including the demarcation of the border.⁵ By May, most of the issues had been resolved according to the recommendations of the commissions, allowing the leaders of Ecuador and Peru to sign the Presidential Act of Brasilia.⁶ The Act included a legal declaration to reject the use of war and violence against each other and formally resolved the long-standing territorial dispute. One point of contention regarding navigation rights on the Amazon remained unresolved, but both governments committed to addressing it peacefully.

⁴ Higgins. *Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE)*. pp.9-10

⁵ Simms. "Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution." pp.15-6

⁶ Presidential Act of Brasilia, 1998. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ecuadorperu-actbrasil98> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Year(s): 1986 – 1992.

Location: *El Salvador.*

UN Regional Group: *Latin America and the Caribbean.*

Type of Conflict: *Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.*

Type of Initiative: *Mediation of a peace agreement.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The UN.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *After 12 years of devastating civil war, the armed conflict in El Salvador was finally ended after negotiations mediated by the UN culminated with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992.*

El Salvador collapsed into civil war following a military coup d'état in October 1979. For over 12 years, a coalition of left-wing armed groups united under the banner of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*, FMLN) fought against the US-backed Salvadorian government. Regional efforts to reduce armed conflict culminated with the Esquipulas II Agreement in 1987, however the war in El Salvador continued.¹ Two years later, government officials began meeting with representatives of the FMLN and laid the groundwork for further negotiations to take place. An unsuccessful military offensive in November 1989 served to convince the Government of El Salvador to invite the UN to mediate a peace process between the belligerents.²

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar dispatched Álvaro de Soto to mediate the peace process.³ Progress was made within months, and on 4 April 1990, the Geneva Agreement was signed, establishing 'a negotiation process for resolving the El Salvador conflict.'⁴ In July, the Agreement on Human Rights was signed in Costa Rica in an effort to

¹ Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II), 1987. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasII87> (Accessed 13/10/2020)

² UCDP. *El Salvador*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/316> (Accessed 13/10/2020)

³ Alvaro de Soto. "Harnessing incentives for peace: An interview with Alvaro de Soto." *Conciliation Resources*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/incentives-sanctions-and-conditionality/harnessing-incentives-peace-interview-alvaro-de-soto> (Accessed 13/10/2020)

⁴ Geneva Agreement, 1990. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-genevaagreement90> (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

reduce the impact of the conflict on civilians.⁵ By the end of the year, all Salvadorian political parties had voiced their support for an end to the war. However, the ongoing negotiations remained unable to find a compromise on the future of the military and it was not until a fresh round of talks were held in New York that the belligerents agreed to initial a settlement.⁶ The peace process culminated with the signing of the 1992 Chapultepec Agreement, a comprehensive accord which provided the framework for a ceasefire and disarmament, as well as a programme of comprehensive government reforms.⁷ The Agreement represents the first UN-brokered end to an armed conflict and was hailed as a ‘revolution’ by the Secretary-General.⁸ The nine-month ceasefire stipulated in the Agreement held firm, and the FMLN began its transition from armed force to political party. In 1994, the former belligerents reiterated their commitment to implementing the terms agreed at Chapultepec and building peace.⁹ While myriad problems continue to challenge the Salvadorian people, the country has been spared from war since February 1992.

⁵ Agreement on Human Rights (San Jose Agreement), 1990. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-sanjoseagreement90> (Accessed: 31/11/2020)

⁶ Álvaro de Soto. “A Key United Nations Moment and its Lessons.” *UN Chronicle*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/key-united-nations-moment-and-its-lessons> (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

⁷ Chapultepec Agreement, 1992. Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement> (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

⁸ David Holiday & William Stanley. “Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador.” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 2. (1993) pp.415-6

⁹ Joint Declaration by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/elsalvador-jointdeclarationfmln> (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

Year(s): 1989 – 1995.

Location: *El Salvador.*

UN Regional Group: *Latin America and the Caribbean.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of a Conflict Relapse.*

Type of Initiative: *An observer mission and a political mission.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The UN.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador and the United Nations Mission in El Salvador verified the implementation of a ceasefire, contributed to stabilising the country, and strengthened the fragile institutions, preventing a conflict relapse in El Salvador.*

The first UN presence in El Salvador came in January 1990 with the opening of the regional office of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Much of ONUCA's focus, however, was on monitoring interstate borders in the region rather than managing the war in El Salvador.¹ In May 1991, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which had been mandated by the human rights agreement signed in Costa Rica the previous year.² In July, ONUSAL established offices across the country and became the first UN mission to focus on the investigation of alleged human rights abuses.³

Following the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, ONUSAL's mandate was expanded to include verifying the ceasefire, separating the former belligerents, re-establishing government control in former areas of conflict, and removing land mines.⁴ The UN effort in this regard was highly successful, and not a single violation of the ceasefire was reported.⁵ With the initial phase of El Salvador's post-conflict transition complete, ONUSAL's mandate was further extended to include maintaining law and order, strengthening domestic

¹ UN Peacekeeping. *United Nations Observer Group in Central America: ONUCA*. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuca.htm> (Accessed: 13/10/2020)

² UN Peacekeeping. *United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador: ONUSAL*. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html#one> (Accessed 13/10/2020)

³ Tommie Sue Montgomery. "Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (1995) p.150

⁴ *Ibid.* p.141

⁵ Susan Burgerman. "Building the Peace by Mandating Reform: United Nations-Mediated Human Rights Agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala." *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2000) p.71

institutions such as the Salvadorian police and judiciary, and monitoring elections.⁶ The peacekeepers in El Salvador were the first to be given such a task. Beginning in 1993, UNSUAL also began preparatory work for the restoration of democracy in El Salvador. This entailed identifying how many Salvadorian citizens were not registered to vote and ensuring that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of El Salvador was carrying out its duties effectively.⁷ In 1994, UNSUAL's efforts to strengthen the Salvadorian state received support from the UN Development Programme, which provided expertise and guidance on reintegration programmes and electoral reform.⁸ UNSUAL kept working to build peace in El Salvador until May 1995, when it was withdrawn and replaced with a small political mission tasked with verifying the peace process and providing good offices. The new mission, the United Nations Mission in El Salvador, remained in the country for a year.⁹ Although Salvadorian society continues to face many challenges, it has been spared from war since 1992.

⁶ Holiday & Stanley. "Building the Peace." p.416

⁷ Montgomery. "Getting to Peace in El Salvador." p.153

⁸ Bugerman. "Building the Peace by Mandating Reform." p.71

⁹ UN Peacekeeping. *El Salvador – UNSUAL: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html> (Accessed 13/10/2020)

Year(s): 1998 – 2000.

Location: Badme, Gash-Barka, Eritrea.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Government of Algeria.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was ended by mediation efforts led by the Organisation of African Unity during negotiations held in Algeria and the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to the region.

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, and although the 1000km border was already defined by colonial era treaties, it was yet to be demarcated. Although the governments in both countries were former wartime allies, relations soon deteriorated and, in late 1997, several armed clashes occurred on the border.¹ A joint Border Commission was established to investigate the dispute, however only one meeting was held before relations soured further. In May 1998, Eritrean forces occupied the disputed territory, sparking an armed conflict.² The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) acted quickly to try and bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, presenting an initiative developed by the Rwandan and US governments. The Government of Eritrea rejected the proposal and, in response, the Ethiopian military launched a large offensive in February 1999. In a change of tack, the Eritrean leadership accepted the OAU proposals, only for their Ethiopian counterparts to refuse to sign an article on technical arrangements.³ The fighting continued, with Ethiopian forces launching additional large offensives in early 2000.

Indirect talks resumed in April 2000 with little progress, however once Ethiopian troops had struck deep into Eritrean territory, the parties gathered for talks in Algiers. The negotiations

¹ UCDP. *Eritrea - Ethiopia*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/409> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Terrence Lyons. "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa." *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 36, No. 120. (2009) p.168

³ International Crisis Group. "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War." *Africa Report*, No. 101. (2005) p.2

culminated in June 2000 with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which affirmed the disputed territory to be under Ethiopian administration, stipulated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from a 25km demilitarised zone, and called for a UN peacekeeping force to assist with implementation.⁴ In September 2000, the first of UNMEE's 4,200 peacekeepers arrived to supervise the demilitarised zone.⁵ With peacekeepers in place and their respective armies withdrawn from the demilitarised zone, the leaders of both countries met in Algiers to continue the peace talks.⁶ Building on previous proposals, the parties signed a formal peace treaty witnessed by the UN Secretary-General, the OAU, EU, and the governments of Algeria and the USA in December 2000, ending the armed conflict and placing responsibility for resolving the territorial dispute in the hands of neutral commissions.⁷ The brutal war cost the lives of almost 100,000 people, however consistent efforts to facilitate dialogue and the deployment of UNMEE helped to bring the fighting to an end.

⁴ Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreathioia-cessationhostilities2000> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁵ UNMEE. *Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmee.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ International Crisis Group. "Ethiopia and Eritrea." p.3

⁷ Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreathioia-agreement2000> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Year(s): 1995 – 1998.

Location: *The Hanish Islands, Yemen.*

UN Regional Group: *Africa and Asia-Pacific.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of Interstate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Government of France, the UN, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The immediate threat of armed conflict was ended and the territorial dispute over the Hanish Islands was resolved by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.*

The Hanish Islands are an archipelago in the Red Sea located between Eritrea and Yemen. During the colonial period, the Italian and British governments failed to definitively settle the boundaries between their respective colonies, and this situation did not improve when Ethiopia and North Yemen governed the land on either side of the Islands. The dispute remained largely dormant until Yemeni unification and Eritrean independence (1990 and 1991, respectively), when both administrations sought to settle their borders and raise revenue. In 1995, Yemen granted a tourism license to develop diving on the islands, sending 200 soldiers to guard the construction site on the largest island in the archipelago (Greater Hanish), while Eritrea signed a contract for oil exploration in the maritime area around the Islands and issued an ultimatum of 11 November for the Yemeni troops to withdraw. After ministerial talks took place in October and 25 detained Yemeni fishermen were released by Eritrean authorities, the dispute appeared to be nearing a diplomatic resolution.¹ However, when the Eritrean armed forces found the Yemeni positions on Greater Hanish still occupied on 15 December, they launched an offensive. The fighting continued for 3 days, when telephone negotiations between both presidents resulted in a ceasefire at midnight on 17 December. The battle was already over when the deadline hit, leaving a total of 18 dead and 213 captured Yemeni soldiers and civilians.² The prisoners were released three days later.

¹ Daniel Dzurek. "Eritrea-Yemen Dispute Over the Hanish Islands." *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 1. (1996) p.72

² Jeffrey Lefebvre. "Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3. (1998) p.369

After the battle, the Arab League condemned Eritrea and urged its members to support Yemen's claim to the Islands, sparking a brief war of words with the Organisation of African Unity. The discovery that some Israeli-made boats were used in the Eritrean offensive added another dimension to the dispute, leading to condemnations of the Eritrean government by a host of Arab states.³ The belligerents received offers to mediate from the UN, Organisation of Islamic Conference, and several prominent regional powers, but, after diplomatic pressure from the UN Secretary-General, eventually accepted the offer of the French government in 1996. After months of talks, the parties agreed to refer the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to judge the case and resolve it peacefully.⁴ Tensions were heightened again in August 1996 after more military activity in the area, but on 3 October 1996 a formal peace agreement was signed in Paris. The arbiters came to their decision on 9 October 1998, awarding most of the islands to Yemen but guaranteeing Eritrean fishing rights in the area.⁵ The armed conflict was over, the dispute was resolved, and the risk of a more severe interstate conflict was greatly reduced.

³ Ibid. p.377-8

⁴ Yemen-Eritrea Arbitration Agreement, 1996. Available in: *Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law*, Vol. 3, No. 1. (1996)

⁵ Permanent Court of Arbitration. *Case 81: Eritrea/Yemen - Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea*. (PCA, 2021) Available at: <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/81/> (Accessed 19/11/2021)

Year(s): 1993 – 1997.

Location: Estonia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A diplomatic intervention led by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe helped to avert an armed conflict in Estonia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In 1990, the people of Estonia voted in the first free elections in the country since 1938. A major issue facing the new government was the plight of the non-Estonian minorities (most of whom were Russian) in Estonia, who constituted over a third of the total population. Initially, the Estonian government considered granting citizenship to all residents in the country. However, following a referendum in March 1991 (in which the Estonian population chose independence) and the attempted coup in Moscow in August, the administration introduced much more stringent conditions.¹ The potential fallout from the dispute was exacerbated by the Russian government's refusal to withdraw military personnel from Estonia until the non-Estonian population was granted citizenship. Foreseeing the problems that could arise from these developments, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established a Mission in Estonia in February 1993.² In June 1993, another discriminatory law was discussed in the Estonian parliament and in response, Russian communities in Estonia organised referenda on increased autonomy, while the Russian government cut gas supplies and warned that it would intervene if necessary.³

¹ Sergey Khrychikov & Hugh Miall. "Conflict Prevention in Estonia: The Role of the Electoral System." *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 2. (2002) p.193

² OSCE. *OSCE Mission to Estonia (closed)*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/estonia-closed> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

³ Celestine Bohen. "Russia Cuts Gas Supply To Estonia in a Protest." *The New York Times*. (1993) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/26/world/russia-cuts-gas-supply-to-estonia-in-a-protest.html> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Faced with an escalating crisis that could easily have spiralled into armed conflict, the Estonian government invited the CSCE to assess the crisis and mediate a peaceful resolution. The recently appointed CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, was immediately dispatched to Estonia. The following day, he issued a series of recommendations to improve the legal status of the non-Estonian population, which itself helped to calm the crisis.⁴ In the ensuing weeks, he engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy between the Estonian government and the Russian communities, convincing the former to allow the referenda to go ahead on the condition that they remained symbolic, and the latter to state their respect for the territorial integrity of Estonia.⁵ Although many issues remained, the threat of armed conflict had been defused. Meanwhile, the OSCE Mission (renamed from CSCE in 1994) worked with both parties to maintain stability, verifying the withdrawal of Russian troops and providing language training to the Russian population.⁶ Despite some tense moments in 1994-1996, the presence of the OSCE (and later, the EU) helped to ensure that any disputes remained in the political sphere.⁷

⁴ Max van der Stoel (Wolfgang Zellner & Falk Lange, eds). *Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities*. (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1999) p.102

⁵ Hanne-Margaret Birckenbach. "Half Full or Half Empty? The OSCE Mission to Estonia and its Balance Sheet, 1993 – 1999." *European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper*, No. 6. (2000) p.42

⁶ Rob Zaagman. "Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania." *European Centre for Minority Issues Monograph*, No. 1. (1999) p.19

⁷ M. Merrick Yamamoto. *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001*. (Maryland: University of Marland, 2017) p.63

Year(s): 2007.

Location: Ethiopia/Somalia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action, the mediation of a peace agreement, and stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the governments of Portugal, USA, and USSR.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Government of Puntland ended the pervasive armed conflict on the Ethiopia/Somalia border, minimising the risk of an interstate conflict in future.

Adadda is an area of prime grazing land that straddles the border of Ethiopia and the Somali Federal Republic of Puntland that has historically been shared between local clans. During the dry months between January and April, when both pasture and water become scarce, low-intensity conflicts between rival groups of pastoralists are common. State collapse, the widespread conflicts that continue to affect the region, and increasing environmental degradation served to hamstring traditional methods of mediation and resolution while also exacerbating the intensity of these conflicts. Efforts to resolve particularly substantial conflicts in 1985, 1997, and 2001 failed due to these factors, and fighting over scarce resources in Adadda during the dry season continued.¹ The significance of these conflicts was compounded by the cross-border nature of the fighting, with clan militias engaging each other over an internationally recognised border. Thus, the fighting between armed pastoralist groups in Adadda ran the risk of sparking a major confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia in addition to representing a pervasive conflict that defied resolution for decades.

In 2007, the construction of wells in a prohibited area sparked another confrontation. The rival groups raised their militia on either side of the Ethiopia-Somalia border and began fighting each other. Initial efforts to stop the conflict were led by local traditional and religious leaders. In contrast to previous flare-ups of fighting where state structures were absent for all intents and purposes, these interventions were supported by the administrations

¹ Pat Johnson, ed. *The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building. Peace Initiatives in Puntland, 1991-2007.* (Interpeace, 2008) pp.58-9

of Ethiopia, Puntland, and Somalia. The fighting between the pastoralist groups was ended immediately when 65 troops of the Puntland armed forces were deployed in an interpositional location (essentially on the border with Ethiopia) between the militias.² The cessation of hostilities was followed by the creation of a mediation committee comprising traditional and religious leaders, ministers of the Puntland administration, as well as representatives of the belligerent parties. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which was reliant on support from Ethiopia at this time, put considerable pressure on the leadership of Puntland to resolve the conflict quickly. After several rounds of talks, the parties came to an accord and signed the Burtinle Peace Agreement on 8 May 2007.³ The talks established Puntland as the guarantor of peace in the area, provided for reparations, and created a buffer zone between the rival groups to prevent a conflict relapse. Implementation was overseen by a joint committee.

² Ibid. pp.59-60

³ Burtinle Peace Agreement, 2007. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1853/Burtinle%20Peace%20Agreement> (Accessed 1/11/2021)

Year(s): 2004 – 2017.

Location: Ethiopia/Kenya International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action, the mediation of a peace agreement, and stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The 2005-2009 conflict between the Gabra and Borana communities on the Ethiopia/Kenya border was ended, stabilising the frontier, and reducing the likelihood of further conflict.

The territory around the Ethiopia-Kenya border is home to a range of pastoralist and agropastoralist groups, many of whom traverse the frontier to access seasonal pastures. The Gabra and Borana are two such groups whose communities span both sides of the border. Historically, occasional cattle raiding was the only violent feature of otherwise peaceful relations between these groups. However, increasing pressure on water and pasture reserves in recent decades (combined with the proliferation of small arms) placed great strain on this dynamic. Recurrent droughts in the early 2000s devastated the Borama, who lost almost 80 per cent of their livestock and 98 per cent of their crops.¹ In this context, a dispute over an alleged murder quickly escalated into a raid by the Gabra on the diminished herds of the Borana in June 2002. Initial efforts to calm the situation succeeded in preventing any immediate escalation, and in 2005 local peace committees even mediated a formal peace agreement.² However, just a week later, more clashes and raids took place. Skirmishes continued until, on 12 July 2005, approximately 1,000 Gabra conducted a series of raids on the Barana, killing 95 people, destroying villages, and rustling over 10,000 head of livestock.³ The raiders were eventually chased away by Kenyan security forces, but the shocking attack left the Gabra and Barana locked in a conflict that could have easily escalated

¹ UCDP. *Borana – Gabra*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5534> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

² Vincent Achuka. "How killing of Gabra man led to massacre in Turbi." *Nation*. (9 June 2019) Available at: <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/how-killing-of-gabra-man-led-to-massacre-in-turbi-175566?view=htmlamp> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

³ Oscar Gakuo Mwangi. "Kenya: Conflict in the 'Badlands': The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District." *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 107. (2006) p.81

into an international crisis had either Kenyan or Ethiopian security personnel become embroiled in the fighting.

Beginning in 2007, elders from both sides of the border began trying to broker a peace between the communities, combining traditional and innovative methods to contain small conflicts and forging local agreements to end feuds and disputes. After laying this foundation, the elders hosted peace conferences encompassing representatives from across society in 2009.⁴ These conferences served to systematically end the fighting in each area they took place in, incrementally spreading peace. At an event hosted by the Kenyan National Steering Committee in August 2009, representatives from both communities signed the Dukana-Dillo-Maikona Declaration, pledging to share water and facilitate cross-border trade, while also agreeing to compensation rates for lost lives and livestock. In 2017, the Declaration was updated and reaffirmed.⁵ While conflict between pastoralist groups remains a pervasive challenge to peace in the Horn of Africa, these measures ended the conflict between the Borama and the Gabra and reduced armed conflict on the Ethiopian-Kenyan border.

⁴ Pastoralist Communication Initiative. “The Long Conversation – Gabra-Borana Peace: A Summary of Findings from the research led by the Pastoralist Shade Initiative.” *Pastoralists.org*. (11 October 2011) Available at: <http://www.pastoralists.org/key-findings-on-achieving-peace-released/> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

⁵ Validation of the Reviews and Amendments on Dukana-Dillo-Maikona Declaration, 2017. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1910/Validation%20of%20the%20Reviews%20and%20Amendments%20on%20Dukana-Dillo-Maikona%20Declaration> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

Year(s): 2000 – 2018.

Location: Eritrea/Ethiopia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and the resolution of a militarised border dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea helped to prevent renewed interstate conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia while the militarised territorial dispute that sparked the 1998-2000 war was eventually resolved by the work of the Independent Boundary Commission of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, and although the 1000km border between them was already defined by colonial era treaties, it was yet to be demarcated. The governments in both countries were former wartime allies, but relations soon deteriorated and, in late 1997, several armed clashes occurred on the border.¹ A joint Border Commission was established to investigate the dispute, however only one meeting was held before relations soured further. In May 1998, Eritrean forces occupied the disputed territory, sparking an armed conflict.² The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) acted quickly to try and bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, presenting an initiative developed by the Rwandan and US governments. The Government of Eritrea rejected the proposal, and, in response, the Ethiopian military launched a large offensive against the Eritrean positions in February 1999. In a change of tack, the Eritrean leadership accepted the OAU proposals, only for their Ethiopian counterparts to refuse to sign an article on technical arrangements in the proposal.³ The fighting continued, with Ethiopian forces launching additional large offensives in early 2000.

¹ UCDP. *Eritrea - Ethiopia*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/409> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Terrence Lyons. "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa." *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 36, No. 120. (2009) p.168

³ International Crisis Group. "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War." *Africa Report*, No. 101. (2005) p.2

Indirect talks resumed in April 2000 with little progress, however once Ethiopian troops had struck deep into Eritrean territory, the belligerent parties gathered for talks in Algiers, Algeria. The negotiations culminated in June 2000 with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which affirmed the disputed territory to be under Ethiopian administration, stipulated the withdrawal of Eritrean troops out of a 25km demilitarised zone, and called for a UN peacekeeping force to assist with implementation.⁴ In September 2000, the first of 4,200 peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) arrived to supervise withdrawals and monitor the demilitarised zone.⁵ With peacekeepers in place and their respective armies withdrawn from the demilitarised zone, the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia met in Algiers to continue the peace talks.⁶ Building on previous proposals, the parties signed a formal peace treaty witnessed by the UN Secretary-General and representatives from the OAU, EU, and the governments of Algeria and the USA in December 2000, ending the armed conflict and placing responsibility for resolving the dispute in the hands of neutral commissions, including an Independent Boundary Commission established for the purpose at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.⁷ The UN Cartographic Section supported the work of the Commission, which issued its verdicts in April 2002.⁸ The brutal war cost the lives of almost 100,000 people, however consistent efforts to facilitate dialogue and the deployment of UNMEE helped to bring the fighting to an end.

⁴ Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreathioia-cessationhostilities2000> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁵ UNMEE. *Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmee.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ International Crisis Group. "Ethiopia and Eritrea." p.3

⁷ Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/eritreathioia-agreement2000> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁸ Permanent Court of Arbitration. *Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission*. (PCA, 2022) Available at: <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/99/> (Accessed 17/01/2022)

Year(s): 2011 – 2021.

Location: Ethiopia/Kenya International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure and stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations, the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments, and the EU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Armed conflict between communities living near the Ethiopia-Kenya border was reduced and the risk of interstate conflict was significantly reduced.

The Ethiopian-Kenyan frontier is a sparsely populated and remote region, historically home to a mix of nomadic pastoralist populations (such as the Turkana and Dassenach) for whom the international border traditionally meant little. This ambiguity made the region a strategically important location for troops of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as they conducted their insurgency against Ethiopian security forces. This led to multiple clashes inside Kenyan territory, including incidents that led to the deaths of Kenyan civilians.¹ This pattern of violence took place alongside ongoing low-intensity conflicts between the local population over livestock, pasture, and water. Over 100 people were killed in such disputes between 2002 and 2004. Further clashes took place in 2010 and 2011, with a particularly bad clash taking place on 1 May 2011 when around 30 Turkana from Kenya were killed by some Dassenach after entering Ethiopia to trade at a market.² This led to retaliatory attacks, and people who happened to be on the wrong side of the border (around 70 in total) were taken hostage by both communities.³ The crisis posed a major threat of escalating into a major conflict between the two peoples and threatened to sour bilateral relations between

¹ BBC. "The Somali connection." *BBC News*. (23 July 1999) Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/07/99/battle_in_the_horn/399898.stm (Accessed 18/11/2021)

² Alex Thurston. "Turkana-Merille Fighting: A Deadly Cycle in Kenya and Ethiopia." *Sahel Blog*. (6 May 2011) Available at: <https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/05/06/turkana-merille-fighting-a-deadly-cycle-in-kenya-and-ethiopia/> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

³ Fromothermedia. "Ethio-Kenyan border: Turkana, Dassenech/Merille Fighting." *Horn Affairs*. (15 May 2011) Available at: <https://hornaffairs.com/2011/05/15/ethio-kenyan-border-turkana-dassenechmerille-fighting/> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

Ethiopia and Kenya, while the pervasive instability in the frontier region represented a constant source of low-intensity armed conflict.

The 2011 crisis was defused by local government and civil society organisations on both sides of the border. Ethiopian militia and police escorted the Turkana still in the country back to Kenya, local peace committees and NGOs organised a forum for dialogue between the two groups, and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) units of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development within each country organised a conference with local stakeholders on the incident.⁴ This calmed the immediate situation while bilateral ministerial meetings and CEWARN initiatives worked to develop a lasting solution to the instability along the frontier. This resulted in the creation of a bilateral cross-border programme aimed at strengthening local capacity to prevent conflict and promote sustainable peace. In practical terms, these measures established peace committees including members from both communities, strengthened capacity of local administrations, and increased border patrols. In 2018, the EU and UN began supporting the initiative.⁵ When the area was hit by devastating floods in 2020, the two communities negotiated a resource-sharing agreement through the mechanism of the peace committees rather than engage in violent competition for resources, as they had when facing previous crises.⁶

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ UNDP Kenya. “Cross-Border Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the Marsabit-Moyale Cluster.” *UNDP Kenya Projects*. (UN, 2021) Available at: <https://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/projects/cross-border-cooperation-between-ethiopia-and-kenya-for-conflict.html> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

⁶ Pact. “‘We have to feel our neighbors’ pain’: On the Kenya-Ethiopia border, feuding groups unite after crisis.” *Pactworld Features*. (23 November 2020) Available at: <https://www.pactworld.org/features/%E2%80%98we-have-feel-our-neighbors%E2%80%99-pain%E2%80%99-kenya-ethiopia-border-feuding-groups-unite-after-crisis> (Accessed 18/11/2021)

Year(s): 2018.

Location: Somali Region, Ethiopia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Kenya, Dubai, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and Conciliation Resources.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The long-running armed conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia was ended by a peace agreement mediated with support from Conciliation Resources.

Ogaden is a historical name of the contemporary Ethiopian federal state of the Somali Region. Colonised by the Ethiopian Empire in the nineteenth century but with a predominantly Somali population, the region served as a buffer between Addis Ababa and the encroachments of European powers in the Horn of Africa for decades.¹ In the aftermath of the Second World War, Ogaden was formally handed over to the re-established Ethiopian state after its liberation from Italian rule by the British. The emergence of a unified and independent Somalia in 1960 inspired armed resistance to Ethiopian rule in Ogaden, and in 1977 this movement took full advantage of upheaval in Addis Ababa to seize large swathes of territory in the region. These efforts were supported by the Somali National Army, sparking the Ogaden War (1977-1978) between Ethiopia and Somalia, which ended with an Ethiopian victory. In this context, the failure of new governments to address demands for autonomy or self-determination in Ogaden during the 1990s (as neighbouring Somalia collapsed into conflict) inspired another armed rebellion, this time led by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The conflict escalated considerably in 2007, after ONLF troops attacked an oil prospecting camp, leading to an increasingly harsh response from Ethiopian security forces and local Somali militias more opposed to the ONLF than Ethiopian rule.²

¹ Tobias Hagmann. *Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The Search for an end to conflict in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia*. (London, 2014) pp.13-4

² Ibid. p.26

In 2011, the Government of Ethiopia asked their Kenyan counterparts to facilitate peace talks with the ONLF. The following year, the parties met for the first time in Nairobi under the guidance of a team led by a Kenyan Somali minister (Kenya has historically been more successful in integrating its Somali population) and advised by the NGO Conciliation Resources.³ After an initial round of dialogue resulted in a Declaration of Principles, ONLF leaders attended negotiations training in London with Conciliation Resources. However, progress stalled until, in 2015, Conciliation Resources advised the ONLF to begin talks with the regional administration of the Somali Regional State, which had grown in power and influence since 2010. After some initial overtures, these parties met for secret talks in Dubai in November 2017.⁴ This set the tone for more conclusive talks to take place after the unexpected change of power which brought the current Abiy Ahmed administration to power in April 2018. The ONLF declared a ceasefire in June, before attending negotiations in Dubai, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, culminating with the Asmara Peace Declaration on 21 October 2018.⁵

³ Aden Abdi. "Pathways to peace in Ogaden: Navigating symbolism in early peace talks." *Accord*, Vol. 29. (2020) p.66

⁴ Ibid. p.70

⁵ Joint Declaration between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (The Asmara Declaration), 2018. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2231> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

Year(s): 1988 – present.

Location: New Caledonia, Overseas France.

UN Regional Group: Western Europe and Others.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of France and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of peace agreements mediated by the French government and the ongoing supervision of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation has ensured that the debate over the future of New Caledonia has not escalated into armed conflict.

The collection of islands in the Pacific known as New Caledonia was part of the French Empire until 1946, when it became a French Overseas Territory. Divisions between the indigenous Kanak population and European and Polynesian settlers have been a feature of New Caledonian politics since the colonial period, with several Kanak rebellions taking place over the years. In 1984, a coalition of pro-independence Kanak political parties formed the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste*, FLNKS) and launched an insurgency against French security services with the goal of achieving independence. Within weeks, they had gained control of many towns and established a parallel administration.¹ The conflict was marked by clashes between militias, assassinations, and hostage-taking, culminating with the 1988 hostage incident at Ouvéa Cave, in which four gendarmes and over twenty FLNKS personnel were killed.²

The 1988 Matignon Agreements ended the fighting before it could escalate. Mediated by the Government of France and signed by FLNKS and “loyalist” political parties, the Agreements

¹ David Robie. “Flashback to Kanaky in the 1980s – ‘Blood on their banner’.” *Asia Pacific Report*. (2018) Available at: <https://asiapacificreport.nz/2018/11/01/flashback-to-kanaky-in-the-1980s-blood-on-their-banner/> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

² Steven Greenhouse. “17 Die as French Free Hostages in New Caledonia.” *The New York Times*. (1988) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/06/world/17-die-as-french-free-hostages-in-new-caledonia.html> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

provided for a gradual transition to independence.³ It was an interim solution, with a referendum scheduled for 1998 providing a deadline for the parties to the conflict to find some consensus.⁴ Although the process outlined in Matignon calmed the conflict, many issues remained unresolved. Kanak support for the peace process was mixed, with many political parties maintaining militias and hard-line elements within them advocating a return to armed struggle.⁵ Talks held between the New Caledonian political parties in the early 1990s culminated with an agreement to postpone the 1998 referendum and manage the transition within the framework of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation. This allowed the negotiation of a transition to independence based on consensus and delayed the potentially volatile referendum.⁶ The agreement was formalised on 5 May 1998 by the Nouméa Accord, which was signed by the main New Caledonian political parties (including the FLNKS) and the Government of France.⁷ The Accords also introduced a provincial government and a special status for the territory, created a parallel New Caledonian citizenship for residents, scheduled several referenda, and established a *Comité des signataires* to monitor implementation. In the ensuing decades, the UN Special Commission has monitored the process, directly supporting the New Caledonians to achieve self-determination peacefully.⁸

³ Jon Fraenkel. "Introduction: The Long-run Impact of New Caledonia's Noumea Accord." *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 54, No. 2. (2019) p.200

⁴ Stephen Henningham. "The Uneasy Peace: New Caledonia's Matignon Accords at Mid-Term." *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 4. (2019) p.519

⁵ Ibid. p.532

⁶ Nic MacLellan. "The Noumea Accord and Decolonisation in New Caledonia." *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 34, No. 3. (1999) p.245

⁷ *L'accord de Nouméa*, 1998. Available at: <https://outre-mer.gouv.fr/laccord-de-noumea> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

⁸ UN. "Referendum on Status of New Caledonia 'Important Step' Forward in Decolonization Process, Secretary-General Says as Special Committee Begins Annual Session." *UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, SG/SM/19467-GA/COL/3329. (2019) Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19467.doc.htm> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Year(s): 1993 – 1999.

Location: North Macedonia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe/ Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, EU, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A timely diplomatic intervention by a range of international organisations and the deployment of a preventive peacekeeping mission helped the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to avoid armed conflict during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Macedonia was one of six republics within the federal framework of socialist Yugoslavia. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia (two of the other republics), fell into armed conflict as their respective administrations attempted to guide them towards statehood. When the Macedonian population voted for independence in a September 1991 referendum, many observers feared another armed conflict would ensue, either with Belgrade or among the diverse Macedonian population.¹ Although the Yugoslav National Army withdrew peacefully in February 1992, later that year the leadership of the nascent Macedonian state requested that the UN send observers to monitor events. Peacekeepers already deployed to the region as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) entered Macedonian territory in December 1992 and were quickly reinforced with 500 American troops.² The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe also established the Spillover Mission to Skopje and tasked it with maintaining peace in the area.³

¹ Alice Ackermann. “Managing Conflicts Non-Violently Through Preventive Action: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1. (1999) p.1

² UN Peacekeeping. *Introduction to UNPREDEP*. (UN, 1999) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unpred_b.htm (Accessed 14/10/2020)

³ OSCE. *Mandate of the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje*. (OSCE, 1992) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/skopje/42366> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Tensions between the government and parts of Macedonia's Albanian community escalated in 1992 following an unofficial referendum on increased autonomy for a predominantly Albanian part of the country. The result (a large majority in favour) was dismissed by the government in Skopje.⁴ As a similar turn of events had preceded every other conflict in former Yugoslavia, Macedonia became the focus of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. After conducting 11 fact-finding missions, he recommended that the government introduce Albanian-language education, hold a nationwide census, progress towards ethnic representation in state institutions, and strengthen an advisory body tasked with proposing solutions to problems among Macedonia's communities, the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations.⁵ In addition to suggesting policy, van der Stoel also helped mediate discussions between the Macedonian government and Albanian leaders, ultimately resolving a potentially violent conflict peacefully. On 13 March 1995, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), representing the first deployment of its kind, was established to replace UNPROFOR.⁶ UNPREDEP remain in Macedonia until 1999.

⁴ Přemysl Rosůlek. "Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia (1991-2001): Could the attempt to create a Multiethnic Society Succeed?" *Perspectives Review of International Affairs*, No. 17. (2002) p.44

⁵ Max van der Stoel. *Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities*. Hamburg: Nomos, 1999) p.103

⁶ UNPREDEP. *UNPREDEP Mission Profile*. (UN Peacekeeping, 1999) Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unpred_p.htm (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Year(s): 2001.

Location: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (North Macedonia since 2019)

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, a peacekeeping mission, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Armed conflict was prevented once again in Macedonia in 2001, in this case by a diplomatic intervention by a range of intergovernmental organisations, the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation peacekeeping mission, and the strengthening of existing peace infrastructure.

In 2001, Macedonia once again stood at the precipice of armed conflict. Beginning in February, an ethnic Albanian separatist movement known as the National Liberation Army (NLA) began attacking government security forces near the Kosovan border. After a relatively brief clash around the town of Tetovo, the fighting halted for a month, before erupting at a much greater scale in May.⁷ As much of the NLA's personnel and equipment was travelling across the mountainous border with Kosovo, the crisis presented a very real possibility of escalating into a much larger regional conflict.

The first step to resolving the crisis was (once again) taken by Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities Max Van der Stoel, who issued repeated early warnings of the potential for conflict.⁸ As a result, European leaders invited the Macedonian president to a conference in Stockholm in March 2001 to discuss the crisis. Efforts to pressure the government to find a peaceful solution were undermined by the inability of Macedonian political parties to form a stable national

⁷ BBC. "Macedonia fights on two fronts." *BBC News*. (2001) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1346587.stm> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

⁸ Nyheim. *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse*. p.58

governing coalition. By chance, Paddy Ashdown (British politician and future High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina) was already in the region and quickly moved to assess the situation. After meeting with the NLA leadership, he began conveying their demands to the European leaders gathered in Stockholm.⁹ With dialogue started, a range of international organisations and national governments moved to resolve the crisis. EU officials in Kosovo gathered statements from local leaders condemning the violence before travelling to Skopje and convincing the Macedonian parliament to resume talks. In June, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) approved the deployment of 3,000 troops to oversee the de-escalation process in the case that a deal was struck.¹⁰ NATO Secretary-General George Robertson then mediated negotiations alongside representatives of the EU and the Government of the USA.¹¹ The negotiations culminated with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001.¹² The Agreement stipulated a range of reforms that were aimed at making Macedonia a more inclusive place to live for its ethnic Albanian population. NATO troops disarmed the NLA personnel, the OSCE helped to strengthen existing peace infrastructure such as the Committees for Inter-Community Relations, and the EU approved funding for a range of development projects.¹³ Once again, war in Macedonia was prevented.

⁹ Paddy Ashdown. *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007) pp.154-8

¹⁰ Staff and agencies. "More Macedonia violence as Nato troops arrive." *The Guardian*. (2001) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/20/balkans2> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

¹¹ Ashdown. *Swords and Ploughshares*. p.158

¹² Framework Agreement (Ohrid Agreement), 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

¹³ OSCE. *OSCE Mission to Skopje: Mandate*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-skopje/mandate> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Year(s): 2017 – present.

Location: The Gambia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The deployment of an Economic Community of West African States peacekeeping force has helped The Gambia to prevent a constitutional crisis that from escalating into an armed conflict.

In December 2017, The Gambia held a presidential election. The incumbent, President Yahya Jammeh, had been in power since 1994, led a repressive regime, and had refused the presence of international monitors at the polls. Thus, the unexpected announcement from the Gambian Electoral Commission that the opposition candidate had won the contest caught many observers off guard. Even more surprising was the conciliatory tone initially offered by Jammeh, who congratulated his rival, Adama Barrow.¹ Within a week, however, Jammeh deployed troops on the streets and claimed irregularities in the vote-counting process meant that fresh elections should be held. Fearing armed conflict or a brutal crackdown, Barrow, along with tens of thousands of other Gambian citizens, fled to neighbouring Senegal.

The international community, led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was quick to condemn Jammeh's actions and called for the restoration of constitutional rule. The UN Special Representative for West Africa and the presidents of Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone visited Jammeh, imploring him to give up the presidency. Jammeh's refusal to cede power led ECOWAS to gather troops on the border and

¹ Christof Harmann. "ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia." *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 52, No. 1. (2017) pp.86-7

prepare for a military intervention once his mandate ended.² The EU provided initial funds for the operation via its Early Response Mechanism and has continued supporting ECOWAS efforts in The Gambia.³ In the meantime, Barrow was inaugurated in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal on 19 January 2017 and, on the same day, the UN Security Council approved ECOWAS intervention to enforce the decision of the Gambian people.⁴ The ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia made clear its intention to enter the country the moment Jammeh's term in the presidency ended, however such action was avoided when he finally agreed to leave the country.⁵ In 2018, the African Union Technical Support to The Gambia mission was established to support the stabilisation process and advise the Gambian government on the rule of law, democracy, transitional justice, and Security Sector Reform.⁶ Diplomatic pressure and threat of military intervention helped to ensure a peaceful transfer of power and maintain stability in The Gambia.

² Ruth Maclean. "Gambia crisis: Senegal troops poised at border as Jammeh mandate ends." *The Guardian*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/senegal-troops-poised-at-the-gambia-border-as-jammeh-mandate-ends> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

³ Africa-EU Partnership. *Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG)*. (EU, 2019) Available at: <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-gambia-ecomig> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2337*. (UN, 2017) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2337> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁵ Ruth Maclean. "Yahya Jammeh leaves the Gambia after 22 years of rule." *The Guardian*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/21/anxious-gambians-await-former-president-yahya-jammeh-departure> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁶ Chido Mutangadura. "Will The Gambia be a turning point for AU peace efforts?" *Institute for Security Studies*. (2019) Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-gambia-be-a-turning-point-for-au-peace-efforts> (Accessed 12/11/2020)

Year(s): 1992 – 2008.

Location: South Ossetia, Georgia (*de jure*).

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, a monitoring mission, and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The armed conflict in South Ossetia was contained between 1992 and 2008 by the deployment of a regional peacekeeping mission.

In the Soviet Union, South Ossetia was an Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. This status guaranteed its Ossetian population certain rights and protections. When Georgian leaders moved towards independence in the early 1990s, they introduced Georgian as the main language of the whole republic and limited the rights of formerly autonomous polities within Georgian territory. In response, South Ossetian leaders proclaimed the independence of their oblast (upgrading it to the status of a republic and asserting sovereignty) and expressed their desire to remain part of the Soviet Union. Following the failed August 1990 coup d'état in Moscow, Soviet troops began withdrawing from the territory of Georgia, allegedly arming the Ossetian population on their way.¹ In December 1990, the Georgian administration declared a state of emergency in South Ossetia and the following month sent armed police into the region to disarm Ossetian militia. This sparked a clash in Tskhinvali (the *de facto* capital of South Ossetia) which left the town divided, before the Georgians withdrew following the mediation of a ceasefire by Soviet authorities. The fighting escalated considerably in the spring of 1991, causing widespread destruction but changing little on the ground: Georgian forces were unable to make any ground into South Ossetia.²

¹ John Mackinlay & Evgenii Sharov. "Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia." in John Mackinlay & Peter Cross. *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. (Tokyo, 2003) p.75

² Christoph Zürcher. *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*. (New York, 2007) p.126

With little progress on the battlefield, Georgian leaders chose to blockade and besiege South Ossetia as winter settled in 1991. Fighting took place again in 1992, but a change in Georgian leadership and the growing crisis in Abkhazia diminished the prospect of renewed offensives in the summer.³ However, it was not until dozens of civilians were killed in May 1992 and South Ossetian forces were found to be using heavy weaponry (representing a potential escalation of the conflict) that the belligerents met for talks. In June, representatives of the Government of Georgia met with the regional leadership of North Ossetia (within Russia), agreeing to a ceasefire and the formation of a joint monitoring and peacekeeping force. These negotiations served as the basis for the Sochi Agreement, which was signed by Georgian and Russian leaders on 24 June 1992.⁴ In addition to a formal ceasefire, the agreement established the Joint Control Commission and the Russian-led Joint Peacekeeping Force of approximately 2,000 personnel from the Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian armed forces to uphold the peace.⁵ This framework succeeded in keeping the peace in South Ossetia until 2008, when an interstate conflict erupted between Georgia and Russia.

³ Mackinlay & Sharov. "Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia." p.77

⁴ Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement), 1992. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-sochi-agreement92> (Accessed 10/11/2021)

⁵ Mackinlay & Sharov. "Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia." p.79-80

Year(s): 1993 – present.

Location: Abkhazia, (de jure) Georgia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Confederation of Independent States, the EU, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: A series of international and regional peacekeeping missions have helped to contain the armed conflict in Abkhazia, preventing a conflict relapse that could have sparked much broader regional confrontations.

As Georgian leaders moved toward independence during the collapse of the Soviet Union, a series of armed clashes took place in the region of Abkhazia between the Abkhazian and Georgian populations. In 1992, a year after Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, Abkhazian armed groups launched an insurgency against government security forces while the local administration declared Abkhazian independence.¹ The fighting continued for over a year, costing thousands of lives and driving 200,000 non-Abkhaz civilians from their homes in the area.² Despite providing extensive military support to the Abkhaz separatists, the Government of Russia hosted a series of peace talks during the war. A UN mediated ceasefire in December 1993 created a window for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to be deployed to verify compliance and facilitate dialogue.³ However, despite the presence of UNOMIG, the fighting continued until 14 May 1994, when the Russian-brokered Moscow Agreement ended the conflict and established a The Confederation of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents.⁴

¹ UCDP. *Georgia: Abkhazia*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/392> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

² Lynch. *Russian Peacekeeping in the CIS*. p.129

³ Memorandum of Understanding between the Georgian and the Abkhaz Sides at the Negotiations held in Geneva, 1993. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-mou-abkhazia93> (Accessed 24/11/2020); UN Peacekeeping. *Georgia – UNOMIG – Background*. (UN, 2009) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomig/background.html> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁴ Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, 1994. Available at: John Mackinlay & Evgenii Sharov. “Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia.” in John Mackinlay & Peter Cross, eds. *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003) p.91

With CIS forces in place, the international effort to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict began immediately. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established its own mission in Georgia to support UN efforts to resolve the conflict.⁵ A brief outbreak of fighting in 1998 was successfully contained in six days, resulting in another ceasefire and an agreement on confidence-building measures, while another eruption of violence in August 2008 was ended by EU-mediated talks.⁶ However, Russian recognition of Abkhazian independence a few weeks later undermined the mandates of UNOMIG and the CIS and OSCE missions.⁷ Many Russian troops remain in Abkhazia following this decision; however, they serve as bilateral partners rather than peacekeepers.⁸ As a result, the European Union Monitoring Mission, which was deployed in September 2008 to monitor the latest agreement is the only international presence in the area.⁹ Although the conflict remains unresolved, Abkhazia has been spared from war for almost three decades.

⁵ OSCE. *OSCE Mission to Georgia (Closed): The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/georgia-closed/44629> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁶ Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations and Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities, 1998. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-protocol-ceasefire98> (Accessed 24/11/2020); Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 1998. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-athensmeeting98> (Accessed 24/11/2020); Carter Johnson. "Keeping the Peace After Partition: Ethnic Minorities, Civil Wars, and the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma." *Civil Wars*, Vol. 17, No. 1. (2015) p.33

⁷ Implementation of the Plan of 12 August 2008, 2008. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/georgia-implementation-plan2008> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁸ Vladimir Socor. "Russia Discards its "Peacekeeping" Operation in Abkhazia." *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 5, No. 196. (2008) Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-discards-its-peacekeeping-operation-in-abkhazia/> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁹ EUMM. *Our Mandate*. (EUMM, 2020) Available at: https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate (Accessed 24/11/2020)

Year(s): 2004.

Location: *Autonomous Republic of Adjara, Georgia.*

UN Regional Group: *Eastern Europe.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The governments of Georgia and Russia, local people and organisations.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The diplomatic efforts of the Georgian and Russian governments helped prevent a war in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara.*

The Adjara Autonomous Republic existed within Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1921. Bordering Turkey and home to a sizeable Muslim population (particularly in the 1920s), Adjara was one of only two polities within the Soviet Union to enjoy political and administrative autonomy on the basis of the confessional outlook of the population – the other being the Jewish Autonomous District in Russia.¹ The Georgian state was severely weakened by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the early 1990s. In this context, Aslan Abashidze rose to power in Adjara. Over the ensuing decade, he exploited the complex situation in Georgia to build an authoritarian regime and consolidate his control of the region. This included raising paramilitary forces, collecting revenue from the port of Batumi, and withholding taxes from Tbilisi. This strategy proved to be highly effective (and profitable to Abashidze) until the Rose Revolution of November 2003 brought a new Georgian administration to power. The new leadership refused to tolerate the complex relationship that had developed with Adjara and, in March 2004, placed a blockade on the area until all paramilitary forces were disarmed. In response, Abashidze declared a state of emergency, mobilised reservists, and cracked down on opposition.² Members of the Georgian government were prevented from entering Adjara by police and paramilitaries in March 2004, preceding a crisis in which Adjarian forces destroyed two bridges and a railway line to cut the region off from Georgia entirely. In response, the Georgian armed forces conducted

¹ Zurab Tchiaberashvili. “Ajara: A Case in Conflict Avoidance.” In Ali Askerov, Stefan Brooks, & Lasha Tchantouridzé. *The Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years’ Crisis*. (Lexington Books, 2020) p.88

² Ibid. pp.84-5

their largest ever military exercise along the Adjarian border, watched by over 1,000 Adjarian troops.³

Faced with an increasingly authoritarian regime and the prospect of war, the Adjarian population took to the streets in growing numbers to demonstrate against Abashidze's rule. On the 5 May, a delegation from the Georgian government crossed into Adjara to hold talks with Abashidze's interior minister, who agreed to stand his personal forces down in return for personal safety. The same day, demonstrators took control of central Batumi. These developments inspired an unlikely phone call between the Georgian president and Vladimir Putin, who agreed to offer asylum to Abashidze to help diffuse the crisis. That evening, the head of the Russian Security Council arrived in Georgia to hold talks with the Adjarian leadership. The next morning, Abashidze stepped down and fled to Moscow, ending the crisis before it could escalate into an armed conflict.⁴

³ Giorgi Gogia. "Georgia's woes are far from over." *The Guardian*. (26 March 2004) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/26/theobserver> (Accessed 14/11/2021)

⁴ Tchiaberashvili. "Ajara." p.85

Year(s): 2008.

Location: Georgia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Negotiations hosted by the EU ended the 2008 interstate conflict between Georgia and Russia in five days.

The uneasy peace established between Russia, Georgia, and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s held with only relatively minor infractions (notably in 2004) until 2008.¹ A 2006 referendum on South Ossetian independence, Russian intrusions into Georgian airspace, and the collapse of talks under the auspices of the OSCE in October 2007 created a tense climate. This situation developed rapidly the following year when Georgia requested to join NATO and the Kosovan declaration of independence spurred a concerted South Ossetian effort for international recognition. In April 2008, Russia opened formal ties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and significantly increased the numbers of troops it had deployed in the area. Armed clashes took place near Tskhinvali in June, increasing in frequency and severity until 8 August, when the Georgian president declared a state of war.² At this stage, far more Russian troops were in the contested republics than the peace arrangements negotiated 15 years previously allowed and the Russian Air Force was bombing targets across Georgia. In a matter of days, Georgian forces were forced out of contested parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by local militia backed by Russian troops. On 10 and 11 August, Russian forces pressed deep into Georgia, temporarily occupying the town of Gori while the Russian navy established a maritime blockade of the Georgian coast.³ Up to

¹ UCDP. *Georgia: South Ossetia*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/393> (Accessed 10/11/2021)

² Alexis Crow. "Georgia-Russia Conflict Timeline (includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia)" *RUSI Commentary*. (7 October 2015) Available at: <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/georgia-russia-conflict-timeline-includes-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia> (Accessed 10/11/2021)

³ IWPR Georgia. "Russia's War With Georgia: 2008 Timeline." *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*. (4 August 2014) Available at: <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russias-war-georgia-2008-timeline> (Accessed 10/11/2021)

850 people were killed in the fighting, and almost 200,000 were forced from their homes. With 2,000 hardened Georgian troops returning from Iraq and reserve forces were being mobilised, the stage was set for a much less restrained – and potentially devastating - interstate confrontation.

The EU had developed a growing interest in the Caucasus over the preceding decade, making it ideally placed to facilitate talks to end the conflict and prevent a much larger war. On 12 August, French President Nicholas Sarkozy (in his capacity of chair of the EU) flew to Moscow for talks with the Russian administration. After successfully negotiating an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, Sarkozy took the agreement to the Georgian government, which duly accepted the terms.⁴ The agreement also established an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to verify the withdrawal of Russian troops and monitor the new frontlines. Although the withdrawal of Russian forces took place slowly, the fighting was over. Just three days later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited both Georgia and Russia in support of the peace process.⁵

⁴ Protocol on Agreement (The Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili plan), 2008. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/724> (Accessed 11/11/2021)

⁵ Richard Whitman & Stefan Wolff. “The EU as a Conflict Manager? The Case of Georgia and Its Implications.” *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1. (2010) p.92

Year(s): 1994 – 1996.

Location: Northern Region, Ghana.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Ghana, local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Guinea Fowl War in the Northern Region of Ghana was ended by the deployment of troops and the mediation of a peace agreement.

The Northern Region is a large and relatively poor administrative region of Ghana that is home to a diverse population. Some groups live within chiefly communities (with chiefs, paramount chiefs, and sometimes kings), while others live an acephalous lifestyle without such hierarchies. During the colonial period, the British invested a range of decentralised “indirect rule” powers to the chiefs.¹ This resulted in an imbalance in political influence and land access which, after Ghanaian independence in 1957, increasingly became a source of conflict. Beginning in 1981, the Northern Region was wracked by a series of increasingly severe armed clashes between militia mobilised by the various communities in the area. It was in this context that a dispute on 3 February 1994, supposedly over the price of a guinea fowl in the village of Nakpachei, rapidly escalated into an armed conflict between three chiefly groups – the Dagomba, Gonja, and Nanumba – and four traditionally acephalus groups – the Nawuri, Nchumburu, Bassare, and Konkomba.² Within three days, the fighting had spread across 7 districts. Armed with bows, shotguns, and some assault rifles, armed groups pillaged and destroyed at least 442 villages, displacing 160,000 people, and killing up to 15,000.³ In response to the crisis, the Government of Ghana issued a state of emergency on

¹ Hizkias Assefa. “Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana.” In Muhammed Abu-Nimer, ed. *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*. (Lexington Books: Lanham, 2001) p.165

² Julie Kaye. “Ethno-Politicization in the 1994-1995 Case of Conflict in Northern Ghana: The Role of Youth Associations and Faith-Based Organizations.” *Chieftain: The Journal of Traditional Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2004) p.5

³ Ada van der Linde & Rachel Naylor. *Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation, and Civil Society in Northern Ghana*. (Oxfam: London, 1999) pp.27-8

10 February and deployed troops across the region to deter further violence. While the immediate fighting was ended by this operation, allowing peace talks to commence and the state of emergency to be lifted, another eruption of violence in March 1995 highlighted the need for a more lasting solution.⁴

The effort to end the conflict was multi-faceted. Initially, a government agency established in response to the conflict (the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team) mediated talks between the belligerents. This team succeeded in negotiating a ceasefire in June 1994, but it was not until a consortium of Ghanaian NGOs supported by a team from the Nairobi Peace Initiative began hosting talks in May 1995 that meaningful progress was made. At a series of meetings held in the city of Kumasi, these organisations painstakingly mediated negotiations for nearly a year that culminated on 30 March 1996 with the signing of the Kumasi Accord for Peace and Reconciliation Between the Ethnic Groups of Northern Ghana.⁵ Several organisations were established to oversee peace in the area, with a focus on equitable development. In December 1995 and May 1996, leaders involved in the conflict attended reconciliation ceremonies witnessed by the President of Ghana.⁶

⁴ Ibid. p.30

⁵ Assefa. "Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana." p.177-8

⁶ Linde & Naylor. *Building Sustainable Peace*. p.34

Year(s): 2002 – 2019.

Location: Northern Region, Ghana.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention, the mediation of a peace agreement, legal prosecution, and local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Ghana and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A war between rival claimants to the throne of the Kingdom of Dagbon in Northern Ghana was prevented by a Ghanaian military intervention and the mediation of a peace agreement after sixteen years of talks.

The Kingdom of Dagbon exists within the contemporary borders of Ghana, the constitution of which enshrines the role of traditional chieftains and kings in society. The state remains the primary political unit in Ghana, with the chieftains and kings fulfilling ceremonial roles along with some duties concerning local government, development, conflict resolution, and security.¹ Leadership of the Kingdom of Dagbon was historically rotated between two families, leaving plenty of scope for disputes and clashes between rival claimants to emerge. Indeed, the risk that such a dispute could trigger a wider conflict was recognised by the Government of Ghana as early as 1972. However, various investigations and legal rulings failed to resolve the crisis at the heart of the Kingdom of Dagbon and contributed to a growing sense of confusion and uncertainty over the issue of succession.² By the 1990s, a host of unresolved disputes between the families sharing the throne had accumulated, ranging from the burial rights of deceased kings to the legitimacy of the incumbent. In 2000, these issues became conflated with politics as the rival families supported opposing platforms during elections. This situation came to a head in March 2002 amidst a dispute over a festival. An attack on a member of one royal family preceded widespread clashes over

¹ Abdul Karim Issifu. "An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana: The Case of Dagbon Chieftaincy." *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 6. (2015) pp.28-9

² Ken Ahorsu & Boni Yao Gebe. "Governance and Security in Ghana: The Dagbon Chieftain Crisis." *SIPRI/OSI African Security and Governance Project*. (2011) pp.15-6

several days until, on 25 March 2002, the incumbent king was executed along with around 25 supporters in the royal palace.³ This unprecedented event threatened to escalate into a war for the throne that could have devastated northern Ghana.

The immediate threat of violence was minimised by the rapid (within hours) deployment of military and police units to the region by the Government of Ghana and the declaration of a state of emergency.⁴ The following month, an independent committee – the Wuaku Commission - was established to investigate the attack and recommend what action should be taken. This body was later supported by a UN committee after a request from the Ghanaian government.⁵ In 2003, the Government of Ghana established the Committee of Eminent Chiefs led by the Asantehene (the traditional ruler of the Ashanti) with support from the UN Development Programme to resolve the crisis. In 2006, the belligerents signed a roadmap to peace developed by this committee, allowing a regent to be appointed to the throne and some royal funerals to be held.⁶ Approximately 40 people were eventually arrested for the attack in 2010, limiting the risk of a conflict relapse. After no less than 60 rounds of talks, the Eminent Chiefs finally mediated a peaceful resolution to the dispute in 2018.⁷ This deal was presented to the Government of Ghana the following year and a new king was duly enskinned.

³ Edward Salifu Mahama & Felix T. Longi. “Conflicts in Northern Ghana: Search for Solutions, Stakeholders and Way Forward.” *Ghana Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2013) p.121

⁴ Ahorsu & Gebe. “Governance and Security in Ghana.” p.20

⁵ Staff and agencies. “Mission attempts to ease Dagbon crisis.” *IRIN News*. (2002) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/203057> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

⁶ Issifu. “An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana.” pp.35-6

⁷ Staff and agencies. “Otumfuo settles Andani, Abudu rift in Dagbon crisis.” *GhanaWeb*. (19 November 2018) Available at: <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Otumfuo-settles-Andani-Abudu-rift-in-Dagbon-crisis-701993> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

Year(s): 2002 – present.

Location: Ghana.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Ghana, the UN Development Programme, and local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Armed conflict across Ghana has been reduced by the construction and maintenance of a comprehensive peace infrastructure.

After committing so many resources to ending the armed conflicts and pervasive instability that plagued the Northern Region between 1994 and 2002, the regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council (NRPAC) in 2003 and tasked it with coordinating the efforts of government and civil society groups (such as the NGO Consortium established in response to the Guinea Fowl War and traditional chieftains such as the Asantehene) as they worked to prevent armed conflict and mediate a peaceful resolution to disputes.¹ NRPAC is formed of 24 members appointed by the regional government. The composition reflects a spectrum of religious groups, political parties, traditional elders, chieftains, representatives of women and youth groups, as well as police and security personnel.² In 2006, with assistance from the UN Development Programme, the Ghanaian Ministry of the Interior embarked on a project to expand the peace infrastructure emerging in the Northern Region to the entire country, with peace advisory councils at the district, regional, and national level serving to monitor, prevent, and resolve armed conflicts across Ghana.³ These councils are supported by Peace Promotion Officers, who are appointed from shortlists drawn up by regional governments, and a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the

¹ Vincent Verzat. “Infrastructures for Peace: A Grass-roots Way To Do State-Building?” *Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 10*. (2014) p.4

² Rashid Draman, Janet Adama Mohammed, & Peter Woodrow. *The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Portfolio of UNDP Ghana: Evaluation Report*. (Cambridge, MA: CDA, 2009) p.17

³ Ulrike Hopp-Nishanka. “Giving Peace an Address? Reflections on the Potential and Challenges of Creating Peace Infrastructures.” In Barbara Unger, Stina Lundström, Katrin Planta, & Beatrix Austin, eds. *Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice*. (Berlin: Berghof, 2013) p.7

Ministry of Interior.⁴ This framework emerged under the policy umbrella of the National Architecture for Peace in Ghana, but was a painstaking process involving the creation and harmonisation of 212 district peace councils and 10 regional bodies.⁵ 2011 represents a major milestone in the construction process, when the National Peace Council Act was approved by the Ghanaian parliament, formalising the growing role of this peace infrastructure in managing armed conflict.⁶

Since its creation, the Ghanaian peace infrastructure has helped resolve the Dagbon crisis, worked to ensure peaceful resolutions to chieftaincy disputes in Upper West Region, and mediated an end to an ongoing low-intensity conflict between the Alavanyo and Nkonya in Volta Region.⁷ In addition, the National Peace Council has helped to prevent electoral violence in Ghana, with both the 2008 and 2012 contests representing serious risks of sparking armed conflict. These relatively high-level initiatives are supported by nationwide efforts to strengthen the voices of women and youth campaigning for peace, build the capacity of local people and organisations to manage conflict, and introduce guidelines for political media coverage.⁸

⁴ Hopp-Nishanka. "Giving Peace an Address?" p.13

⁵ William Awınador-Kanyirige. "Ghana's National Peace Council." *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Policy Brief*. (2014) p.5

⁶ National Peace Council. *The National Peace Council Act, 2011*. (NPC, 2021) Available at: <https://www.peacecouncil.gov.gh/the-national-peace-council-act-2011/> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

⁷ Draman, Mohammed, & Woodrow. *The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Portfolio of UNDP Ghana*. pp.27-30

⁸ Ibid. pp.21-4

Year(s): 2008 – 2009.

Location: Ghana.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention, peace infrastructure, local action, and monitoring missions.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Ghana and local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Ghanaian people and organisations worked alongside the government and security services to ensure that the 2008 elections did not spark an armed conflict in Ghana.

Despite its recent history of relatively free, fair, and peaceful elections, the 2008 presidential contest in Ghana presented a significant risk of sparking armed conflict. This was particularly true in the troubled Northern Region, where changes in government had a direct impact on ongoing chieftaincy disputes such as that over the throne of the Kingdom of Dagbon. In the run-up to the election, violence marred the voter registration process in Northern Region, where supporters of the two main political parties were found to be acquiring weapons in preparation for conflict and street clashes began to occur with increasing frequency.¹ With polling indicating that the margin of victory would be razor thin and much to win (or lose) from the contest, particularly with regard to tit-for-tat corruption prosecutions of outgoing government ministers and the windfall of oil revenue from freshly opened offshore fields at stake, tensions grew. Furthermore, events in Kenya and Zimbabwe that took place just months before demonstrated that a vigorous and potentially violent reaction to suspected foul play could prove beneficial should a power-sharing arrangement result from any election-related crises. In the days before the population went to the polls, residents of Northern Region fearing an armed conflict would ensue formed self-defence units.² The first round of voting went ahead amidst a large security operation involving 36,000 personnel, armoured vehicles, and 10,000 additional troops in reserve, but was inconclusive, leading to a second

¹ Jesse Salah Ovadia. "Stepping Back from the Brink: A Review of the 2008 Ghanaian Election from the Capital of the Northern Region." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2. (2011) pp.323-5

² Ibid. p.331

round.³ A worsening security situation saw attempts to storm the electoral commission office and the suspension of polls in Tain election district.⁴

Faced with the challenge of ensuring a peaceful outcome from this uncertain situation, government agencies, local people and organisations, international observers, and Ghana's nascent peace infrastructure worked tirelessly. Their efforts were coordinated by the National Elections Security Task Force. While the military and police provided a strong and visible deterrent in 1,399 pre-determined violence prone areas, civil society groups (ranging from churches to trade unions) organised peace marches and dialogue fora, and international observation missions surveyed and verified the electoral process as far as their resources allowed.⁵ Thus, when the final ballots were being counted, public debate remained focussed on safeguarding the peace in Ghana. The electoral commission also played a pivotal role by not bowing to pressure from any quarter and ensuring that both candidates were kept apprised of the situation until the result was declared on 3 January 2009.⁶ Thanks to this wide-ranging effort, armed conflict was prevented in Ghana.

³ Staff and agencies. "Police gear up to prevent election violence." *IRIN News*. (21 November 2008) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/81613/ghana-police-gear-prevent-election-violence> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

⁴ Kathrin Meissner. "Elections and Conflict in Ghana." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis*. (2010) p.2

⁵ Staff and agencies. "Police gear up to prevent election violence."

⁶ Meissner. "Elections and Conflict in Ghana." p.8-9

Year(s): 2000 – present.

Location: The Great Lakes, Africa.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the African Union, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: After being established by the African Union and the UN, the ICGLR has prevented further interstate conflict in the Great Lakes since 2003.

Although the Second Congo War was already one of the largest in history, the extent of foreign involvement and the frequency of direct confrontations between the armed forces of at least ten different states posed a major risk of inciting a much broader conflict. Furthermore, the armed conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda that took place in the 1990s had created an extremely uncertain political and socio-economic climate (marked by the displacement of sizeable populations and the preponderance of armed groups in the area) in the Great Lakes which promised to continue destabilising the entire region. As a result, the UN Security Council called for an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region in 2000, as efforts to end the armed conflict in DRC began to gain some momentum. Later that year, the African Union (AU) and UN established a permanent secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya, to lay the groundwork for the conference. In 2004, a year after the Sun City Agreement ended the Second Congo War, the ICGLR hosted its first summit in Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania. The talks culminated with the governments of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia unanimously adopting the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, which called for the transformation of the Great Lakes into a space of sustainable peace and democracy, on 20 November 2004.¹ In

¹ Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, 2004. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/greatlakes-daressalaam-declaration2004> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

2006, at the second ICGLR summit, representatives of the 11 member states signed the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development which, among other things, included a commitment to renounce the threat or use of force and resolve any disputes by peaceful means.²

With these provisions in place, the ICGLR Executive Secretariat was established in May 2007 and tasked with coordinating, facilitating, and monitoring the implementation of the agreements. Twice a year, the Secretariat hosts meetings of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee to discuss peace and security in the region. In addition, the leaders of each member state attend an ICGLR summit every two years and mechanisms are in place for extraordinary summits to be held in emergencies to avert any crises.³ These efforts coincided with a US initiative to improve relations and strengthen links between the armed forces of Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda with the goal of reducing cross-border militancy in the region.⁴ Instability and armed conflict continue to plague the Great Lakes, but the prospect of interstate conflict has been greatly reduced by the ongoing work of the ICGLR.

² Protocol of Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, 2006. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/greatlakes-nonaggression2006> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

³ International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. *ICGLR Overview: Who We Are*. (ICGLR, 2021) Available at: <https://www.icglr.org/index.php/en/background> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

⁴ Oxford Analytica. "Cross-Border Militancy Threatens Great Lakes." *Reliefweb*. (4 September 2007) Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/cross-border-militancy-threatens-great-lakes-4-sept-2007> (Accessed 05/01/2022)

Year(s): 1994 – 1996.

Location: Guatemala.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Negotiations mediated by the UN resulted in the signing of the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace in 1996, ending the armed conflict in Guatemala after 36 years.

The Guatemalan Civil War was fought between an authoritarian military government and a coalition of armed opposition groups gathered under the banner of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (*Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteco*, URNG). Beginning in 1960, the conflict went through myriad phases until the 1990s, when an emergent civilian administration was able to curtail the political power of the military after the US Government withdrew its support for that regime. Facing international and domestic pressure (led by individuals such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú) to end the conflict, the new Government of Guatemala entered into UN-mediated negotiations with URNG representatives in Oslo in March 1990.¹ The talks continued for many years, with the US Government and the Organisation of American States voicing their support for the process, but little progress was made. A series of attempted coups d'état and autocoups threatened to undermine both the democratisation and peace processes in Guatemala until 1993, when Ramiro de León Carpio was elected to the Presidency by the Guatemalan Congress after the incumbent fled the country, providing a level of stability to the situation.²

In cooperation with the Guatemalan Congress and the Catholic Church, de León developed a package of comprehensive reforms and injected new life into the UN-mediated talks.³ In

¹ Rachel Sieder & Richard Wilson. *Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997)

² Fernando Orgambides. "Human rights President' tries to win over the army: Ramiro de Leon Carpio talks to Fernando Orgambides of El Pais about his hopes for Guatemalan democracy." *The Independent*. (1993) Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/human-rights-president-tries-to-win-over-the-army-ramiro-de-leon-carpio-talks-to-fernando-orgambides-1490492.html> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

³ Burgerman. "Building the Peace by Mandating Reform: United Nations-Mediated Human Rights Agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala." *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2000) pp.75-6

January 1994, the UN hosted a fresh round of negotiations in Mexico City, culminating with the signing of a Framework Agreement, which established a structure for the ongoing negotiations to take place.⁴ Two months later, the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights was signed, strengthening the rule of law and inviting the UN to deploy a verification mission to Guatemala.⁵ Additional agreements were signed in the ensuing months, with provisions addressing the plight of refugees, indigenous peoples, and victims of human rights violations. In 1996, a newly elected government took over from de León's caretaker administration. Negotiations between the URNG and the new government proceeded rapidly, with additional agreements being signed throughout the year until, on 29 December 1996, the peace process culminated with the signing of the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace.⁶ The Accord re-iterated all previous agreements and provided a comprehensive roadmap for Guatemala's post-conflict transition, formally ending the armed conflict.

⁴ Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-resumptionnegotiationsurng94> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁵ Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-humanrightsgreement94> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁶ Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, 1996. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-firmlastingpeace96> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

Year(s): 1996 – 2004.

Location: Guatemala.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A verification mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU, Organisation of American States, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: *The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala ensured the ceasefire held and disarmed combatants, in addition to guaranteeing a relatively safe and secure environment for elections to take place alongside EU and Organisation of American States observers, preventing a conflict relapse in Guatemala.*

The March 1994 Timetable Agreement called for the deployment of a UN mission to support the ongoing peace process in Guatemala.¹ Six months later, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), which was initially an unarmed mission composed of 250 human rights monitors, indigenous specialists, and police, deployed to Guatemala.² Following the negotiation of the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire in December 1996, a small contingent of 155 unarmed military observers were attached to MINUGUA and tasked with monitoring the ceasefire, separating combatants, and disarming URNG troops. These tasks were completed efficiently, with the entire URNG demobilisation process being completed in just 18 days.³

Despite some initial successes, the peace process in Guatemala faced a growing number of obstacles. For the most part, these were the result of domestic political opposition to the implementation of reforms stipulated in various peace agreements. Changes to the Guatemalan legal system and security sector, for example, were hindered by institutional resistance. Similarly, constitutional reform was derailed and ultimately rejected in a May

¹ Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/guatemala-timetablenegotiations94> (Accessed 18/11/2020)

² UN Peacekeeping. *Guatemala – MINUGUA: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minuguabackgr.html> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

³ William Stanley. *Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of MINUGUA*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013) p.142

1999 referendum in which just 18 percent of the population participated.⁴ The failure to implement important provisions of previous accords undermined the peace process and threatened to renew the conflict.⁵ The general election held later that year remained peaceful, thanks in part to the deployment of Organisation of American States and EU observers, however it resulted in a hard-line political party (led by a former general who had previously taken power in a coup d'état) which was strongly opposed to the peace process coming to power.⁶ One of the new government's first actions was to begin a 'comprehensive remilitarization of the state,' bringing Guatemala even closer to conflict relapse.⁷ Fortunately, the ongoing efforts of MINUGUA (particularly its human rights component) helped to maintain a degree of stability until the government was replaced by a moderate party in the 2003 elections.⁸ When MINUGUA formally closed in December 2004, implementation of the peace agreements was back on track and the Guatemalan military had been halved in size and placed under civilian control.⁹ MINUGUA helped to reduce political violence, build stability, and ultimately prevent a return to war in Guatemala.

⁴ Mireya Navarro. "Guatemalans Deny Changes For Indians And the Army." *The New York Times*. (1999) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/17/world/guatemalans-deny-changes-for-indians-and-the-army.html> (Accessed 18/11/2020)

⁵ Stanley. *Enabling Peace in Guatemala*. p.186

⁶ "Report of the Electoral Observation Mission to Guatemala 1999 Elections." *CP/doc. 3356/00*. (OAS Permanent Council, 2000)

⁷ Stanley. *Enabling Peace in Guatemala*. p.224

⁸ BBC. "Guatemala general beaten in poll." *BBC News*. (2003) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3256721.stm> (Accessed 18/11/2020)

⁹ *Ibid.* pp.262-4

Year(s): 2008 – 2010.

Location: Guinea.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Thanks to timely diplomatic action by the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, and the UN, a violent political crisis in Guinea was prevented from escalating into armed conflict in 2009.

Following the death of the long-serving President of Guinea in December 2008, officers in the army launched a coup d'état and formed a military junta to govern the country. Protests against the coup were increasingly met with force and in September 2009, 156 civilians were killed and thousands more injured when security forces launched a violent crackdown.¹ Concerns were raised further when it was discovered that the military junta was hiring South African mercenaries and raising a militia to consolidate its grip on power.² Fearing the crisis could escalate into armed conflict, the UN dispatched a commission to investigate the massacre, the Economic Community of West African States instated an arms embargo on Guinea and sent an envoy to mediate between the junta and the opposition, and the African Union froze the assets of junta members.³ On 21 December, the UN commission concluded that the military junta was responsible for the attacks and recommended that the International Criminal Court pursue an investigation.⁴ The publication of the UN report also led a wide

¹ BBC. "Guinea massacre toll put at 157." *BBC News*. (2009) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8280603.stm> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

² International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. *Crisis in Guinea*. (ICRtoP, 2010) Available at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-guinea> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

³ Sascha Pichler Fong & Adam Day. "UN Preventive Diplomacy in the 2008-10 Crisis in Guinea." in Laurie Nathan, Adam Day, João Honwana, & Rebecca Brubaker. *Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work?* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018) Available at: <https://cpr.unu.edu/capturing-un-preventive-diplomacy-success-how-and-why-does-it-work.html> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁴ International Commission of Inquiry. *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, S/2009/693*. (UN Security Council, 2010)

range of national governments (such as France and the US) to cut aid to Guinea and place their own sanctions on members of the junta.⁵

Faced with growing international attention and condemnation, the military junta agreed to an elections timetable proposed by a broad range of Guinean political parties in March 2009, inspiring donors from across the world to support the process and help Guinea conduct its first credible elections.⁶ Growing international pressure also led to negotiations between the belligerents in Burkina Faso. The talks culminated with the signing of the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration on 15 January 2010, which called for the restoration of constitutional rule and the formation of a transitional government.⁷ In addition, the perpetrators of the coup agreed to remain outside of Guinea. The transitional government successfully calmed the crisis and organised elections for June 2010. Although irregularities forced a second round in December, the disputes were settled in court and the fresh elections went ahead peacefully with the help of a significant contingent of international observers.⁸ Two years after the coup, Guinea's first democratically elected leader came to power. Aside from some relatively minor outbreaks of violence in 2013 and 2015, Guinea has remained at peace.

⁵ Alexis Arieff & Nicolas Cook. "Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States." *Congressional Research Service (R40703)*. (2009) p.1

⁶ *Ibid.* p.19

⁷ Ouagadougou Joint Declaration, 2010. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/guinea-ouagadougou-declaration2010> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁸ Fong & Day. "UN Preventive Diplomacy in the 2008-10 Crisis in Guinea." p.29

Year(s): 2012 – 2020.

Location: Guinea-Bissau.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, a peacekeeping mission, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Economic Community of West African States, EU, UN, and the Government of Guinea.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A diplomatic intervention led by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau helped to prevent armed conflict in Guinea-Bissau in 2012.

Guinea-Bissau was subjected to a civil war, three coups d'état, an army mutiny, the assassination of the president, and an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention in the decade or so prior to the 2012 elections.¹ In April of that year, just weeks before the population was scheduled to go to the polls, the military took power in yet another coup d'état. This chronic instability not only threatened to trigger a return to civil war, but also aggravated the Casamance Conflict in neighbouring Senegal and provided a haven for drug traffickers on their way to Europe.² In response, a range of international organisations worked to prevent armed conflict and foster stability in Guinea-Bissau.

ECOWAS began by demanding that the military junta reinstate civilian rule and acquiesce to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.³ The following month, a transitional government

¹ BBC. "Guinea-Bissau profile – Timeline." *BBC News*. (2018) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13579838> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

² Davin O'Regan & Peter Thompson. *Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's First Narco-State*. (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2013)

³ BBC. "Guinea-Bissau: First Ecowas peacekeeping troops arrive." *BBC News*. (2012) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18110585> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

took power and over 600 troops of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) were deployed to the capital, Bissau. They were tasked with re-asserting government control across the country, guarding senior politicians, and beginning a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process.⁴ The 2012 elections cancelled by the military junta were re-scheduled for 2014, and although they went ahead peacefully, disputes within the victorious party led to another political crisis which once again threatened destabilise the country.⁵ In August 2015, ECOWAS dispatched a Special Envoy to mediate an end to the crisis, while ECOMIB personnel maintained law and order. The EU provided support to the Mission, covering the cost of the entire operation until the crisis was resolved.⁶ Additional support was provided by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for Guinea-Bissau, which focused on strengthening state institutions.⁷ In October 2016, President Alpha Conde of Guinea hosted negotiations between Bissau-Guinean politicians and civil society organisations. The talks culminated on 14 October 2016 with the Conakry Accord, which created the framework for constitutional rule and an ECOWAS monitoring process to ensure its implementation.⁸ In 2019, the President of Guinea completed his constitutionally mandated term of office for the first time in history.⁹

⁴ The Africa-EU Partnership. *Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) – ECOMIB I & II*. (EU, 2019) Available at: <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-guinea-bissau-ecomib-ecomib-i-ii> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁵ Brown Odigie. “ECOWAS’s efforts at resolving Guinea-Bissau’s protracted political crisis, 2015-2019.” *ACCORD Conflict Trends 2019*, No. 2. (2019) Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ecowass-efforts-at-resolving-guinea-bissaus-protracted-political-crisis-2015-2019/> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁶ African Peace Facility. *ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB): Factsheet*. (EU, 2018)

⁷ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. *UNIOGBIS: UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/uniogbis> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁸ United Nations Secretary-General. “Capitalize on Conakry Accord as Important First Step to Ending Institutional Crisis, Secretary-General Urges Political Stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau.” *UN Press Release*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm18371.doc.htm> (Accessed 10/11/2020)

⁹ Odigie. “ECOWAS’s efforts at resolving Guinea-Bissau’s protracted political crisis, 2015-2019.”

Year(s): 1985 – 1991.

Location: *The Guinea-Bissau/Senegal International Border.*

UN Regional Group: *Africa.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of an Interstate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Government of France and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *French diplomacy helped to prevent border clashes from escalating while the arbitration of the ICJ resolved the territorial dispute between the two countries.*

In 1974, the government of newly independent Guinea-Bissau sought to confirm their international borders to facilitate trade and economic development. Like in most African states, these were inherited from the former colonial power – in this case, Portugal. A point of contention emerged with neighbouring Senegal concerning potentially rich offshore resources. This was compounded by alleged Bissau-Guinean support for armed opposition groups in the Senegalese region of Casamance, which is located directly across the border. Bilateral negotiations over the border began in 1977 but were ultimately fruitless, leading the Senegalese and Bissau-Guinean governments to refer the case to an independent arbitration tribunal in 1985.¹ When the findings of the tribunal were rejected by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in 1989, the case was referred to the ICJ. In April 1990, while the case was being assessed in The Hague, Senegalese troops and military aircraft were spotted operating in Bissau-Guinean territory. The following month, Bissau-Guinean forces clashed with Senegalese troops, leaving 17 soldiers dead.² With the dispute becoming increasingly militarised and armed forces lining up against each other along the border, the prospect of an interstate conflict was significant.

¹ Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. “The Guinea-Bissau – Senegal maritime boundary dispute” *Marine Policy*, Vol. 61, No. 1. (2015) p.286

² AP News. “Senegal, Guinea Bissau Agree to Pull Back Troops in Dispute.” *AP News*. (24 May 1990) Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/b54afe1f80c0bc585c51ea797e43a16b> (Accessed 25/10/2021)

Fearing that the crisis could rapidly escalate into a major war, the Government of France invited ministers from both states to Paris for emergency talks on 23 May 1990.³ This meeting served to immediately defuse tensions, and the following day Guinea-Bissau and Senegal withdrew their armed forces from their mutual border to minimise the risk of future clashes. On 12 November 1991, the ICJ issued its judgement on the dispute, dismissing Guinea-Bissau's appeal and affirming Senegal's sovereignty over the disputed maritime territory. This time, the findings were accepted by both parties. Since the settlement, bilateral ties have improved and the states now cooperate in several fields, including the development of maritime resources. While the land border remains a cause of tension given relatively frequent incursions by Senegalese forces pursuing militants from Casamance (including in 2000 and 2009), improved ties between the two governments and the mechanisms established to resolve the maritime boundary dispute (such as a joint border commission) have prevented any major escalation.⁴

³ UK Parliament. "Senegal/Guinea Bissau Dispute." *Hansard: House of Lords*, Vol. 520. (1990) Available at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1990-06-12/debates/d1bccdba-220f-4376-bfcf-d1f876f4635a/SenegalGuineaBissauDispute> (Accessed 25/10/2021)

⁴ Reuters Staff. "Senegal, Bissau deny border dispute." *Reuters*. (24 October 2009) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-bissau-senegal-border-idAFJOE59N02U20091024> (Accessed 25/10/2021)

Year(s): 1998 – 1999.

Location: Guinea-Bissau.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Mediation by the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the Economic Community of West African States helped to end the civil war in Guinea-Bissau.

In January 1998, troops of the Bissau-Guinean armed forces discovered that some of their colleagues had been covertly supplying the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (*Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance*, MFDC) with arms and munitions to support their campaign for independence from Senegal. Under pressure from the governments of Senegal and France to identify the culprits, the president of Guinea-Bissau placed the blame on his Chief of Staff, who was subsequently removed from his position despite his remonstrations of innocence. After failing to assassinate the president, the disgraced head of the military gathered significant portions of the army along with an array of opposition groups behind him and launched a coup d'état in May 1998.¹ The rebels quickly established control of much of the country but faced resistance from elements of the armed forces that remained loyal to the president. In June, Senegal and Guinea dispatched a total of 1,700 troops to support the embattled administration, leading to heavy fighting across the country and sparking the conflict known as the Seventh of June War.

The international effort to mediate an end to the conflict began on 26 July 1998, when the CPLP negotiated a temporary truce between the belligerents. This was followed by talks hosted by the CPLP and ECOWAS in nearby Cape Verde, which culminated at the end of

¹ Vincent Foucher. "Wade's Senegal and its Relations with Guinea-Bissau: Brother, Patron or Regional Hegemon?" *South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme Occasional Paper*, No. 132. (2013) p.7

August with a ceasefire. Talks continued in Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, and Nigeria, with the belligerents eventually signing the Abuja Peace Agreement on 1 November.² A key provision of the agreement was the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops and the deployment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force. The peace process was dealt a major blow in January 1999 when the fighting resumed, but a fresh ceasefire was signed on 9 February, this time bringing an end to fighting. The ECOWAS mission remained in place for a few months until all Senegalese and Guinean troops had withdrawn, but it was a relatively short-lived deployment. Although the November 1999 elections went ahead relatively peacefully and re-established constitutional rule in Guinea-Bissau, the country continued to be plagued by frequent coups d'état in the years (and decades) following the conflict.³ The mediation efforts of the CPLP and ECOWAS ended the Seventh of June War, but Guinea-Bissau remained highly unstable following the conflict.

² The Abuja Peace Agreement, 1998. Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/abuja-peace-agreement> (Accessed 25/10/2021)

³ Mesfin Gebremichael, ed. "Guinea Bissau Conflict Insight." *Peace & Security Report*, Vol. 1. (2019) pp.16-8

Year(s): 2003 – 2006.

Location: Guyana.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, a monitoring mission, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Carter Center, Commonwealth, Organisation of American States, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The UN Social Cohesion Program and the deployment of international observers from a range of intergovernmental organisations helped to ensure that the 2006 elections in Guyana did not spark an armed conflict.

Highly contested national elections held in 2001 resulted in widespread violence in the Guyanese capital of Georgetown and the surrounding countryside, in a sequence of events almost identical what had followed contests in 1997 and 1992.¹ Although escalation into armed conflict was avoided in those instances, the crises highlighted the fragility of the Guyanese state and its vulnerability to election violence. Such concerns only grew when post-election analysis of the events of 2001 warned of an ‘increase in violence’ and ‘heightened acrimony’ compared with previous contests.² The efforts of the Commonwealth to facilitate a dialogue between the two main political parties in Guyana collapsed in 2002, leading the opposition to boycott Parliament. The ongoing unrest culminated in July 2002 with an attack on the presidential building in which two people were killed.³ In response, a range of international organisations began operating with the shared goal of reducing the likelihood of similar violence during the next election cycle and ultimately preventing an armed conflict from erupting in Guyana.

¹ Wendy MacClinchy. *What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field – Guyana 2003-15*. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018)

² Ibid. p.4

³ Michael Lund. “Can Dialogues Change the Course of a Small Nation? The Social Cohesion Program in Guyana.” in Michael Lund & Steve McDonald. *Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace*. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015) pp.85-94

Beginning in 2003, the UN Development Program implemented the Social Cohesion Program in collaboration with a range of other multilateral organisations and the Guyanese government. The objective was to build social cohesion, enhance security, and make progress with constitutional reform. This entailed efforts to promote dialogue by establishing Multi-Stakeholder Forums, as well as initiatives to build Guyanese capacity to manage conflict through the provision of training to police and civil society groups. In addition, the Program sponsored research and discussion on the subject of armed conflict among Guyanese academics, the media, and youth.⁴ Further efforts were implemented by the British Government, which focused on the judiciary.⁵ When the time came for the 2006 elections to be held, coordinated election observation missions from the Organisation of American States, Carter Center, and the Commonwealth were well prepared. In addition to their usual duties regarding the electoral process itself, these observers also spent weeks meeting with a host of influential figures from across Guyanese society prior to the contest, playing an important role in ensuring that all stakeholders were prepared to support a peaceful election. On election day, observers deployed at polling stations across the country were able to verify the integrity of the electoral process, thus reassuring Guyanese society that the result was genuine.⁶ These efforts helped to prevent armed conflict in Guyana and served to help stabilise the fragile democratic process in the country.

⁴ MacClinchy. *What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention*. p.6

⁵ Lund. "Can Dialogues Change the Course of a Small Nation?" p.97

⁶ The Carter Center. *Final Report to the Guyana Elections Commission on the 2006 General and Regional Elections*. (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2007) p.5

Year(s): 2004 – 2019.

Location: Haiti

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti helped to prevent armed conflict from erupting in Haiti in 2004 after a severe constitutional crisis.

With its extensive history of political violence and coups d'état along with a succession of natural disasters in recent years, Haiti remains one of the most unstable countries in the western hemisphere. The deployment of a US-led operation in 1994 and three separate UN peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 2000 did little to improve the situation, and in 2004 Haitian politics was disrupted by another coup. In February 2004, an armed group known as the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti launched an insurgency against the government, successfully capturing two of the largest cities in the country.¹ Just weeks later, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Haitian president, was taken from the country by US military personnel, supposedly after resigning voluntarily, and left in exile in the Central African Republic.² With no legitimate government and an armed rebellion seizing territory, Haiti stood at the precipice of war.

In accordance with the Haitian constitution, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court took power as interim president following the unusual departure of Aristide. His first move was to invite the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission to restore stability. Within a day, troops from the US arrived, soon followed by contingents from across the world. Brazil offered the largest contingent of the 7,000 soldiers and police who gathered under the banner of the United

¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program. *Haiti*. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/816> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

² The events remain somewhat unclear, but this article presents documentary evidence and concise analysis: Larry Rousseau. "Revisiting the Haitian Coup 10 Years Later." *HuffPost*. (2014) Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/larry-rousseau/haitian-coup_b_4860630.html (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).³ Upon their arrival, MINUSTAH personnel worked to restore a ‘secure and stable environment’ and prevent the spread of armed conflict across the country.⁴ While efforts in this regard were largely successful, Haiti was hit by a series of hurricanes in 2008 and an earthquake in 2010 which killed 300,000 people and devastated much of the country’s infrastructure. In response, MINUSTAH was heavily reinforced. In 2017, MINUSTAH completed its mandate and was replaced with a much smaller follow-up mission, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, which focused on strengthening the rule of law.⁵ For all its faults (sexual abuse scandals and a cholera outbreak), the fifteen-year UN presence in Haiti prevented an incipient armed conflict from erupting, restored order, and helped foster democracy.

³ John Miller Beauvoir. “In Post-Conflict Haiti, Brazil Consolidates Its Status as Regional Actor.” *Stimson Center*. (2017)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1542*. (2004) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1542> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁵ MINUJUSTH. *Home*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://minujusth.unmissions.org/en> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2007.

Location: Honduras/Nicaragua International Border (maritime).

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, an observer mission, and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States and the International Court of Justice.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Organisation of American States helped to prevent a territorial dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua from escalating into armed conflict while the International Court of Justice investigated the case and resolved the dispute peacefully.

The 700km Honduras-Nicaragua land border has been a source of dispute since the end of Spanish colonial rule in the 1820s. Although several wars have taken place between the two states, many of the disputes have been settled by international arbitration. Indeed, various resolutions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and before that, the King of Spain, had resolved several areas of contention, but the maritime boundary remained a major point of contention. In 1999, the Honduran parliament ratified a 1985 treaty with Colombia which implicitly recognised Colombian sovereignty over maritime territory claimed by Nicaragua. Almost immediately, the Nicaraguan government raised a case with the ICJ regarding the delimitation of its maritime border with Honduras.¹ With the dispute escalating, the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua requested that the Organisation of American States (OAS) hold a special session to address the crisis.

In response to the dispute, the OAS dispatched a Special Representative to mediate negotiations between the two governments. The talks resulted in a series of agreements to ensure peaceful relations, culminating in March 2000 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, which noted that the two countries should restrict military activities along the

¹ ICJ. *Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras)*. (ICJ, 2020) Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/120> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

border and conducting joint maritime patrols.² In February 2001, tensions were heightened again amidst claims of violations of the measures outlined in the Memorandum. The OAS once again hosted talks, and the agreement that was reached included an invitation for technical experts and observers from the international community to monitor the border. In June 2001, the OAS formed a small Observer Mission with staff from its secretariat and military personnel from Argentina and Brazil. The Mission, which was entirely financed by the Fund for Peace, verified both the land and maritime border, providing assurances to both sides and encouraging cooperation between them. At a ceremony at OAS headquarters in December 2001, representatives of both governments signed additional agreements aimed at improving relations between them.³ In October 2007, the ICJ concluded its investigation, and its findings were accepted by both parties, bringing a peaceful end to the dispute.⁴

² OAS. *Agreements*. (OAS Peace Fund, 2020) Available at: <https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/agreements/> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

³ OAS. *Peace Fund – Honduras and Nicaragua*. (OAS Peace Fund, 2009) Available at: <http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/hondurasandnicaragua/> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁴ ICJ. *Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea*.

Year(s): 2002 – present.

Location: Horn of Africa.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: *The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism established by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has used data, technology, and a decentralised network of people and organisations to build an effective early warning system that has demonstrably reduced armed conflict across the Horn of Africa.*

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprises eight states spanning the Nile Valley, African Great Lakes, and the Horn of Africa. Recognising the progress that was being made towards peace in the region and resolving to consolidate it, a 2000 IGAD summit culminated with a declaration which, among other things, established the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).¹ With a secretariat based in Addis Ababa, CEWARN is a network of analysts, coordinators, and field monitors who synthesise extensive data collection and analysis with a custom-made analytical software tool. Much of its work is carried out in partnership with government agencies and civil society organisations. Once processed, its findings and recommendations are shared with relevant actors such as the governments of IGAD member states and the African Union Continental Early Warning System.² The establishment of CEWARN represents a major investment (supported by the EU, USAID, and several national governments) in early warning and early response to prevent violent conflict, one which has continued to grow and develop significantly over time.³

¹ Khartoum Declaration, 2000. Available at: <https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

² Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. *About CEWARN*. (CEWARN, 2020) Available at: <https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

³ Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. *Home*. (CEWARN, 2020) Available at: <https://www.cewarn.org/index.php> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

After first becoming operational in 2002, CEWARN focused on monitoring pastoral conflicts along the Kenya-Uganda and Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia borders.⁴ Its operations were credited with contributing to a significant reduction of armed conflict in those areas, such as in 2007 when a CEWARN Field Monitor successfully prevented 100 Pokot warriors in Kenya from launching a cross-border attack on Ugandan security forces.⁵ In September 2012, the CEWARN Strategy Framework 2012-2019 was launched in Uganda, heralding a significant increase in the scope of the Mechanism's operations.⁶ These included employing its methodologies and tools to identify a much wider range of conflicts over a larger geographical area. New technological capabilities were added to CEWARN's arsenal, including SMS-based field observation reports, crowd-sourced data, and geographic information mapping systems.⁷ By 2016, CEWARN had established conflict response units and situation rooms in every IGAD member state and commanded the resources of a Rapid Response Fund to support communal peace dialogue and finance solutions to the underlying causes of conflicts, such as developing water access for pastoralists who were clashing over a limited supply.⁸ CEWARN has contributed to a significant reduction in armed conflict in the Horn of Africa and represents an effective method of reducing violence.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ David Nyheim. *Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response*. (OECD, 2009) p.76

⁶ Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. *Brochure*. (CEWARN, 2019) p.10 Available at: <https://www.cewarn.org/index.php/about-cewarn> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

⁷ Ibid. p.14

⁸ IGAD. "IGAD commemorates International Peace Day highlighting on its role in promoting peace and security for sustainable development in the region." *Articles*. (2016) Available at: https://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1345:djibouti-ethiopia-and-somalia-identified-priority-areas-and-develop-draft-binding-agreements-on-animal-health-and-livestock-trade-&catid=95:icpald (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Year(s): 1990 – present.

Location: Assam, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia- Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, local action, diplomacy, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, and India.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: A gradual peace process has reduced the scale of the armed conflict in Assam while negotiations involving local people and organisations, several layers of the Indian government, and Assamese armed groups are being held.

Northeast India is a diverse region geographically isolated from the rest of the country. Under British rule, states such as Assam became centres for the production of tea, leading to high levels of migration from other parts of India. Further demographic changes were driven when considerable numbers of people fled East Pakistan during the war which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. This situation came to a head during the 1970s and 1980s, when a range of Assamese groups began blockading oil pipelines, damaging state property, and harassing and killing people who they deemed foreign. A horrific massacre of civilians in 1983 spurred the Indian government into action, and in 1985 the Assam Accord was negotiated.¹ This agreement focused on the issue of migration into Assam, but also guaranteed the Assamese population with certain protections and established the Assam People’s Council to provide them with an additional layer of political representation. Although the Assam Accord ended the immediate crisis and established a framework for increased Assamese representation, it was rejected armed groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), who continued to pursue the stated goal of achieving complete independence for Assam through armed struggle during the 1980s.² In 1991, talks with the Indian government resulted in the surrender of approximately 4,000 ULFA personnel, however some hardliners remained

¹ Assam Accord, 1985. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-assam-accord85> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

² Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 46. (2008) pp.18-19

committed to insurgency and the conflict continued at a relatively low intensity throughout the 1990s.³

Progress towards a negotiated settlement to this conflict in Assam began in 2004, when a tentative dialogue preceded talks between ULFA, the Indian government, and representatives of Assamese civil society. A ceasefire held during the talks, but ultimately the negotiations reached a stalemate.⁴ ULFA was dealt a blow (along with other armed opposition groups) when the governments of Bhutan and Bangladesh conducted military operations in the late 2000s to put an end to the organisation's use of rear bases on their territory. After several senior ULFA leaders surrendered to Bangladeshi security forces in 2009, the organisation split into two factions.⁵ In 2011, the largest faction began unconditional talks with the Indian government. Negotiations continued for over a decade with the faction known as the Surrendered ULFA in a peaceful climate but failed to reach a final settlement. Hopes for peace were given a boost in May 2021, when the hard-line ULFA faction declared a unilateral ceasefire and joined the peace process. At the time of writing, these ceasefires remain in place while negotiations between both ULFA factions, the Indian government, the state administration of Assam, and Assamese civil society representatives are taking place.⁶

³ UCDP. *India: Assam*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/365> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Anuradha M. Chenoy & Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy. *Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts*. (Haryana: Penguin, 2010) p.41

⁶ Rajib Dutta. "Assam: Ulfa-I extends unilateral ceasefire again by 3 months." *The Times of India*. (15 November 2021) Available at: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/assam-ulfa-i-extends-unilateral-ceasefire-again-by-3-months/articleshow/87713177.cms> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Year(s): 1986 – 2020.

Location: Mizoram, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of India.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflicts in Mizoram, India, were ended after a lengthy negotiation process between armed groups and the Government of India.

Mizoram is a predominantly Christian state located in Northeast India which is home to a diverse range of communities, many of which are identified under the collective name Mizo. After initially being governed as an integral part of Assam, the federal state of Mizoram was established in 1987 after a lengthy insurgency by an armed group, the Mizo National Front, was brought to an end by the signing of the Mizoram Accord with the Indian government.¹ That agreement remains widely hailed as a success, preventing the state from experiencing the same level of conflict as many of its neighbours in the region and accommodating many legitimate concerns of some of the local population.² However, many communities in Mizoram remained unsatisfied with these developments. In 1986, armed groups representing the Hmar people began launching attacks in the north of the state, starting a relatively low-intensity conflict which continued until another Memorandum of Settlement was reached after talks in 1992-1994.³ The key provision of the agreement was the creation of an autonomous Development Council for the community within the administrative framework of Mizoram. This left the Bru, historically a small community in Mizoram, but one that swelled in the 1970s after unrest in Tripura (itself a result of displacement from East Pakistan/Bangladesh) and the construction of the Dumboor hydroelectric dam forced much of

¹ Memorandum of Settlement (Mizoram Accord), 1986. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-mizoram-accord86> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

² Swarna Rajagopalan. "Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones." *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 46. (2008) pp.24-5

³ Memorandum of Settlement Between The Government of Mizoram and the Hmar People's Convention (HPC), 1994. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1837> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

the Bru population in that state from their homes and into Mizoram. In 1995 and 1997, the Bru community in Mizoram was subjected to violence by the majority Mizo population and were again forced from their homes, this time to refugee camps in Tripura.⁴ Several armed groups emerged during this period, including the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), and launched an insurgency against the state.

Talks between representatives of the BNLF, Mizoram state, and the Indian government began in 1998. After 13 rounds of talks, the parties agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding in which the BNLF agreed to end its insurgency and state authorities committed to providing the Bru with constitutional protections and development support.⁵ This ended the fighting for all intents and purposes, although one armed Bru group remained outside the peace process. Furthermore, although some Bru returned to Mizoram from 2009 onwards, the majority remained in a highly uncertain situation in refugee camps in Tripura for decades. Talks between Bru representatives and various layers of the Indian government continued until 16 January 2020, when a landmark agreement was signed in New Delhi offering the Bru refugees the choice of being settled with government support in Tripura or returning to Mizoram.⁶ This agreement resolved the conflicts in Mizoram.

⁴ Rahul Karmakar. "Who are the Brus, and what are the implications of settling them in Tripura?" *The Hindu*. (20 January 2020) Available at: <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/who-are-the-brus-and-what-are-the-implications-of-settling-them-in-tripura/article30600913.ece> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁵ Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Mizoram and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), 2005. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1836> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁶ Debraj Deb. "Explained: What is the agreement to settle Bru refugees in Tripura?" *The Indian Express*. (20 January 2020) Available at: <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/understanding-the-bru-refugees-settlement-mizoram-tripura-6224956/> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Year(s): 1993 – present.

Location: Tripura, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, diplomacy, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Bangladesh and India.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The armed conflict in Tripura between the Indian government and Tripuri armed groups was ended by a series of negotiated settlements with several armed opposition groups and the stabilisation of the international border.

Of all the states in Northeast India, Tripura was most affected by the influx of people fleeing East Pakistan during partition in 1947 and the war which created Bangladesh in 1971. Indeed, the coming of these predominantly Bengali migrants more than doubled the population of the state and the indigenous Tripuri community was relegated from being the local majority to representing just a third of the population. These changes were accompanied by the loss of swathes of Tripuri land and contributed to the broader marginalisation of the community.¹ In 1978, the first Tripuri armed groups emerged and launched a violent campaign against migrant communities and Indian security forces, calling for a ban on more immigration, increased tribal rights, and autonomy (or full independence) for Tripura.² After a decade of conflict, the Indian government came to terms with the main Tripuri armed group in 1988, promising to reorganise the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) and limit migration in exchange for peace and the surrender of armed cadres.³ This Memorandum of Understanding bought a few years of peace in Tripura, but by 1992 two powerful Tripuri armed groups had emerged in opposition to the settlement: the All Tripura Tribal Force (later the All Tripura Tiger Force, ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of

¹ Jayanta Bhattacharya. "Ramification of Conflicts in Tripura and Mizoram." in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. *Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects*. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) pp.78-9

² UCDP. *India: Tripura*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/335> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

³ Memorandum of Understanding with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV), 1988. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-mou-TNV88> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

Tripura (NLFT), both of which called for the deportation of all people who had entered from East Pakistan/Bangladesh since 1949 and the complete independence of Tripura.⁴

Talks were held between the ATTF and the regional administration of Tripura in 1993, resulting in the Memorandum of Settlement.⁵ This agreement invested further powers in the TTAADC and offered more protections to the Tripuri community. This caused a split in the ATTF, with one faction abiding by the agreement and the other opting to continue the armed struggle alongside the NLFT.⁶ Despite the commitment of these two groups to achieving their goals though armed conflict continued, overall levels of violence in Tripura continued to decline, thanks in part to joint security operations to remove rear bases over the international border in Bangladesh and Myanmar and a well-funded government disarmament programme – by 2010, approximately 8,000 former militants had surrendered in exchange for cash payments.⁷ In 2004, a faction of the NLFT signed a Memorandum of Settlement with the government and the ATTF reduced its activities and indicated its desire to join the peace process.⁸ These declarations ended the fighting in Tripura for all intents and purposes. A complex peace process ensued with no firm resolution of the conflict, but in 2019 the remaining faction of the NLFT signed a peace agreement with the Government of India, formally ending the conflict in Tripura.⁹ Although a final settlement still needs to be negotiated, the fighting has ended.

⁴ UCDP. *India: Tripura*.

⁵ Memorandum of Settlement between the Tripura State Government and All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF), 1993. Available: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-memorandum-settlement-tripura93> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

⁶ Swarna Rajagopalan. "Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones." *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 46. (2008) pp.27-8

⁷ Bhattacharya. "Ramification of Conflicts in Tripura and Mizoram." p.84

⁸ UCDP. *India: Tripura*.

⁹ Bharti Jain. "National Liberation Front of Tripura signs peace pact to join mainstream." *The Times of India*. (10 August 2019) Available at: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/national-liberation-front-of-tripura-signs-peace-pact-to-join-mainstream/articleshow/70621676.cms> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

Year(s): 1993 – 2020.

Location: Bodoland Territorial Region, Assam, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, diplomacy, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, and India and the Assam regional administration.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict between Bodo armed groups and Indian security services in Assam was finally ended in 2020 after several attempts to find a negotiated settlement.

Northeast India is a diverse region geographically isolated from the rest of the country. Under British rule, states such as Assam became centres for the production of tea, leading to high levels of migration from other parts of India. Further demographic took place when considerable numbers of people fled East Pakistan during the war which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.¹ Amidst this upheaval, the predominantly Christian Bodo people (who are indigenous to Assam) were left with very little representation in state institutions, which were dominated locally by Assamese leaders, and faced constant struggles to protect their historic lands.² In 1986, the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) formed a militant organisation with the express intention of reversing the imposition of Assamese culture and language, displacing migrants, and creating a Bodo homeland within India.³ After a series of armed clashes led to the deaths of over 300 people in the early 1990s, the regional government of Assam held talks with ABSU leaders in 1993. The negotiations culminated with the Memorandum of Settlement, which established the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) to govern the Bodo people. The Memorandum failed to identify the territorial jurisdiction of the BAC and the agreement itself was rejected by many Bodo groups, such as the National

¹ UCDP. *India: Bodoland*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/421> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

² Suryasikha Pathak. "Ethnic Violence in Bodoland." *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 47, No. 34. (2012) p.20

³ Anuradha M. Chenoy & Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy. *Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts*. (Haryana: Penguin, 2010) p.42

Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which launched its own armed insurgency.⁴ By 2003, up to 3,500 NDFB militants armed with weapons allegedly supplied by Pakistani intelligence services were operating out of bases in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar in pursuit of Bodo self-determination. A joint military operation between Bhutan and India dealt this movement a serious blow in 2003, opening the door to further negotiations.⁵

The 2003 negotiations created the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in place of the BAC, this time delineating a Bodo district within the state of Assam and enshrining the protection of the Bodo language.⁶ Over the ensuing years, several other armed Bodo groups agreed to ceasefires (or strengthened existing ones) and began to disarm. Progress stalled once again in 2009, when some NDFB personnel split from the organisation and returned to insurgency. This faction split even further in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in 2008 and 2012, leaving a complex web of small armed groups which rejected the peace process. In 2020, after years of talks, all four factions of the NDFB signed a revitalised peace agreement with the Government of India and the regional administration of Assam. This accord ended the conflict, established the Bodoland Territorial Region within Assam, and provided the BTC with increased autonomy and revenue.⁷

⁴ Swarna Rajagopalan. "Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones." *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 46. (2008) pp.19-20

⁵ E.N. Rammohan. "The Insurgent Northeast." in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. *Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects*. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) p.98

⁶ Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-memorandum-settlement-bodoland2003> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁷ Sushanto Talukdar. "The third Bodo accord: A new deal." *Frontline*. (28 February 2020) Available at: <https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30800941.ece> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Year(s): 1995 – present.

Location: Nagaland, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, diplomacy, an observation mission, and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Bangladesh and India.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: An ongoing peace process effectively contained the armed conflict in Nagaland for 14 years until a more comprehensive settlement was reached in 2015.

Naga is a generic term for a group of over 30 tribes that inhabit some hilly areas of Northeast India. During British rule, this population was offered certain protections. Upon the independence of India in 1947, the area was incorporated into the province of Assam. After decades of campaigning (both peaceful and militant) by Naga groups, Nagaland was established as a federal state of India in the 1960s. Not all were satisfied with this outcome, with several armed groups committed to complete Naga independence from India emerging in the 1970s and launching insurgencies against security forces and violently forcing non-Naga populations from the territory they claimed.¹ Despite some noteworthy efforts at negotiating a peaceful end to the conflict, such as the 1975 Shillong Accord, certain cadres consistently splintered from such processes, formed new armed groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and continued to employ violence in pursuit of their goals.² While much of the fighting has taken place within Nagaland State, the NSCN vision for a “greater Nagaland” has inspired violent campaigns against non-Naga populations in claimed territory across Northeast India. Pakistani intelligence is alleged to have armed Naga militants at various stages, while the armed groups themselves regularly used rear bases in

¹ H. Srikanth & C.J. Thomas. “Naga Resistance Movement and the Peace Process in Northeast India.” *Peace and Democracy in South Asia*, Vol. 1, No. 2. (2005) pp.58-64

² Shillong Agreement between the Government of India and the Underground Nagas, 1975. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-shillong-agreement75> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

Bangladesh and Myanmar, adding layers of complexity to a conflict which is estimated to have cost the lives of 40,000 people.³

Contemporary efforts to end the conflict in Nagaland began in 1995, when the Indian government met with the leaders of one NSCN faction in Paris. In 1997, these talks resulted in a ceasefire and further talks.⁴ In 2001, a ceasefire with another NSCN faction was negotiated in Bangkok. That year, the Indian prime minister established a ceasefire monitoring group of retired Indian police servicemen in support of the peace process.⁵ These efforts allowed for more comprehensive talks, which were reliant on regular reiterations of the ceasefire agreements and ongoing dialogue, to begin in 2003.⁶ These mechanisms effectively contained the armed conflict until June 2015, when an NSCN faction ambushed and killed 19 Indian soldiers. After declaring that faction a terrorist organisation, the Indian government signed a framework peace agreement with other NSCN groups in August 2015 and the remaining factions have since joined the peace process.⁷ The framework agreement was initially kept secret, but included provisions to establish a Naga regional council, integrate NSCN troops into the military, and offer the Naga population with other constitutional protections.⁸ A key aspect of the accord was its stipulation that Naga political institutions would share sovereignty with the Indian government, satisfying the demands of both parties involved.⁹

³ UCDP. *India: Nagaland*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/251> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁴ Extension of Ceasefire with the NSCN-IM, 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-extension-ceasefire-NSCNIM2001> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁵ Namrata Biji Ahuja. "The secret deal: Exclusive details of the framework agreement with the Nagas." *The Week (India)*. (23 April 2017) Available at: <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/the-secret-deal.html> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁶ Joint Statement of the Government of India and the NSCN-IM, 2004. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-joint-statement-NSCN> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁷ Polstrat. "Where are the Naga peace talks headed after the recent ceasefire?" *Medium*. (14 September 2021) Available at: <https://polstrat.medium.com/where-are-the-naga-peace-talks-headed-after-the-recent-ceasefire-bada408df18c> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

⁸ Ahuja. "The secret deal."

⁹ Sanjib Baruah. *In the Name of the Nation: India and its Northeast*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020) p.108

Year(s): 2005 – present.

Location: Manipur, India.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of India.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The level of armed conflict taking place in the complex social and military environment of Manipur has been reduced thanks to a gradual peace process led by the Indian government.

Located in the Northeast of India on the border of Myanmar, the state of Manipur is one of the most diverse in the country. The Meitei people make up around half of the population of the state, while the rest is composed of an array of relatively small communities, most of whom speak Sino-Tibetan languages. This unique polity enjoyed a high degree of self-determination for much of its history, including under British rule. However, upon integration with the Indian Union in 1949, Manipur was placed under the jurisdiction of the governing administration of Assam. In 1964, armed groups committed to Manipuri independence began launching insurgencies against Indian security forces.¹ The location of Manipur (at the crossroads of ongoing armed conflicts in Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Myanmar) and the presence of groups who advocated union with neighbouring territories (such as Naga seeking the creation of a “greater Nagaland”) combined to make the state particularly unstable.² Throughout the 1970s, more armed groups emerged in Manipur, with the most powerful being composed primarily of Meitei people and advocating complete independence for the state. These groups included the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLAM).³ After being brought to the verge of defeat during Indian military

¹ UCDP. *India: Manipur*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/347> (Accessed 11/01/2022)

² Swarna Rajagopalan. “Peace Accords in Northeast India: Journey over Milestones.” *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 46. (2008) p.33

³ E.N. Rammohan. “The Insurgent Northeast.” in Sanjoy Hazarika & V.R. Raghavan, eds. *Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects*. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011) p.104

operations during the 1980s, these groups were back in action during the early 1990s, thanks in part to alliances that were forged with other armed groups in the Northeast and Myanmar. Since then, dozens more armed groups pursuing a variety of objectives have emerged.

The Government of India attempted to bring the main opposition groups to the negotiating table in 1996, 1998, and 2001 to no avail. However, in 2005, several groups agreed to a Suspension of Operations Agreement with the Indian army and three years later formalised this accord with civilian authorities. Over 30 separate armed groups have since joined this peace process, although little headway has been made in finding a resolution to the conflict.⁴ In the context of ongoing setbacks on the battlefield and the loss of rear bases in neighbouring states, many of the original armed groups such as the PLAM have ceased to operate. Coupled with the various ceasefires, which have been renewed annually since 2008, this has reduced the level of armed conflict in Manipur. A resolution to the pervasive conflict in the state hinges in many ways on developments in the peace process in neighbouring Nagaland, which has recently showed signs of promise.

⁴ Chitra Ahanthem. "Peace Audit Northeast: The Road to Peace in Manipur." *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report*, No. 156. (2014) pp.5-6

Year(s): 2001 – 2002.

Location: Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention and the mediation a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Indonesia.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The intercommunal violence in Central Sulawesi was ended by an Indonesian military deployment and the mediation of a peace agreement.

After three decades in power, the authoritarian leader of Indonesia, Suharto, was forced to resign on 21 May 1998 in the face of a severe economic crisis, widespread demonstrations, and growing opposition from within his administration. In this uncertain context, armed clashes took place across the country with growing frequency. In Poso, a district in the diverse province of Central Sulawesi on the Greater Sunda Islands, fighting between Christian and Muslim militia erupted on 24 December 1998.¹ In April 2000, a much larger bout of violence occurred, this time escalating into a conflict which led to the complete destruction of two towns, the eviction of swathes of the local Christian population from their homes, and the increasing polarisation of the diverse Sulawesi population into two camps: the predominantly Christian “Reds” and the majority-Muslim “Whites.” The conflict continued at a relatively low intensity, with regular clashes taking place between militia armed with machetes, bows, and homemade shotguns until July 2001, when a radical Islamic group known as Laskar Jihad entered the fray, bringing automatic weapons and an unprecedented level of organisation to the conflict.²

In July 2001, a change of administration in Jakarta had a significant impact on the conflict. Over 1,500 troops supported by 10 tanks and a wide range of police and paramilitary units were deployed to Poso, leading to some clashes with both Red and White forces. However, when the fighting threatened to spread into neighbouring districts in November 2001, these

¹ Human Rights Watch. “Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi.” *HRW*, Vol. 14, No. 9. (2002) p.15

² Dave McRae. *A Few Poorly Organised Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia*. (Brill, 2013) p.84

troops formed the core of a major operation to stop the fighting, disarm combatants, and restore the rule of law to Central Sulawesi. The urgency with which this operation took place compared with previous efforts is believed to have been directly influenced by the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA. Within a month, Indonesian security forces succeeded in halting the conflict, creating the climate for negotiations to begin. A government minister from Sulawesi led the mediation team, which proceeded to invite a wide range of stakeholders to participate in the talks. The negotiations culminated on 20 December 2001 with the Malino Declaration for Poso, which called for the cessation of hostilities and the return of security and the rule of law.³ The conflict in Poso cost the lives of around 1,000 people, and although the area was plagued by shootings and bombings mostly perpetrated by Laskar Jihad until 2007, the intercommunal violence was ended by a military deployment and the negotiation of the Malino Declaration for Poso.⁴

³ Malino Declaration to End Conflict and Create Peace in Poso (Malino I), 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-malinoI2001> (Accessed 2/12/2021)

⁴ Human Rights Watch. "Breakdown." pp.38-9; For the post-Malino violence, see: International Crisis Group. "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi." *ICG Asia Report*, No. 74. (2004) p.28

Year(s): 2002 – 2007.

Location: Central Sulawesi, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention, legal prosecution, peace infrastructure, and local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Indonesia, local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Stability in Central Sulawesi was restored with an ongoing military deployment and local initiatives, ending the intercommunal conflict and preventing a conflict relapse.

In January 2002, a month after the Malino Declaration ended the fighting in Central Sulawesi, over 4,000 Indonesian troops and police were stationed in Poso and Morowali districts. The extent of this deployment meant that, initially at least, there was one member of the government security forces for every 100 residents in the area.¹ These personnel served to prevent disputes from escalating into violence, provided security to the local population (although some human rights abuses were recorded), and began disarming the various armed groups that had emerged around Poso since 1998. Despite these efforts, a major threat to the fragile peace resurfaced after troop numbers were drawn down in July 2002. A series of bombings preceded a planned attack on a predominantly Christian town in Poso in August, while the two commissions established to oversee the implementation of the Malino Declaration began their first evaluations, costing the lives of 13 people and threatening to reignite the conflict.² In the wake of the October 2002 bombings in Bali, the Indonesian security forces stepped up their campaign in Central Sulawesi, utilising anti-terrorism laws to track down and arrest those responsible for the post-Malino attacks with demonstrable results. Combined with the ongoing disarmament campaign, this served to end much of the intercommunal violence in Poso and brought stability to the area after four years of uncertainty.

¹ Dave McRae. *A Few Poorly Organised Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia*. (Brill, 2013) p.110

² Ibid. p.116

The 2005 election for local governor and deputy governor positions constituted the first major test of the peace being built in Central Sulawesi after the Malino Declaration. At a series of meetings between Christian and Muslim leaders and the provincial branch of the Indonesian electoral commission prior to the contest, all parties agreed to pursue peaceful campaigns. In addition, an informal agreement was reached by which all parties agreed to ensure that every slate of candidates on the ballot was composed of a Christian and a Muslim, guaranteeing a *de facto* consociational power-sharing arrangement regardless of the outcome of the election.³ These efforts were matched by civil society groups, which hosted regular public meetings and interreligious fora. Despite some tense moments amid widespread protests, the election went ahead peacefully.⁴ In January 2007, Indonesian security forces arrested several key terrorist leaders and uncovered hidden caches of arms and explosives in Poso. This action brought about ‘a stark and immediate improvement in security in Poso’ and significantly minimised the risk of a conflict relapse.⁵

³ Graham Brown & Rachael Diprose. “Bare-Chested Politics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia: The Dynamics of Local Elections in a ‘Post’-Conflict Region.” *CRISE Working Paper*, No. 37. (2007) p.10

⁴ *Ibid.* p.16

⁵ McRae. *A Few Poorly Organised Men*. pp.129-30

Year(s): 2002 – 2004.

Location: Maluku, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Indonesia

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict in Maluku was ended by an Indonesian military operation and the mediation of a peace agreement.

The Maluku Islands are home to a diverse population, with their role as the centre of the Dutch spice trade in the colonial period leaving a distinct legacy and a sizeable Christian community. In the central islands such as Ambon, this Christian community constituted half of the population.¹ In the tense climate following the fall of Suharto and the violence in Poso, a minor dispute involving a bus driver sparked three days of riots in the city of Ambon in January 1999. Violence between migrants and indigenes, and Muslims and Christians, spread into the surrounding area. At least 48 people were killed and swathes of Ambon, including churches and mosques, were destroyed.² In February, the conflict spread to the rest of Ambon island, with much of the fighting involving attacks on villages and towns that were home to minority populations or violent clashes over control of mixed conurbations. The efforts of regional and national authorities to maintain stability floundered, with many local security personnel becoming embroiled in the conflict and poor infrastructure preventing the deployment of reinforcements. Fighting continued throughout 1999, devastating Ambon city and inspiring Laskar Jihad (a militant Islamic organisation with ties to some hard-line elements within the Indonesian security forces) to enter the fray in early 2000.³ The introduction of modern weapons and trained militants changed the dynamic of the conflict,

¹ Christopher R. Duncan. “The Other Maluku: Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku.” *Indonesia*, Vol 80. (2005) p.57

² Jacques Bertrand. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) p.124

³ UCDP. *Christians (Indonesia) – Muslims (Indonesia)*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5513> (Accessed 11/12/2021)

putting predominantly Christian “Red” forces on the backfoot and driving thousands of civilians from their homes.⁴

In June 2000, the Government of Indonesia declared a state of emergency and employed a new strategy to contain the conflict. A battalion of elite troops (Yon Gab) was formed and deployed to Maluku in place of units which had sided with one community or the other. While much of the intercommunal violence ended shortly after the state of emergency was declared, these troops gave government security forces the edge they needed to prevent intercommunal violence and stop Laskar Jihad from perpetuating the conflict.⁵ This operation served to halt the fighting until the broader security situation in Indonesia improved. In February 2002, negotiations between Christian and Muslim community leaders from Maluku mediated by an Indonesian government minister culminated with the signing of an 11-point declaration in the town of Malino. Known as the Malino II Peace Accord, this agreement ended the conflict and created the framework for peace to return to the area.⁶ Laskar Jihad laid down their arms after the October 2002 Bali Bombings.

⁴ International Crisis Group. “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku.” *ICG Report*, No. 31. (2002) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-search-peace-maluku> (Accessed 11/12/2021)

⁵ Bertrand. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. p.132

⁶ Moluccas Agreement in Malino (Malino II), 20004. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-malinoII2002> (Accessed 11/12/2021)

Year(s): 2000 – 2003.

Location: North Maluku, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Indonesia, local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The deployment of Indonesian security forces to North Maluku ended the intercommunal conflict and prevented further fighting.

The outbreak of armed conflict in Central Sulawesi and Maluku after the fall of Suharto in 1998 served to heighten intercommunal tensions in other diverse provinces of Indonesia. In North Maluku, 85 per cent of the population was Muslim and 15 per cent were Christian, but divisions between indigenous tribes and migrant populations added many more layers of complexity to this dynamic. Despite a history of relatively peaceful coexistence, relations between these communities had worsened over preceding decades due to disputes over transmigration and the distribution of political power. In 1999, a scheduled programme of decentralisation began in North Maluku, altering administrative boundaries and changing the political structure of the province. These changes caused much uncertainty and inspired fierce competition between communities over the location of district capitals, allocations of resources, and administrative appointments.¹ On 18 August 1999, fighting erupted between the Kao (indigenous to the island) and Makianese (relocated in 1975 due to a feared volcanic eruption) ethnic groups in North Maluku on the same day that a new subdistrict was supposed to be inaugurated. For over a month, militia from these groups fought each other and burned down villages across the area, forcing 15,000 people from their homes. Violence rapidly spread across North Maluku, taking on increasingly religious overtones. For the most part, the conflict represented efforts by one militia or another to clear minority populations from towns and villages, but also featured massacres and forced conversions, particularly after a

¹ Christopher R. Duncan. "The Other Maluku: Chronologies of Conflict in North Maluku." *Indonesia*, Vol 80. (2005) pp.59-60

range of radical Islamic armed groups entered the fray on behalf of the Muslim communities of North Maluku.²

The Government of Indonesia attempted to prevent the conflict, deploying troops in an interpositional location between the Kao and Makianese while prominent civil society leaders attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Ongoing failures to end the fighting led the president to declare a state of emergency on 27 June 2000, deploy considerable numbers of troops, and impose a naval blockade on the entire region.³ This succeeded in ending the fighting – there were no more documented incidents after the declaration – but shootings and bombings remained a feature of North Malukan life for years. Approximately 3,000 people were killed in the conflict and over 100,000 more were forced from their homes.⁴

² Christopher R. Duncan. *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia*. (Ithaca: Cornell, 2013) pp.90-9

³ Ibid. p.102

⁴ Smith Alhadar. "The forgotten war in North Maluku." *Inside Indonesia*, No. 63. (2000) Available at: <https://www.insideindonesia.org/The-forgotten-war-in-North-Maluku> (Accessed 10/12/2021)

Year(s): 2004 – 2005.

Location: Aceh, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The NGO Crisis Management Initiative.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Negotiations mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative resulted in the Helsinki Agreement, which brought an end to the armed conflict in the Indonesian province of Aceh.

In 1976, local leaders in the Indonesian province of Aceh launched an armed insurgency against the government in Jakarta with the goal of achieving independence. The conflict gradually escalated throughout the 1990s, with armed groups organised under the banner of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) making territorial gains and establishing alternative administrations in the areas it controlled. In 1998, the Indonesian military launched a sweeping offensive against GAM positions but was unable to achieve an outright victory.¹ In 1999, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue hosted the first talks between the Indonesian Government and GAM.² These led to further meetings in Geneva, which in turn produced a ceasefire that lasted from May 2000 until April 2001, when the Indonesian government launched another military offensive. Although unsuccessful, the 1999-2001 negotiations laid the groundwork for a lengthy peace process.³

Further talks took place in 2002, resulting in the signing of another ceasefire and an invitation for a small monitoring mission composed of Thai and Philippine personnel to be deployed.⁴ Some parts of this agreement were implemented, but in 2003 the Indonesian government

¹ Damien Kingsbury. "A Mechanism to End Conflict in Aceh." *Security Challenges*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2005) p.76

² Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Aceh, Indonesia*. (CHD, 2020) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/aceh-indonesia/> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

³ UCDP. *Indonesia: Aceh*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/366> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

⁴ Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-cessationhostilities2002> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

imposed martial law and launched yet another major military operation against GAM. After this offensive failed to achieve its objectives, a new Indonesian was elected in April 2004. In November 2004, the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, and his Crisis Management Initiative began mediating a fresh round of talks between the new government and GAM.⁵ These negotiations gained a greater sense of urgency the following month when an earthquake struck just off the Aceh coast, devastating the area and costing the lives of 160,000 citizens of Aceh. This disaster understandably changed the dynamic of the conflict considerably and in January 2005, Ahtisaari hosted representatives of both parties in Helsinki to continue the peace process.⁶ These talks culminated in August 2005 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, which ended the conflict and outlined a framework for increased autonomy for Aceh within Indonesia.⁷ The terms of the Memorandum also stipulated that the EU and ASEAN (represented by Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia) should establish a mission to monitor implementation. After almost three decades of armed conflict which cost the lives of 15,000 people and a devastating tsunami, Aceh was at peace.

⁵ Pierre-Antoine Braud & Giovanni Grevi. "The EU mission in Aceh: implementing peace." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, No. 61. (2005) p.20

⁶ CMI. "Ten years since the Aceh peace agreement." *News*. (2015) Available at: <http://cmi.fi/2015/08/14/ten-years-since-the-aceh-peace-agreement/> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁷ Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 2005. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-memorandumaceh2005> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

Year(s): 2005 – 2012.

Location: Aceh, Indonesia.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, and the governments of Norway and Switzerland.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The International Monitoring Presence and the Aceh Monitoring Mission helped to prevent a conflict relapse in the Indonesian province of Aceh.

Prior to the signing of the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding which ended the armed conflict in Aceh, the EU dispatched the Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) of 82 unarmed observers to Indonesia. These observers were therefore ready to get to work the moment the agreement was signed on 15 August 2005, preparing the ground for the arrival of the 227-strong Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) the following month.¹ The AMM was a unique operation, representing a fully integrated initiative carried out jointly by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU. The monitoring teams were intentionally multinational and included personnel who had served in the short-lived 2002 monitoring mission deployed by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines. In addition to verifying disarmament and facilitating confidence-building measures, the AMM also chaired the Commission on Security Arrangements, which brought the parties together on a weekly basis to discuss and resolve issues at AMM headquarters. This mechanism has been described as the driving force behind the peace process, with the Commission playing an important role in ensuring that decisions on disarmament, the relocation of Indonesian military personnel, and the provision of economic assistance packages were understood by and consented to by all parties involved.²

¹ Peter Feith. "The Aceh Peace Process: Nothing Less than Success." *US Institute of Peace*. (2007) pp.3-4

² John Quigley. "Enhancing South-East Asia's Security: The Aceh Monitoring Mission." in Sebastian Bersick, et al, eds. *Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations in a Global Context*. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006) pp.67-8

By the end of 2005, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) had been completely disarmed and its militant wing was formally disbanded. Aside from a relatively small residual force agreed to during the peace process, Indonesian troops had also withdrawn from the region under AMM supervision.³ Although initially mandated to only operate until 2006 (the original March deadline was extended to September), the AMM remained in Aceh until 2012. During this period, it played an important role in mediating talks between the former belligerents regarding the implementation of new laws (such as the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh) and the conduct of elections. This sustained presence combined with the AMM policy of “proactive monitoring” to help ensure that renewed conflict did not erupt in Aceh. Its mission complete, the AMM was formally withdrawn on 28 May 2012.⁴

³ EU Council Secretariat. *Background: EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) – ACEH/07*. (EU Commission, 2006) p.2

⁴ Staff and agencies. “Editorial: Thank you, EU.” *The Jakarta Post*. (28 May 2012) Available at: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/28/editorial-thank-you-eu.html> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

Year(s): 2015.

Location: Iran.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU3 (the governments of France, Germany, and the UK) and the P5+1 (UN Security Council plus German government).

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Ongoing international dialogue with the Government of Iran and the diplomatic initiatives of the EU3 and P5+1 helped to prevent the ongoing Iranian diplomatic crisis from escalating into an interstate armed conflict.

The enrichment of uranium in Iranian territory has been a source of international tension and the subject of negotiations at the highest levels since the governments of Iran and the USA entered into a civil nuclear cooperation programme in 1957. Through the complexities of the Cold War, the Iranian Revolution, and the devastating Iran-Iraq War, the question of Iran's nuclear capabilities – or more accurately, whether it should be allowed to develop them - has remained at the forefront of international relations.¹ The 2003 invasion of Iraq raised concerns among European leaders of a similar war with Iran. As a result, the governments of France, Germany, and the UK (the EU3) held talks with the Iranian administration.² Although dialogue continued, efforts to find a compromise failed, with proposals brought forward by the EU and the governments of Turkey and Russia being rejected by either the US or Iranian administrations. In 2006, the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) joined together in their diplomatic efforts with Iran regarding its nuclear programme. Little progress was made, however, and the discovery of underground nuclear

¹ Seyed Hossein Mousavian & Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian. "Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security." *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2018) pp.169-172

² Ian Traynor. "Tehran agrees to nuclear freeze." *The Guardian*. (2004) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/08/politics.eu> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

facilities in Iran in 2009 raised the very real prospect of war, particularly after the Government of Israel threatened to bomb the location.³

The dispute remained unresolved until the Iranian people elected a moderate government in 2013. In September 2013, US President Barack Obama made the first contact between the leaders of Iran and the US since 1979. Two months later, the P5+1 and the Government of Iran reached an interim agreement limiting Iran's nuclear programme, easing sanctions on Iran, and continuing dialogue.⁴ A lengthy negotiation process showed signs of promise in April 2015, when a framework deal stipulating further limitations in exchange for sanctions-relief was announced.⁵ A final round of talks between the P5+1 and the Government of Iran were held in Vienna in June 2015, continuing for 17 days and eventually culminating with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 14 July 2015.⁶ The Plan represented a significant moment of reconciliation, easing tensions and building trust between the US and Iran, creating a framework for European states to engage with Iran, and ultimately reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. The presidency of Donald Trump threatened to undermine the process, however, the 'strategic patience' approach adopted by the Government of Iran with European persuasion has helped to maintain peace.⁷

³ Ian Traynor, Julian Borger, & Ewen MacAskill. "Obama condemns Iran over secret nuclear plant." *The Guardian*. (2009) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran-secret-underground-nuclear-plant> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁴ Julian Borger & Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Iran seals nuclear deal with west in return for sanctions relief." *The Guardian*. (2013) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-west-sanctions-relief> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁵ Julian Borger & Paul Lewis. "Iran nuclear deal: negotiators announce 'framework' agreement." *The Guardian*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-deal-negotiators-announce-framework-agreement> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁶ Kelsey Davenport. "The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance." *Arms Control Association Fact Sheets & Briefs*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁷ Vali Nasr. "Iran and the US: The Long and Arduous Diplomatic Road." *RUSI Commentary*. (2020) Available at: <https://rusi.org/commentary/iran-and-us-long-and-arduous-diplomatic-road> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

Year(s): 1991 – 2003.

Location: Iraq/Kuwait International Border.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: UN peacekeepers helped to prevent further hostilities between Kuwait and Iraq after the First Gulf War.

The First Gulf War ended following the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by US-led coalition forces on 28 February 1991 after just 6 weeks of fighting. The coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait and pursued them deep into Iraqi territory. On 15 March 1991, the authoritarian ruler of Kuwait was formally restored to power in an independent and sovereign Kuwait and the withdrawal of coalition forces gained pace. With the war over, the task of upholding the peace and preventing a renewed conflict was taken up by the UN Security Council in Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991.¹ Among its provisions, the resolution set the framework for a formal ceasefire and established the mechanisms for monitoring implementation, including the deployment of an unarmed UN observation mission, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). When the Iraqi administration accepted the terms of Resolution 687, the Security Council formally established UNIKOM with Resolution 689 on 9 April.² The first of UNIKOM's authorised strength of 300 personnel arrived on 13 April and the mission was fully operational by 6 May.³

The key provision for preventing a conflict relapse was the demarcation of a demilitarised zone (DMZ) running 10km into Iraqi territory and 3km into Kuwait along the entire 200km border. Upon its arrival, UNIKOM was tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of all forces (including coalition) from the DMZ. Once this was complete, the UN observers took up

¹ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 687*. (3 April 1991) Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1991> (Accessed 1/11/2021)

² United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 689*. (9 April 1991) Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1991> (Accessed 1/11/2021)

³ UN Peacekeeping. *Iraq/Kuwait - UNIKOM – Background*. (UN, 2021) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html> (Accessed 1/11/2021)

positions across the DMZ to monitor the area. Following a series of incursions into the DMZ by Iraqi forces, the mandate of UNIKOM was expanded in 1993 to allow it to prevent such incursions by Security Council Resolution 806 and the mission was reinforced with over 3,000 troops.⁴ This increased strength allowed UNIKOM to conduct a much wider range of patrols, establish more checkpoints, and offer protection to its isolated observers. This greatly stabilised the situation and created a window for the ongoing work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Commission to complete its work – which it did in February 1994. UNIKOM successfully navigated these challenges along with tense periods in November 1993 and October 1994 (when Iraq massed troops on the edge of the DMZ), preventing renewed war during the entire period it was operational.⁵ Following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, UNIKOM operations were suspended, and the mission was concluded entirely in October 2003.

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 806*. (5 February 1993) Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1993> (Accessed 1/11/2021)

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *Iraq/Kuwait - UNIKOM – Background*.

Year(s): 1995 – 1999.

Location: *Kurdish Region, Iraq.*

UN Regional Group: *Asia-Pacific.*

Type of Conflict: *Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Mediation of a peace agreement.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Government of the USA.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The Washington Agreement ended a four-year armed conflict between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan during the 1990s.*

The Kurdish population of Iraq faced a renewed armed conflict with Baghdad almost immediately after the Gulf War ended in 1991. However, a no-fly zone over the area which was enforced by US and allied armed forces provided a considerable degree of protection to Iraqi Kurdistan and prevented Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from re-establishing control of the area. Elections held in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992 resulted in a 50-50 split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the formation of a unity administration to govern the *de facto* Kurdish state. Within two years, however, the coalition between the two rival parties (which had a history of violent competition dating back to 1975) collapsed and, on 1 May 1994, an armed conflict erupted over exclusive control of Iraqi Kurdistan, with the PDK allegedly being supported by the Iranian government and the KDP briefly allying itself with the Iraqi government.¹ A key source of contention was control of the border with Turkey, which offered a major source of revenue to whomever administered it.²

In August 1995, the belligerents agreed to attend US-sponsored talks in Dublin, Ireland. The negotiations were marred by a resumption of fighting in Kurdistan and were quickly abandoned. A few months later, the Government of Iran mediated another round of talks, however they also failed to end the conflict. US efforts, given a renewed sense of urgency

¹ Johannes Jüde. "Contesting borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan's de facto state." *International Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 4. (2017) p.856

² *Ibid.* p.855

following the Iranian initiative, continued, with fresh talks taking place in November 1995 and April 1996. The Government of Turkey hosted yet another round of talks in 1996, resulting in the Ankara Declaration and the deployment of a short-lived Peace Monitoring Force (April-October 1997).³ The fighting resumed in October 1997, continuing at a significant scale despite further talks being held. In the first months of 1998, the Kurdish leaders began a bilateral peace process which entailed bi-monthly meetings alternately held in each other's territory known as the Koya/Shaqlawala Process. These meetings included confidence-building measures and led to the formation of a joint committee to manage the newly introduced UN Oil for Food Programme.⁴ In July 1998, the US government invited the leaderships of both parties to Washington, DC, for talks mediated by a host of senior officials, including the Secretary of State. After over two weeks of negotiations, the parties signed the Washington Agreement on 17 September 1998, finally bringing an end to the conflict.⁵

³ Karwan Salih Waisy. "The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000." *American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, No. 3. (2015) pp.226-7

⁴ Brigitte E. Hugh *Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-Sharing Agreements Between the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998* (Utah State University: All Graduate Theses and Dissertations 7821, 2020) p.53

⁵ Alan Makovsky. "Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment." *The Washington Institute*. (1998) Available at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kurdish-agreement-signals-new-u.s.-commitment> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

Year(s): 1974 – present.

Location: Israel/Syria International Border.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific/Western Europe and Others.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force has helped to prevent renewed war between Israel and Syria since 1974.

The State of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948 following the end of the British Mandate in Palestine. Within a day, a coalition of Arab states launched an offensive, sparking a relatively brief armed conflict.¹ Further wars took place in the ensuing decades, culminating in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (sometimes known as the Yom Kippur War). Within weeks, the UN Security Council mediated a ceasefire and deployed United Nations Emergency Force II to separate Israeli forces from their Egyptian counterparts along the Suez Canal, stabilising the situation on that front.² In March 1974, the US Government led a diplomatic initiative which culminated with the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces.³ The UN moved to support the peace process, establishing the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the same day that the agreement was signed.⁴ The 1,250 peacekeepers of the Force were tasked with verifying compliance with the terms of the ceasefire, particularly in the contested area of the Golan Heights. They were supported in this task by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which had been operating in the region since 1948.⁵

After successfully facilitating the withdrawal of armed forces from the buffer zone, UNDOF mapped the frontlines and established the 80x10km Area of Separation. UN Observers

¹ Benny Morris. *1948*. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2009)

² UN Peacekeeping. *Middle East – UNEF II: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unef2backgr1.html> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

³ Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, 1974. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israelsyria-separationforces74> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

⁴ UNDOF. *Background*. (UNDOF, 2020) Available at: <https://undof.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

⁵ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*. p103

monitor the Area and conduct regular inspections of armed forces near the border, sharing their findings with the Israeli and Syrian governments. UNDOF also serves to facilitate dialogue, ensuring that minor disputes are not escalated.⁶ Between 1974 and 2012, UNDOF helped to ensure that there was not a single armed escalation in the Area of Separation. Since the current armed conflict in Syria began in 2011, the situation on the Syrian side of the Area has become highly volatile. A host of contributing states withdrew their troops from UNDOF, which verged on the brink of collapse until over 500 Fijian soldiers joined the Force in 2013.⁷ Despite facing some serious challenges, such as attacks and kidnappings carried out by armed groups in Syria on peacekeepers, UNDOF remains in place, helping to prevent renewed interstate conflict between Israel and Syria.⁸

⁶ Ibid. p.109

⁷ UNDOF. *A New Beginning: 40 years of peacekeeping, 1974 – 2014*. (UNDOF, 2014) p.34

⁸ BBC. “Golan Heights profile.” *BBC News*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14724842> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

Year(s): 1991 – 1994.

Location: *Israel/Jordan International Border.*

UN Regional Group: *Asia-Pacific/Western Europe and Others.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of an Interstate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Mediation of a peace agreement.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The UN and the governments of Israel, Jordan, and the USA.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *The mediation efforts of the Government of USA ended the state of war between Israel and Jordan that had existed for 46 years, greatly reducing the risk of further interstate conflict and stabilising the region.*

Israel and Jordan were in state of war with each other from the day that Israel was established in 1948. This status continued unchanged regardless of whether there was any actual fighting, preventing bilateral dialogue or reconciliation between them despite the extensive international border that they share. This left a host of issues unresolved, ranging from disputed territorial claims over the West Bank and East Jerusalem to the use of water resources on the River Jordan. Further armed conflicts took place between Israel and Jordan in 1967 and 1974, demonstrating that the state of war was not only symbolic. Although informal communications channels were developed between the two states in the 1980s, the permanent state of war posed a constant risk of sparking an armed conflict which was likely engulf the entire region.

Recognising the threat to regional peace and security that was posed by the state of war between Israel and Jordan, the governments of the USA and Soviet Union came together in October 1991 to invite delegates from Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian community to a peace conference in Madrid. Talks at the conference were followed up in Washington, DC in December 1991, where a lengthy peace process between the governments of Israel and Jordan began.¹ After two years of negotiations mediated by US officials, the

¹ Jewish Virtual Library. *Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Peace Negotiations.* (Jewish Virtual Library, 2020) Available at: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/overview-of-israel-jordan-peace-negotiations> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

belligerents agreed to the Common Agenda in September 1993, which provided a framework for wide-ranging negotiations on improving the security situation, sharing water, returning refugees, resolving territorial disputes, and even future bilateral cooperation.² Talks continued, with King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel holding their first public meeting in Washington, DC in July 1994. This round of negotiations culminated in July 1994 with the Washington Declaration, mediated by US President William Clinton, whereby the war was formally ended, bilateral relations were established, and areas of cooperation were introduced.³ In October 1994, the talks concluded with the signing of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace, which formalised many aspects of the Washington Declaration.⁴ This peace process greatly reduced the likelihood of armed conflict between the two states, which remain at peace to this day.

² Agreed Common Agenda, 1993. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-commonagenda93> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

³ Washington Declaration, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-washingtondeclaration94> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

⁴ Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/israeljordan-peacetreaty94> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

Year(s): 1949 – present.

Location: Kashmir.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the Government of the Soviet Union.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan has helped to prevent a major interstate war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir since 1949.

India and Pakistan emerged from the British Empire in 1947. The Princely State of Kashmir also emerged from the Empire and was initially independent, however following a Pakistani invasion in the wake of the British withdrawal, the Kashmiri leadership elected to join the Indian Union in exchange for military assistance from New Delhi. In 1948, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established to mediate an end to the conflict. Its efforts culminated with the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement on 27 July 1949.¹ With the ceasefire in place, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was added to UNCIP to monitor and verify the terms of the ceasefire. When UNCIP was withdrawn in 1951, UNMOGIP remained in place to continue its work.²

By facilitating communication between the belligerent armed forces and offering reassurances to both sides on the conduct of the other with regular inspections, UNMOGIP helped to prevent minor clashes or disputes from escalating into interstate conflict. It was remarkably successful in this regard, helping to limit the conflict almost entirely for decades.³ However, UNMOGIP faced a major challenge in 1965, when the conflict escalated again. The UN Security Council immediately implored the governments of India and Pakistan to observe the ceasefire and cooperate with UNMOGIP. The following day, the fighting ended

¹ Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Ceasefire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Karachi Agreement), 1949. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/indiapakistan-karachiagreement49> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

² UNMOGIP. *Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmogip.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

³ Pauline Dawson. *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*. (London: Hurst, 1994) p.296

and negotiations mediated by the Government of the Soviet Union culminated with another ceasefire agreement in January 1966.⁴ To support the de-escalation process, UNMOGIP was reinforced and an additional peacekeeping force, the United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), was deployed to monitor the withdrawal from troops from Kashmir.⁵ India and Pakistan went to war again in 1971 when the former supported Bangladesh's bid for independence from the latter. UNMOGIP provided a key mechanism for the disengagement of forces after the conflict. The Mission's role was significantly reduced after 1972, however its personnel have remained in place, continuing to observe the ceasefire and report to the UN Secretary-General.⁶ The conflict erupted again briefly in 1999, but a major war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has been averted for over 70 years thanks in part to the work of UNMOGIP.

⁴ Tashkent Declaration, 1966. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/india-pakistan-tashkent-declaration66> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *India-Pakistan: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombackgr.html> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁶ UNMOGIP. *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmogip.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 29/11/2020)

Year(s): 1993.

Location: Wajir County, North Eastern Province, Kenya.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action, the mediation of a peace agreement, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN and the governments of Portugal, USA, and USSR.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict between clans in Wajir County, Kenya, was ended in 1993.

Wajir is a county located in Kenya's North Eastern Province bordering Somalia and Ethiopia. This frontier region is remote, home to a large Somali population, and was essentially lawless during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly after collapse of the Barré regime in Somalia in 1991. Home to three pastoralist Somali clans, the Ajuran, Degodia, and Ogaden, Wajir has a long history of low-intensity conflicts over resources.¹ When arms proliferated across the region and substantial numbers of Somalis fled over the border in 1991, considerable strain was placed on resources in the area. It was in this context that North Eastern Province prepared for the December 1992 Kenyan general election – the first multi-party contest since independence. In Wajir District, the election came to be viewed as a competition between the clans for territorial dominance, with contested constituencies becoming the targets of violent campaigns to manipulate demographics through forced evictions. In Wajir-West, for example, Degodia leaders allegedly won the election by bringing in clan members from outside the constituency to outnumber the local Ajuran population.² After the election, the Degodia administration exclusively distributed government positions within the clan, leaving the Ajuran fearful of the complete loss of their lands and influence. In June 1993, clashes erupted into an open conflict which quickly spread across north-eastern Kenya, costing the lives of 1,200 people.³

¹ National Cohesion and Integration Commission & Interpeace. *Voices of the People: Impediments to Peace and Community and Resilience in Wajir County*. (Nairobi, 2021) p.2

² Ken Menkhaus. "The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its implications for state-building." *Afrika Focus*, Vol. 21, No. 2. (2008) p.25

³ Richard Carver. "Kenya Since the Elections." *WRITENET*. (1 January 1994) Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c2c.html> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

Efforts to end the conflict began when Dekha Ibrahim Abdi and another woman intervened to stop violence taking place at a market in Wajir. Following the event, they formed Wajir Women for Peace Group and were soon joined by other civil society groups to form the Wajir Peace Group. These local organisations engaged with clan elders and managed to convene a peace conference with the help of the local member of parliament. The talks concluded with the creation of a 36-person cross-clan council which was mandated to bring an end to the conflict.⁴ By employing some traditional Somali peacemaking methods (*xeer* and *diya*) and incorporating a broad range of stakeholders, this council was able to oversee the end of hostilities and succeeded in mediating the Al Fatah Peace Declaration, which was signed on 29 September 1993.⁵ The declaration essentially represented a code of conduct for relations between the clans in Wajir, but it also called for the creation of peace committees encompassing elders, government officials, security personnel, and NGOs to prevent further conflicts.⁶

⁴ Rashid Abdi. "A Dying Breed of Peacemakers in Kenya's North East." *International Crisis Group*. (18 November 2015) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/dying-breed-peacemakers-kenya-s-north-east> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

⁵ Al-Fatah Peace Declaration, 1993. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1916/Al-Fatah%20Peace%20Declaration> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

⁶ Paul van Tongeren. "Potential cornerstone of infrastructures for peace? How local peace committees can make a difference." *Peacebuilding*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2013) pp.41-2

Year(s): 1993 – present.

Location: Wajir County, North East Province, Kenya.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, the Government of Kenya.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Conflict relapses in Wajir County were prevented and armed conflict in the area has been significantly reduced thanks to the maintenance of a peace infrastructure.

Six months after the Al Fateh Declaration, a new local governor (known as a District Commissioner) was appointed to Wajir. They faced the immediate challenge of consolidating the peace that had been achieved through the mediation of the inter-clan council and the hard work of local civil society groups. In 1994, a rapid response team was established with members from local government and civil society. This team continued to employ traditional Somali methods such as *xeer* and *diya* to resolve disputes and prevent wider conflicts rather than relying on Kenyan law, thereby accommodating their efforts with the needs and perspectives of the local population.¹ In 1995, the various civil society groups working for peace in Wajir were united as a District Development Committee within the local government administration, formalising the links between the state and civil society that had developed in the search for peace. In addition, in May 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) was established as a permanent organisation with support from the Kenyan government and international donors.² The WPDC was led by the District Commissioner and included representatives from the military and security services, government departments, NGOs, elders, women, youth, religious leaders, the business community, and Wajir’s four members of parliament. By encompassing such an array of stakeholders, the WPDC entrenched collaboration between local government and society as the means to address crises and provided a administrative framework for the use of customary

¹ Menkhaus. “The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya.” p.26

² Aden Abdi & Jeremy Lind. “Kenya: The changing nature of local peacebuilding in Kenya’s north-eastern borderlands.” *Accord Insight*, Vol. 4. (2018) p.29

law and traditional methods of peacemaking to prevent or resolve conflicts. In this period, the WPDC also helped form a Council of Elders, composed of 10 clan leaders, to facilitate communication and dialogue between the clans in Wajir and the Kenyan government adjusted local constituency boundaries to ensure each clan had a seat in parliament.³

The measures taken in response to the violence of the early 1990s succeeded in reducing armed conflict in Wajir. The Ajuran and Degodia clans have not fought since, and although occasional armed clashes do still occur in the area, these often involve cross-border incidents that are beyond the remit of the WPDC and are considerably smaller than previous conflicts: an uptick in violence in July 2000, for example, resulted in 30 deaths.⁴ When the rest of Kenya verged on the brink of civil war during 2007-2008 election violence, Wajir remained one of the most peaceful districts in the entire country, demonstrating the effectiveness of the peace infrastructure that was developed. In 2010, Interpol listed a city in Wajir as the safest in East and Central Africa.⁵

³ Menkhaus. "The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya." p.27

⁴ Ibid. p.28

⁵ Abdi & Lind. "Kenya." p.29

Year(s): 2001 – present.

Location: Kenya.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace Infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Kenya, local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The development of an effective peace infrastructure helped to reduce armed conflict across Kenya and limit the risk of electoral violence.

Following the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Wajir, local governments established similar organisations in collaboration with civil society groups across northern Kenya. Recognising the need for an institutional framework to coordinate and consolidate the various initiatives, the Government of Kenya established the National Steering Council (NSC) as an interdepartmental government agency in 2001. The 2007-2008 electoral violence revealed that the parts of Kenya with functional peace committees experienced considerably less conflict than those areas where no such infrastructure was in place. In response, the Kenyan government established another agency, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, and expanded the committees (sometimes referred to as Nakuru Peace Committees) and structures to 150 new Kenyan districts, with an initial focus on the Rift Valley – a region that experienced the most upheaval in 2007-2008.¹ In 2011, the NSC published a revised conflict management policy which outlined a comprehensive infrastructure for reducing armed in Kenya with plans for a National Peace Council supported by a permanent secretariat that would coordinate the efforts of regional and county-level peace councils, local peace committees, and a mediation support unit. These organisations were tasked with hosting peace fora, maintaining peace committees, liaising with the media, conducting conflict analysis, and supporting the National Conflict Early

¹ National Cohesion and Integration Commission. *Footprints of Peace: Consolidating National Cohesion in a Devolved Kenya, 2014-2018*. (NCIC, 2018) pp.1-2

Warning and Response platform.² Parts of this infrastructure was already in place in some areas of the country and was developed in others, but it was not until 2015 that the Kenyan parliament formally adopted the NSC's conflict management policy.³

The emergence of the national peace infrastructure in Kenya has met with demonstrable success. A 2010 referendum and the 2013 elections went ahead peacefully, with UN Development Programme assessments highlighting the contributions of the local peace committees.⁴ In addition to reducing electoral violence, the peace infrastructure also prevents and ends relatively low-intensity conflicts between communities in Kenya: In 2011, the Mabanga Peace Conference resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the Babukusu, Iteso, and Sabaot in Bungoma; the following year, peace was made between the Agikuyu and Kalenjin; in 2016, the Nanyuki Peace Agreement was mediated between the Aulian and Borana in Isiolo County; and in 2018, talks in Nakuru resulted in a peace agreement between the Luo and Nandi.⁵

² National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. *Our Work: National Peace Coordination*. (NSC, 2021) Available at: <https://www.nscpeace.go.ke/work/national-peace-coordination> (Accessed 23/11/2021)

³ Maria Osula. "Finally! A peace policy for Kenya." *Saferworld Comment and Analysis*. (4 November 2015) Available at: <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/174-finally-a-peace-policy-for-kenya> (Accessed 23/11/2021)

⁴ John Makokha & Grace Miano. *UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation 2012: Ken Outcome 49 – Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery*. (UNDP, 2012) p.29

⁵ Mabanga Peace Accord, 2011. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1947/Mabanga%20Peace%20Accord> (Accessed 23/11/2021); Nakuru County Peace Accord, 2012. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/785/Nakuru%20County%20Peace%20Accord> (Accessed 23/11/2021); Nanyuki Peace Agreement between the Aulian Community of Garissa County and Borana Community of Isiolo County, 2016. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1920/> (Accessed 23/11/2021); Resolutions of the Nakuru Peace Agreement between the Luo and Nandi Communities of Kisumu and Nandi Counties attended by National and County Government Officials held at Water Buck Hotel, Nakuru, 2018. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2101/Resolutions%20of%20the%20Nakuru%20Peace%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Luo%20and%20Nandi%20Communities%20of%20Kisumu%20and%20Nandi%20Counties%20attended%20by%20National%20and%20County%20Government%20Officials%20held%20at%20Water%20Buck%20Hotel,%20Nakuru> (Accessed 23/11/2021)

Year(s): 2007 – 2008.

Location: Kenya.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action, diplomacy, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), the African Union, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Electoral violence in Kenya was prevented from escalating into armed conflict by the efforts of local people and organisations and the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities, which led the talks which produced the National Accord and Reconciliation Act.

A disputed election in December 2007 led to outbreaks of spontaneous violence, organised attacks by militias, and a violent crackdown by security forces in Kenya.¹ With the prospect of a civil war becoming increasingly likely, Kenyan citizens mobilised to monitor the violence while international organisations took action to facilitate the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Recognising the potential for armed conflict to emerge from the disputed election, five Kenyans met the day after the polls to discuss how to prevent such an outcome.² They acted rapidly to mobilise a network of volunteers from across Kenyan society, which they named Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), and began broadcasting their appeals for violence to be avoided. On 9 January 2008, CCP published the Citizens' Agenda for Peace, which outlined strategies for ending the crisis, including the formation of a power-sharing coalition government. Other groups within the network mobilised prominent personalities and the religious community to voice their opposition to violence and provide their time, resources, and good offices to facilitate dialogue.³ The CCP later became a key actor in the peace process and played a pivotal role in resolving the crisis.

¹ Monica Kathina Juma. "African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2009) p.410

² George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles. *Citizens in Actions: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008*. (Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, 2010) p.x1

³ George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles. *Citizens in Actions: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008*. (Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, 2010)

At the diplomatic level, the African Union (AU) provided a mandate for a diplomatic intervention to help resolve the crisis and dispatched its Panel of Eminent Personalities (led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan) to mediate the peace process.⁴ Within a week of the Panel's arrival, the parties to the dispute agreed to enter into dialogue and appointed representatives for the negotiations. On 1 February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon arrived in Nairobi to offer his support to the peace process. Two weeks later, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived to declare US support for the process.⁵ With mounting diplomatic pressure to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, negotiations culminated on 28 February 2008 with the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which provided the framework for the formation of a power-sharing government (as outlined in the Citizen's Agenda for Peace).⁶ Following the agreement, the Government of National Unity was formed. Although subsequent Kenyan elections were held without similar levels of violence, local analysts highlight the need for the preventive measures that were successful in 2008 to become permanent and embedded.⁷

⁴ Juma. "African mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 election crisis." p.407

⁵ Elisabeth Lindenmayer & Josie Lianna Kaye. *A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya*. (International Peace Institute, 2009)

⁶ National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/kenya-national-accord-act2008> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

⁷ Claire Elder, Susan Stigant, & Jonas Claes. *Elections and Violent Conflict in Kenya: Making Prevention Stick*. (Washington, DC: Peaceworks, 2014) Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/11/elections-and-violent-conflict-kenya-making-prevention-stick> (Accessed 14/10/2020)

Year(s): 1953 – 1995.

Location: North Korea/South Korea International Border.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Military Armistice Committee.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Military Armistice Committee helped to contain the armed conflict between North and South Korea for over four decades, playing a key role in implementing the terms of the 1953 Armistice and monitoring adherence to them by both signatories.

After over three years of intense fighting, the Korean War came to an unofficial end on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. The Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of military forces from a demilitarised zone which was created as a buffer between North and South, dividing the peninsula in two. Although it ended the fighting and serves as the only legal instrument for the avoidance of renewed hostilities, the Agreement did not provide a resolution to the conflict. It did, however, establish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), an unarmed military observer mission, and the Military Armistice Committee (MAC), a ten-person committee of military personnel, to verify implementation and provide a mechanism for dialogue across the lines should the need arise.¹ Owing to the high levels of international involvement in the conflict, the NNSC was composed of four theoretically neutral nations selected by the belligerents: Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.² The MAC includes five representatives selected by the North and five from the South.

¹ Agreement Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, 1953. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/koreadrk-militaryarmistice53> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

² Marek Hańderek. *Documents Concerning the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission*. (North Korean Archives Project, 2020) Available at: <https://northkoreanarchives.org/2018/12/05/documents-concerning-the-neutral-nations-supervisory-commission-in-korea-in-the-archive-of-the-institute-of-national-remembrance/#> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Between 1953 and 1956, hundreds of NNSC personnel verified compliance with the ceasefire and the demilitarised zone, monitored the rotation of units along the front line (passing such information to both sides as a confidence building measure), and inspected freight at ports of entry across the peninsula for arms shipments.³ These activities helped to reduce tensions and lower the risk of armed conflict in the years immediately after the conflict. In 1956, inspection responsibilities were removed from the NNSC's mandate, and the Commission was significantly reduced in size. Between 1953 and 1991, full meetings of the MAC were convened 459 times, while thousands more occurred among the lower ranks. These regular meetings helped to maintain dialogue between the belligerents and served as a mechanism for disputes to be discussed and resolved peacefully.⁴ The transition of Czechoslovakia and Poland from communism at the end of the Cold War led North Korea to dismiss them as its representatives on the NNSC, forcing it to suspend most of its activities in February 1995. A small team has remained to gather and exchange intelligence, while meetings are occasionally held between the NNSC states.⁵ The MAC continues to operate.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ray Smith. *Peacekeeping Without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice Arrangements*. (Thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations, 2015) p.12

⁵ Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. "2019 Joint Statement by Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission Member State." *Regeringskansliet*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.regeringen.se/uttalanden/2019/03/2019-joint-statement-by-neutral-nations-supervisory-commission-member-states/> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

Year(s): 1999.

Location: Kosovo.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A direct military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ended the armed conflict in Kosovo during the collapse of Yugoslavia.

As Yugoslavia collapsed in the 1990s, a Kosovar Albanian armed group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an insurgency against federal security forces in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. After the KLA acquired significant quantities of weapons during the armed conflict in neighbouring Albania in 1997, the fighting in Kosovo escalated in 1998.¹ Amidst reports of atrocities against civilians in March 1998, the Contact Group (composed of the EU, US, and Russia) imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia and the administration of Slobodan Milošević and the UN approved an arms embargo. Talks hosted by the Government of Russia resulted in the deployment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission in July, and another agreement in October allowed the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) to deploy 2,000 unarmed international observers of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to monitor implementation.² These efforts, however, had little impact on the conflict. By the end of 1998, the KLA had spread their insurgency across Kosovo, forcing Milošević to order large military operations across the province which consistently resulted in atrocities against Kosovar Albanian civilians. This resulted in increasingly harsh international condemnation, along with threats of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military intervention.

¹ UCDP. *Serbia (Yugoslavia): Kosovo*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/412> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

² Staff and Agencies. "Yugoslavia: OSCE Signs Kosovo Verification Accord." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. (16 October 1998) Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/yugoslavia-osce-signs-kosovo-verification-accord> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

In February 1999, the representatives of the KLA and the Government of Yugoslavia met for peace talks mediated by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana in Rambouillet, France. The terms offered to the Yugoslav party were that Kosovo would remain an Autonomous Province of Yugoslavia and 5,000 Yugoslav personnel could remain in the area, but that overall responsibility for security in the area would be taken up by 30,000 NATO troops for a period of three years until the final status of Kosovo could be determined.³ These terms proved unacceptable to Milošević, and his counter-offer of allowing an unarmed UN mission to deploy to Kosovo was rejected by the KLA and NATO. The failure of these talks led to the withdrawal of the KVM on 22 March 1999, a day prior to the announcement that NATO would commence a military campaign against Yugoslavia. On 24 March, NATO launched an extensive bombing campaign across Yugoslavia.⁴ This culminated at the beginning of June, when Milošević finally acquiesced to a joint Finnish-Russian overture on 9 June 1999 and signed a technical military agreement which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the deployment of an international presence under UN auspices.⁵ The following day, NATO suspended its air operations and on 12 June, Norwegian special forces led the NATO troops of the Kosovo Force into the area. These developments, spurred by the NATO military intervention, ended the war.⁶ Over 90 percent of the Kosovar Albanian population was forced from their homes during the conflict, which cost the lives of 13,500 people. Although decisive, the NATO bombing campaign cost the lives of approximately 500 civilians in Yugoslavia.⁷

³ Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords), 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

⁴ James Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. (London: Hurst, 2003) p.286

⁵ Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovoserbia-militarytechnicalagreement99> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

⁶ Patrick Wintour, Ian Traynor, & Ed Vulliamy. "Why Milosevic blinked first." *The Guardian*. (1999) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/06/balkans> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁷ Human Rights Watch. *The Crisis in Kosovo*. (HRW, 2001) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

Year(s): 1999 – present.

Location: Kosovo.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission, a political mission, and a transitional international administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EU, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation peacekeeping force, a UN transitional administration, and a political mission from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe have successfully helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Kosovo since 1999.

Slobodan Milošević withdrew Yugoslav forces from Kosovo in early June, marking the end of the war.¹ On 10 June, the UN Security Council gave NATO the go-ahead to send personnel into Kosovo as stipulated in the technical agreement with Milošević, and, two days later, 42,000 troops of the international Kosovo Force (KFOR) moved into Kosovo, where they were tasked with maintaining a safe and secure environment and preventing renewed war.² Although the conflict was over, tensions between Kosovo's Albanian and Serb communities threatened to spark a conflict relapse which could have escalated into a regional war. Furthermore, with the Kosovar Albanian population now enjoying the benefits of political power, the plight of the Serb population that remained in Kosovo became a humanitarian concern. Kosovo also lacked the most basic structures of governance in the aftermath of the conflict and the Yugoslav withdrawal from the area. Cognisant of these risks, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) to coordinate the international efforts in Kosovo and govern the territory until the institutions for self-rule could be built.³

¹ Patrick Wintour, Ian Traynor, & Ed Vulliamy. "Why Milosevic blinked first." *The Guardian*. (1999) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/06/balkans> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

² NATO. *NATO's role in Kosovo*. (NATO, 2020) Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed 24/11/2020)

³ UN Security Council. *Resolution 1244*. (UN, 1999) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1244> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

UNMIK provided many basic services to the population between 1999 and 2002, when it took up a more supervisory role following the election of local representatives to administrative bodies.⁴ UNMIK was supported by parallel missions from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which focused on democratisation, elections, and institution building, and the EU, which led the economic recovery.⁵ Furthermore, KFOR remained in Kosovo to provide security and ensure stability.⁶ It continues to maintain a force of 3,800 personnel at the time of writing. Following the declaration of Kosovan independence in 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo was established to support the development of the Kosovan police force and judiciary.⁷ Ongoing talks between Serbian and Kosovan authorities have been mediated by the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo since 2005.⁸ Although the status of Kosovo remains contested and progress with regard to building state institutions has been undeniably slow, the array of international efforts to stabilise the area have helped prevent a conflict relapse in Kosovo for over two decades.

⁴ Daan W. Everts. *Peacekeeping in Albania and Kosovo: Conflict Response and International Intervention in the Western Balkans, 1997-2002*. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020) p.198-9

⁵ OSCE. *OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Mandate*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/mandate> (Accessed 24/11/2020); Marcus Brand. *The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government*. (Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2003) p.10

⁶ NATO. *NATO's role in Kosovo*.

⁷ EULEX. *About EULEX*. (EU, 2020) Available at: <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,60> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

⁸ UNOSEK. *Origins of UNOSEK*. (UNOSEK, 2020) Available at: <https://www.unosek.org/origins-of-unosek/> (Accessed 24/11/2020)

Year(s): 2010.

Location: Kyrgyzstan.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The measures taken by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Kyrgyzstani people and organisations helped to prevent political crises and social unrest from escalating into armed conflict in 2010.

In 2010, Kyrgyzstan was confronted with a series of major political crises that threatened to spark a civil war. The incumbent president was forced from office during violent street protests in April and his administration was quickly replaced with an interim government which pledged to implement a democratisation agenda.¹ After several incidents of violence throughout May, tensions between southern Kyrgyzstan's Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities quickly escalated. Fed by the ambitions of rival political elites vying for power in the region, these tensions came to a head in the city of Osh between 10 – 15 June. During riots and armed clashes, over 400 people were killed, up to 2,000 were injured, and 300,000 were forced to flee from their homes as much of the city was destroyed.²

Both the Confederation of Independent States and UN considered deploying peacekeepers to Kyrgyzstan but ultimately left the resolution of the crisis in the hands of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which at the time was chaired by neighbouring Kazakhstan. A Kazakh OSCE Special Representative was dispatched to investigate events and begin facilitating dialogue between the belligerent parties. Meanwhile, diplomatic pressure to contain the violence mounted as the EU and UN called for a return to

¹ Franco Galdini. "The June 2010 'Events' Four Years On: Past, Present, Future." *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Central Asia Security Policy Briefs*, No. 15. (2014)

² Freedom House. *A Chronicle of Violence: The events in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 (Osh Region)*. (Freedom House, 2012)

constitutional order and sent their own officials to support the OSCE. Further support was offered by the Russian and US governments, which both offered their full support to the Kazakh-led initiative in the country.³ High-level actions taken by the OSCE were complemented by the tireless work of local peacebuilders, who successfully prevented the violence from escalating further in southern Kyrgyzstan. In the city of Aravan, for example, local leaders formed the Aravan Committee for Restoring Stability and implored gathering crowds to not resort to violence. In addition to preventing violence, the Committee also supported local traders and farmers, thus minimising the impact of the crises on the population. Although hundreds of people died as a result of the unrest, the escalation of the crises into an armed conflict was prevented thanks to the preventive diplomacy of the OSCE and the actions of local peacebuilders.⁴

³ Center for Strategic Studies & International Studies and Institute for New Democracies. “The OSCE and the 2010 Crisis in Kyrgyzstan.” *Policy Brief and Case Study*. (2010) Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/policy-brief-case-study-osce-and-2010-crisis-kyrgyzstan> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁴ Alisher Khamidov, Nick Megoran, & John Heathershaw. “Bottom-up peacekeeping in southern Kyrgyzstan: how local actors managed to prevent the spread of violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad to Aravan, June 2010.” *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 45, No. 6. (2017)

Year(s): 1978 – present.

Location: Lebanon.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: UN Peacekeepers have helped maintain stability and contain or end several armed conflicts in Lebanon since 1978.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established on 19 March 1978 in response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon following attacks on Tel Aviv by Palestinian militants from bases in the area. UNIFIL was initially tasked with confirming Israeli withdrawals, restoring peace and security to the area, and helping the Government of Lebanon re-establish its authority across the country.¹ Owing to the complex geopolitical situation, the peacekeepers were initially limited to providing humanitarian assistance rather than pursuing their mandate. In 1985, the gradual Israeli withdrawal began, continuing until 2000, when it was finally completed.² UNIFIL filled the gap left by their departure, with peacekeepers working to maintain the ceasefire through joint patrols and regular consultations with both the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Army. In this period, UNIFIL played a key role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (which were still in recovery from the 1975-1989 civil war) as they asserted state authority in southern Lebanon and disarmed militias, while also providing vital basic services to the population.³ Although quantifying the impact of UNIFIL during these years is difficult, the fragility of the

¹ United Nations Security Council. *Resolutions 425 & 426*. (1978) Available at: <http://unsr.com/en/resolutions/425> (Accessed 27/10/2021)

² Suzanne Goldenberg. "Chaos and humiliation as Israel pulls out of Lebanon." *The Guardian*. (24 May 2000) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/24/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon> (Accessed 27/10/2021)

³ UNIFIL. *UNIFIL Background*. (UN, 2021) Available at: <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background> (Accessed 27/10/2021)

Lebanese state and the preponderance of armed groups in the area of operation made renewed conflict a real possibility.

The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (in response to Hezbollah attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory) cost the lives of many peacekeepers and presented many challenges to UNIFIL. After a month of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed on 14 August. In the aftermath of the conflict, the parameters of the UNIFIL mission changed considerably.⁴ The strength of the operation was increased considerably, both in terms of overall numbers and heavy weapons, and a naval component was added to help the Lebanese Armed Forces monitor their maritime borders and limit the flow of weapons to Hezbollah. Once again, UNIFIL was positioned between the withdrawing IDF troops and unoccupied Lebanese territory to assure both sides, monitor the ceasefire, deliver basic services, and accompany Lebanese security forces as they returned to the area.⁵ This complex task was completed without incident, and relative stability was once again established in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL continues contributing to peace and stability in the region at the time of writing.

⁴ Jeffrey Feltman. "Debating UN peacekeeping in Lebanon." *Brookings*. (15 June 2020) Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/debating-un-peacekeeping-in-lebanon/> (Accessed 27/10/2021)

⁵ UNIFIL. *UNIFIL Background*.

Year(s): 2017 – 2018.

Location: Lesotho.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union and the Southern African Development Community.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Southern African Development Committee Preventive Mission in Lesotho helped to maintain stability during a period of severe political crisis in Lesotho, preventing an armed conflict from erupting in 2017.

Lesotho, a small kingdom surrounded by South Africa, has had a troubled relationship with democracy since constitutional rule was re-established in 1993 after a period of military rule. A contested election in 1998 led to mass protests and a Southern African Development Committee (SADC) intervention, with further instability being averted with the introduction of some electoral reforms. However, politics in the 2000s continued to be marked by weak governing coalitions, contested elections, and attempted coups d'état by the armed forces.¹ In 2014, an attempted coup forced much of the government (including the prime minister) to flee to South Africa, where they requested international assistance to help restore order.² In the ensuing negotiations hosted by the Government of South Africa, new elections were scheduled for 2015, however these failed to produce a stable governing coalition and the chaos continued. A few months later, a former military chief was assassinated, sparking a SADC investigation. In their findings, the SADC officials recommended a host of political, constitutional, and security reforms which, they hoped, would bring some stability to

¹ Roger Southall. "Why Lesotho's in such a mess and what can be done about it." *The Conversation*. (2017) Available at: <https://theconversation.com/why-lesothos-in-such-a-mess-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-79678> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

² Christopher Williams. "South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective." *The Conversation*. (2020) Available at: <https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

Lesotho.³ The proposals were, however, largely ignored by the Government of Lesotho and the country remained on the verge of collapse.

In September 2017, the SADC met to discuss the possibility of deploying an intervention force to prevent the collapse of law and order in Lesotho. After agreeing that such a move was necessary (and making use of the previous request for aid by the Government of Lesotho), the 269 personnel of the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL) moved into Lesotho on 2 December 2017. They were tasked with creating a secure, stable, and peaceful environment, restoring the rule of law, and helping to implement certain Security Sector Reform programmes.⁴ Almost immediately, the situation in Lesotho calmed and SAPMIL was able to focus on facilitating dialogue and leading confidence building patrols with the fractured Basotho security services. Just two months into their deployment, an African Union (AU) delegation assessed SAPMIL, recommending AU member states provide financial and logistical support to the mission.⁵ Having helped to prevent the political deadlock from escalating into armed conflict, SAPMIL was withdrawn in November 2018.

³ Peter Fabricius. "Is SADC at last flexing its muscles in Lesotho?" *ISS Today*. (2017) Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-sadc-at-last-flexing-its-muscles-in-lesotho> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁴ SADC. "SADC officially launches the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho on December 2, 2017." *News*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-officially-launches-sadc-preventive-mission-kingdom-lesotho-december-2-2017/> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

⁵ SADC. "AU conducts an Assessment on the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL)." *News*. (2018) Available at: <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/au-conducts-assessment-sadc-preventive-mission-lesotho-sapmil/> (Accessed 07/12/2020)

Year(s): 2003.

Location: Liberia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Economic Community of West African States and the International Contact Group on Liberia.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: After 14 years of armed conflict and instability, the war in Liberia was finally ended by the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 18 August 2003.

The war in Liberia began in 1989, when a former government official, Charles Taylor, launched an insurgency against government security forces. By August 1990, the Liberian armed forces had largely been defeated and Taylor's troops were besieging the capital, Monrovia.¹ In August 1990, governments in the region agreed to deploy the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in an effort to contain the crisis.² They were later supported by UN observers, however the fighting continued until, after more than a dozen failed attempts to forge a peace, the 1996 Abuja II Agreement succeeded in halting the fighting.³ The following year, elections were held, resulting in a resounding victory for Taylor, whose forces controlled most of the country.⁴ Although much of Liberia enjoyed some semblance of peace following the election, fighting continued in parts of the country throughout the period and in 2001, the country descended into war once again.

In June 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (which included the African Union, ECOWAS,

¹ UCDP. *Liberia: Government*. (UCDP: 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/341> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

² Human Rights Watch. "Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights." *HRW Reports*, Vol. 5, No. 6. (1993)

³ Supplement to the Abuja Accord, 1996. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-supplementabuja96> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁴ Lansana Gberie. "Liberia's War and Peace process: A Historical Overview." in Festus Aboagye and Alhaji M S Bah, eds. *A Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN, and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005) p.61

World Bank, and UN along with a range of national governments) hosted negotiations in Accra, Ghana. Following his indictment by the Special Court in Sierra Leone, Taylor fled back to his stronghold in Monrovia.⁵ Representatives of the Government of Liberia remained, however, and the talks continued.⁶ A wide range of civil society actors, such as the Mano River Women Peace Network, the Women in Peacebuilding Program, the Liberian Bar Association, and the Inter-Religious Council for Liberia, took part in the 76-day process at Accra and ultimately helped to shape the post-conflict transition.⁷ By June 2003, an array of armed groups had pushed Taylor's forces back to Monrovia. Taylor relinquished power on 11 August, fleeing to Nigeria. Within a week, what remained of his administration negotiated an end to the conflict during negotiations hosted by ECOWAS in Ghana, culminating on 18 August with the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement.⁸ In addition to ending the conflict, the Agreement created the framework for a two-year transitional government which was tasked with administering the country until nationwide elections could be held in October 2005. Over 200,000 people (approximately ten percent of the entire Liberian population) were killed during the war.⁹

⁵ Paul Welsh. "Liberian leader's strange day in Ghana." *BCC News*. (2003) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2965110.stm> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁶ Priscilla Hayner. "Negotiating peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice." *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue November Report*. (2007)

⁷ Desirée Nilsson. *Crafting a Secure Peace – Evaluating Liberia's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003*. (Uppsala University and the UN Mediation Support Unit, 2009) p.22

⁸ Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁹ Gberie. "Liberia's War and Peace process." p.51

Year(s): 2003 – 2018.

Location: Liberia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, Economic Community of West African States, and UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of peacekeeping operations helped to maintain stability in Liberia for fifteen years following the signing of the Accra Agreement, preventing a conflict relapse.

Both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN had deployed personnel to Liberia during the war in an effort to contain the violence and expedite an end to the conflict. Although those operations ultimately failed, the talks that took place in Ghana during the summer of 2003 provided renewed impetus for a fresh multilateral deployment if an agreement was found. On 1 August 2003, weeks before the Accra Agreement was signed, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), to prepare the ground for the arrival of a UN mission.¹ Two months later, following the conclusion of the negotiations in Accra, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took over from ECOMIL. The Mission was reinforced until 2005, when the number of personnel peaked at 15,000 peacekeepers and 1,100 police.² Liberia was left devastated by 14 years of armed conflict. Its national infrastructure and state institutions had been destroyed and thousands of combatants remained scattered across the country, weapons in hand. These challenges only served to magnify the task of ensuring the fragile peace that had been negotiated in Accra did not fail as a dozen previous agreements had. Thus, upon its deployment, UNMIL's priorities were managing the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process, training the newly established police force, providing border security, building the capacity of other state institutions, and repairing

¹ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1497*. (2003) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1497> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

² Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.119

infrastructure to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid.³ Between December 2003 and November 2004, UNMIL disarmed more than 100,000 former combatants.⁴ In January 2004, UN Police launched a training programme for the Liberian National Police and helped to re-open the national training academy. The first class of 127 police cadets graduated from the programme within a year.⁵ In October 2005, presidential and legislative elections went ahead with the support of UNMIL in a safe and secure environment. In 2006, work began on building a new military for Liberia, with UNMIL providing support to the process alongside the US.⁶ In February 2018, UNMIL withdrew from Liberia, leaving a small contingent of ECOWAS personnel and a UN Peacebuilding office in the country to monitor events.⁷ This sustained effort helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Liberia.

³ UNMIL. *UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia – Mandate*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmil.unmissions.org/mandate> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁴ Wolf-Christian Paes. “The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2005) p.253; Peace Accords Matrix. *Accra Peace Agreement*. (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2020) Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement#easy-footnote-bottom-1-18679> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁵ United Nations Mission in Liberia. *The Story of UNMIL*. (New York: UN, 2018)

⁶ David C. Gompert, Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns, Keith Crane, & K. Jack Riley. *Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007)

⁷ Daniel Forti & Lesley Connolly. *The Mission is Gone, but the UN is Staying: Liberia’s Peacekeeping Transition*. (International Peace Institute, 2018)

Year(s): 2009 – 2014.

Location: Madagascar.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Southern African Development Community, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A political crisis which verged on the brink of sparking a civil war in Madagascar was prevented from escalating by an effective international diplomatic intervention and the mediation of a peace agreement by the Southern African Development Community.

In February 2009, opposition protests in Madagascar were met with a brutal crackdown by security forces. The response cost the lives of 135 people and led to mutinies in the army.¹ Opposition against President Marc Ravalomanana's rule centred on a former mayor, Andry Rajoelina. In March 2009, military personnel supportive of Rajoelina removed the army Chief of Staff and Minister of Defence from office and deployed troops around the capital, Antananarivo, before forcing Ravalomanana to resign.² In the ensuing weeks, Rajoelina declared himself head of a High Transitional Authority with military support and disbanded parliament. The crisis continued, with Ravalomanana continuing to claim the presidency, appointing a prime minister (who was duly arrested by security forces), and receiving support from factions in the military.³ With two rival governments, a divided military, and a paralysed state apparatus, Madagascar was on the verge of civil war.⁴

The African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the UN made efforts to mediate the crisis, attempting to host talks between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana early in 2009. However, once Rajoelina seized power, Madagascar was

¹ Lauren Ploch. "Madagascar's 2009 Political Crisis." *Congressional Research Service (R40448)*. (2009) p.1

² Ibid. p.3

³ BBC. "Madagascar army split raises war fears." *BBC News*. (2002) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1857555.stm> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

⁴ Alex Duval Smith. "Madagascar on the verge of civil war, US ambassador warns." *The Guardian*. (2009) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/12/madagascar-civil-war-rajoelina-ravalomanana> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

suspended from the AU and SADC, while the EU and US withheld aid.⁵ In June 2009, the SADC appointed the President of Mozambique to lead a mediation team to Madagascar along with representatives from the AU and *l'Organisation de la Francophonie* (OIF) to negotiate the formation of a power-sharing government.⁶ These efforts culminated in September with the signing of the Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, which affirmed commitments to free and fair elections, formed a transitional government, and invited the SADC to establish a mission to oversee implementation.⁷ The elections stipulated in the Roadmap were postponed several times, but when they did finally go ahead in 2013, both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were, under international pressure, prevented from standing. The UN provided funding and technical assistance for the election, while a host of international organisations deployed election monitors.⁸ These efforts helped to ensure a peaceful outcome to the contest. Thanks to effective diplomatic pressure and mediation, the political crisis in Madagascar was prevented from escalating into armed conflict.

⁵ Ploch. "Madagascar's 2009 Political Crisis." p.4

⁶ Lesley Connolly. "The troubled road to peace: Reflections on the complexities of resolving the political impasse in Madagascar." *ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief*, No. 21. (2013) p.2

⁷ Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar - Commitments by Malagasy Political Stakeholders, 2011. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/madagascar-roadmap2011> (Accessed 26/11/2020)

⁸ The Carter Center. *Legislative and Second Round of Presidential Elections in Madagascar: Final Report*. (The Carter Center, 2013) p.4

Year(s): 2011 – 2012.

Location: Malawi.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A timely diplomatic intervention by the UN helped to prevent an ongoing political crisis in Malawi from escalating into armed conflict in 2011.

In 2011, the people of Malawi took their frustration over rising taxes, fuel shortages, and the increasing authoritarianism of the government to the streets.¹ Beginning at the University of Malawi in February, the protests spread across the country, culminating in large public demonstrations in July. In response, the Government of Malawi ordered a crackdown on the protestors in which 20 civilians were killed and 58 injured by the police.² The crackdown inspired further unrest and violence, which in turn led the government to accuse the opposition of attempting a coup d'état. Civil society leaders then issued the government with an ultimatum, giving it a month to address the concerns outlined in a 20-point petition or face further street protests. Some militant opposition groups threatened violence should the demands for reform be ignored, while rumours that the government was hiring Zimbabwean mercenaries in preparation for a conflict served to heighten tensions even further.³ The likelihood of further violence and an escalation into armed conflict was high.

The UN Secretary-General was quick to recognise and respond to the crisis, appointing a Special Envoy in July 2011 and tasking him with calming the situation and preventing a recurrence of the recent violence. The Envoy successfully brought the parties together and, on 16 August, they formally agreed to participate in a UN-facilitated National Dialogue in

¹ Julius Agbor. "Averting Further Crisis in Malawi." *Brookings Op-Ed*. (2011) Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/averting-further-crisis-in-malawi/> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Diana Cammack. "Malawi risk becoming 'fragile state'." *The Guardian*. (2011) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/17/malawi-political-economic-crisis> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

³ Francesco Galtieri. *What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field - Malawi 2011-17*. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018) p.3

which the 20-point petition would serve as the agenda.⁴ This provided a credible alternative to the protests, which under the circumstances remained a potential spark for armed conflict. Between September 2011 and March 2012, UN staff mediated talks between government officials and representatives from civil society. These efforts succeeded in reducing tensions and containing the immediate crisis, however much work remained to resolve the conflict. The UN Development Programme led efforts to prevent conflict and reduce tensions at the regional level, while other agencies worked to create a safe and secure environment in which the upcoming elections could be held.⁵ By engaging with both parties and providing a mechanism for constructive dialogue between them, the UN effort helped to prevent the political crisis from escalating into armed conflict.

⁴ Ibid. p.4

⁵ Ibid. p.7

Year(s): 1990 – 1996.

Location: Mali.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Algeria and local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Mediation by the Government of Algeria resulted in a ceasefire, allowing local people and organisations in Mali to participate in a peace process which ended the Second Tuareg Rebellion in the early 1990s.

Mali emerged as an independent state in 1960. The subtropical south of the country is home to 90 percent of the population, including the Bambara social group who have dominated Malian institutions for centuries. To the north, swathes of sparsely populated desert with a handful of urban centres are home to Arabs and the Tuareg, many of whom are semi-nomadic. Upon independence, the newly empowered Malian administration sought to make these populations sedentary and consolidate control from traditional elites. These policies represented a reversal from French rule, where the north enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. In 1963, several armed groups emerged from the aggrieved Tuareg population and launched an insurgency against the Government of Mali in Bamako.¹ This rebellion was crushed militarily, leaving lasting antagonisms between the northern population and the government. A series of droughts in the ensuing decades worsened the plight of these communities, forcing many to leave Mali and join Muammar Qadhafi's Islamic Legion in Libya. In 1990, some veterans of the Islamic Legion launched another insurgency in northern Mali which enjoyed a broad base of support among both the Arab and Tuareg communities of the area.² Four major armed groups and an array of smaller ones gathered under the banner of

¹ Jean Sebastian Lecocq. *The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali*. (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2002) p.97

² Stephanie Pezard & Michael Shurkin. *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015) p.12

the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (*Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad*, MPLA) and joined the rebellion.

The government responded to the rebellion by declaring a state of emergency and launching security operations, this time to no avail. Ongoing military failures (including some major defeats) and growing domestic opposition to the administration forced the Government of Mali to accept an Algerian offer to mediate talks.³ The negotiations culminated on 6 January 1991 with the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords, which included provisions for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces and prisoner exchanges, and a commitment to provide the north with more investment and autonomy.⁴ A coup d'état later in the year threatened to derail the peace process, but fresh elections produced a new government, which continued dialogue. On 11 April 1992, ongoing talks encompassing a broad range of Malian communities and political stakeholders culminated with the signing of a more comprehensive peace agreement, the National Pact.⁵ Although this agreement caused several splinters in the MPLA (which itself dropped the “liberation” from its name during this period) that led to renewed fighting, those factions initially opposed to the peace process were gradually incorporated into it until 1996, when the last groups laid down their arms and a Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Timbuktu.⁶ A comprehensive military integration programme (involving thousands of Tuareg troops and supported by the UN), ongoing efforts by local people and organisations (supported by Norwegian Church Aid), and the implementation of the relevant provisions of the National Pact by the government helped to consolidate the peace.⁷

³ Kalifa Keita. “Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 9, No. 3. (1998) p.112

⁴ Accord sur la cessation des hostilités, 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordcessationhostilites91> (Accessed 26/01/2022)

⁵ Pacte national conclu entre le gouvernement de la République du Mali et les mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad consacrant le statut particulier du nord au Mali, 1992. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-pacte-reconciliation-national92> (Accessed 26/01/2022)

⁶ UCDP. *Mali: Azawad*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372> (Accessed 26/01/2022)

⁷ Pezard & Michael Shurkin. *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali*. pp.15-6

Year(s): 2006 – 2009.

Location: Kidal Region, Mali.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Algeria and Libya, and local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Mediation by the governments of Algeria and Libya helped to establish a framework to end the Third Tuareg Rebellion in Mali, but the conflict itself was ended by talks hosted by local politicians.

After over a decade of relative peace, northern Mali was subjected to another armed conflict in 2006. A breakaway faction of the Tuareg movement known as the Alliance of 23 May for Democratic Change (*Alliance démocratique du 23 Mai pour le changement*, ADC) launched a series of attacks in the Kidal Region of northern Mali, demanding the full implementation of the National Pact that had been agreed in 1992.¹ Building on its success during the previous Tuareg rebellion in Mali, the Government of Algeria mediated fresh negotiations almost as soon as the fighting started. The talks culminated on 4 July 2006 (just three months after the fighting began) with the signing of the Algiers Accord for the Restoration of Peace, Security, and Development in the Kidal Region.² The terms of the agreement began to be implemented in 2007, inspiring large numbers of ADC personnel to lay down their arms and end their rebellion.³ The prospect of ending this conflict before it gathered pace (UCDP did not record 25 battle-related deaths in 2006) was, however, terminated when the ADC split in May 2007, with one faction electing to continue the armed struggle.⁴ This faction changed its name to the North Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (*Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le*

¹ Stephanie Pezard & Michael Shurkin. *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015) p.16-7

² Accord d'Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement dans la région de Kidal, 2006. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordalger2006> (Accessed 26/01/2022)

³ Jean Sebastian Lecocq. *The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali*. (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2002) p.335

⁴ UCDP. *Mali: Azawad*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372> (Accessed 26/01/2022)

Changement, ATNMC) and forged bonds with armed groups in neighbouring Niger, threatening to add an interstate dimension to the conflict.

Talks between the ATNMC and the Government of Mali took place in December 2007, again with Algerian mediation. Although some progress was made (such as a prisoner exchange), this peace process was derailed entirely when the ATNMC launched a series of offensives against the Malian armed forces, in some cases far to the south of the country. Aware of the limitations of military operations against the Tuareg, the Malian government continued to choose dialogue and negotiation, taking up an offer from the Government of Libya (which still enjoyed strong links with Tuareg communities) to mediate further talks. A brief ceasefire and another prisoner exchange took place in September 2008 because of these negotiations, but a final battle between the Malian armed forces (this time supported by considerable numbers of Tuareg personnel) and the ATNMC took place on 21 January 2009 in which the latter was defeated. Two days later, the remaining ATNMC cadres ended their insurgency after talks mediated by local politicians, ending the Third Tuareg Rebellion in Mali.⁵ In the aftermath of the conflict, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes were implemented across Kidal and investment to the area did increase, but armed conflict erupted in Northern Mali once again in 2012.⁶

⁵ Lecocq. *The Desert is Our Country*. p.337-9

⁶ Pezard & Shurkin. *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali*. p.19-20

Year(s): 2011 – present.

Location: Mali.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has facilitated a series of successful peace processes between communities in Mali, helping them to negotiate peace agreements and build mechanisms to prevent further conflict.

In 2012, another armed conflict erupted between armed groups in northern Mali and the administration in Bamako. This time, the predominantly Tuareg opposition forces coordinated themselves through the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (*Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad*, MNLA) and sought complete independence from Mali. The MNLA rapidly wrested control of much of the north from the Malian armed forces. Citing the president's poor handling of the crisis, senior officers in the military staged a coup d'état in March 2012, leading to further instability. The situation continued to worsen for government forces, and in April the MNLA proclaimed the formation of the Independent State of Azawad after driving all Government of Mali forces from region. Within months, the short-lived state of Azawad was overrun by militants of Ansar Dine and several other radical Islamic groups who had gained a foothold in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.¹ In this chaotic and uncertain context, intercommunal violence and low-intensity armed conflicts between social groups, either competing for resources or reigniting old grievances, became a prevalent and pervasive issue across Mali. Although the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement represents progress towards a peaceful solution to the war between the MNLA and the Malian government, implementation remains limited, radical Islamic groups still pose

¹ UCDP. *Mali: Azawad*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/372> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

a major threat in the north, and low-intensity armed conflict continues to plague significant portions of country.²

In this context, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) has been operating in Mali (with a mandate from the Government of Mali beginning in 2011) in support of the national peace process and in an effort to reduce armed conflict in the regions of Kidal, Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu, Taoudéni, Mopti, and Ségou. By working with local communities and other stakeholders affected by conflict along with the armed groups involved, HD has successfully mediated a series of peace agreements and continues to advise on the development of mechanisms to prevent conflict relapses, including local peace infrastructure such as monitoring commissions. These successes include a peace agreement between two Tuareg communities, the Dawsahak and Imajgan, another between the Idourfane and Ibogolitane communities from the regions of Gao and Ménaka, another accord between farmers and pastoralists in the municipality of Djenné, and a fourth agreement between the Dogon and Fulani communities Mopti – all of which were signed in 2018.³ The following year, HD mediated the negotiation of a humanitarian agreement in Djenné between Bambara and Bozo farmers, Fulani pastoralists, and an armed group that had emerged from the hunting community in the area.⁴ These efforts have demonstrably reduced armed conflict in Mali.

² Mathieu Pellerin. “Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm.” *International Crisis Group Q&A*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

³ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Mediation and support for the peace process in Mali.” *Activities*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-in-northern-and-central-mali/> (Accessed 27/01/2022); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Two rival Tuareg communities from Mali sign a cessation of hostilities agreement.” *Updates*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/two-rival-tuareg-communities-from-mali-sign-a-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement/> (Accessed 27/01/2022); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Central Mali: The Dan Nan Ambassagou Armed Group Declares a Unilateral Ceasefire.” *Updates*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/central-mali-the-dan-nan-ambassagou-armed-group-declares-a-unilateral-ceasefire/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁴ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Signing of a humanitarian agreement between farmer and herder communities as well as hunters from the area of Djenné in Mali.” *Updates*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/updates/signing-of-a-humanitarian-agreement-between-farmer-and-herder-communities-as-well-as-hunters-from-the-area-of-djenne-in-mali/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

Year(s): 2017 – present.

Location: Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and stabilising international borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has worked with the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to reduce armed conflict in the frontier region where their respective international borders meet.

The eruption of renewed armed conflict in Mali in 2012, the subsequent collapse of state authority over parts of the country, and the preponderance of small arms in the region led to the emergence of a broad spectrum of armed groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Some were radical Islamic groups with ties to international networks, some were the various predominantly Tuareg factions of the Azawad independence movement, while others still were local self-defence militias established by communities at risk.⁵ In the context of pervasive instability, many of these armed groups made use of the porous and unsecured borders to their advantage. Radical Islamic groups, for example, used rear bases in territory they controlled in Mali to launch attacks against the Nigerien armed forces. In response, desperate politicians have armed and empowered a growing number of militia groups, who in turn often develop predatory behaviour, preying on local populations and employing violence to extract benefits from the government.⁶ This cycle left local communities mired in violence, hindered the delivery of basic services, and placed increasing pressure on resources in this frontier region. Although the national governments of all three states currently coordinate their efforts and enjoy good relations, the sheer scale of cross-border violence poses a

⁵ UCDP. *Mali*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/432> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁶ International Crisis Group. “The Niger-Mali Border: Subordinating Military Action to a Political Strategy.” *ICG Report*, No. 261. (2018) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

constant risk of an incident triggering a severe diplomatic incident, or even an interstate conflict should the administration of one state or another change significantly.

Recognising the risks that pervasive border instability represented, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger invited the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) to help them reduce conflict and tension in the region on the border of the three countries in 2017. The following year, HD put in motion a tripartite mediation process involving armed groups that had not yet signed up to the ongoing national peace process embodied in the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (excluding radical Islamic groups), along with representatives from their communities of origin and officials from their respective states.⁷ These efforts resulted in the signing of five peace agreements between communities in the area in 2018 and 2019, reducing the incidence of armed conflict in the area. In addition, HD continues to work with the state institutions of the three countries to ensure their conflict management efforts are harmonised and as effective as they can be.⁸ The Government of France has dispersed over £55 million in emergency funds as part of the “Three Borders” project, which represents a concerted effort to improve access to water and other resources in the region.⁹ Although Mali continues to face armed conflict, these efforts have helped to stabilise the frontier region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

⁷ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Mediation in the border regions of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.” *Activities*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-in-the-border-regions-of-mali-burkina-faso-and-niger/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Agence Française de Développement. *Emergency Development Programme: “Three Borders” Project in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger*. (Paris: AFD, 2019) pp.1-2

Year(s): 1994 – present.

Location: Chiapas (*de jure*), Mexico.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The NGO Si Paz supported by donors and local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Although the conflict between the Zapatista movement and the Government of Mexico has not been formally resolved, the fighting has been effectively contained since 1997.

In 1982, revolutionaries took to the mountains and jungles of Chiapas, Mexico's poorest state, to secretly form the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN). There they found thousands of displaced farmers (many of whom were of indigenous descent) who had been forced from their lands by government policies and the institutional racism of successive regional governments. Chiapas state policy made it impossible for indigenous people to own land, particularly when faced with intimidation and violence from large landowners. This left a third of the population illiterate and landless with no access to potable water or electricity. In this climate, the EZLN evolved into an organisation primarily focused on improving the lives of this marginalised population.¹⁰ After quietly organising for over a decade, the EZLN shook the world on 1 January 1994, when 3,000 armed personnel emerged from the jungle and occupied 4 municipalities in Chiapas to protest the North American Free Trade Agreement, which came into force that day, and issued a declaration that amounted to a declaration of war against the Mexican government.¹¹ Public demonstrations in support of the EZLN message and a peaceful resolution to the crisis occurred spontaneously across Mexico in the ensuing days. After over a week of combat, an initial ceasefire was mediated by a local bishop, halting the

¹⁰ Pablo Romo & Marylene Smeets. "Inclusivity in Mediation Processes: Lessons from Chiapas." *Discussion Points of the Mediation Support Unit (MSN)*, No. 6. (2014) p.5

¹¹ UCDP. *Government of Mexico – EZLN*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/850> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

fighting for much of the rest of 1994, but talks collapsed in October.¹² In February 1995, the government forces launched an offensive, forcing the EZLN back into the jungle.

Faced with widespread public protests and opposition from within the administration, the Government of Mexico withdrew its forces and returned to the negotiating table in March 1995. The Commission of Concordia and Pacification was established to facilitate talks, which proceeded until 16 February 1996 when the San Andres Accords were signed.¹³

Despite such efforts, violence continued in Chiapas, with a 1997 massacre by government forces representing a particular low point.¹⁴ This derailed the peace process (which remains unfinished), but efforts to prevent further violence have been carried out by Si Paz, an NGO based in Chiapas and supported by organisations across the world, which serves as a vital monitoring presence in the area, a facilitator of dialogue, and an ever-present conflict resolution mechanism.¹⁵ Up to 1,500 people died in the conflict between 1994 and 1997, but the violence has been effectively contained for decades.¹⁶

¹² Romo & Smeets. "Inclusivity in Mediation Processes." p.6

¹³ Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, and the EZLN, 1996. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/214/Actions%20and%20Measures%20for%20Chiapas%20Joint%20Commitments%20and%20Proposals%20from%20the%20State%20and%20Federal%20Governments,%20and%20the%20EZLN> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

¹⁴ Luis Hernandez Navarro. "The Escalation of the War in Chiapas." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 31, No. 5. (1998) p.7

¹⁵ Servicio Internacional para la Paz. *What is SIPAZ?* (SIPAZ, 2021) Available at: <https://www.sipaz.org/what-is-sipaz-2/?lang=en> (Accessed 7/12/2021)

¹⁶ Navarro. "The Escalation of the War in Chiapas." p.7

Year(s): 1992 – present.

Location: Transnistria, (*de jure*) Moldova.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Joint Control Commission, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Community/European Union.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The peacekeeping efforts of the Joint Control Commission and ongoing talks mediated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has helped to prevent renewed conflict between the Government of Moldova and the administration of the breakaway republic in Transnistria.

As the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1989, the Moldovan population was divided on the question of independence. An increasingly tense political climate led pro-Soviet groups along the border with Ukraine to announce the formation of a new Republic, Transnistria, which they declared would remain in the Soviet Union. The unfolding crisis continued to escalate, despite Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev dismissing the declaration as void.¹ Following the attempted coup in Moscow in 1991, independence was proclaimed by Moldovan leaders in the capital, Chişinău. A few months later, leaders in Transnistria declared independence from Moldova. Fighting began when Moldovan police (an army was yet to be established) attempted to gain control of government buildings in Transnistria from paramilitary forces.² The conflict continued to escalate until June 1992, when a Russian military intervention in support of the separatists drove back a Moldovan offensive.

Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict began in April 1992, but it was not until June that progress was made. The Agreement on Principles, signed in July 1992, formally ended the conflict and provided for the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC)

¹ Cristian Urse. "Solving Transnistria: Any Optimists Left?" *Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes*, Vol. 7, No. 1. (2008) p.58

² UCDP. *Moldova: Dniestr*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/394> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

to keep the peace in Transnistria.³ The JCC, a 5,500-strong peacekeeping mission formed of Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian military personnel, was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and separating the belligerents.⁴ The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has served as an observer on the JCC since its formation, gathering information on the conflict, the activities of the erstwhile belligerents, and the work of the peacekeeping mission. In addition, the OSCE has maintained dialogue between the parties to the conflict, shuttling between leaders in Chişinău and Transnistria while also convening international talks on the issue at the highest levels.⁵ These efforts made noteworthy progress in recent years, with the Berlin, Vienna, and Rome protocols demonstrating some promise for finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.⁶ Since 2005, the EU has also been working to maintain stability in the area through the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine.⁷ Although the conflict remains unresolved, decades of work by the JCC and OSCE have prevented another eruption of fighting.

³ Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova, 1992. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/moldova-peacefullsettlementdniestr92> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁴ Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.131

⁵ OSCE. “Conflict prevention and resolution.” *OSCE Mission to Moldova*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/104529> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement, 2018. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁷ EUBAM. *What we do? Conflict Resolution*. (EUBAM, 2020) Available at: <http://eubam.org/what-we-do/conflict-resolution/> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Year(s): 1990 – 1994.

Location: *Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, Moldova.*

UN Regional Group: *Eastern Europe.*

Type of Conflict: *Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Government of Moldova.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *A second war in Moldova during the 1990s was prevented thanks to the negotiation of an effective political compromise with Gagauz leaders.*

Moldavia was a republic within the Soviet Union. The area was home to a predominantly Moldovan population, some of whom advocated unity with Romania while others hoped for independence, along with a large Russian minority and the Gagauz – a Turkic speaking Orthodox community who live in the south of the country. When the leaders of the Moldovan nationalist movement rose to power in 1989, they introduced policies that were intended to empower Moldovans at the expense of the traditional Russian elite. This included discriminatory legislation on language, which threatened the position of other minorities, such as the Gagauz. In response, Gagauzian leaders proclaimed the formation of an independent republic in September 1989.¹ When the Soviet Union began collapsing in 1990, this range of political outlooks left newly independent Moldova in an extremely unstable situation. In September of that year, Russian leaders in Transnistria declared independence and fell into conflict with the Moldovan administration in Chişinău. This conflict distracted from the situation in Gagauzia, where the leaders of the unrecognised republic were mustering a local defence force with some assistance from their counterparts in Transnistria. Armed clashes between government security forces and Gagauz paramilitaries occurred intermittently while the conflict in Transnistria took place, setting the stage for another war on Moldovan soil should the situation escalate.²

¹ Steven Roper. "Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia." *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (2001) pp.104-5

² Oleh Protysk. "Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: The Real and the Virtual in Post-Soviet State Design." in Marc Weller & Katherine Nobbs, eds. *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*. (Philadelphia, 2010) p.233

After Moldovan forces failed to re-establish control of Transnistria with a major offensive in the summer of 1992, the incumbent administration resigned, creating an opportunity for a resolution of the incipient conflict with the Gagauz. The first formal talks were held in 1993, but the process gained traction when the February 1994 Moldovan elections brought yet another new government to power. By the end of the year, an accommodation with the Gagauz was negotiated and the Moldovan parliament approved a Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, establishing a 'national-territorial autonomous unit' with Gagauz, Moldovan, and Russian as its official languages within Moldova.³ Gagauz schools and a university were also supported. Membership of this polity was approved in a series of village-wide referenda, and once it was established, the local population elected a popular assembly and a governor.⁴ These actions served to diffuse the crisis and prevent the eruption of another armed conflict in Moldova in the 1990s. Although the extent of autonomy enjoyed in Gagauzia is disputed, arguments over this issue remain peaceful.

³ Johann Wolfschwenger & Kirsten Saxinger. "Federalism, National Identity and Overcoming Frozen Conflicts: Moldova's Experience." *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 19, No. 4. (2020) p.359

⁴ Roper. "Regionalism in Moldova." p.118

Year(s): 1989 – 1992.

Location: Mozambique.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Community of Sant’Egidio and the Government of Italy.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Negotiations hosted by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Rome concluded with the signing of the General Peace Agreement, which ended the armed conflict in Mozambique after three decades of near-continuous war.

Mozambique emerged from the Portuguese empire in 1975 after a decade of armed conflict between colonial forces and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Following the Carnation Revolution, Portuguese forces were immediately withdrawn, and FRELIMO was formally given control of Mozambique.¹ The Soviet Union and East Germany provided initial diplomatic and military support to the new administration, which was also later supported by Zimbabwe. In 1977, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) launched an insurgency against newly established and FRELIMO-led Government of Mozambique with the support of the governments of neighbouring Rhodesia and, from 1980, South Africa. With external backers providing support to both sides, the conflict raged for over a decade without a decisive outcome.² A change of FRELIMO leadership in 1986 sparked renewed efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and two years later South Africa withdrew its support for RENAMO, providing some hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.³

Although the war appeared to be nearing its end, it proved difficult to find an intermediary to host negotiations which was satisfactory to both parties. FRELIMO distrusted the

¹ The Lusaka Agreement, 1974. Available at: <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/frelimo-and-the-transitional-government-of-mozambique-the-lusaka-agreement/> (Accessed 20/11/2020)

² UCDP. *Government of Mozambique – Renamo*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/722> (Accessed 20/11/2020)

³ Martin Rupiya. “Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique.” in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, & Alex Vines, eds. *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.14

governments of the USA, South Africa, Kenya, the UK, and Malawi, while RENAMO refused to deal with the Zimbabwean administration, which had deployed thousands of troops in support of FRELIMO and the Mozambican military.⁴ The first organised effort to end the war was led by church leaders in Mozambique, who utilised funds provided by the World Council of Churches to engage in Track II diplomacy between FRELIMO and RENAMO representatives in Kenya and the US.⁵ These efforts created the conditions for dialogue to take place and, in 1989, talks jointly mediated by the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe laid the groundwork for further dialogue, despite both parties refusing to meet face to face.⁶ The following year, FRELIMO and RENAMO attended negotiations hosted by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome and, in December 1990, a partial ceasefire was reached.⁷ A devastating drought in 1991-1992 severely impacted RENAMO's ability to sustain the war and threatened the Mozambican people with famine, catalysing the peace process.⁸ After 27 months of negotiations mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio, the parties signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992, formally ending the war which had cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and bringing peace to a country torn apart by three decades of armed conflict.⁹

⁴ Colin Darch. *A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective*. (Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique, 2018) p.15

⁵ Dínis S. Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Gonçalves. "A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique." in Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, & Alex Vines, eds. *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998) p.29

⁶ Darch. *A Success Story Gone Wrong?* p.15

⁷ Rupiya. "Historical Context." p.15

⁸ Jane Perlez. "Southern Africa Hit By Its Worst Drought of the 20th Century." *The New York Times*. (1992) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/07/world/southern-africa-hit-by-its-worst-drought-of-the-20th-century.html> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁹ General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 1992. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/mozambique-general-peace-agreement92> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Year(s): 1992 – 1994.

Location: Mozambique.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: *The United Nations Operations in Mozambique helped to maintain peace and stability in extremely adverse conditions in post-war Mozambique.*

Prior to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, Mozambique had been in a state of armed conflict for 28 years (with a brief pause in 1974-1975). The struggle between FRELIMO and RENAMO left over 100,000 armed combatants in Mozambican society, state institutions were extremely fragile, up to six million people were displaced from their homes, and landmines littered the landscape.¹ In addition, the transition to democracy stipulated in the Agreement required the country to hold its first ever multi-party elections within a year.² These challenges were compounded by the impact of a major drought that hit the region in 1991-1992. Together, these factors posed a major hurdle to efforts to consolidate the hard-earned peace and posed a severe risk of sparking renewed armed conflict.

Following the signing of the Agreement, the UN led efforts to prevent a conflict relapse in Mozambique. A Special Representative was immediately dispatched to the country with a team of 21 military observers to monitor and verify the ceasefire, and in December 1992, the Security Council approved the formation of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (*Opérations des Nations Unies au Mozambique*, ONUMOZ). The Mission was tasked with supporting the peace process, leading the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process, building a new Mozambican military, and monitoring elections.³ Logistical problems impeded the deployment of ONUMOZ, delaying both the disarmament process and

¹ Rupiya. "Historical Context." p.15

² General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 1992.

³ UN Peacekeeping. *Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Mandate*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozM.htm> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

the scheduled elections, however by May 1993 it was up to strength.⁴ In October 1993, a year after the war ended, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Mozambique and hosted wide-ranging talks, fostering consensus to move ahead with DDR and elections and introducing a police component to ONUMOZ.⁵ By August 1994, approximately 90,000 combatants had been disarmed and inducted into UN Development Programme reintegration programmes, while 10,000 troops of the new armed forces had been trained.⁶ This allowed the October elections, which were supported by 2,300 international electoral observers, to take place peacefully and in free and fair conditions.⁷ FRELIMO won the elections and remained in power, but with a democratic mandate to govern the country. With an elected government in place and the DDR process complete, ONUMOZ was drawn down throughout 1994, before the final personnel left in January 1995.⁸ Although many challenges remained in Mozambique, a return to armed conflict was prevented.

⁴ UN Peacekeeping. *Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at:

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozFT.htm#Setting> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁵ Chris Alden. “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1. (1995) p.113

⁶ *Ibid.* pp.113-121

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *Mozambique – ONUMOZ: Background*.

⁸ Richard Syngé. *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94*. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) pp.145-167

Year(s): 2013 – 2018.

Location: Mozambique.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, local action, and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Government of Switzerland, and local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Talks mediated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Government of Switzerland helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Mozambique more than two decades after the devastating civil war there had ended.

The 1992 General Peace Agreement and the contributions of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (*Opérations des Nations Unies au Mozambique*, ONUMOZ) helped to usher in over two decades of peace in Mozambique. The post-conflict transition was largely successful, with economic recovery boosted by relatively generous aid imbursements and the development of considerable oil and gas resources. Furthermore, approximately 92,000 soldiers - 71,000 from the Liberation Front of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, FRELIMO) and 21,000 of the Mozambican National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO) had been disarmed and reintegrated into society within a few years of the Agreement.¹ However, disputes over bias in the demobilisation process and the provision of pensions to former soldiers served to keep relations between the two parties tense and hindered any chance of genuine reconciliation. This was compounded by RENAMO's failure to access political office via the ballot box, and with it, a share of the wealth and influence enjoyed by the FRELIMO administration.² In April 2013, the RENAMO leadership declared the 1992 Agreement to be void and launched a fresh insurgency against the FRELIMO administration, mainly targeting police stations and

¹ Alex Vines. "Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?" *Chatham House Research Paper*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/prospects-sustainable-elite-bargain-mozambique-third-time-lucky-0/2-key-features-past-elite> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

² Ibid.

commercially important transport routes.³ Although limited in scope, the attacks threatened to spark a renewed war in Mozambique.

Bilateral negotiations began immediately after the first attacks began and concluded in August 2015 after 114 rounds of talks between FRELIMO and RENAMO representatives. This peace process was mediated by five academic and religious figures from Mozambique who received professional support from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.⁴ Initial progress was made in early 2014, when sweeping electoral reforms were agreed, and in September the parties signed the Declaration on the Cessation of Military Hostilities in the capital, Maputo.⁵ Further talks were held in 2015, however ongoing disputes and occasional armed clashes led RENAMO leaders to formally end negotiations with the government. The renewed conflict continued to grow throughout 2016, prompting several international efforts to mediate dialogue. An initial committee failed to make much progress, but an initiative led by the Swiss government resulted in a ceasefire in early 2017. A small monitoring team was established to verify the ceasefire, and further talks helped to consolidate the peace.⁶ In August 2018, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding on military issues, and the following year, the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed, bringing a formal end to decades-old conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO and preventing renewed war in Mozambique.⁷

³ BBC. “‘Renamo attack’ on Mozambique’s Maringue police station.” *BBC News*. (2013) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24625718> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

⁴ The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Annual Report – The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2015*. (Geneva: HD, 2015) p.10

⁵ Declaração de Cessaçao das Hostilidades Militares, 2014. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/mozambique-ceasefire-2014> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

⁶ Vines. “Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique.”

⁷ AP. “Mozambique Peace Accord Is Signed, Paving Way for Elections.” *The New York Times*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/world/africa/mozambique-peace-accord-signed-paves-way-for-elections.html> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Year(s): 1994 – present.

Location: Nargorno-Karabakh.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Minsk Group, and the Government of Russia.*

Impact: Limited.

Summary: *The armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, has been contained since 1994 by the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Minsk Group, preventing the eruption of a much larger confrontation.*

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that has been a *de jure* part of Azerbaijan since the 1920s but retains a majority Armenian population. In February 1988, the provincial government of the region voted to join Armenia. In November 1989, as the Soviet Union began to collapse, the Armenian administration declared Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of a unified Armenia. When Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, the administration in Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed the establishment of the independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹ The dispute had become increasingly violent since 1990, with reports of intercommunal strife across the area. In the first months of 1992, the Government of Azerbaijan launched a large offensive to assert its control of the area. For the rest of the year, bitter fighting took place across the region between the Azerbaijani military and the forces of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which received support from the Government of Armenia.² Efforts to halt the fighting were first led by the Government of Iran, before the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took over in June 1992 and formed the Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the USA) to mediate the

¹ Lionel Beehner. "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus." *Council on Foreign Relations*. (2005) Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-caucasus> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

² UCDP. *Azerbaijan: Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)* (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/388> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

resolution of the conflict.³ It was not, however, until 1994 when the fighting was finally ended by a ceasefire unilaterally mediated by the Government of Russia.⁴

The ceasefire established a 175km Line of Control to separate the belligerents while further talks were held, and although both parties agreed in principle to the creation of an international peacekeeping mission to patrol it, no such force was deployed.⁵ As a result, the only factors preventing further conflict (other than the restraint of each party) was the influence of the Government of Russia and the ongoing mediation of the Minsk Group. In a relatively unique example of long-term international cooperation, the Minsk Group has maintained an ongoing dialogue between the parties to the conflict for over 25 years.⁶ Through regular engagement, the Group successfully prevented the dispute from sparking a repeat of the early 1990s or a direct confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁷ At the time of writing, the eruption of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020 has ended following another intervention by the Government of Russia. The armed conflict has again been contained, although this time the deployment of peacekeepers was required.

³ OSCE. *Minsk Group: What we do*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/mg/108305> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁴ Bishkek Protocol, 1994. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/armeniaazerbaijan-bishkekprotocol94> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁵ Conciliation Resources. "Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers." *Discussion Paper*. (2015) p.5

⁶ For example: Joint Declaration between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, 2008. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/azerbaijanarmeniarussia-declaration2008> (Accessed 09/12/2020)

⁷ Carey Cavanaugh. "OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process." *Security and Human Rights*, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2016)

Year(s): 1989 – 1990.

Location: Namibia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and an international transitional administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Transition Assistance Group helped to ensure that the withdrawal of South African troops and broader post-conflict transition of the newly independent Namibian state was peaceful.

The German colony of South West Africa was occupied by the British colony of South Africa during the First World War. A League of Nations mandate conferred legitimacy on South African administration of the Territory; however, this became increasingly tenuous during the period of de-colonisation. In the 1960s, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) launched an armed struggle for independence and adopted the name "Namibia" for the country they were fighting for. The Government of South Africa had other plans, seeking instead to incorporate South West Africa as a fifth province.¹ The 1978 Settlement Proposal, developed by the UN Security Council, outlined a framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, by which the UN would supervise elections in Namibia and South Africa would withdraw its forces from the area.² Before the Proposal could be implemented, SWAPO became embroiled in the conflict in neighbouring Angola (which also involved South Africa), stalling the peace process.³

In 1988, two major peace agreements ended international involvement in the armed conflict in Angola and Namibia, removing the key barrier to implementing the 1978 Proposal.⁴ The negotiations also facilitated a ceasefire between the belligerents in Namibia, which in turn

¹ UCDP. *South Africa: Namibia*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/298> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Security Council Resolution 435 (1978): Namibia, 1978. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/namibia-resolution435> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

³ UCDP. *South Africa: Namibia*.

⁴ Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa (Tripartite Agreement), 1988. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/angola-tripartite-agreement88> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

aided the deployment of United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) personnel in April 1989.⁵ The arrival of the peacekeepers coincided with movements of large numbers of SWAPO troops and equipment into Namibia from Angola, leading the South African administration to warn of renewed conflict unless the UN resolved the crisis. In response, UNTAG facilitated dialogue between the parties while the UN Secretary-General urged both sides to calm the situation. The international mediation effort culminated with the Mount Etjo Declaration, which reaffirmed the commitment of all sides and observers to the peace process.⁶ With renewed conflict averted, UNTAG returned its focus to supervising Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes and the withdrawal of South African troops, monitoring police conduct, assisting with the return of 43,000 refugees, and preparing for the election.⁷ The Namibian people went to the polls in November 1989 in a peaceful environment, and in March 1990 the elected Constituent Assembly promulgated a constitution. UNTAG handed over responsibility to the new administration and withdrew, its mission complete.

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *Namibia – UNTAG: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untagFT.htm> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ Mount Etjo Declaration, 1989. Available at: <https://search.archives.un.org/agreements-mount-etjo-declaration-9-4-1989> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *Namibia – UNTAG: Background*.

Year(s): 2005 – 2006.

Location: Nepal.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Nepalese political parties worked together with widespread public support to find a political solution to the ongoing armed conflict in Nepal and mediate the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which brought an end to a decade of war and created the framework for a lasting peace.

In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a “People’s War” against the Government of Nepal. Although the conflict was initially of a relatively low intensity, it rapidly escalated in 2001-2002 after the king assumed executive powers for himself and cancelled elections.¹ Early efforts to end the war were led by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which mediated talks between the parties from 2000-2003. The UK Department for International Development joined the effort in 2001, facilitating consultations with the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Crisis Management Initiative. The UN Secretary-General also offered his good offices to facilitate talks, while the Carter Center also made its services available.² Such efforts were, however, unsuccessful or dismissed by the belligerents, and the conflict continued.

Faced with increasingly draconian policies from the Royal Palace and a lack of progress on the battlefield, the side-lined political parties of Nepal met with the Maoists in November 2005. These talks culminated with a 12-Point Understanding which, among its provisions, called for an end to autocratic rule and the formation of a constituent assembly to produce a

¹ Elliot Short. “Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence.” pp.84-92

² Teresa Whitfield. “Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking.” in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. *Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.158-9

new constitution.³ The unlikely alliance between some traditionally conservative political parties and the Maoist movement gained widespread support among the Nepalese population and inspired widespread protests against the monarchy in April 2006. In the face of these popular demonstrations, the king relinquished power to Nepal's last elected parliament, which immediately renewed talks with the Maoists. The following month, a formal ceasefire was negotiated, in June, the parties agreed to an Eight-Point Understanding regarding the peace process, and in August, a formal request was sent to the UN Secretary-General for assistance.⁴ This succession of accords culminated on 21 November 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which formally ended the war and created a framework for the formation of a transitional government and the promulgation of an interim constitution.⁵ A month later, the parties signed the Agreement on the Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies, which outlined an extensive UN-supervised Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and military integration process.⁶ The negotiations that ended the war in Nepal were conducted without external mediators or facilitators, although the efforts of a host of international organisations helped to open dialogue between the parties.

³ 12-Point Understanding between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists), 2005. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-12pointunderstanding2005> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁴ Whitfield. "Nepal's Masala Peacemaking." p.158

⁵ Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2006. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-comprehensiveagreement2006> (Accessed 09/11/2020)

⁶ Agreement on the Monitoring of Arms and Armies, 2006. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-monitoringarmies2006> (Accessed 29/11/2020)

Year(s): 2007 – 2011.

Location: Nepal.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Local action and a special political mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: *The United Nations Mission in Nepal worked with local people and organisations to ensure that the peace process stayed on track while facilitating the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration and military integration process, preventing a conflict relapse in Nepal.*

The series of peace agreements signed between November 2005 and December 2006 brought an end to the armed conflict in Nepal. Although the fighting had stopped, the Maoists retained *de facto* control of 70 percent of the country and maintained a large armed force.¹ Furthermore, the political consensus that had driven the peace process threatened to collapse as the ties that bound the diverse array of political parties and interest groups began to unravel. Indeed, less than a year after the war ended, Madhesi militants in the Terai region launched an insurgency in the hope of achieving greater participation in the re-negotiation of Nepal's social contract.² These factors served to make the dual transition from war to peace and autocracy to democracy all the more challenging, greatly increasing the risk of a conflict relapse.

In January 2007, the UN deployed the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to monitor and assist with the implementation of the peace agreements.³ These accords were exceptional to the extent that they were negotiated with extremely limited international assistance, and although a UN presence was requested to assist with implementation, the Nepalese architects

¹ Global Peace Operations Review. "Nepal." *Mission Notes*, No. 4.15. (2008) p.1

² Sebastian von Einsiedel & Cale Salih. "Conflict Prevention in Nepal." *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research Conflict Prevention Series*, No. 1. (2017) p.5

³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1740*. (2007) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1740> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

of the peace process required a unique international presence.⁴ As a result, UNMIN remained a political rather than a peacekeeping mission and was tasked with completing a much more focused mandate than many contemporary UN operations. Its main task was supervising the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme. This began in 2007 and by the end of the year over 30,000 former Maoist combatants had been processed. The reluctance of the Nepalese parties to allow armed peacekeepers into the country led to the formation of a neutral security force, the Interim Task Force, which was formed of Nepalese veterans of the Indian Army (of which there are many) and served to monitor the cantonment sites.⁵ UNMIN's other main task was facilitating the military integration and Security Sector Reform process. To this end, it successfully navigated several crises and delays, ensuring that reforms were implemented, and the Nepalese military was ready to integrate former Maoist troops following the Mission's departure in 2011.⁶ The limited UN presence in post-war Nepal proved vital in facilitating the first steps toward peace and preventing a conflict relapse after a decade of war.

⁴ Ian Martin. "The United Nations and Support to Nepal's Peace Process: The Role of the UN Mission in Nepal." in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.201

⁵ *Ibid.* p.209

⁶ Short. "Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence." p.94

Year(s): 1986 – 1990.

Location: Nicaragua.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of peace agreements mediated by regional governments and the deployment of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America helped to end the armed conflict in Nicaragua in 1990.

In 1978, a coalition of revolutionary groups known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, FSLN) launched an insurgency against the US-backed military dictatorship that was governing Nicaragua. Initial efforts to negotiate a compromise by the Organisation of American States failed, and by June 1979 most of the country was under FSLN control. The former president fled to Honduras, while much of his defeated military formed the Counterrevolution (*Contrarrevolución*, Contra) movement with support from the Government of the USA. By 1981, the Contras were receiving arms directly from the US and the following year, they launched an insurgency against the FSLN administration. With extensive US support for the Contras and the Government of Cuba assisting the FSLN, Nicaragua became a battleground for foreign powers.¹

The first efforts to find a solution to the armed conflicts plaguing Central America during the 1980s were led by the Government of Costa Rica, which proposed a plan to bring peace to the region in 1986. After the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua approved the plan in a series of agreements signed in Esquipulas in 1986-1987, the President of Costa Rica received the Nobel Peace Prize.² The agreements created a

¹ UCDP. *Government of Nicaragua – Contras*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/742> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

² Esquipulas Declaration (Esquipulas I), 1986. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasI86> (Accessed 14/12/2020); Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America (Esquipulas II), 1987. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-esquipulasII87> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

framework for stabilising the region but offered little in the way of direct solutions to the conflict in Nicaragua. Some progress was made towards peace in January 1988 when the FSLN administration came to terms with a relatively small indigenous armed group.³ The real breakthrough, however, came a month later when growing international condemnation, the Iran-Contra scandal, and a 1986 International Court of Justice judgement against the USA regarding its involvement in the conflict forced the American government to cut its support for the Contras. The following month, the FSLN administration and the Contras agreed a ceasefire.⁴ At a summit in February 1989, the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica approved a joint declaration in which the FSLN would introduce reforms and schedule early elections, while Contra forces would be disarmed.⁵ An additional demobilisation agreement was signed in August 1989, mandating the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (*Observadores de Naciones Unidas en Centroamérica*, ONUCA) to verify and assist with its implementation.⁶ ONUCA finished disarming the Contras in June 1990, marking the end of the peace process.⁷ These agreements served to end the armed conflict in Nicaragua.

³ Basic Preliminary Accord between Government of Nicaragua and YATAMA, 1988. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-preliminaryaccordyatama88> (Accessed 14/12/2020); Agreement on the Functions of the Conciliation Commission between the Government of Nicaragua and YATAMA, 1988. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-conciliationcommission88> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

⁴ John M. Goshko. "U.S. War by Proxy at an End." *The Washington Post*. (1990) Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/02/27/us-war-by-proxy-at-an-end/770483d0-c355-4288-8819-9b0dcc928aee/> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

⁵ Joint Declaration of the Central American Presidents (Costa del Sol Declaration), 1989. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-costadelsoldeclaration89> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

⁶ Joint Plan for the Voluntary Demobilisation, Repatriation or Relocation of the Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their Families, as well as Assistance in the Demobilisation of all those involved in Armed Actions in the Countries of the Region, 1989. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/centralamerica-jointplandemobilisation89> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *United Nations Observer Group in Central America: ONUCA*. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onusca.htm> (Accessed: 13/10/2020); Orlando J. Fernandez. "Nicaragua – the Role of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in the Central American Peace Process." *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2004)

Year(s): 1994 – 1997.

Location: Nicaragua.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a verification mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States and the UN via the International Support and Verification Commission.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The Frente Norte 3-80 insurgency in Nicaragua was ended by a peace agreement and its personnel were disarmed.

The 1986-1990 peace process ended the war in Nicaragua and created the framework for a comprehensive disarmament programme to take place across the country. This task was carried out by the International Support and Verification Commission (*Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación*, CIAV), a newly formed organisation established by the secretary-generals of the UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Led by two Argentinians, the 700 staff of the CIAV were faced with the challenge of disarming and repatriating over 18,000 Contras and displaced civilians over the border in Costa Rica and Honduras as well as ensuring the peaceful reintegration of tens of thousands of combatants in Nicaraguan territory back into society.¹ The Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration programme ran into problems almost immediately thanks to the widespread instability and lawlessness in post-conflict Nicaragua. When it became apparent that the government had no intention of drawing down its forces in line with the Contras, recently disarmed Contra troops began to rearm in late 1990 and continued their insurgency, becoming known as *Recontras*. The CIAV estimated that by the spring of 1992, roughly 1,000 Recontras organised in 13 separate groups were operating in northern Nicaragua.² One such group, the Northern Front 3-80 (*Frente Norte 3-80*, FN 3-80), proved to be the most organised. In one 1993 attack, FN 3-80 took 41 government delegates hostage. This crisis was resolved by the mediation of a

¹ Fernando Arocena. *The International Commission for Support and Verification: Demobilizing and Integrating the Nicaraguan Resistance 1990-1997*. (OAS, 1998) pp.22-4

² Ibid. pp.37-8

truce by the CIAV on 25 August, which led to the release of the hostages unharmed, but the conflict erupted again just a month later.

Progress was made in 1994 with the negotiation of an agreement which recognised FN 3-80 as a legal entity, provided its troops with provisions to sustain themselves during the peace process, and initiated a comprehensive reintegration process that guaranteed housing and assistance to demobilising combatants. While negotiations continued, 164 FN 3-80 personnel were accepted into the police academy while some leaders were incorporated into local government.³ The talks culminated on 30 May 1997 with a peace agreement witnessed by representatives of the church and the CIAV.⁴ The accord provided for the end of the conflict and the incremental disarmament of remaining FN 3-80 forces in line with the fulfilment of scheduled programmes by the Government of Nicaragua. With the framework built up over the previous years in place, this final agreement was implemented within two months, ending the conflict, and leaving FN 3-80 completely disarmed.

³ Ibid. p.70

⁴ Acuerdo de Paz entre Gobierno y Frente Norte 3-80 (Acuerdo de Managua), 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nicaragua-managua-accord97> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

Year(s): 1993 – 1997.

Location: Agadez, Niger.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and France.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The 1991-1997 Tuareg rebellion in Niger was ended by a series of peace agreements, heralding a decade of relative peace in the country.

The Sahel is a large geographical region spanning a range of African states located in the Sahara Desert. While many populations live on the desert periphery, the Tuareg live across the Sahel, with large populations in Niger and Mali and noteworthy communities in Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya. French troops consolidated control of the region in 1890, but an official colony was not formed until 1922. While this relatively brief colonial experience only lasted for 32 years, the French administration established the borders and political structures which were inherited by newly independent states such as Niger in 1960.¹ These borders disrupted the nomadic, pastoralist life of most Tuaregs. A series of droughts in the 1970s and 1980s devastated Tuareg communities, driving many to flee to Libya and join Muammar Gaddafi's Islamic Legion. In 1991, the Government of Niger hosted a national conference to establish democratic institutions and a constitution before multi-party elections were held in 1992. It was in this context that a group of Tuareg former Islamic Legionnaires created the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azawad (FLAA) on 19 October 1991 and began an insurgency against the Nigerien government, demanding the introduction of a federal system, favourable recruitment quotas for the civil service and military, investment in northern Niger, and employment in the Arlit uranium mines.² The Government of France mediated secret talks in 1993, resulting in a peace agreement that met, on paper at least, many of the FLAA

¹ Emizet Kisangani. "The Tuaregs' Rebellions in Mali and Niger and the U.S. Global war on Terror." *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 29, No. 1. (2012) p.69

² Ibid. p.75

demands. Just a month later, however, the FLAA split into several groups due to differences over the agreement and the conflict resumed.³

In October 1993, the various Tuareg armed groups in Niger merged to form the Coordination for Armed Resistance. After launching a series of attacks in 1994, this new organisation entered into negotiations with the Government of Niger in June 1994. These talks were mediated by the governments of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and France, and concluded with the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 9 October 1994. The Tuareg umbrella organisation collapsed again after the talks and yet another merger took place in early 1995, creating the Organisation of the Armed Resistance (ORA). The ORA negotiated another peace agreement in Niamey on 24 April 1995, this time formally ending the conflict.⁴ Although some Tuareg groups initially dismissed the agreement, talks held in Algeria brought them into the peace process on 23 November 1997, ending the conflict. Niger enjoyed a decade of relative peace after the 1991-1997 Tuareg rebellion.

³ UCDP. *FLAA*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/524> (Accessed 23/11/2021)

⁴ Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, 1995. Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/agreement-between-the-republic-niger-government-and-the-ora> (Accessed 23/11/2021)

Year(s): 2009 – 2010.

Location: Niger.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Libya.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: *The Third Tuareg rebellion (2007-2009) in Niger was ended with a peace agreement mediated by the Government of Libya.*

In March 2006, Tuareg soldiers recently integrated into the Malian army deserted their posts and began launching attacks on government outposts. This conflict was quickly resolved before it could escalate, with a restrained response from the Government of Mali and the mediation of the Algerian government producing a peace agreement in February 2007. Although this conflict was ended before much fighting took place, it served to inspire Tuareg in neighbouring Niger to create the Niger Movement for Justice (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ) and launch their own insurgency, citing the Government of Niger's inability to deliver on wide-ranging commitments it had made to the Nigerien population.¹ The MNJ sabotaged power plants, transport infrastructure, and an airport. In response, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency, deployed 4,000 troops to the northern region where the MNJ was based, and forcefully relocated thousands of civilians from the area. These events served to inspire yet another rebellion in Mali and raised concerns that the insurgencies could escalate into a conflict encompassing the entire Sahara.² The Government of Niger initially rejected the prospect of negotiations, casting the MNJ as criminals and seeking to destroy them militarily rather than entering into any kind of peace process. The situation continued to deteriorate in 2008, with additional Tuareg groups, other minorities (such as the Toubous and Fulani from the south), and deserters from the Nigerien military

¹ UCDP. *Niger: Government*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/430> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

² Stephen A. Emerson. "Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 22, No. 4. (2011) p.673-5

joining the rebellion.³ With thousands of rebels up in arms, the prospect of a long and bloody war was high.

The conflict in Niger continued until early 2009, when splits in the MNJ and a series of diplomatic interventions set the stage for a negotiated settlement. The Government of Libya, which also served as Chairman of the African Union at the time, exerted most pressure. Muammar Gaddafi's historic links to the Tuareg (through the Islamic Legion that he maintained from 1971 until 1987) provided him with enough credibility to bring both sides to the negotiating table, and talks began in April 2009.⁴ After agreeing to a ceasefire, the rebels were promised amnesty if they disarmed. On 6 October 2009, a final peace agreement was signed encompassing both Nigerien and Malian Tuareg armed groups in the Libyan oasis city of Sabha.⁵ Most of the rebels disarmed within a month, and the few remaining rebels came to terms with the government by the end of 2009. In January 2010, a formal disarmament ceremony was held in northern Niger attended by the country's president and the various leaders of the armed groups, marking the end of the conflict.⁶

³ Ibid. p.676

⁴ Virginie Baudais, Amal Bourhrous, & Dylan O'Driscall. "Conflict Mediation and Peacebuilding in the Sahel: The Role of Maghreb Countries in an African Framework." *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 58. (2021) p.15

⁵ Staff and agencies. "Mali, Niger, Tuareg rebels pledge peace: Libya." *Reuters*. (7 October 2009) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-libya-tuareg-20091007-idAFJ0E5960DB20091007> (Accessed 9/12/2021)

⁶ UCDP. *Niger: Government*.

Year(s): 2015.

Location: Nigeria.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, mediation of a peace agreement, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Nigeria, the National Peace Committee, and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The National Peace Committee helped to guide Nigeria through its first peaceful elections in history amidst a tense a political climate, preventing an armed conflict.

Prior to 2015, Nigeria had a troubled history with democracy. The 2011 elections sparked widespread violence in the north of the country in which 800 people died, while the contest four years earlier was judged dismally by international observers and also led to violence. Prior to this, the military had run the country for much of its post-colonial history.¹ The prospects of a peaceful election were reduced even further by ongoing political violence in Biafra and the Niger Delta, the fight against Boko Haram in the north of the country, concerns about the politicisation of the security services, and the extremely confrontational rhetoric and confessional divide between the two main Nigerian political parties.² Together, these factors served to create a perfect storm which observers predicted could push Africa's most populous state into a devastating civil war during the 2015 elections.

Recognising the potential for calamity, personnel of the Office of the Presidency began hosting a series of consultations in June 2014 aimed at making the political parties aware of the danger that their rhetoric was placing Nigeria in.³ These efforts culminated in January

¹ BBC. "Nigeria profile – Timeline." *BBC News*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13951696> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

² International Crisis Group. "Nigeria's Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence." *Africa Report*, No. 220. (2014) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-dangerous-2015-elections-limiting-violence> (Accessed 02/12/2020); Martin Ewi. "Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?" *African Security Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2. (2015) p.208

³ The Kukah Centre. *2015 General Elections: The Untold Story – National Peace Committee Report*. (Abuja: The Kukah Centre, 2018) p.1

2015 with the National Sensitization Workshop on Non-Violence in the 2015 Elections, in which all presidential candidates and political parties contesting the election signed a peace agreement, known as the Abuja Accord, in the presence of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku, who chaired the event.⁴ The Accord recommended establishing a National Peace Committee to monitor adherence to its principles. The Committee was established in weeks and was tasked with advising the government and electoral commission on the resolution of disputes and making itself available for national mediation and conciliation in the case of electoral violence or armed conflict.⁵ The efforts of the Committee were abetted by logistical and financial support from the UN Development Programme and the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, as well as the parallel efforts of the United Nations Office for West Africa to prevent conflict.⁶ Upon election day, the defeated candidate conceded and called for his followers to accept the outcome, marking the conclusion of Nigeria's first fair and peaceful elections.⁷

⁴ Ibid. See Annex for the full agreement.

⁵ Ibid. p.6

⁶ The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Annual Report – The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2015*. (Geneva: HD, 2015) p.10; Laurie Nathan. *UN Preventive Diplomacy during the 2015 Nigerian Elections*. (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018)

⁷ Ann Oden. "Nigeria Makes History with Peaceful 2015 Presidential Election." *Pyxera Global*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.pyxeraglobal.org/nigeria-makes-history-with-peaceful-2015-presidential-election/> (Accessed 02/12/2020)

Year(s): 2013 – 2020.

Location: Plateau State, Nigeria.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention, peace infrastructure and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Nigeria and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A military intervention by the Nigerian military helped to contain intercommunal violence in Plateau State until the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue mediated a peace agreement which ended the fighting and helped create a peace infrastructure to continue its work and prevent a conflict relapse.

Plateau State is located in central Nigeria, in the “Middle Belt” of the country which divides the majority Muslim north with the predominantly Christian south. The largest city in the state, Jos, was engulfed in a vicious riot in 2001, largely fought between communities classified in the constitution as “indigenes” and “settlers” over legal privileges and protections and political representation in local and provincial institutions.¹ Over the course of six days, groups armed with bows and arrows, spears, petrol bombs, and homemade firearms fought each other for control of the city until a military intervention by the Nigerian armed forces finally ended the violence. Approximately 1,000 people died in the unrest. Conflicts such as this took place again in 2002 and in 2008, when 700 people were killed.² In response to the pervasive eruptions of violence, the Government of Nigeria established the Operation Safe Haven taskforce in 2010. The taskforce incorporated agencies and departments spanning the entire Nigerian security establishment and was tasked with managing and ultimately ending the conflicts in Jos and Plateau State. This served to contain

¹ Kingsley L. Madueke. “Towards a Sequence of Ethnic Riots: Stages, Processes and Interactions in the Production of Communal Violence in Jos, Nigeria.” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 23, No.2. (2021) p.236

² Kingsley L. Madueke & Floris F. Vermeulen. “Frontiers of Ethnic Burtality in an African City: Explaining the Spread and Recurrence of Violent Conflict in Jos, Nigeria.” *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 53, No. 2. (2018) p.46

some of the violence (although over one hundred people were killed during unrest in 2012) but failed to develop a more lasting solution to the problem.

Since 2013, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) has been working to encourage communities across the Middle Belt to employ dialogue as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. In August 2013, HD began facilitating an intercommunal dialogue process in Jos involving eight local communities (the Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, Fulani, Hausa, Igbo, South-South, Yoruba, and Women), traditional and religious leaders, representatives of the regional administration of Plateau State as well as the federal government, and observers from the relevant Nigerian security agencies. These talks culminated in June 2014 with the signing of the Joint Declaration of Commitment to Peace and Cooperation, which included provisions to end the fighting and bring communities together to rebuild a more peaceful city.³ This served to end the conflict and created a climate in which, at the least, destroyed infrastructure has been rebuilt and basic services can be delivered. To prevent a conflict relapse, HD established a Conflict Early Warning Response System and supported the formation of the Plateau Peace Dialogue Forum, which was tasked with keeping the peace process on track.⁴ In 2016, the Plateau Peace Building Agency (PPBA) took responsibility for maintaining peace in the area and, two years later, published the Plateau State Road Map for Peace which serves as a guide for coordinating efforts to reduce armed conflict.⁵ In 2020, the PPBA worked with its counterpart in Kaduna State to end a conflict between communities on the border. These efforts have reduced armed conflict in Plateau State.⁶

³ HD Jos Forum Inter-communal Dialogue Process Joint Declaration of Commitment to Peace and Cooperation, 2014. Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁴ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. "Nigeria." *Activities*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁵ Darren Kew. "How to calm violent crises? Nigeria has an idea." *United States Institute of Peace Analysis and Commentary*. (4 June 2021) Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/how-calm-violent-crises-nigeria-has-idea> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

⁶ Maurice Ogbonnaya. "Peacebuilding Agencies and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Nigeria's Middle Belt Region: Successes and Policy Challenges." *African Peacebuilding Network Briefing Note*, No. 31. (2021) p.2

Year(s): 2015 – 2016.

Location: Kafanchan, Kaduna State, Nigeria.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure and mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The efforts of local people and organisations, the local administration, and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue helped to bring 29 communities affected by armed conflict together and create a peace agreement and an infrastructure to support and monitor implementation.

Kaduna State is located in northern Nigeria. Much like the country as a whole, northern Kaduna is predominantly Muslim and the south is mostly Christian. While these divisions have occasionally been the cause of conflict when translated into the political arena (such as during the electoral violence that followed the 2011 presidential elections), it is periodical competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists, and the historic grievances associated with such competition, that is the key driver of low-intensity conflict in Kaduna State.⁷ A series of 20 initiatives to end the cycle of violence dating back to 1979 have attempted but ultimately failed to achieve their aims.

The 2015 presidential election proceeded peacefully thanks to a concerted and widespread effort to ensure that it was the first peaceful and constitutional transition of power in Nigerian history. During the contest, the issue of armed conflict rose to the fore of domestic politics. In Kaduna State, the newly elected governor established a committee under the chairmanship of a retired general to investigate the cause of the conflict upon taking office after pledging to address the issue in his campaign. Building on this framework, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) facilitated a six-month inter-communal dialogue process, bringing in

⁷ Aniete Ewang, “Multiple Killings in Nigeria’s Kaduna State: Authorities Should End Cycle of Impunity.” *Human Rights Watch*. (31 July 2020) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/31/multiple-killings-nigerias-kaduna-state> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

representatives of 29 communities from 5 local government areas identified as potential conflict flashpoints. Each community contributed six delegates (representing a development/cultural association, traditional council, youth, women, religious groups, and a prominent public figure) to the process. These delegates served in joint working groups facilitated by HD and attended by local, state, and federal government representatives.⁸ The inter-communal dialogue culminated on 23 March 2016 with the signing of the Kafanchan Peace Declaration and the Kafanchan Women Peace Declaration.⁹ The documents committed the farmers and pastoralists to resolving any future disputes between them peacefully, called for resources to be shared, and committed the communities to cooperate on the economic development of the area. A further provision established a monitoring committee to oversee implementation and adherence. HD supported the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning Response System for southern Kaduna, as well as a local institution known as the Kafanchan Peace Development Initiative, which was tasked with building a lasting peace in the area.¹⁰ In 2017, the ongoing effort to reduce armed conflict across Kaduna was taken up by the Kaduna State Peace Commission.¹¹ Although armed conflict continues (in 2021, Kaduna suffered the most political violence of any Nigerian state other than Borno, the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency), the efforts of local people and organisations supported by HD demonstrably reduced armed conflict between communities in southern Kaduna State.¹²

⁸ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Inter-communal Dialogue Process in Five Flashpoint Local Government Areas in Southern Kaduna, Kaduna State, Nigeria.” *Roadmap/Agenda for Discussion*. (16 November 2015)

⁹ Kafanchan Peace Declaration between Grazers and Farmers, 2016. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/lview/1921/Kafanchan%20Peace%20Declaration%20between%20Grazers%20and%20Farmers> (Accessed 27/01/2022); Kafanchan Women Peace Declaration, 2016. Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

¹⁰ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Nigeria.” *Activities*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

¹¹ Kaduna State Commission. *About KAPECOM*. (KSC, 2022) Available at: <https://kadunapeacecommission.org/#> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

¹² Olajumoke Ayandele. “Confronting Nigeria’s Kaduna Crisis.” *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. (2 February 2021) Available at: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-nigerias-kaduna-crisis/> (Accessed 27/01/2022)

Year(s): 2016.

Location: Plateau State, Nigeria.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Local people and organisations and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue developed a peace declaration that ended the ongoing low-intensity armed conflicts between 56 communities in southern Plateau State, Nigeria.

Plateau State is located in central Nigeria, in the “Middle Belt” of the country which divides the majority Muslim north with the predominantly Christian south. These divisions have occasionally been the cause of conflict when translated into the political arena (such as during the electoral violence that followed the 2011 presidential elections), but it is periodical competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists, and the historic grievances associated with such competition, that drove an ongoing low-intensity conflict between communities in southern Plateau State, focused in the local government areas of Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Shendam, Qua’an-Pan, and Wase. These districts, richly endowed in land and natural resources, attract significant numbers of pastoralist groups not just from southern Plateau State, but also from neighbouring states such as Nassarawa, Taraba, and Bauchi in times of conflict, political upheaval, or drought.¹³ Eight investigations were carried out on the violence in southern Plateau State between 2001 and 2006, and in 2010 the Nigerian military launched Operation Safe Haven in an effort to reduce armed conflict across the area. These efforts did bring relative stability to some areas, such as Jos, the largest city in the state, but failed to end armed conflict in Plateau State.

¹³ The Southern Plateau Peace Declaration, 2016. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/lview/1958/Southern%20Plateau%20Peace%20Declaration> (Accessed 27/01/1990)

Following its successes in Kaduna and another part of Plateau State, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) facilitated a lengthy inter-communal dialogue process between 56 communities from the affected areas of Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Shendam, Qua'an-Pan, and Wase.¹⁴ Each community contributed six delegates (representing a development/cultural association, traditional council, youth, women, religion, and a prominent figure) to the process. These delegates then served in joint working groups facilitated by HD and attended by local, state, and federal government representatives. The dialogue culminated with the signing of the Southern Plateau Peace Declaration in December 2016 at a ceremony attended by the German and US ambassadors, traditional elders, and a range of public officials.¹⁵ The wide range of communities signing up to the declaration committed to resolving any disputes between them peacefully and improving the security situation together. A monitoring committee formed from signatories to the declaration, the Plateau Peace Dialogue Forum, and the Plateau Peace Building Agency worked to ensure implementation and monitor adherence to its terms.¹⁶ Although conflict and violence continue in parts of Plateau State, the low intensity conflicts between communities in the areas covered in the Peace Declaration have ended.

¹⁴ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Nigeria*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/1990)

¹⁵ Seriki Adinoyi. "US, German Envoys Superintend Peace Pact in 30 Plateau Communities." *This Day*. (24 December 2016) Available at: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/12/24/us-german-envoys-superintend-peace-pact-in-30-plateau-communities/> (Accessed 27/01/1990)

¹⁶ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Nigeria*. (HD, 2022) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/jos-plateau-state-nigeria/> (Accessed 27/01/1990)

Year(s): 2016 – present.

Location: Nigeria (the Middle Belt is composed of 15 federal states).

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Nigerian state-level governments with donor support.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The development of a peace infrastructure across the Middle Belt of Nigeria has helped to reduce armed conflict and prevent electoral violence.

The 2015 presidential election placed armed conflict across Nigeria firmly at the fore of domestic politics. Following the successes in mediating a series of peace declarations in states across Nigeria’s Middle Belt in 2013-2016, the regional administrations of three federal states (Plateau, Kaduna, and Adamawa) elected to establish agencies to support the ongoing peace processes and consolidate the peace that was being forged. In February 2016, the governor of Plateau State created the Plateau State Peace Building Agency (PPBA) and tasked it with promoting a culture of peace and harmonious coexistence for the diverse population on the Plateau.¹⁷ Working directly with the governor and state cabinet, the PPBA informs policy in addition to running programmes across the state. These include an initiative to work with traditional elders to set up peace committees in each of Plateau State’s 17 districts, hosting ongoing consultations and stakeholder fora, as well as collaborating with civil society and non-governmental organisations to mediate peaceful resolutions of conflicts. The PPBA is largely focused on managing farmer-pastoralist conflicts but contributed to ensuring the 2019 elections went ahead peacefully on the Plateau.¹⁸ In November 2017, the Kaduna State Peace Commission (KSPC) was created with the same mandate as the PPBA but enjoys a position that is more independent from government than its counterpart.¹⁹ In its

¹⁷ Plateau Peace Building Agency. *About Us*. (PPBA, 2021) Available at: <https://www.plateaupeacebuilding.org/index.html> (Accessed 6/12/2021)

¹⁸ Darren Kew. “Nigeria’s State Peacebuilding Institutions: Early Success and Continuing Challenges.” *USIP Special Report*, No. 496. (2021) p.7

¹⁹ Kaduna State Peace Commission. *Who We Are*. (KSPC, 2021) Available at: <https://kadunapeacecommission.org/> (Accessed 6/12/2021)

first year, the KSPC intervened in ten different conflicts (with some support from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) and began establishing peace committees in 21 of the states' 23 districts.²⁰ The following year, this model was again replicated in Adamawara State and strengthened in 2020.

These state-level efforts to reduce armed conflict in Nigeria's Middle Belt emerged from the governing administrations of each state. However, funding is limited to the salaries and running costs of the organisations. As a result, financial contributions and the delegation of expertise from organisations including the German development agency (GIZ), Ford Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Search for Common Ground, and the United States Institute for Peace continue to play a vital role in building capacity, improving practice, and facilitating interventions.²¹ While the situation in Nigeria remains complex (with particular regard to the anti-grazing laws and Boko Haram insurgency), these initiatives have reduced armed conflict and ensured peaceful elections in this historically conflict-prone region in 2019.²²

²⁰ Kew. "Nigeria's State Peacebuilding Institutions." p.11

²¹ Ibid.

²² Darren Kew. "How to calm violent crises? Nigeria has an idea." *USIP Analysis and Commentary*. (4 June 2021) Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/how-calm-violent-crises-nigeria-has-idea> (Accessed 6/12/2021)

Year(s): 1994 – 2001.

Location: Autonomous Region of Bougainville, (*de jure*) Papua New Guinea.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission, a monitoring mission, and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Pacific states and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict in Bougainville was ended after a decade of fighting by the deployment of a series of regionally led peacekeeping missions and negotiations.

In 1988, a dispute over the construction of a large copper mine erupted into violence in the Bougainville region of Papua New Guinea. The local population saw little benefit from the mining operation (the profits were split between an Australian company and the Government of Papua New Guinea) and resented the environmental destruction caused by the mine. As a result, some locals sabotaged equipment and facilities. In response, the Government of Papua New Guinea launched a violent military crackdown. By 1989, the mine had ceased operating due to the pervasive instability and the area was subject to an armed conflict between the newly formed Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Papua New Guinean security forces.¹ The election of a new Papua New Guinean prime minister in 1994 opened a window for peace talks to take place. To facilitate the talks, a pan-Pacific initiative led by the Government of Australia and including the Papua New Guinean administration agreed to establish a peacekeeping mission.² The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force operated in Bougainville for a month while the negotiations took place.³ While some progress was made

¹ Mary-Louise O’Callaghan. “The origins of the conflict.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. *Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.9 Available at: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/papua-new-guinea%E2%80%93bougainville/origins-conflict> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

² Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand, concerning the Status of Elements of the Defence Forces of those countries deployed in the North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea as part of the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force, 1994. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/232> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

³ Bob Breen. *Giving Peace a Chance – Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: A Case of Military Action and Diplomacy*. (Canberra: Australian National University, 2001)

in establishing an interim government for Bougainville, the peace process ultimately collapsed, and the fighting continued.

Negotiations between rival Bougainvillean groups were held in Canberra in 1995, but it was not until talks were held in New Zealand in 1997 between the Bougainville Interim Government and the Government of Papua New Guinea that the fighting finally abated. The talks culminated in a cease-fire and the deployment of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), a New Zealand-led unarmed peacekeeping mission tasked with employing the “Pacific Way” to verify that the terms of the truce were followed.⁴ The peace process continued into 1998, with talks held in Australia and New Zealand culminating in additional agreements.⁵ One such accord, the Lincoln Agreement, called for the formation of the Peace Monitoring Group to continue the work of the TMG.⁶ In addition, the United Nations Political Office Bougainville was established to serve as another observer of the ongoing peace process.⁷ Negotiations continued for many years, with a series of agreements gradually consolidating the peace. These efforts concluded in August 2001 with the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which brought a permanent end to the conflict.⁸

⁴ Burnham Declaration by Bougainville Leaders on the Re-establishment of a Process for Lasting Peace and Justice on Bougainville, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/png-burnham-declaration97> (Accessed 17/11/2020); Rebecca Adams, ed. *Peace on Bougainville – Truce Monitoring Group – Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace*. (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001); Jim Rolfe. “Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2001)

⁵ Robert Tapi. “From Burnham to Buin.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. *Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.27

⁶ Lincoln Agreement on Peace Security and Development on Bougainville, 1998. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/png-lincolnagreement98> (Accessed 17/11/2020); Richard Gehrman, Matt Grant, & Samantha Rose. “Australian Unarmed Peacekeepers on Bougainville, 1997-2003.” *Peace Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1. (2015)

⁷ Scott S. Smith. “The role of the United Nations Observer Mission.” in Andy Carl & Sr. Lorraine Garasu. *Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002) p.54

⁸ Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/png-bougainville-agreement2001> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Year(s): 2001 - 2005.

Location: Autonomous Region of Bougainville, (*de jure*) Papua New Guinea.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Pacific states and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A series of international peacekeeping missions helped to ensure Bougainville did not relapse into conflict and created a stable and secure environment for the new administration to govern the region.

The Bougainville Peace Agreement ended the fighting, but with a complete lack of state institutions and a society awash with weapons and separatist leaders, the risk of a conflict relapse remained high in the immediate post-war period. In addition, the referendum on Bougainvillean independence promised within 15-20 years in the Agreement and the introduction of autonomous governance on the islands remained sources of contention and potential sparks of conflict between Bougainvillean leaders and the Government of Papua New Guinea in far-off Port Moresby.⁹ As a result, the international presence that had been deployed to Bougainville during the conflict remained in place, with the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) teams assisting with weapon disposal and verification of the ceasefire until 2003, when they were replaced with the much smaller Bougainville Transition Team.¹⁰ The United Nations Political Office in Bougainville continued its work until 2004, when it was replaced by the United Nations Observer Mission for Bougainville (UNOMB), which was tasked with monitoring Bougainville's autonomous status, facilitating the disposal of weapons, and organising the referendum.¹¹

⁹ Peter Jennings & Karl Claxton. "A Stitch in time: Preserving peace on Bougainville." *Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report*. (2013) p.6

¹⁰ John Gordon & Jason H. Campbell. *Organising for Peace Operations: Lessons Learned from Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016) p.26

¹¹ UNDP Papua New Guinea. *Peace building in Bougainville: Background*. (UNDP, 2020) Available at: https://www.pg.undp.org/content/papua_new_guinea/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/peace-building-in-bougainville.html (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Until an appropriate Bougainvillean government could be formed, the UN and PMG teams worked alongside the Peace Process Consultative Council, which was chaired by UNOMB and served to facilitate an inclusive dialogue on the peace process with the parties to the ceasefire.¹² By May 2004, the peacekeepers had supervised the destruction of 81 percent of the arsenals of the two largest Bougainvillean armed groups as well as the lead formation of a separatist leader who had remained largely outside of the peace process.¹³ Progress with disarmament and ongoing compliance from the parties to the Agreement prompted UNOMB to determine that the security situation was conducive to holding the planned elections in May-June 2005.¹⁴ After preparing the elections and supervising their conduct alongside teams of international electoral observers, UNOMB was withdrawn and responsibility for administering the Autonomous Region was handed over to the elected Bougainvillean government.¹⁵ Although the peace built in Bougainville was disrupted by several outbreaks of violence after 2005, the international effort had prevented a conflict relapse and laid the foundations for stable governance in Bougainville.

¹² Australian Civil-Military Centre. *Partnering for Peace: Australia's peacekeeping and peacebuilding experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste*. (Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012) p.22

¹³ UN. "Post-conflict Bougainville's disarmament process is progressing well, UN says." *UN News*. (2004) Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/05/102662-post-conflict-bougainvilles-disarmament-process-progressing-well-un-says> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

¹⁴ UN. "UN official says with autonomous government in place in Bougainville, UN mandate complete." *UN News*. (2005) Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/07/143972-un-official-says-autonomous-government-place-bougainville-un-mandate-complete> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

¹⁵ UN Security Council. "Following 15 June Inauguration of Bougainville's Autonomous Government, United Nations Mandate Fully Implemented, Security Council Told." *UNSCR Press Release*, SC/8437. (2005) Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8437.doc.htm> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Year(s): 1986 – present.

Location: Municipality of Sagada, Cordillera, Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: By creating and maintaining zones of peace, local people and organisations reduced the impact of armed conflict on the civilian population.

Originating from some of the Philippine resistance movements that fought the Japanese during the Second World War, the Philippine Communist Party (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*, PKP) continued its armed struggle against the post-war administration in Manila with the aim of leading a Maoist revolution until 1954. In 1968, the PKP split, with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) emerging as the more powerful force and launching an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines across the country.¹ The fall of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 heralded an opportunity for a negotiated settlement to ongoing conflict, but although some talks were held with the Government of the Philippines, now led by newly elected Corazon Aquino, the parties failed to come to terms. In January 1987, Philippine security forces fired on a crowd of protesters (killing thirteen and injuring hundreds), leading the CPP to withdraw from the talks and return to armed struggle. The scale of the armed conflict intensified for the ensuing three years, only to recede again in the early 1990s.²

In this context, many communities caught in the crossfire between the CPP armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), and the Philippine military and police developed a relatively effective method of mitigating the impact of the ongoing conflict on their lives. Inspired by the local community of Hungduan, who successfully negotiated ad hoc arrangements for the NPA to withdraw from the locality and for government forces to remain outside the area in

¹ UCDP. *Government of Philippines – CPP*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/411> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

² Kevin Avruch & Roberto S. Jose. "Peace Zones in the Philippines." in Landon E. Hancock & Pushpa Iyer. *Zones of Peace*. (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2007) p.53

1986, preventing the destruction of their homes and businesses, people in other areas worked to implement similar arrangements in their localities.³ In 1988, the population of Sagada (in Cordillera) issued a 12-point declaration signed by municipal leaders, the clergy, civil society, and tribal elders which banned military operations (and alcohol) in the entire municipality and called for tribal customs to be respected and sanctuary for the wounded to be offered. This declaration met with widespread public support and was endorsed by the Government of the Philippines in 1989. Similar frameworks were applied in Sitio Cantmanyog in the Western Visayas, Tulunan (Barangay Bituan) on Mindanao, and Tabuk, near Sagada, over 1989 and 1990. With committees established to represent the zones in negotiations, local communities had access to a mechanism to consistently engage in delicate talks, make adjustments to certain arrangements with one party to the conflict or the other, and ultimately try and keep the armed conflict away from their homes and businesses.⁴ By creating and maintaining these zones of peace, local people and organisations reduced the impact of armed conflict on the civilian population.

³ Ibid. p.55

⁴ Ibid. p.65

Year(s): 1986 – present.

Location: Cordillera, Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of the Philippines.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army that began in 1986 reached a formal peace agreement in 2011 which continues to be implemented with oversight from a monitoring committee.

Originating from some of the Philippine resistance movements that fought the Japanese during the Second World War, the Philippine Communist Party (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*, PKP) continued its armed struggle against the post-war administration in Manila with the aim of leading a Maoist revolution until 1954. In 1968, the PKP split, with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) emerging as the more powerful force and launching an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines across the country.¹ In the mountainous and relatively sparsely populated Cordillera Region (on the island of Luzon), the communist movement was heavily influenced by a spectrum of local indigenous communities with grievances of their own against the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. A key point of contention was construction of a hydroelectric dam and the exploitation of natural resources in Cordillera, both of which threatened the livelihoods of the local population.² When Marcos was forced to flee the country in the face of widespread political and military opposition to his rule in 1986, the CPP cadres in Cordillera rejected the decision of the Central Committee to continue the armed struggle against the new, elected Government of Philippines, and formally split from the organisation to form the Cordillera

¹ UCDP. *Government of Philippines – CPP*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/411> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

² Miriam Coronel Ferrer. "The Moro and the Cordillera Conflicts in the Philippines." In Kusuma Snitwongse & W. Scott Thompson, eds. *Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) p.118

People's Liberation Army (CPLA).³ Despite the name, the CPLA sought autonomy for Cordillera within a federal Philippine state rather than full independence.

The same day that the CPLA was established, it entered into a traditional *sipat* (ceasefire) agreement with the new government at a ceremony held at the Mount Data Hotel in Bauko. This ended the fighting between the CPLA and the Government of Philippines in Cordillera and laid the foundation for the creation of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by the administration of Corazon Aquino later that year. This polity was governed by a 200-strong Cordillera Regional Assembly and a 29-member Executive Board, providing a degree of political representation to the population.⁴ Despite these gains, the CPLA refused to disarm, and the government failed to create a permanent autonomous status for Cordillera and stopped funding the CAR in 2000, leaving the conflict unresolved for decades. In 2011, the CPLA agreed to disarm in return for investment and autonomy for the region, and positions in the armed forces for some of its personnel. These arrangements were formalised with the signing a Memorandum of Agreement on 18 January 2011.⁵ This was met with public celebrations of the Mount Data Accord on its 25th anniversary in September 2011 in support of the peace process.⁶ In 2019, the Government of Philippines created a Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Committee to track the implementation of the terms of the agreements and serve as a mechanism to prevent renewed conflict.⁷

³ Ibid. p.120

⁴ Ibid. p.131-2

⁵ Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the CBA/CPLA towards the CPLA's Final Disposition of Arms and Forces and its Transformation into a Potent Socio-Economic Unarmed Force (Closure Agreement), 2011. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-closure-agreement2011> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

⁶ Karl de Mesa. "Cordillera celebrates 25th anniversary of peace accord." *GMA News Online*. (20 September 2011) Available at: <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/232874/cordillera-celebrates-25th-anniversary-of-peace-accord/story/> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

⁷ Isabela Gamu. "CPLA elders, AFP, OPAPP join peace month celebration." *Philippine News Agency*. (17 September 2019) Available at: <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1080654> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Year(s): 1992 – 1995.

Location: Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of the Philippines.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A peace agreement mediated by an agency of the Government of the Philippines ended the repeated efforts of the Soldiers of the Filipino People, the Young Officers' Union, and the Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance factions of the military to seize power with force.

After more than two decades in power, the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos was brought to an end in 1986 by a broad coalition of opposition groups, including significant portions of junior officers in the Philippines Armed Forces as well as business interests and the clergy. This movement was unified in opposition to the corrupt and brutal administration and had been galvanised by an economic crisis that began in 1983. In a bid to reassert his legitimacy, Marcos held a snap election in February 1986, however the discovery of blatant electoral fraud inspired widespread public protests now known as the People Power Revolution. With significant sections of the military openly supporting the protesters (and reportedly preventing Marcos from launching a violent crackdown), he was forced to flee to the USA. Corazon Aquino rode a wave of popular support in the aftermath of the Revolution to the presidency, where she reinstated constitutional rule and democracy in the Philippines. However, the elements of the military that had supported her rise to power soon voiced their criticism of her leadership, largely focused on her handling of the ongoing conflict and intermittent peace process with the Communist Party of the Philippines. Beginning in 1987, these factions within the military launched a total of seven attempted coups d'état.¹ These attempts to seize power came to a crescendo on 1 December 1989, when three groups united by a broad anti-American sentiment and known as the Soldiers of the Filipino People, the Young Officers' Union, and the Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance seized strategic

¹ Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz. "Breaking With the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia." *East-West Center Policy Studies*, No. 63. (2012) p.27

infrastructure around Manila and attacked the Armed Forces General Headquarters.² After six days of fighting (100 killed, 600 injured) and the use of “persuasion flights” by US fighters stationed in the Philippines, most of the soldiers involved in the coup attempt surrendered on 7 December.³

Although that coup had failed, many of the personnel involved in planning and carrying out the attacks remained underground. After being formally dismissed from the military for their actions and with many of their captured comrades facing an uncertain future, the prospects of an armed insurgency were high. The Government of the Philippines established a commission to investigate the grievances aired by the rebellious groups within the military and instigated some reforms, but the conflict remained unresolved. The June 1992 elections produced another new administration in Manila, one which had prioritised peace and reconciliation in their campaign. A National Unification Commission was created in September 1992 and tasked with opening dialogue with armed opposition groups and promulgating guidelines for the conduct of peace initiatives by public officials. One of its first successes was negotiating the Interim Peace Agreement with the military factions, which was signed on 23 December 1992.⁴ This ceasefire ended the armed conflict for all intents and purposes, but further talks eventually culminated on 13 October 1995 with the General Agreement for Peace.⁵

² Sheila S. Coronel. “Dateline Philippines: The Lost Revolution.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 84. (1991) p.181

³ Carlos F. Garcia. *Negotiating Peace with the Reform the Armed Forces Movement/Soldiers of the Filipino People/Young Officers Union: Issues and Prospects*. (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995) pp.37-51

⁴ Ibid. p.57

⁵ General Agreement for Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Rebolusyonyong Alyansang Makabansa - Soldiers of the Filipino People - Young Officers' Union, 1995. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/640> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Year(s): 1992 – 1996.

Location: Mindanao, Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of Islamic Conference and the governments of Indonesia and Libya.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Negotiations mediated by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the governments of Indonesia and Libya, and supported by an OIC Joint Ceasefire Commission, ended the armed conflict between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996.

Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, is home to a diverse population, 20 percent of whom are Muslims and identify as Moro (also referred to as Bangsamoro). Owing to the nature and longevity of the post-war authoritarian regimes that ruled the country, this community was marginalised for decades and lacked anything but token political representation.¹ During the widespread armed conflict between the Government of the Philippines and a series of communist groups that began immediately after the Second World War and continues to this day, displaced communities from across the Philippines were encouraged by the administration in Manila to settle in Mindanao. This process isolated the Moro community even further and, after some Muslim recruits in the Philippine military were killed by their officers in 1968, intercommunal clashes erupted across the island. Later that year, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established and began training in nearby Malaysia. In 1972, the MNLF launched an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines, initially with the goal of achieving total independence (this changed in 1978, when increased autonomy was formally adopted as the objective, leading to a split in the organisation). A devastating armed conflict followed, peaking in the 1970s before pausing

¹ Miriam Coronel Ferrer. *Costly Wars, Elusive Peace*. (Quezon: University of the Philippines Press, 2013) p.140

altogether after the regime of Ferdinand Marcos was toppled in 1986, only to resume in February 1988.²

The situation in Mindanao gained increasing international attention in the early 1990s. By this stage, the MNLF had splintered multiple times and many of its cadres had signed up to government disarmament programmes, leaving it weakened.³ A change in government in the 1992 elections brought Fidel Ramos to power, who promptly created the National Unification Commission (NUC) and tasked it with finding solutions to the conflicts across the Philippines. Recognising an opportunity to come to a negotiated settlement, the MNLF began talks with the government via the NUC in 1992, and the following year signed a Statement of Understanding for formal negotiations to take place and agreed to a ceasefire.⁴ The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) worked with representatives of both parties to establish a Joint Committee to oversee implementation and adherence while further talks took place. After four years of negotiations mediated by the governments of Indonesia, Libya, and the OIC, the talks culminated on 2 September 1996 with the Final Peace Agreement.⁵ The key provision of the accord was the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (first proposed in 1976), which offered constitutional protections and political representation to the Muslim community. This ended the conflict between the Philippine government and the MNLF, but not every faction of the movement endorsed the Agreement and continued the armed struggle.

² UCDP. *Philippines: Mindanao*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/308> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

³ Ferrer. *Costly Wars, Elusive Peace*. p.141

⁴ Statement of Understanding on the Second Round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and the MNLF, 1993. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-2ndroundexploratory93> (Accessed 28/01/2022); Interim Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1992. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-interimceasefire93> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

⁵ Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, 1996. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-implementingtripoli96> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Year(s): 2003 – 2014.

Location: Mindanao, Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, monitoring missions, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The International Contact Group, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, the EU, and the Government of Norway.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Lengthy negotiations mediated by the International Contact Group (composed of four governments and four NGOs), supported by international monitoring missions and local peace infrastructure, helped to end the armed conflict on Mindanao.

Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines, is home to a diverse population, 20 percent of whom are Muslims and identify as Moro (also referred to as Bangsamoro). Owing to the nature and longevity of the post-war authoritarian regimes that ruled the country, this community was marginalised for decades and lacked anything but token political representation.¹ During the widespread armed conflict between the Government of the Philippines and a series of communist groups that began immediately after the Second World War and continues to this day, displaced communities from across the Philippines were encouraged by the administration in Manila to settle in Mindanao. This process isolated the Moro community even further and, after some Muslim recruits in the Philippine military were killed by their officers in 1968, intercommunal clashes erupted across the island. Later that year, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established and began training in nearby Malaysia. In 1972, the MNLF launched an insurgency against the Government of the Philippines with the goal of achieving total independence for Mindanao. When this objective was reduced to autonomy within the Philippines, the movement fractured, with the hard-line element adopting the name the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). MILF halted its

¹ Miriam Coronel Ferrer. *Costly Wars, Elusive Peace*. (Quezon: University of the Philippines Press, 2013) p.140

insurgency during the MNLF peace process and entered into talks with the government 1999, only for conflict to erupt again the following year.²

Efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict between MILF and the Government of the Philippines took place throughout the 2000s, with a ceasefire negotiated in 2003 and monitored by an International Monitoring Team (IMT) organised by the Organisation of Islamic Conference observation mission (composed of members from Brunei, Libya, and Malaysia) holding for most of 2004-2006.³ In 2009, the IMT was supported by EU and Norwegian personnel, along with three local organisations. With these foundations in place, an International Contact Group (composed of the governments of the UK, Japan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and the NGOs Conciliation Resources, the Community of Sant'Egidio the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Muhammadiyah) was created to observe and advise on the peace process.⁴ In this framework, the belligerents negotiated agreements on ending the conflict, wealth and power sharing, and normalising relations, before finally signing the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro on 27 March 2014.⁵ This accord created a new autonomous polity called Bangsamoro to replace the Autonomous Region created in 1996 and established a Transitional Authority led by the MILF leadership to govern the region for a limited period. Implementation was supported by a Japanese monitoring mission, the Mindanao Task Force, and a Third-Party Monitoring Team, composed of local and international NGO staff, in addition to a Joint MILF-Government of Philippines committee (encompassing local monitoring teams across 13 provinces) and the Bangsamoro Development Authority, with which MILF could access development funds.⁶

² UCDP. *Philippines: Mindanao*. (UCDP, 2022) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/308> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

³ Ferrer. *Costly Wars, Elusive Peace*. pp.301-2

⁴ Kristian Herbolzheimer. "The peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines: evolution and lessons learned." *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report*. (2015) pp.2-3 Available at: <https://www.c-r.org/resource/peace-process-mindanao-philippines#> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

⁵ Dato' Tengku Abdul Ghafar. *Beyond the Peace Table: Reflections on The GPH-MILF Peace Process*. (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2017) Available at: <https://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/beyond-the-peace-table-reflections-on-the-gph-milf-peace-process/> (Accessed 28/01/2022); The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2014. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-comprehensiveagreement2014> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

⁶ Ferrer. *Costly Wars, Elusive Peace*. p.303; Herbolzheimer. "The peace process in Mindanao, the Philippines." p.3

Year(s): 2002 – present.

Location: Iligan City, Mindanao, Philippines.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The local NGO Balay Mindanaw.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Negotiations mediated by the local NGO Balay Mindanaw stopped the fighting between the Revolutionary Workers' Party – Mindanao and the Government of Philippines in 2005 and ongoing efforts, although unable to produce a peace agreement, have prevented further conflict.

The Revolutionary Workers' Party (RWP) emerged from the long-standing Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in September 1994 during a period of upheaval within that organisation known as the Second Great Rectification Movement. The key point of contention was the CPP leadership's determination to continue the armed struggle it had launched in 1968. Following the split, the RWP soon began negotiations with the Government of the Philippines, but divisions within the movement over the talks led to another fracture and the emergence of the Revolutionary Workers' Party – Mindanao (RWP-M) as an independent organisation in 2001. With 14 of the Philippines' 20 poorest provinces in Mindanao and sizeable marginalised population of landless agricultural labourers, the RWP-M still enjoyed significant support and had decades of experience conducting insurgencies against security forces. As a result, despite its relative isolation, it remained a potent force in Mindanao and was more than capable of perpetuating armed conflict.

In 2002, RWP-M leaders reached out to the mayor of Iligan City in Mindanao to explore the possibility of initiating a peace process with the Government of Philippines. Informal talks between the RWP-M and the mayor took place with help from a local NGO working to reduce armed conflict in Mindanao, Balay Mindanaw (BM). In 2003, the Philippine government established a panel to conduct negotiations and talks mediated by BM began on 22 September 2003. A second round of talks resulted in the signing of the Agreement on

Cessation of Hostilities on 28 October 2005, formally ending the fighting. The following year, additional agreements were signed on implementation and continuing the peace process. Dialogue between the parties continues at the time of writing, and although a final peace agreement is yet to be negotiated, investment in Mindanao and the work of local communities and organisations such as BM in support of the peace process has prevented further conflict between the RWP-M and the Government of Philippines.¹

¹ Authors note: I could only find the following source for this case. Balay Mindanaw. *GRP-RPM-M Peace Process*. (BM, 2022) Available at: <https://balaymindanaw.org/bmfi/grp-rpm-m-peace-process/> (Accessed 28/01/2022)

Year(s): 1992 – 2001.

Location: Qatar/Saudi Arabia International Border.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the resolution of a militarised territorial dispute.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Egypt.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The territorial dispute between Qatar and Saudi was resolved, preventing an interstate conflict from erupting over the contested territory.

Although the territory of Saudi Arabia was never colonised by European powers, all its neighbouring states were. As a result, the contemporary international borders are the result of colonial era treaties drawn up in the 1920s and revised in later decades. The Saudi border with Qatar (a British protectorate from 1916 until 1971) was partially demarcated in 1965, but 20km of territory remained disputed. The situation was further complicated by a series of highly contested treaties in the 1970s in which the United Arab Emirates had ceded territory to Saudi Arabia, including land bordering Qatar. In 1990, the Saudis asserted their authority over the territory for the first time by closing the historic road between Abu Dhabi and Qatar and building some guard posts in the area. On 31 September 1992, Qatari and Saudi troops clashed at Qatar's al-Khofous Border Crossing, leaving three dead. The following day, the Government of Qatar suspended the 1965 agreement with Saudi Arabia, leaving the entire frontier between the two countries as contested – and already militarised – territory. Just hours after the Qatari declaration, Saudi troops launched an attack on the border post.¹ The Qatari troops stationed there had been ordered to hold fire, preventing further bloodshed, but the crisis threatened to escalate into a much larger conflict on 4 October when the Qatari government issued a protest memorandum describing the incident as an unjustified military attack.² In the context of ongoing rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia on a host of issues

¹ Associated Press. "2nd Saudi Border Clash Reported." *The Washington Post*. (1/10/1992) Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/10/02/2nd-saudi-border-clash-reported/c50bc249-a594-4466-bf39-e07cdf44a34/> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

² Associated Press. "Qatar Demand Saudis Leave a Disputed Post." *The New York Times*. (4 October 1992) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/04/world/qatar-demand-saudis-leave-a-disputed-post.html> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

at the time, the prospect of further armed clashes on the border sparking an interstate conflict was reasonably high.³

Qatar boycotted the Gulf Cooperation Council in response to the crisis and its threat of withdrawal prevented the organisation from being able to serve as effective mediator. Fortunately, the Government of Egypt made noteworthy progress in its efforts to contain the crisis. Following a series of talks, the Qatari and Saudi governments agreed to form a technical committee to delineate the border, with Egypt serving as the guarantor of the committee's findings.⁴ The dispute became militarised again in 1994, with five skirmishes taking place along the border just as the committee was supposed to begin its work.⁵ This delayed, but did not halt progress, and after agreeing to the findings of the committee in 1999, a formal agreement was signed in Doha on 21 March 2001.⁶ In 2008, the two countries restored diplomatic relations and the following year signed a border agreement at UN Headquarters in New York, providing a symbolic final resolution of the issue.⁷

³ Gwenn Okruhlik & Patrick Conge. "The Politics of Border Disputes: On the Arabian Peninsula." *International Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 2. (1999) p.236

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Yoel Guzansky. "Lines Drawn in the Sand: Territorial Disputes and GCC Unity." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 70, No. 4. (2016) p.551

⁶ Associated Press. "Saudi and Qatar End 35-Year Border Dispute, Sign Accord." *Al-Bawaba*. (21 March 2001) Available at: <https://www.albawaba.com/news/saudi-and-qatar-end-35-year-border-dispute-sign-accord> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

⁷ Guzansky. "Lines Drawn in the Sand." p.550

Year(s): 1994 – 1999.

Location: Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Gabon.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: A series of peace agreements mediated by the Government of Gabon brought an end to the armed conflict that engulfed the Republic of Congo during the 1990s.

The Republic of Congo held its first multi-party elections in 1992. Although the election itself went ahead peacefully, the results were disputed, and the three main political parties in the country raised militias. Within months, a complex armed conflict was taking place between three sizeable armed groups and the Congolese armed forces. A ceasefire was reached in January 1994, allowing more comprehensive peace talks hosted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the governments of France and Gabon to begin.¹ Efforts to resolve the conflict at this stage were ultimately unsuccessful and, in the months prior to the 1997 presidential election, the fighting erupted once again, devastating the capital, Brazzaville.² An additional layer of complexity was added to the conflict when veterans of conflicts in Angola and Chad entered the fray, providing the necessary impetus to bring former president Denis Sassou-Nguessou back into power in Brazzaville.³ The first steps towards peace were made in 1998, when the Government of Republic of Congo invited 1,420 delegates to hold a National Forum for Reconciliation. The Forum adopted an interim constitution and nominated a transitional administration to run the country until elections scheduled three years hence could produce an elected government. Before any more progress could be made, however, the fighting erupted again and by December 1998,

¹ UN Country Team. UN Plan: Together from the Ground Up – Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). (Brazzaville: UN, 2002) p.10

² UCDP. *Congo: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/408> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

³ Howard W. French. “Rebels, Backed by Angola, Take Brazzaville and Oil Port.” *The New York Times*. (1997) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/16/world/rebels-backed-by-angola-take-brazzaville-and-oil-port.html> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

much of the country was engulfed in conflict.⁴ Fresh peace talks were again led by the Government of Gabon in 1999, culminating with the Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo.⁵ The Agreement was comprehensive, stipulating far-reaching reforms, amnesty for combatants, and an extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme, in addition to formally launching a fresh national dialogue to produce a new constitution.⁶ In March-April 2001, this nationwide consultation and dialogue process regarding the constitution was held and, once complete, the new document was promulgated by the Congolese parliament in September. Initial efforts to build stability were largely successful, returning 30,000 combatants to civilian life by September 2001 and integrating 8,000 more into the armed forces.⁷ These initiatives ended the intrastate conflict in Republic of Congo, but fighting erupted once again in March 2002 between government forces and a final armed group, which managed to retain control of the Pool region.⁸ Renewed clashes following the 2016 elections threatened a return to war until a final ceasefire was signed in 2017, bringing the Republic of the Congo a step closer to peace.⁹

⁴ UN Country Team. *UN Plan*. p.10

⁵ Accord de cessation des hostilités en République du Congo, 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/congo-cessationhostilities99> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁶ Peace Accords Matrix. *Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo*. (University of Notre Dame, 2020) Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/agreement-on-ending-hostilities-in-the-republic-of-congo> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁷ UCDP. *Congo: Government*.

⁸ Philip Kleinfeld. "UPDATED: Congo-Brazzaville's hidden war." *The New Humanitarian*. (2018) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2018/06/18/updated-congo-brazzaville-s-hidden-war> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁹ Le Monde with AFP. "Au Congo-Brazzaville, un cessez-le-feu signé avec les rebelles de la région du Pool." *Le Monde*. (2017) Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/12/23/rdc-un-cessez-le-feu-signe-avec-les-rebelles-de-la-region-du-pool_5233990_3212.html (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Year(s): 2016 – 2017.

Location: Republic of Congo.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Republic of Congo.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreements ended the Ninja insurgency in the Pool region, while a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme has helped to stabilise the area.

The implementation of the peace agreements that ended the 1997-1999 war in the Republic of Congo was impeded by frequent armed clashes between 2002 and 2007. By 2010, the situation was improving, and the country was at peace for several years.¹ However, this fragile calm was threatened once again in the run-up to the March 2016 presidential election. Following a widely criticised referendum to extend presidential term limits, the election went ahead amidst a government-enforced media blackout and the incumbent administration claimed victory. The opposition dismissed the results as fraudulent and launched a campaign of civil disobedience. In this fraught climate, armed groups centred on former militants of the Ntsiloulou faction of the Ninja militias (which fought in the civil war) launched an attack on police, military, and administration compounds in the capital, Brazzaville, in April 2016.² In response, government security forces launched a major assault on suspected Ninja hideouts in the forests of the Pool region, killing many civilians, and driving 200,000 people from their homes in the process.³

The fighting continued until 23 December 2017, when talks between government and Ninja representatives culminated in a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities agreement. The deal

¹ UCDP. *Government of Congo – Ninjas*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/861> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

² Reuters and AP. "Heavy gunfire in Congo-Brazzaville capital as police battle militia." *The Guardian*. (4 April 2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/04/heavy-gunfire-in-congo-brazzaville-capital-as-police-battle-militia> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

³ Philip Kleinfeld. "Updated: Congo-Brazzaville's hidden war." *The New Humanitarian*. (18 June 2018) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2018/06/18/updated-congo-brazzaville-s-hidden-war> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

entailed Ninja withdrawals from key strategic points (such as the Congo-Ocean railway) and an arms-for-cash Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme focused on the Pool region.⁴ Fears that the agreement would collapse were allayed somewhat on 31 August 2018, when a follow-up agreement was signed with UN support committing considerable financial resources to incentivise ex-Ninja combatants to disarm and stabilise the area. Approximately 7,500 former rebels surrendered their weapons in exchange for cash payments, while additional aspects of the programme focused on helping displaced people return to their homes.⁵ The government-led efforts to resolve the conflict quickly succeeded in ending the fighting and prevented a much larger war in the Republic of Congo.

⁴ Reuters Staff. "Congo Republic signs peace accord with 'Ninja' rebels." *Reuters*. (23 December 2017) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-congorepublic-security/congo-republic-signs-peace-accord-with-ninja-rebels-idUKKBN1EH0HT?edition-redirect=uk> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

⁵ Firmin Oyé. "Le programme DDR sera élargi à la population civile." *Les Dépêches de Brazzaville*, No. 3309. (3 September 2018) p.2

Year(s): 1992.

Location: East Prigorodny, North Ossetia, Russian Federation.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Russia.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The deployment of Russian forces ended the fighting in East Prigorodny after six days.

Within the framework of the Soviet Union, the Prigorodny District was initially part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. After the Ingush and Chechen populations were forcibly deported to central Asia and the Chechen-Ingush Republic was disbanded on the orders of Stalin in 1944, Prigorodny was absorbed into the neighbouring North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. When the deported populations returned to their homelands and the Chechen-Ingush Republic was re-established in 1957, the area had been settled by Ossetians and Russians and Prigorodny remained as part of North Ossetia rather than returning to the Chechen-Ingush Republic.¹ As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was established on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the Ingush chose to join the newly created Russian Federation. In the midst of this period of uncertainty, the fate of Prigorodny and its population became a major point of contention for political leaders in the region. For the Ingush, particularly those who had struggled to re-establish themselves in Prigorodny despite the protests of the Ossetian and Russian settlers, the territory should have been ‘returned’ to the newly established Russian Federal Republic of Ingushetia. For Ossetians, Prigorodny had been part of their home since 1944. It was in this context that fighting erupted in East Prigorodny on 31 October 1992, sparking the first armed conflict on Russian territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With support from some Russian security forces, North Ossetian security

¹ Olga Osipova. “North Ossetia and Ingushetia: The First Clash.” In Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, & Lara Olsen, eds. *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) pp.40-2

personnel and paramilitaries expelled most of the Ingush population (up to 64,000 people) in the Republic of North Ossetia in a week.²

Although Russian forces had participated in the conflict, it was the Government of Russia that held the key to ending the fighting and preventing an inter-republic conflict within the Federation. A sizeable contingent of the Russian Army, exercising emergency powers decreed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, brought stability to the situation and ended the fighting (after about 600 deaths) on 6 November 1992. A Temporary Administration, also established by the emergency powers and answering directly to Yeltsin, ruled by decree in both North Ossetia and Ingushetia until February 1995. Displaced Ingush were allowed to return to select villages in East Prigorodny and some hostages were returned.³ Although the territory remains contested, the conflict has been contained since 1992.

² Human Rights Watch. *The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodny Region*. (HRW, 1996) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Russia.htm> (Accessed 27/10/2021)

³ Osipova. "North Ossetia and Ingushetia." p.57-61

Year(s): 1991 – 2000.

Location: Republic of Dagestan, Russia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Traditional methods of political organisation have helped prevent armed conflict in the Republic of Dagestan during the unrest and instability that has marked life in much of the Caucasus in the post-Soviet period.

As the Soviet Union collapsed and much of the Caucasus descended into war, the diverse and economically poor Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Dagestan appeared at risk of following the path of its neighbours. Like all parts of the Caucasus, the population of Dagestan was affected by the withdrawal (and partial disintegration) of Soviet armed forces in the region and the return of populations, such as Chechens, who had been deported to central Asia in 1944. With over 30 recognised national groups within its borders (including Russians, Chechens, Lezgins, all of whom could seek unity with fraternal populations outside the republic) and a plurality of confessional outlooks within a society awash with small arms, Dagestan was viewed by outside observers as an area at great risk of armed conflict, particularly after the wars in nearby Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh erupted in the early 1990s.¹

In contrast to most of the other political units established in the Caucasus during the Soviet period, the structures of government in Dagestan remained in place after 1991 and became the nucleus of the post-communist administration. Indeed, there was widespread support from across Dagestani society for the carefully balanced consociational political system that had developed over the centuries and eventually became formalised within the Soviet constitutional framework of the republic. This was manifested in three separate referenda on the shape of post-Soviet Dagestan's political administration and the mobilisation of

¹ Christoph Zürcher. *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus*. (New York, 2007) p.186

multiethnic Dagestani self-defence units in opposition to incursions by Chechen militants in 1999.² This system emerged from the *djamaat*; a traditional method of political organisation focused on territory rather than kinship which created administrative bodies that were inherently multiethnic. The Soviets institutionalised this practice, ensuring that power was always shared among the many groups in Dagestan. The 1994 Dagestan Constitution enshrined these consociational arrangements, with overlapping legislative bodies ensuring that, at the least, the major ethnic groups in the republic were represented in government. In practical terms, this framework makes it very difficult for political platforms premised on ethnic exclusivity to succeed and means that Dagestani leaders are forced to build their political support base on a multiplicity of ethnic groups.³ By maintaining these mechanisms during times of great uncertainty, the people of Dagestan helped to prevent armed conflict in their republic.

² Robert Ware & Enver Kisriev. "Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach." *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 1. (2001) pp.111;

³ Ware & Kisriev. "Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan." pp.111-2; UCDP. *Russia (Soviet Union) : Dagestan*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/414> (Accessed 11/11/2021)

Year(s): 2000 – 2009.

Location: Chechen Republic, Russia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of Russia.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The diplomatic manoeuvrings of the Government of Russia ended the war in Chechnya after a decade of conflict.

As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Chechen leaders proclaimed the formation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Initial Russian efforts to re-establish control in the area were repulsed, but factions within the independence movement soon fell into conflict with each other. A major Russian offensive in 1994 sparked the First Chechen War, which ended in 1996 with a peace agreement. Fighting resumed in 1999 and Russian forces quickly established control over much of Chechnya. However, they faced a determined insurgency from an increasingly radical (and international) resistance movement: In addition to local separatists, Arab Mujahideen and radical Turkish groups fought to establish the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.¹ Many Chechen leaders who had risen to prominence in the First Chechen War such as Akhmad Kadyrov switched sides in 1999-2000. Upon the Russian victory, Kadyrov was appointed as interim leader of a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation as part of ‘backroom deal’ which established a ‘special relationship’ between Grozny and Moscow.² In 2003 he was elected president of the republic. His victory coincided with the promulgation of a Russian peace plan, which outlined a new constitution offering considerable autonomy for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. It was subsequently approved in a referendum.³ Kadyrov was assassinated the following year, but his son Ramzan

¹ UCDP. *Chechen Republic of Ichkeria*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/352> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

² Vadim Dubnov. “Chechnya’s New Contract With the Kremlin.” *Carnegie Moscow Center*. (27 October 2016) Available at: <https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/10/27/chechnya-s-new-contract-with-kremlin-pub-64955> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

³ Nick Paton Walsh. “Weary Chechens turn out to vote for Russian peace plan.” *The Guardian*. (24 March 2003) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/24/chechnya.russia> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

was appointed deputy prime minister the following day and was elevated to lead Chechnya in 2007.

Through policies to co-opt former resistance leaders (often referred to as “Chechenisation”) and offer meaningful autonomy to the population (or at least the elites), the Government of Russia was able whittle away support for the independence movement until it was isolated from much of the population. Thus, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (which at this point was little more than an idea carried in the minds of exiles and insurgents) that had inspired the First Chechen War became increasingly the preserve of extremists, becoming part of the Caucasus Emirate (affiliated to Al-Qaeda) in 2007 and the Vilayat Kavkaz (affiliated to ISIS) in 2015. As the conflict receded, the Russian government ended its military operation in 2002, and had pulled out most security forces by 2009. The withdrawal was met with an announcement from exiled resistance leaders that Chechen security forces, even those of the pro-Moscow administration, should not be targeted.⁴ A low-level insurgency continued until 2017, by which point most fighters had departed to Syria.

⁴ David Hearst. “Chechnya leaders and rebels to meet for peace talks.” *The Guardian*. (12 August 2009) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/12/chechnya-rebels-talks-russia> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

Year(s): 2003.

Location: *São Tomé and Príncipe.*

UN Regional Group: *Africa.*

Type of Conflict: *Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.*

Type of Initiative: *Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The governments of Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, and the USA, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, and the Economic Community of Central African States.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *Constitutional order was peacefully restored in São Tomé and Príncipe thanks to the mediation efforts of a host of national governments and international organisations.*

São Tomé and Príncipe became independent from Portugal in 1975, enjoying a relatively peaceful transition to self-rule. The country's first elections were held in 1991 in a free and fair environment, although a short-lived coup d'état in 1995 highlighted the potential for the Santomean military to destabilise politics.¹ The discovery of offshore oil fields in the seas around São Tomé and Príncipe in 2000 presented a potential boost for the Santomean economy, but also served to raise the stakes in politics.² Ongoing disputes between the prime minister and president over constitutional reform culminated with the latter dissolving parliament in January 2003. Violent protests against the government broke out in April and, by July, threatened to overthrow the government.³ Further complexity was added to the crisis by the return of Santomean veterans of South Africa's infamous Buffalo Battalion to the country after serving for decades as mercenaries. On 16 July 2003, a group of these veterans launched a coup d'état with the support of around half of São Tomé and Príncipe's small army. Once in power, the military junta was reinforced by additional Buffalo Battalion veterans who returned to São Tomé and Príncipe in its wake.⁴ Although the coup had taken

¹ Gerhard Seibert. "São Tomé e Príncipe: Military Coup as a Lesson?" *Lusotopie*. (1996)

² Rory Carroll. "Troops seize power in oil rush." *The Guardian*. (2003) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/17/oil.business> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

³ Gerhard Seibert. "Coup d'état in São Tomé e Príncipe: Domestic causes, the role of oil and former 'Buffalo' Battalion soldiers." *Institute for Security Studies Paper*, No. 81. (2003) p.2

⁴ Ibid. p.5

place without loss of life, São Tomé and Príncipe faced armed conflict between the military junta and forces loyal to the deposed administration.⁵

The international effort to prevent armed conflict and restore constitutional rule began the day after the coup, when American and Portuguese diplomats met representatives of the military junta.⁶ Meanwhile, a host of national governments and regional institutions condemned the coup and discussed the possibility of a military intervention. After three days of talks, the junta agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with the diplomats, establishing the framework for a negotiated settlement. Further talks were hosted by the governments of Nigeria, the USA, Portugal, South Africa (at the request of the Buffalo Battalion veterans), as well as the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the Economic Community of Central African States..⁷ After negotiating the restoration of constitutional rule in return for amnesty for the coup plotters, the mediators presented the deal to the ousted Santomean president, who returned to the islands accompanied by the President of Nigeria.⁸ This timely diplomatic intervention prevented the outbreak of armed conflict in São Tomé and Príncipe.

⁵ BBC. "Junta' declared in Sao Tome." *BBC News*. (2003) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3070355.stm> (Accessed 13/12/2020)

⁶ Gerhard Seibert. "The Bloodless Coup of July 2003 in São Tomé e Príncipe." *Lusotopie*, Vol. 10. (2003) p.252

⁷ Seibert. "Coup d'état in São Tomé e Príncipe." p.6

⁸ Seibert. "The Bloodless Coup of July 2003 in São Tomé e Príncipe." p.255

Year(s): 2012 – present.

Location: Casamance, Senegal.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Community of Sant’Egidio and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Although a final settlement to the conflict is yet to be negotiated, ongoing negotiations hosted by organisations such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Community of Sant’Egidio have helped to strengthen a 2014 ceasefire and end the fighting in the Casamance region of Senegal.

The Casamance region of Senegal was subjected to over three decades of armed conflict between the Senegalese military and the secessionist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) after the latter launched an insurgency in 1982.¹ In 1991, some factions within the MFDC signed a ceasefire with the Government of Senegal, limiting the extent of the conflict. Many groups within the MFDC initially rejected the ceasefire, and although increasing numbers came to terms with the government in the ensuing years, the peace process was dealt a serious blow by the escalation of violence in 1995.² The fighting continued until a new peace process began in 2000. While this process, like its predecessors, failed to resolve the conflict, the intensity of the fighting was once again reduced. Indeed, a truce signed in 2004 ended the fighting altogether for a few years, but Casamance soon fell back into conflict.³ In 2012, a new president was elected on a ticket of ending the conflict and bringing peace to Senegal, leading to another revival of the peace process.⁴

¹ Aïssatou Fall. “Understanding The Casamance Conflict: A Background.” *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Monograph*, No. 7. (2010) p.1

² Ibid. p.20-5

³ BBC. “Senegal’s Casamance MFDC rebels declare a ceasefire.” *BBC News*. (2014) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27221999> (Accessed 15/11/2020)

⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia. *Senegal*. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/375> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Beginning in October 2012, the most powerful factions within the MFDC met with officials from the Government of Senegal at a meeting hosted by the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome.⁵ In 2014, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue was invited by the Senegalese government to re-launch the peace process after talks had stalled the previous year.⁶ These renewed efforts proved fruitful, and in May 2014 the leader of the largest faction of the MFDC declared a unilateral ceasefire with government forces.⁷ While a comprehensive resolution to the conflict encompassing every wing of the MFDC is yet to be found, the ceasefire heralded years of peace for Casamance. Indeed, since the ceasefire came into place only one outbreak of violence has occurred, when 13 people were killed in an attack in 2018. The prospects for peace were much strengthened in the first months of 2020, when representatives of both parties reiterated their intention to 'resume regular negotiations' and 'give new impetus to the peace process' at another meeting hosted by the Community of Sant'Egidio.⁸

⁵ Community of Sant'Egidio. "Hostages freed in Casamance thanks to Community of Sant'Egidio." *Community of Sant'Egidio Press Release*. (2012) Available at: <https://archive.santegidio.org/pageID/3/langID/en/itemID/6137/Hostages-freed-in-Casamance-thanks-to-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html> (Accessed 15/11/2020)

⁶ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. *Mediation and support for the peace process in Casamance – Senegal*. (CHD, 2020) Available at: <https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/mediation-of-the-casamance-conflict-in-senegal/> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁷ BBC. "Senegal's Casamance MFDC rebels declare a ceasefire." *BBC News*. (2014) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27221999> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁸ Community of Sant'Egidio. "Senegal: Peace Negotiations Resumed in Casamance." *News*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/30284/langID/en/itemID/34828/Senegal-peace-negotiations-resumed-in-Casamance.html> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2001.

Location: Sierra Leone.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Military intervention and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Economic Community of West African States, the UN, and the British government.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The war in Sierra Leone was ended and constitutional rule was re-established by a British military intervention in support of a UN peacekeeping mission after over a decade of conflict and devastation.

Sierra Leone endured over a decade of armed conflict after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an armed rebellion against the government in 1991. The conflict left the country deeply divided, and in 1997, armed rebel groups captured the capital, Freetown.¹ In response, regional leaders deployed the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to retake the city, however the intervention met with little progress elsewhere in the country.² The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) hosted negotiations between the belligerents in Togo in 1999, culminating with the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord.³ Among many stipulations, the agreement invited the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to deploy to Sierra Leone to keep the peace and disarm combatants.

UNAMSIL troops were confronted with major challenges in Sierra Leone, not least because RUF forces largely ignored the cease-fire. The position of the UN peacekeepers became untenable as disarmament locations were attacked and hundreds of personnel were taken prisoner by the RUF.⁴ The situation worsened when, in May 2000, the RUF began another

¹ UCDP. *Sierra Leone: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/382> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

² Cyril Obi. "Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire." *African Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2009) p.125

³ Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (Lomé Peace Agreement), 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-lome-agreement99> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁴ Funmi Olanisakin. *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008) p.3

major push for Freetown. In response, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited the British government (as the former colonial power in Sierra Leone) to intervene in support UNAMSIL.⁵ After initial reconnaissance teams completed their assessments, a force of over 1,200 British troops (supported by many more at sea) entered Sierra Leone, first securing the airport before helping UNAMSIL to rescue its imprisoned or besieged personnel.⁶ In August 2000, the UN Security Council declared the RUF to be the cause of continuing conflict and issued UNAMSIL with a mandate to directly support the Sierra Leonean government in their campaign against the organisation rather than attempt to keep the peace.⁷ Alongside British and UNAMSIL troops, newly trained units from the Sierra Leonean Army were soon able to force the RUF to the negotiating table.⁸ A ceasefire between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was signed in November 2000, with an additional agreement between the Civil Defence Force (a pro-government paramilitary group) and the RUF being signed in May 2001.⁹ Following an extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process throughout 2001, the war was formally declared over by the Government of Sierra Leone in early 2002. Approximately 70,000 people were killed in the conflict and a further 20,000 were mutilated.

⁵ Michael Ellison, Richard Norton-Taylor, & Ewen MacAskill. "UN see British forces as only hope." *The Guardian*. (2000) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/12/sierraleone.unitednations1> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁶ Lucy Scott. "A Success Story? The British Intervention in Sierra Leone Revisited." *Oxford Research Group Blog*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/a-success-story-the-british-intervention-in-sierra-leone-revisited> (Accessed 14/12/2020); Paul Williams. "Fighting For Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone." *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 3. (2001)

⁷ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1313*. (2000) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1313> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁸ Janine di Giovanni. "Sierra Leone, 2000: A Case History in Successful Interventionism." *The New York Review*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/06/07/sierra-leone-2000-a-case-history-in-successful-interventionism/> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁹ Agreement of Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-cessationhostilitiesruf2000> (Accessed 14/12/2020); Communiqué on the Cessation of Hostilities between the Civil Defense Force (CDF) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 2001. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-cessation-hostilities2001> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

Year(s): 2000 – 2008.

Location: Sierra Leone.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone disarmed over 70,000 combatants, oversaw a peaceful election, and helped to strengthen the Sierra Leonean state, preventing a conflict relapse.

After being overwhelmed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) stood in a precarious position once the war ended. To improve the Mission’s credibility, the Security Council greatly increased the number of peacekeepers from a wartime limit of 6,000 to over 17,000 in 2002.¹ UNAMSIL was also fashioned with more robust capabilities, including helicopter gunships and much-improved intelligence capabilities.² With this new strength and a mandate to respond ‘robustly’ to any threat of attack, the Mission’s commanders embarked on much more ambitious operations to improve the overall security situation and the Government of Sierra Leone’s control of the country.³

Following the December 2000 cease-fire, UNAMSIL played a key role in developing the “Kambia Formula.” This entailed disarming both RUF and pro-government militias in strategic locations across the country, such as the border region with Guinea after which the strategy was named.⁴ This step-by-step approach not only served to strengthen the ongoing peace process, but also greatly reduced the likelihood of the conflict resuming. By mid-2001, UNAMSIL contingents were (using their own resources) rebuilding infrastructure across the country in an organic development that Funmi Olonisakin argues helped to greatly

¹ Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.123

² Olonisakin. *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone*. p.98-9

³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1313*. (2000) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1313> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁴ Olonisakin. *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone*. p.103

strengthen the UN's credibility in Sierra Leone, despite the criticisms such actions drew at the time.⁵ With UNAMSIL transformed, its efforts to build peace in post-war Sierra Leone were much more fruitful. Its first triumph was the successful disarmament of 72,490 combatants, paving the way for a highly successful Security Sector Reform process led by the UK.⁶ Elections were held peacefully in May 2002 (with the assistance and supervision of the UN and observed by the Commonwealth, EU, and the Carter Center), resulting in the incumbent government winning an overwhelming majority. UNAMSIL continued to work on police reform, military integration, election support, and a wide range of other activities until December 2005, when it was replaced with the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).⁷ The ongoing UN and British effort helped to ensure that Sierra Leone did not experience a conflict relapse after December 2000.

⁵ Ibid. p.108

⁶ United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. "The SSR experience of Sierra Leone, a shining model in West Africa and beyond." *News*. (2017) Available at: <https://unowas.unmissions.org/ssr-experience-sierra-leone-shining-model-west-africa-and-beyond> (Accessed 22/10/2020); Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin, & Gordon Peake. "United Kingdom-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone." *GSDRC*. (2006) Available at: <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/united-kingdom-led-security-sector-reform-in-sierra-leone/> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Mandate*. (United Nations, 2005) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/mandate.html> (Accessed 15/12/2020)

Year(s): 1991.

Location: Slovenia.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and an observation mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The EC.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The mediation efforts of the European Community and the deployment of the European Community Monitoring Mission helped to end the armed conflict in Slovenia after ten days of fighting, preventing a much larger conflict.

Slovenia was a constituent republic of socialist Yugoslavia from its creation during the Second World War. Faced with ongoing constitutional crises and, from 1989, the efforts of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to centralise power in Yugoslavia, Slovenian leaders prepared for independence throughout 1990. Their efforts included amending the Slovenian constitution to declare the republic to be a sovereign state and placing Slovenian components of the Yugoslav armed forces under the command of the Slovenian administration, rather than the federal authorities in Belgrade.¹ In a December 1990 referendum, almost 90 percent of the electorate favoured independence. Six months later, on 25 June 1991, the Slovenian and Croatian parliaments announced the independence of their respective republics from Yugoslavia. The following day, the Yugoslav authorities dismissed the declarations as illegal and deployed the Yugoslav military to secure Slovenia's 137 international border posts in a show of force intended to make the Slovenian leadership back down.² On 27 June 1991, the Slovenian armed forces began launching attacks on Yugoslav units across Slovenia.³

International efforts to contain the crisis began immediately. The European Community (EC), which had previously declared that it would not recognise unilateral declarations of

¹ Laura Silber & Allan Little. *The Death of Yugoslavia*. (London: Penguin, 1996) p.77

² Ian Traynor. "Military alert as Slovenia goes it alone." *The Guardian*. (1991) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1991/jun/26/eu.politics> (Accessed 10/12/2020); James Gow. *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*. (London: Hurst, 2003) p.146

³ Silber & Little. *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p.158

independence from the republics of Yugoslavia, began mediating negotiations on 28 June, the day after the fighting began.⁴ An initial agreement to halt the fighting and suspend Slovenia's independence declaration until a negotiated settlement could be found was partially successful, however fighting continued across the republic. On 3 July 1991, Yugoslav forces withdrew to their barracks and the ceasefire finally came into force. Four days later, the EC hosted delegations from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Yugoslavia on the Adriatic island of Brioni. The talks culminated with a Joint Declaration which ended the conflict in Slovenia and created a framework for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the area.⁵ The Declaration also established the European Community Monitoring Mission, which arrived in Slovenia on 15 July to supervise the disengagement process and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Slovenia.⁶ Although the rest of the Yugoslavia was subjected to years of war, the armed conflict in Slovenia was over.

⁴ Ibid. p.159

⁵ Joint Declaration of the EC Troika and the Parties directly concerned with the Yugoslav Crisis (Brioni Accord), 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/croatia-slovenia-serbia-brioni91> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

⁶ Government of Canada. *European Community Monitoring Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (ECMM)*. (Government of Canada, 2018) Available at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/europe/bolster.html> (Accessed 10/12/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2001.

Location: Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy, the mediation of a peace agreement, a monitoring mission, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Commonwealth and the governments of Australia and New Zealand.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Negotiations facilitated by the Commonwealth and the Government of Australia combined with the deployment of an international monitoring mission and the creation of a peace infrastructure to prevent intercommunal violence from escalating into war in Solomon Islands in 2000.

In 1999, the small Pacific state of Solomon Islands stood at the precipice of an armed conflict which threatened to engulf the largest island in the country, Guadalcanal. In January 1999, the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly issued a declaration reiterating decade-old demands for increased autonomy and land reform. A few months later, an armed group formed of local Guale people known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) launched a series of attacks against migrant populations from other islands in the Solomons, displacing 35,000 people.¹ The international effort to prevent an armed conflict was initially led by the Commonwealth, which dispatched the former prime minister of Fiji to mediate negotiations.² After three days of talks, the IFM signed the Honiara Peace Accord with the Government of Solomon Islands on 28 June 1999, and a month later the parties negotiated the Panatina Agreement.³ The agreements addressed many of the concerns of the Guale people and established peace between the IFM and the government. By the end of the year, however, a rival militia (the Malaita Eagle Force, MEF) emerged from the displaced population in the capital city,

¹ Matthew G. Allen. "Land, Identity and Conflict on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands." *Australian Geographer*, Vol. 43, No. 2. (2012) p.166

² BBC. "Peace deal in Solomon Islands." *BBC News*. (1999) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/379965.stm> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

³ Honiara Peace Accord, 1999. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/solomonislands-honiara-accord99> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

Honiara. MEF fostered close links with the Solomon Islands security forces and, in June 2000, seized power in a coup d'état and took control of the city.⁴

The MEF was party to neither the Honiara or Panatina Agreement, and its seizure of power threatened to undo the peace process. A ceasefire between the IFM and MEF signed aboard an Australian Navy ship in August 2000 provided a window for the Government of Australia to fly 130 delegates from across Solomon Islands society to Australia for negotiations. The talks culminated on 15 October 2000 with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement, a comprehensive accord which provided a framework for extensive reforms as well as an end to the nascent conflict.⁵ The Agreement also called for the establishment of the International Peace Monitoring Team and the local Peace Monitoring Council to oversee its implementation.⁶ Although Solomon Islands was left in an extremely fragile condition by the crisis, an armed conflict was prevented thanks to the diplomatic and mediation efforts of the Commonwealth and the governments of Australia and New Zealand.

⁴ Derek McDougall. "Intervention in Solomon Islands." *The Round Table*, Vol. 93, No. 374. (2004) p.215

⁵ Townsville Peace Agreement, 2000. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/solomonislands-townsville-agreement2000> (Accessed 23/11/2020)

⁶ McDougall. "Intervention in Solomon Islands." p.216

Year(s): 2001 – 2017.

Location: Solomon Islands.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A monitoring mission and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Pacific states led by Australia and the Commonwealth.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The International Peace Monitoring Team, Peace Monitoring Council, and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands helped to prevent armed conflict in Solomon Islands after the unrest of 1999-2000.

The Townsville Peace Agreement prevented an armed conflict and created a framework for comprehensive reforms aimed at alleviating some of the problems that brought Solomon Islands so close to war in 1999. Implementing such reforms posed a significant challenge for the fragile state of Solomon Islands, particularly given the uncertainty that followed the crisis and coup d'état.¹ A key provision of the Agreement called for the integration of 200 demobilised combatants into the police force. By the end of 2001, over 2,000 new “special constables” were on the police payroll, the majority of whom came from the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF).² Combined with police involvement in the 2000 coup, this left the security services in Solomon Islands as a politicised (and armed) institution. Furthermore, elections scheduled for the end of 2001 threatened to spark another crisis. Thus, while fighting had been avoided, there was every likelihood that the Solomon Islands peace process could be derailed.

The challenge of maintaining peace on Solomon Islands first fell to the International Peace Monitoring Team and Peace Monitoring Council. Alongside a host of international election observers, these organisations helped to ensure that the December 2001 elections went ahead

¹ Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka. “A Weak State and the Solomon Islands Peace Process.” *Pacific Islands Development Series*, No. 14. (2002) p.3

² John Braithwaite et al. *Pillars and Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands*. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2010) p.38

peacefully.³ A more significant challenge proved to be disarmament, which was carried out amidst a backdrop of frequent clashes between and within the various militias on Guadalcanal. However, by working with communities and religious groups, thousands of potential combatants had disarmed by July 2002.⁴ Such efforts ultimately proved to have little effect on the situation and Solomon Islands continued to stand on the precipice of armed conflict, leading the newly elected government to formally request international assistance through the mechanisms of the Pacific Islands Forum in July 2003.⁵ Within days, the first personnel of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in Solomon Islands and established security across the country.⁶ Unusually for a peacekeeping mission, the police component led the operation, with the military playing a supporting role.⁷ RAMSI remained in place until 2017, helping to foster stability, disarm militias, build effective state institutions (including the police force), and preventing outbreaks of electoral violence in 2006 from escalating into armed conflict.⁸

³ International Republican Institute. *Solomon Islands Parliamentary Election: Observer Mission Report*. (Washington, DC: International Republican Institute, 2001)

⁴ Braithwaite et al. *Pillars and Shadows*. p.39

⁵ RAMSI. *About RAMSI*. (The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2020) Available at: <https://www.ramsi.org/about/> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ Julein Barbara. "Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 2, No. 2. (2008) p.124

⁷ Australian Civil-Military Centre. *Partnering for Peace*. p.28

⁸ Roderick Brazier. "What Has RAMSI Achieved?" *Australian Institute of International Affairs*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/what-has-ramsi-achieved/> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

Year(s): 1993.

Location: Mudug, Somalia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict; Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The peace agreement ended the fighting in the central province of Mudug, reducing armed conflict in the area and allowing supplies to cross Somalia, mitigating the impact of other conflicts.

Mudug is an administrative region of Somalia located in the centre of the country, separating Puntland and Somaliland from Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. This position makes it a vital crossroads for trade within Somalia (particularly to the northern ports on the Gulf of Aden) and with neighbouring Ethiopia. As such, armed conflict in Mudug has severe humanitarian implications for the entire region. After the fall of the regime in 1991, the city of Galkayo (the capital of Mudug) was attacked by troops of a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC), one of the powerful armed groups that had driven Barre from Mogadishu. Over 500 people were killed, with many more wounded or captured, in this act of ‘clan cleansing.’¹ The following year, as the various armed groups in Somalia consolidated their respective territorial strongholds, Mudug became the frontline between the USC and the SSDF. Frequent clashes occurred throughout 1992 (despite the short-lived UN-mediated ceasefire negotiated that year), stifling trade and the movement of aid.²

It was not until 1993, following extensive negotiations in Addis Ababa between the various armed factions in Somalia, that the prospect of stopping the fighting in Mudug was considered. Talks between the leaders of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and the USC

¹ Lidwien Kapteijns. “Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Turn of 1991 (2013) interview with Reinventing Peace.” *World Peace Foundation*. (2013) Available at: <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/17/clan-cleansing-in-somalia-the-ruinous-turn-of-1991-2013/> (Accessed 29/10/2021)

² UCDP. *SSDF – USC/SNA*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5444> (Accessed 29/10/2021)

faction operating in Mudug (who had, incidentally, shared a prison cell during the Barre regime and knew each other well) along with 227 delegates from the relevant clans began on 28 May 1993, and culminated on the 3 June with the signing of the Mudug Peace Agreement. The agreement contained an immediate ceasefire, provisions for reparations and disarmament and demobilisation of some forces, stipulated the withdrawal of armed forces to a 70km buffer zone, and also established a technical committee composed of the signatories to monitor implementation and administer *diyah* payments.³ Unusually, it also contended that any future fighting should avoid towns and tarmac roads, indicating a level of flexibility but also a shared understanding of the unique importance of Mudug. While many aspects of the agreement were not maintained for long, the signatories did not relapse into a major conflict and the *de facto* line of separation established in 1993 continues to be respected (for the most part) and has helped to shelter northern Somalia from conflict for almost three decades. In 2007, local and international NGOs campaigned to consolidate the 1993 agreement and maintain peace in Mudug with noteworthy success.⁴

³ Mudug Peace Agreement, 1993. Available in: Ralph Johnstone, ed. *Peacemaking at the Crossroads: Consolidation of the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement*. (Interpeace, 2006) pp.30-1

⁴ Johnstone, ed. *Peacemaking at the Crossroads*. p.25

Year(s): 1991 – present.

Location: Somaliland, (*de jure*) Somalia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Conflict Relapse, Risk of Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action, the mediation of a peace agreement, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Thanks to the efforts of local people and organisations, Somaliland has remained at peace for almost thirty years while much of the rest of Somalia was been plagued by conflict and famine.

In January 1991 the President of Somalia fled the country in the face of widespread rebellion. In his absence, rival armed groups competed for dominance and much of southern Somalia, along with the capital, Mogadishu, descended into armed conflict.¹ Faced with the prospect of state collapse and increasing levels of violence, leaders from across north-west Somalia gathered in the city of Berbera for to attend a traditional form of inter-clan conference to develop a response. The talks in Berbera culminated with the resolution that all clans should restrain their respective militias and aim to end the cycle of violence that was plaguing the region.² In May 1991, an even larger event, the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples, was convened in Burao to consolidate the peace and discuss the future of the region. On 18 May 1991, the gathered leaders announced the withdrawal of Somaliland from Somalia and formed an interim government.³

In the first months of 1993, more than 2,000 people gathered in Borama for the Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland. At the Conference, which culminated in May 1993, a council of elders known as a *Guurti* developed two key documents, the Somaliland

¹ T. A. Ridout. "Building Peace and the State in Somaliland: The Factors of Success." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, Vol. 3, No. 2. (2012) p.141

² Academy for Peace and Development. *Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building*. (Interpeace, 2008) p.12

³ Ridout. "Building Peace and the State in Somaliland." p.143

Peace Charter and the Transitional National Charter.⁴ The former outlined the terms for a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme encompassing the militias in Somaliland, while the latter established the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government of Somaliland.⁵ Peace talks continued until 1997, when a final peace conference was held in Hargeisa. More militias agreed to disarm at the event and an interim constitution was adopted, a roadmap to multi-party elections was agreed, and a national flag for Somaliland was adopted by the gathered representatives.⁶ This marked the beginning of a succession of relatively free, fair, and peaceful elections. In 2001, amidst a backdrop of increasing security and growing prosperity, 98 percent of voters approved a new constitution (and with it, formal independence) for Somaliland.⁷ A key aspect of the success of the peace process in Somaliland was the use of traditional methods and local resources.⁸ Disputes were settled via an unwritten code known as *Xeer*, while traditional forms of ‘pastoral democracy’ were employed via the traditional conferences to find consensus among the various clan interests and political agendas.⁹ Through their efforts, the people of Somaliland were able to end armed conflicts, consolidate peace, and build stability in a region mired in violence.

⁴ Republic of Somaliland. *The National Charter: Preamble*. (Republic of Somaliland, 1993) Available at: <https://www.govsomaliland.org/article/preamble> (Accessed 16/01/2022)

⁵ Africa Research Institute. “After Borama: Consensus, representation and parliament in Somaliland.” *Policy Voice Series*. (2013) pp.8-9

⁶ Ridout. “Building Peace and the State in Somaliland.” p.146

⁷ Ibid. p.149

⁸ Ahmed Farah & Ioan Lewis. “Making Peace in Somaliland.” *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, Vol. 146. (1997)

⁹ Academy for Peace and Development. *Peace in Somaliland*. p.13

Year(s): 1991 – 1998.

Location: Puntland State of Somalia, Somalia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict; Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Local action and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Most of north-east Somalia was spared from the conflicts and famines of the 1990s thanks to the efforts of local people and organisations in Puntland to reduce armed conflict.

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the first domestic armed group formed in opposition to the Barre regime, was centred on army officers hailing from the north-eastern region of Somalia. After some initial success, the SSDF collapsed in 1985. After the fall of the regime in January 1991, former members of the SSDF held a conference in the city of Galkayo and agreed to re-establish the organisation to defend the people and interests of the north-east. Just two weeks later, militia from former opposition groups attacked and seized control of the city. With the situation across Somalia rapidly descending into a complex armed conflict that created widespread famine and displaced swathes of the population, there was every likelihood that the north-east would follow suit.¹ Faced with a growing spectrum of threats, SSDF leaders and local clan elders held another conference in the city of Garowe in June 1991 to address the rapidly evolving situation. The delegates agreed to form an interim administration to provide basic services and vowed to defend the vital logistical lifeline for northern Somalia: the port of Bosaso and the road leading from it to Galkayo.² In the ensuing years, armed conflict continued in the north-east, largely between the SSDF and the armed groups from the south trying to assert their authority across the country. The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement ended this conflict, allowing trade between north and south

¹ Human Rights Watch. “Somalia – Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses.” *HRW World Report*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1993) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/somalia/> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

² Pat Johnson, ed. *The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building. Peace Initiatives in Puntland, 1991-2007*. (Interpeace, 2008) p.16

Somalia to resume.³ By the end of December 1993, the SSDF and its supporters had disarmed, integrated, or come to terms with all other armed groups in the region. In this context, another conference was held on “Peace and Life” in the north-east incorporating delegates from across what later became Puntland. Between 1993 and 1995, several provincial administrations were established across the region with the endorsement of large conferences of local elders, who also employed traditional peacemaking practices to resolve conflicts. Faced with ongoing failures to find a national solution to the situation and cognisant of the relative security that these bottom-up processes had provided to the region (not to mention the apparent success of neighbouring Somaliland), the 460 delegates of another major clan conference taking place over the summer of 1998 elected to establish the Puntland State of Somalia to guarantee security in the region.⁴ By providing basic services to the population, consulting the clans, and employing traditional peacemaking methods, the people of the north-east were spared the conflict that tore through southern Somalia throughout the 1990s.

³ Conciliation and Peace Conference of the Regions of Bari Nugal and Mudug, SNA, SNDU, SSDF Peace Agreement (Mudug Peace Agreement), 1993. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1710> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

⁴ Johnson, ed. *The Puntland Experience*. p.25

Year(s): 1998 – present.

Location: Puntland State of Somalia, Somalia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Local action and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Puntland has enjoyed relative peace while conflict has continued across most of Somalia.

The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement and the formation of Puntland in 1998 brought peace to the region, effectively cutting off Puntland and Somaliland from the war-torn southern and central regions of Somalia and providing a framework for managing conflict within those polities. However, where Somaliland enjoyed a linear progression to relative stability and prosperity, the peace in Puntland had to be painstakingly maintained. The delegates who established Puntland in 1998 had agreed that elections should be held within three years. Provisions for the contest were not made, and when the deadline passed rival SSPF leaders fought for power. The conflict raged throughout 2002, until the leaders were persuaded to enter into dialogue by prominent clan elders in early 2003. Formal talks were held in May, culminating in the Puntland Peace Agreement.¹ In 2004, disputes between rival clans in Somaliland and Puntland threatened to sour relations between the two polities, however this was averted thanks to another successful mediation by prominent elders. A similar conflict threatened the key city of Galkayo in 2005, but this was also resolved by local elders, who were able to broker the Ramada Peace Agreement.² Time and again, local elders employing traditional methods of peacemaking were able to end conflicts across the region before they escalated, providing the nascent institutions of Puntland with the time they needed to mature.

¹ IRIN News. “Puntland opponents sign peace deal.” *The New Humanitarian*. (19 May 2003) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/43810/somalia-puntland-opponents-sign-peace-deal> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

² Ramada Peace Agreement, 2005. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1852/Ramada%20Peace%20Agreement> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

In January 2005, Puntland witnessed its first peaceful transition of power as the incumbent president gave way to the winning candidate following an election. While this contest only took place within parliament (the population did not vote), it set in motion a series of developments that have maintained peace and stability across Puntland. Trade agreements were negotiated with the United Arab Emirates, bringing investment and prosperity, while a reformist candidate who won the 2009 election strengthened the judiciary and police, established a transparent public finance system, and drafted a new constitution which would introduce multi-party democracy to Puntland.³ In 2012, after another conference of 478 delegates from across the polity approved the draft, the new constitution was promulgated, and five political parties registered with the newly established Puntland Electoral Commission – prior to this, political parties were banned in Puntland.⁴ These developments took place while conflict continued to rage across much of the rest of Somalia; a fate that would have befallen Puntland were it not for local peacemaking and statebuilding efforts.

³ Ahmed Abbas Ahmed & Ruben Zamora. “Puntland constitutional review process.” *Accord*, Vol. 21. (2010) pp.91-3

⁴ Interpeace. “A historic moment: Puntland’s constitution now ratified.” *Interpeace News*. (20 April 2012) Available at: <https://www.interpeace.org/2012/04/a-historic-moment-puntland-s-constitution-now-ratified/> (Accessed 28/10/2021)

Year(s): 1990 – 1993.

Location: South Africa.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict; Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local civil society organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict between the African National Congress and the Government of South Africa was ended and the risk of a larger war was minimised.

In 1981, the main opposition group to apartheid in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), launched an insurgency against the state.¹ The conflict escalated until 1986, when the government imposed a state of emergency after large parts of the country became ungovernable due to the preponderance of armed groups.² In 1988, South Africa ended its involvement in the Border War in present-day Namibia, and the following year the hard-line state president resigned after a stroke. These events heralded a seismic change in circumstances, and both the Organisation of African Unity and UN General Assembly recognised the moment and called for dialogue and a transition to democracy.³ In 1990, the new South African administration released ANC leader Nelson Mandela, legalised several opposition groups (including the ANC), and entered into talks with the opposition.⁴ However, despite progress on these fronts, the peace process was almost derailed entirely by a surge of political violence that erupted in 1990-1991 and threatened to spark a civil war.⁵

¹ UCDP. *South Africa: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/345> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

² Ian Van Der Waag. *A Military History of Modern South Africa*. (Oxford, 2018) pp.279-80

³ Harare Declaration, 1989. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2074> (Accessed 11/12/2020); United Nations General Assembly. *Resolution A/RES/44/27B*. (2019) Available at: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/44> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

⁴ Groote Schuur Minute, 1990. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-grooteschuur90> (Accessed 11/12/2020); Pretoria Minute, 1990. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-pretoria-minute1990> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

⁵ Muna Ndulo. “United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African Transition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping.” *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*, No. 61. (1995) p.211

It was in this uncertain context that South African church organisations met in November 1990, agreeing in the Rustenburg Declaration to establish a committee to help the country navigate a peaceful path through the crisis.⁶ In September 1991, these church organisations worked with business groups and trades unions to host talks attended by a spectrum of South African political interests. This event resulted in the National Peace Accord, which took the unprecedented step of establishing a code of conduct, agreed to by all parties involved, to keep the peace.⁷ It set out a vision for a democratic and peaceful country and provided for the establishment of peace committees to end the violence and create the conditions for elections. This infrastructure was funded by the South African government (before becoming independent in 1993) and supported by the UK and Denmark. In December 1991, these commitments were formally endorsed at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which was attended by most political parties. The CODESA mechanism served as a framework for debates on the democratic transition to take place peacefully and, together with the efforts of civil society, helped to reduce armed conflict in South Africa.⁸ In December 1993, this process culminated with the formation of the Transitional Executive Council (essentially a consociational power-sharing administration) to govern the country until free and fair elections could be held the following year.⁹

⁶ Peter Gastrow. *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*. (Washington, DC, 1995) p.16

⁷ National Peace Accord, 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-national-peace-accord91> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

⁸ CODESA Declaration of Intent, 1991. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-codesa-intent1991> (Accessed 11/12/2020)

⁹ Gastrow. *Bargaining for Peace*. p.97

Year(s): 1992 – 1994.

Location: KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of South Africa (Transitional Executive Council).

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The armed conflict between the ANC and Inkatha/IFP in the South African province of Natal during the end of apartheid was ended.

The African National Congress (ANC) was the dominant opposition force in apartheid South Africa, but it was not the only one. In the KwaZulu Homeland in Natal, the Inkatha (from 1990 Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP) rose from the mid-1970s to become a powerful force in South African politics. In contrast to the militant campaign of the ANC, the IFP chose a path of reform to end apartheid. The IFP governed KwaZulu Homeland during the apartheid era, while the ANC was officially banned. This allowed it to develop a considerable support base, organise its own security forces, and entrench its position as a rival to the aspirations of the ANC leadership.¹ As the ANC stepped up its military campaign in the 1980s, clashes began taking place with armed IFP supporters in Natal. In 1990, elements within the South African security forces (often referred to as a “Third Force”) started covertly supporting the IFP in its struggle against the ANC, arming its members and providing funds and military training.² Further weapons could be easily acquired from neighbouring Mozambique after decades of war. This transformed the conflict, sparking an eruption of fighting around Pietermaritzburg in March that became known as the Seven Days War. Over 200 people were killed and 20,000 were forced from their homes. In July, the violence spread to the surrounds of

¹ UCDP. *IFP*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1117> (Accessed 16/11/2021)

² Stephen Ellis. “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force.” *Journal of South African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2. (1998) p.284

Johannesburg, and in 1991 a battle involving 2,000 ANC and IFP personnel took place at Umgababa in Natal.³

Efforts to end the conflict between the ANC and IFP began in January 1991 with talks in Durban. These culminated with a formal ceasefire and an agreement which recognised that the conflict between the two organisations had already cost more than 8,000 lives, and that they should work together to end apartheid rather than fight each other.⁴ Despite these pledges, clashes continued between ANC and IFP supporters as South Africa began its transition to democracy. The 1994 elections were rejected by the KwaZulu leadership, who sought to retain the autonomy they enjoyed under the Homelands system. This sparked another surge in armed clashes in Natal between ANC and IFP supporters, which in turn led to the declaration of another state of emergency.⁵ Just days before the elections were scheduled to go ahead, mediation by US and UK diplomats helped to convince the IFP to participate in the elections, calming a potentially volatile situation.⁶ The IFP joined the ANC in a coalition government for a decade after the election, marking the formal end of the conflict, although clashes between supporters continued in Natal until 1996.

³ Gastrow. *Bargaining for Peace*. p.14

⁴ African National Congress/ Inkatha Freedom Party Agreement, 1991. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/220> (Accessed 16/11/2021)

⁵ Bob Drogin. "S. Africa Declares State of Emergency in Natal Province: Violence: De Klerk sends troops into Zulu-dominated region, where Chief Buthelezi opposes this month's national all-race elections. Mandela applauds crackdown." *Los Angeles Times*. (1 April 1994) Available at: <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-04-01-mn-41016-story.html> (Accessed 16/11/2021)

⁶ Richard Carver. "Kwazulu-Natal – Continued Violence and Displacement." *WRITENET*. (1 July 1996) Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc4.html> (Accessed 16/11/2021)

Year(s): 1992 – 1994.

Location: South Africa.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Local action and monitoring missions.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Commonwealth, EU, Organisation of African Unity, and the UN, along with local people and organisations.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The deployment of monitoring missions by the Commonwealth, EU, Organisation of African Unity, and the UN helped to prevent violence during the 1994 elections and ensured that South Africa did not experience a conflict relapse after the transition from apartheid.

The peace process in South Africa following the end of apartheid created the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in December 1993 as a temporary political arrangement to formally end the armed conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and what remained of the minority regime. The TEC was tasked with governing the South Africa until a national government could be formed after elections scheduled for April 1994. With ongoing clashes taking place in KwaZulu-Natal between ANC cadres and supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the continued presence of hard-line elements of the old regime (particularly in the security services), and the return to South Africa of many ANC personnel formerly based outside the country, the elections promised to take place in a potentially volatile environment which could trigger renewed conflict. Faced with ongoing political violence and the prospect of a war which could have dwarfed anything seen in post-colonial South Africa to date, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) requested that the UN Security Council establish an observation mission to report on the transition from apartheid and investigate scenes of violence and conflict.

The United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) was established in 1992 and began deploying its first personnel on 13 September 1992. The Commonwealth, EU, and OAU were all invited to contribute their own observers by the UN, and on the ground observers from all four intergovernmental organisations worked in joint teams and coordinated their approach. In October 1992, the observers began monitoring the conduct of

the police and investigate alleged atrocities after the ANC withdrew from the peace process following a massacre of ANC supporters by the security services.¹ Negotiations resumed in April 1993, with UNOMSA facilitating dialogue with the goal of bringing as many parties as possible into the peace process.² By December 1993, 100 international observers were working across South Africa and reporting to a spectrum of international organisations and governments. Alongside ongoing dialogue facilitated by local people and organisations and the work of South African institutions such as the National Peace Committee, this ongoing international presence helped to keep the peace process on track, however the upcoming elections represented a major concern. As a result, the Commonwealth, EU, OAU, and UN deployed a total of 3,000 monitors to oversee the contest, verify its integrity, and prevent any outbreaks of electoral violence from sparking an armed conflict.³ This deployment allowed the South African people to go to the polls in a relatively free, fair, and safe environment, where they elected Nelson Mandela to lead the country. UNOMSA was terminated on 27 June 1994, its mission complete. The ANC formally disbanded its armed forces in December 1994, marking the completion of South Africa's relatively peaceful transition to democracy.⁴

¹ Muna Ndulo. "United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African Transition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping." *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*, No. 61. (1995) pp.214-6

² *Ibid.* p.222-3

³ UN. "United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA)." *UN Archives and Management Section*. (UN, 2022) Available at: <https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-observer-mission-in-south-africa-unomsa> (Accessed 25/01/2022)

⁴ Mac Maharaj. "The ANC and South Africa's Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace." *Berghof Transitions Series*, No. 2. (2008) p.23

Year(s): 2011 – present.

Location: Abyei, Sudan/South Sudan International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a peacekeeping mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of South Africa and the UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: A UN peacekeeping mission has helped to prevent renewed armed conflict in the contested area of Abyei for a decade.

The town of Abyei and its surrounds represent a vital historic link between northern and southern Sudan and an area of strategic importance.¹ After fighting devastated the area during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), the people of Abyei were promised a referendum to decide whether they wanted to join the Southern Region or remain as part of the north. The referendum never took place, and the town once again became a battleground during the Second Civil War (1983-2005).² During the peace process that culminated with the 2005 peace agreement, the US negotiating team sought to resolve the impasse over the territory of Abyei by proposing self-administration for the town until a referendum on its political future could be held alongside the plebiscite on independence for the Southern Region.³ The Abyei Protocol also included the creation of a boundary commission to define the borders of the contested territory prior to the referendum. When the commission presented its findings in 2008, they were flatly rejected by the Government of Sudan, leading to a rise in tensions that quickly escalated into renewed conflict. The situation worsened as the deadline for the referendum neared, with major clashes taking place in February and March 2011 before a major Sudanese offensive in April and May destroyed much of the town.⁴

¹ Douglas Johnson. "Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?" *African Affairs*, Vol. 107, No. 426. (2007) pp.1-4

² Joshua Craze. *Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict Dynamics in Abyei*. (Geneva, 2011) pp.10-2

³ Protocol between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict, 2004. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-protocol-abyei2004> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

⁴ Craze. *Creating Facts on the Ground*. pp.39-43

In response to the destruction of the town, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1990 on 27 June, authorising the deployment of a peacekeeping force to Abyei.⁵ This followed an agreement on ‘temporary arrangements’ between the belligerents negotiated a week earlier under the mediation of the South African president that requested a third party to monitor the ‘flashpoint’ of Abyei.⁶ With a mandate to use force to protect civilians and an initial mission strength of 4,200 military personnel (later expanded to 5,326), the relatively robust United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) deployed in an interpositionary location between the belligerents to prevent renewed clashes and stabilise the situation in and around the town. Following the referendum on South Sudanese independence, UNISFA was also tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of forces to their respective sides of the demilitarised border zone and helping to set up a monitoring mechanism along the newly established international boundary.⁷ The mission has succeeded in preventing renewed conflict in Abyei for a decade and continues operating at the time of writing.

⁵ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1990*. (UNSCR, 2011) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1990> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

⁶ Agreement between the Government of Sudan and SPLM on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, 2011. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-temporary-arrangements-abyei2011> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping. *UNISFA: Background*. (UN, 2021) Available at: <https://unisfa.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 3/11/2021)

Year(s): 2011 – present.

Location: South Sudan/Sudan International Border.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Monitoring mission, a peacekeeping mission, and stabilising borders.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union (AU), UN, and the governments of Sudan and South Sudan.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: South Sudan and Sudan have maintained relatively peaceful relations for a decade thanks to the mechanisms established following the 2011 referendum.

The Southern Sudan Autonomous Region held a referendum on independence in January 2011 as stipulated in the 2005 peace agreement. The result was overwhelmingly in favour, and the state of South Sudan was formally proclaimed on 9 July. However, relations between the former belligerents remained tense, with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) withdrawing from the Government of National Unity in 2007 (before re-joining the following year) and armed clashes taking place between government security forces and SPLM troops in the contested town of Abyei in 2008 and again in May 2011.¹ Furthermore, conflicts continued to rage in other parts of Sudan, highlighting the extreme fragility of the situation. Thus, when fighting erupted between the Government of Sudan and armed groups previously aligned with the SPLM in South Kordofan and Blue Nile at the same time that a major rebellion was launched in South Sudan immediately after independence, there was a great risk of another war (this time, an interstate conflict).² Understanding the risks involved (and perhaps concerned about the new conflicts both parties were facing), representatives of both states met for talks in Addis Ababa under AU auspices just weeks after South Sudan became independent. The negotiations culminated with an agreement to establish a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone 10km either side of the border and a Joint Border Verification and

¹ UCDP. *Sudan: Abyei*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11344> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

² UCDP. *Government of Sudan – SPLM/A*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/663> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), composed of security personnel from both states, to minimise the risk of further conflict.³

Little progress had been made towards establishing the border monitoring mechanisms by the end of 2011, leading the UN Security Council to task the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) with supporting the process.⁴ The AU and UN continued pressuring the parties to demonstrate their commitment to the border issue. UNISFA began training monitors in December 2012, and the JBVMM conducted its first patrol alongside UN peacekeepers in March 2013.⁵ For the most part, however, the respective Sudanese and South Sudanese components of the JVBMM were limited to their offices in the capitals of each state and most of the work on the ground was carried out by UNISFA personnel. Even in this limited format, the JVBMM served as a vital ‘hotline’ between the armed forces of each state, helping, for example, to prevent fighting within South Sudan from spilling over into Sudan in 2014.⁶ Although implementation has not been perfect, the effort to stabilise the border has ended cross-border support for armed opposition groups and helped prevent conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

³ Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, 2011. Available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1372> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2024*. (UNSC, 2011) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2024> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

⁵ United Nations. “UN mission verifies start of Sudan, South Sudan withdrawal from zone in Abyei.” *UN News*. (26 March 2013) Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/03/435502-un-mission-verifies-start-sudan-south-sudan-withdrawal-zone-abyei> (Accessed 5/11/2021)

⁶ Casie Copland & Ashish Pradhan. “Keeping the Hotline Open Between Sudan and South Sudan.” *Crisis Group Commentary*. (2018) p.2

Year(s): 2015 – present.

Location: South Sudan.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a conflict relapse.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement, a peacekeeping mission, and peace infrastructure.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, Catholic Church, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the governments of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The mediation efforts of a wide range of international actors and the protestations of the Pope helped to end the armed conflict in South Sudan in 2018.

A decades-long armed struggle culminated with the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. The newly established state was plagued by violence and instability, with an insurgency supported by the Sudanese government already underway when the Government of South Sudan took power.¹ As a result, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was deployed on the day of South Sudan's independence in an effort to end the fighting and create the conditions for the country to develop peacefully.² The armed groups in conflict with the government were gradually incorporated into the administration and security forces, only for additional armed groups to emerge. In December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the security forces in the capital, Juba. The conflict spread quickly, and by 2014, the entire country was engulfed.³ The outbreak of war resulted in the Security Council changing the mandate of UNMISS to focus on the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian aid.⁴

¹ UCDP. *South Sudan: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

² United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1996*. (2011) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1996> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

³ UCDP. *South Sudan: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2155*. (2011) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2155> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

Efforts to end the fighting began in 2015 with a series of negotiations mediated first by IGAD, and later the Government of China. Although several peace agreements were signed, the fighting continued until the end of 2017, when the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) successfully brokered a ceasefire. The newly elected administration in Ethiopia hosted further talks in the first months of 2018, before handing over responsibility to a joint Sudanese-Ugandan effort.⁵ This round of talks concluded in September 2018 with the signing of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, witnessed by IGAD and the African Union. The Agreement halted the fighting, established the framework for the creation of a power-sharing administration within two years, and established the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) as an agency of IGAD to oversee implementation.⁶ As the deadline to form an administration neared, the failure to form a unity government led many observers to fear a conflict relapse would occur. Indeed, such was the concern that the peace process would collapse that Pope Francis hosted the rival leaders of South Sudan (in which Catholicism is the largest church) to implore them to refrain from more conflict.⁷ In February 2020, after two years of relative stability and peace, the unity government was formed.⁸ This marked the formal end of the conflict. The RJMEC remains operational and continues to support the peace in South Sudan.⁹

⁵ UCDP. *South Sudan: Government*.

⁶ Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 2018. Available at:

[https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2112/Revitalised%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan%20\(R-ARCSS\)](https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/2112/Revitalised%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan%20(R-ARCSS)) (Accessed 08/12/2020)

⁷ BBC. "Pope Francis kisses feet of rival South Sudan leaders." *BBC News*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47903916> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

⁸ International Crisis Group. "A Major Step Toward Ending South Sudan's Civil War." *International Crisis Group Statement / Africa*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/major-step-toward-ending-south-sudans-civil-war> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

⁹ Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. *Welcome to RJMEC, South Sudan*. (RJMEC, 2022) Available at: <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/> (Accessed 08/12/2020)

Year(s): 2018 – 2020.

Location: South Sudan.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Monitoring missions and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The IGAD has successfully prevented a conflict relapse in South Sudan by employing a range of monitoring mechanisms and facilitating ongoing dialogue between former belligerents.

The 2018 Revitalised Agreement ended the civil war in South Sudan after five years of fighting. The risk of a conflict relapse in such a setting was high, as the IGAD mediators were well aware. As a result, the Agreement re-established many of the mechanisms originally contained within the unsuccessful 2015 peace agreement, such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and its agencies. Led by a former president of Botswana, the RJMEC was tasked with monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and helping with the transition.¹ The military aspects of this work were carried by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which was led by an Ethiopian general but included representatives from the belligerent parties along with civil society and the international community, and the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC).² These bodies verified the withdrawal and cantonment of armed groups before creating the framework for the personnel of the formerly warring armies to be retrained and unified into the national armed forces in 2019.³ Another IGAD-led agency that incorporated the former belligerents, the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), was charged with incorporating the peace agreement into

¹ Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. *About RJMEC: Mandate*. (RJMEC, 2021) Available at: <https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/about-rjmec> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

² Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. *Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM)*. (RJMEC, 2021) Available at: <https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/institutions-and-boards/ctsamm> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

³ Li Xia. “South Sudan says unification of forces on course due to availability of cash.” *Xinhua*. (11/06/2019) Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/11/c_138134171.htm (Accessed 17/11/2021)

the constitutional framework of South Sudan for the transitional period and preparing for the formation of a unity government.

The RJMEC served to uphold the peace throughout 2019 as negotiations continued between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The discussions stalled on issues relating to the personal security of opposition leaders and the number of administrative states post-conflict South Sudan would have, leading to several delays in the formation of a unity government.⁴ As the 2018 agreement specified that such an administration should be formed by 12 November 2019, the looming deadline led many observers to fear renewed fighting once it passed. Indeed, such was the level of concern that Pope Francis hosted the rival leaders in the Vatican and implored them to keep the peace.⁵ IGAD extended the deadline by 100 days and hosted a final phase of talks alongside the South African vice-president. This final effort culminated on 22 February 2020 with the formation of the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity.⁶ Thanks to its effective management of the situation, IGAD has helped prevent a conflict relapse in South Sudan.

⁴ UCDP. *South Sudan: Government*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/11345> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

⁵ BBC. "Pope Francis kisses feet of rival South Sudan leaders." *BBC News*. (11 April 2019) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47903916> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

⁶ Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu. "The Formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan Key Priorities, Tasks and Challenges Ahead." *Accord Conflict Trends*, No. 2. (2020) Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-formation-of-the-revitalized-transitional-government-of-national-unity-in-south-sudan/> (Accessed 17/11/2021)

Year(s): 1985 – 1991.

Location: Moscow, Russian Federation.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and monitoring missions.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Government of the Soviet Union, the European Community, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A potentially volatile collapse of the Soviet Union took place peacefully thanks to the measured response of the Soviet leadership and the presence of international mechanisms that prevented instability and uncertainty from escalating into armed conflict.

Fifteen sovereign states emerged from the Soviet Union between March 1990 and December 1991. Although relatively minor armed conflicts erupted in a handful of these states following independence, the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself took place peacefully. This ‘enigma’ of history, in which an empire dissolved peacefully ‘near the close of a century filled with violence and following over four decades of East-West confrontation,’ has been the subject of historical scrutiny for decades.¹ Arguably the most important contributing factor to the peaceful end of the Soviet Union was the foresight and actions of its last General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, who ensured that once the collapse began, armed force was not used to try and prevent it.² In 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his actions to bring a peaceful end to the Cold War.³ The following year, he survived an attempted coup d’état by military hardliners and continued his efforts to prevent war.

¹ Jacques Levesque. *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*. (University of California Press, 1997); Jack F. Matlock, Jr. “Foreword.” In Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, & Vladislav Zubok. *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010) p.xxv

² Archie Brown. *The Gorbachev Factor*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)

³ The Nobel Prize. *Mikhail Gorbachev*. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1990/gorbachev/facts/> (Accessed 25/10/2020)

The international institutional framework in which the collapse took place was as equally important as the human factor. The European Community (EC) provided a clear and peaceful path forward, in which a divided Europe could plausibly become depolarised and ultimately united by a system of common values. In 1989, the EC signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and in February 1991, opened an office in Moscow to improve relations.⁴ The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) became a key diplomatic player during the period, providing a platform for Soviet leaders to reach out to the West and serving as the primary international organisation working to maintain peace in post-Soviet Europe: CSCE Missions were deployed in every post-soviet state, providing international monitoring and advising governments on good governance, democratisation, and the rule of law.⁵ Key groundwork for these processes had been laid during arms reduction negotiations. The British and US governments also offered further assurances regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and German reunification.⁶ Upon the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to improve relations and invite dialogue with post-soviet states.⁷ These efforts combined to prevent armed conflict during the collapse of the Soviet Union.

⁴ Delegation of the European Union to Russia. *About the European Union Delegation to the Russian Federation*. (EEAS, 2020) Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/719/about-european-union-delegation-russian-federation_en (Accessed 25/10/2020)

⁵ OSCE. *Expansion of the CSCE/OSCE*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/who/timeline/1990s/05> (Accessed 29/11/2020)

⁶ Thomas Blanton. "U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989." in Savranskaya, Blanton, & Zubok. *Masterpieces of History*.

⁷ NATO. *A Short History of NATO*. (NATO, 2020) Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_139339.htm (Accessed 25/10/2020)

Year(s): 2011 – 2017.

Location: Basque Country, Spain.

UN Regional Group: Western Europe and Others.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Other (Assisting a party to a conflict to disarm and disband).

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG) and other international NGOs.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The work of international NGOs helped to end the conflict between the Government of Spain and the Basque separatist movement, ETA.

Faced with violent repression from the Franco regime (1939-1975) in Spain, the passive resistance campaign of the historically dominant Basque separatist political party began losing ground to more radical movements in the 1950s. In 1959, Basque Nation and Liberty (*Euskadi ta azkatasuna*, ETA) was established. Renouncing the peaceful strategy of its forebears, ETA launched an armed insurrection against the Spanish state in the 1960s with the goal of achieving independence for the Basque Country. After initially targeting politicians and security services, ETA launched increasingly indiscriminate attacks in the 1980s. Peace talks were held in Algeria in 1989 but proved fruitless. In 1992, several key ETA leaders were arrested, signalling a significant decline in the conflict: the number of battle-related deaths has not reached 25 since. However, attacks continued throughout the 1990s up until 2006, when ETA bombed Madrid airport.¹

Despite several ceasefires holding for a year or two, a lasting settlement proved impossible thanks to the irreconcilable positions of the belligerents. Successive Spanish governments refused to negotiate until ETA disarmed, while ETA insisted on disarming as part of a negotiated peace process. This changed in 2011, when the ETA leadership announced a unilateral ceasefire and renounced violence. Later that year, an international conference on ways to advance the peace process was held in San Sebastian. Although neither the Spanish government nor representatives of ETA attended, the conference served to set the agenda for

¹ UCDP. *Government of Spain – ETA*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/763> (Accessed 26/10/2021)

the resolution of the conflict. Following the conference, ETA issued a public statement expressing its wish for negotiations and willingness to disarm. To the surprise of observers, the Spanish government rebuffed the opportunity entirely and refused to enter into any kind of dialogue. In response, regional governments in Spain took it upon themselves to open talks and facilitate the peace process (as far as they legally could), while Basque political parties and international NGOs stepped up to discuss the options with ETA. The DAG, a Dutch NGO, played a leading role in these talks and subsequently developed the International Verification Mechanism (IVM) to facilitate the disarmament of ETA. With the Spanish government still refusing to participate, ETA gave the location of its cached weapons to French Basque activists, who in turn gave them to the IVM, who then offered this information to French authorities. This process was completed on 8 April 2017, and a year later ETA formally dissolved itself as an organisation.²

² Vlad Corbu. "From ceasefire to disarmament without states: Lessons from the Basque Country." *Accord*, Vol. 29. (2020) pp.99-102

Year(s): 2002 – 2011.

Location: Sudan and South Sudan.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement;
Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The 50-year conflict between northern and southern Sudan was ended by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which paved the way for South Sudanese independence.

During the colonial period, Sudan was governed by a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration as two separate regions: Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan. Upon independence in 1956, these regions were merged as the unified state of Sudan under a predominantly northern government. The country quickly fell into a long civil war mostly centred in the south. Although the First Civil War ended in 1972, another conflict erupted just over a decade later. The Second Civil War was fought between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and although it again concerned power and control over the south, the conflict spread into northern regions such as Blue Nile and Kordofan. Peace talks held some promise of ending the conflict in the late 1980s, but the 1989 coup d'état which brought Omar al-Bashir to power ended this process.¹ Beginning in 1991, the SPLM began splintering, adding further layers of complexity to the conflict. Several efforts were made to end the war, with the Organisation of African Unity and the governments of Egypt, Libya, and the US all trying to forge a pathway to peace without success. This changed in 2002, when five weeks of talks held in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD resulted in the Machakos Protocol, in which the belligerents signed off on a mutually acceptable framework for further

¹ Richard Baltrop. "The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement." *Negotiating Disarmament Country Study*, Vol. 2. (2008) pp.16-7

negotiations to take place and agreed, in principle, that a peaceful resolution of the war was desirable.²

Negotiations held in 2003 resulted in an agreement on security arrangements, such as an internationally monitored ceasefire that would come into force upon signing a future comprehensive peace agreement.³ Progress increased in 2004, with further accords on sharing wealth and power and ending the conflicts in South Kordofan and around Abyei being approved. However, the war continued. This led the UN Security Council to hold a special session in November 2004, during which the delegates agreed to impose a deadline of the end of 2004 for a conclusive peace agreement.⁴ The belligerents just met this deadline, agreeing to a permanent ceasefire and the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 31 December, before formally signing the accord in Nairobi on 9 January 2005.⁵ This lengthy document established intricate mechanisms for sharing power and oil revenue and promised six years of autonomy for the south prior to a binding referendum on independence. Although many conflicts continued in Sudan, the 2005 agreement ended the 50-year confrontation between north and south.

² Machakos Protocol, 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-machakos-protocol2002> (Accessed 4/11/2021)

³ Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, 2003. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-security-interim-period2003> (Accessed 4/11/2021)

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1574*. (UNSC, 2004) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1574> (Accessed 4/11/2021)

⁵ Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA (with Annexes), 2005. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369> (Accessed 4/11/2021)

Year(s): 2011 – present.

Location: South Kordofan, Sudan.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Peace Direct and the Collaborative for Peace Sudan.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: Peace Committees created with support from the NGO Peace Direct conducted at least 32 successful interventions to prevent relatively minor disputes from escalating into armed conflict in South Kordofan, Sudan.

The region of South Kordofan became the southernmost frontier of Sudan following South Sudanese independence. In 2011, an armed group formed of veterans of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) launched an insurgency against the Sudanese government in Khartoum under the banner of the SPLM-North. By 2013, up to 70,000 government troops were engaged with 30,000 SPLM-North soldiers across South Kordofan.¹ As the fighting escalated, displacing populations and placing great strain on limited resources, the local population became increasingly affected by the conflict.

In response to the growing crisis, Peace Direct and Collaborative for Peace Sudan (CPS) supported the establishment of 11 Peace Committees formed of local residents in South Kordofan. The Committees have access to a Rapid Response Fund, which provides resources to facilitate interventions as they are required. In practice, the actions of such Committees are limited to promoting dialogue, raising awareness, and hosting talks if facilities are available.² For example, in 2017, the Peace Committee in Delenj was invited by local elites to intervene in a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over the destruction of crops. The previous year, ten people were killed in fighting between the communities, and growing tension had raised fears of a much worse conflict. After negotiations mediated by the Committee, the

¹ International Crisis Group. "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan." *Africa Report*, No. 198. (2013) p.i

² Phil Vernon. *Local peacebuilding: What works and why*. (Peace Direct & Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019) p.11

communities agreed to restore and enforce traditional codes of practice that had prevented conflict in the past, establish a joint committee to monitor the agreement, and to no longer carry small arms. In addition, the communities together lobbied the government in Khartoum to improve water distribution in the area.³ Such actions have led to a meaningful reduction in armed conflict in South Kordofan. Peace Direct highlights that 80 percent of interventions successfully prevented or ended armed conflict, with no subsequent incidents connected to the resolved conflicts.⁴ Many of the conflicts are recorded as being ‘at high risk of triggering mass atrocities’ and therefore could have easily escalated, including three cases which had already cost the lives of hundreds of people.⁵

³ Ibid. p.18

⁴ Ibid. p.13

⁵ Peace Direct. *Conflict Prevention in South and West Kordofan, Sudan*. (Peace Direct, 2017) p.3

Year(s): 1989 – 1994.

Location: Suriname.

UN Regional Group: Latin America and the Caribbean.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation of American States.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The mediation of a peace agreement and the deployment of a monitoring mission to verify implementation of its terms by the Organisation of American States ended the armed conflict in Suriname.

Suriname became independent from the Netherlands in 1975. Five years later, the civilian government was overthrown in a coup d'état and the country was governed by an increasingly authoritarian military junta. The collapse of constitutional rule led the American and Dutch governments to suspend all development assistance to Suriname, adding to the instability.¹ In July 1986, an armed group known as the Suriname Liberation Army (SLA) launched an armed struggle to restore democracy. The fighting escalated from hit-and-run attacks to much larger offensives on towns and infrastructure, and by November 1986, the SLA had captured the second largest city in the country.² Amidst growing domestic and international pressure, the military junta agreed to hold elections in November 1987. The incumbent government lost the election, however the military junta retained authority over the armed forces. A ceasefire was declared after the elections but collapsed within weeks.

Efforts to end the conflict began in early 1988, with representatives of the Government of Suriname and the Committee of Christian Churches holding talks with SLA leaders in January. Further negotiations were held in neighbouring French Guiana at the end of June, resulting in a ceasefire and the agreement of a framework for further dialogue. Further clashes threatened to derail the peace process, however, talks in French Guiana the following

¹ Human Rights Watch. *Suriname*. (HRW, 1992) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW2-07.htm> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

² UCDP. *Suriname: Government*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/357> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

year culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in July 1989.³ The gradual progress towards peace was disrupted in December 1990, when the military seized power in another coup d'état. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the governments of the USA, Netherlands, and France condemned the development and called for the restoration of constitutional rule, pressuring the military junta to again hold elections. In May 1991, a new government came to power and passed laws banning military involvement in politics. In 1992, the OAS hosted negotiations between the new government and the SLA, culminating with the signing of the Lelydorp Accord on 1 August 1992.⁴ The Accord ended the conflict, invited the OAS to monitor the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration process, offered an amnesty to combatants, and provided for the integration of some SLA troops into the Surinamese security forces. OAS personnel remained in Suriname until 1994, monitoring compliance, collecting weapons, and removing land mines.⁵

³ Paul Verschuur. "Truce Signed in Guerrilla War in Suriname." *AP News*. (1989) Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/8f70a750b8c992390baf03042aae2932> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

⁴ UCDP. *Suriname: Government*.

⁵ Monica Herz. "Does the Organisation of American States Matter?" *Crisis States Working Papers Series*, No. 2. (2008) p.22

Year(s): 1994 – 1997.

Location: *Tajikistan.*

UN Regional Group: *Asia-Pacific.*

Type of Conflict: *Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.*

Type of Initiative: *A peacekeeping mission and the mediation of a peace agreement.*

Main Implementing Organisation(s): *The Confederation of Independent States, Inter-Tajik Dialogue, Organisation of Islamic Conference, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN, and regional governments.*

Impact: *Lasting.*

Summary: *A series of multilateral peacekeeping and monitoring missions and the mediation efforts of the UN and the Inter-Tajik Dialogue helped to bring an end to the intrastate armed conflict in Tajikistan in 1997.*

Tajikistan emerged from the Soviet Union in September 1991. Multi-party elections were held peacefully in November of that year; however, the result was disputed by a host of opposition parties. In 1992, demonstrations against the new government turned violent as the president began raising militias and elements of the opposition turned to the Taliban in Afghanistan for support.¹ Tensions among these groups continued to heighten until May 1992, when armed conflict erupted between them. In September 1992, the president was ambushed by opposition troops and forced to resign.² His replacement continued the war against an array of Islamic and Democrat opposition groups, which formed up under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). By December, approximately 50,000 people had been killed in the fighting and 700,000 had been displaced from their homes.³ By early

¹ Don Lynch. "The Tajik civil war and peace process." *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4. (2001) pp.52-4

² Steven Erlanger. "After Week of Turmoil, Tajik President Is Forced Out." *The New York Times*. (1992) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/world/after-week-of-turmoil-tajik-president-is-forced-out.html> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

³ Shirin Akiner & Catherine Barnes. "The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics." in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. *Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace process*. (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001) p.16 Available at: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/tajikistan/tajik-civil-war-causes-and-dynamics> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

1993, the UTO had been largely defeated by Russian-backed government forces, however a low intensity conflict continued across swathes of the country.⁴

The international effort to bring an end to the war began in the spring of 1993 with the appointment of a UN Special Envoy for Tajikistan, who was tasked with forging a ceasefire, and the creation of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD), which was led by Russia and the US and began hosting negotiations in 1993.⁵ In September 1993, the Confederation of Independent States established the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan to monitor Tajikistan's borders (particularly the frontier with Afghanistan), promote dialogue, and deliver humanitarian aid.⁶ After several rounds of UN-mediated talks, the belligerents agreed to a temporary ceasefire in September 1994. In December 1994, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan to monitor the ceasefire.⁷ In addition, both the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference established missions to support the peace process.⁸ Although these initiatives succeeded in stopping the fighting for more than a year, Tajikistan relapsed back into war in 1996. The intervention of CIS peacekeepers and the ongoing Track II diplomatic efforts of the ITD brought the belligerents back to the negotiating table by the end of the year, paving the way for a series of comprehensive peace agreements in 1997.⁹ The talks, once again hosted by the UN, culminated on 27 June 1997 with the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan.¹⁰ After five years of war, the armed conflict in Tajikistan was over.

⁴ Dov Lynch. *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) p.159

⁵ Anna Matveeva. "Tajikistan: Peace Secured, but the State of our Dreams?" in Michael Lund & Steve McDonald. *Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace*. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015) p.154

⁶ Valdimir Goryayev. "Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process." in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. *Politics of compromise*. p.36

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *Tajikistan – UNMOT: Background*. (UN, 2000) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmot/UnmotB.htm> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

⁸ Goryayev. "Architecture of international involvement in the Tajik peace process." pp.35-6

⁹ Matveeva. "Tajikistan." pp.142-3; Elena Rigacci Hay. "Methodology of the inter-Tajik negotiation process." in Kamoludin Abdullaev & Catherine Barnes. *Politics of compromise*. p.38-40

¹⁰ General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, 1997. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/tajikistan-general-agreement97> (Accessed 17/11/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2000.

Location: Timor-Leste.

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: A military intervention.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Pacific states and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A multilateral military intervention led by Australia brought an end to the armed conflict in Timor-Leste in 2000 after decades of instability and war.

The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal led to the abrupt end of the Portuguese Empire and the abandonment of its colonies, including Timor-Leste. Independence was short-lived, however, as neighbouring Indonesia occupied the territory within months, despite international condemnation. In response, pro-independence Timorese guerrillas launched an insurgency.¹ The ensuing conflict lasted for over two decades, devastating the region. The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in Jakarta in 1998 presented an opportunity for the conflict to be resolved and, encouraged by international calls for a plebiscite to decide Timor-Leste's future, the new Indonesian administration requested that the UN organise a referendum for 30 August 1999. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor to conduct the referendum.²

Almost 80 percent of the population favoured independence, however the result was contested by pro-integration militias backed by the Indonesian military. The militias launched a devastating offensive, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and sparking the most violent period of the conflict to date. The eruption of violence led to international condemnation, and on 15 September the UN Security Council called for a multinational force to restore peace and security in East Timor until a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission could

¹ Moreen Doe. "Coalitions of the willing' and humanitarian intervention: Australia's involvement with INTERFET." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 3. (2007) p.3

² Geoffrey Robinson. "With unamet in East Timor: A historian's personal view." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 32, No. 1. (2000)

be established.³ Threats by the US Government to lever sanctions on Jakarta via the IMF and World Bank forced the Government of Indonesia to end its claim on the territory and acquiesce to the deployment of a UN-sanctioned international force.⁴ The Australian government led the initiative, not only providing much of the logistical and organisational infrastructure for the operation but also contributing half of the 11,500 troops of International Force East Timor (InterFET).⁵ Other significant contributions were made by New Zealand and Thailand. In the ensuing five months, InterFET took control of all Timorese territory and established a safe and secure environment across the country. With its mission accomplished and the follow-up UN mission in place, InterFET handed over authority to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor on 28 February 2000.⁶

³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1264*. (UN, 1999) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1264> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁴ Doe. “‘Coalitions of the willing’ and humanitarian intervention.” p.4

⁵ Marianne Jago. “InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor.” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (2010) p.386

⁶ UN Peacekeeping. *East Timor – UNTAET: Background*. (UN, 2002) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm> (Accessed 31/11/2020)

Year(s): 1999 – 2012.

Location: Timor-Leste

UN Regional Group: Asia-Pacific.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission and a transitional international administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: A transitional international administration and a peacekeeping mission helped to prevent a conflict relapse in Timor-Leste and laid the foundations for an accountable state governed by a constitution and an elected government to be built.

While the International Force East Timor was ending the armed conflict in Timor-Leste, the UN Security Council was preparing a follow-up mission. This took the form of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was formally established on 25 October 1999.¹ The Administration was vested with full executive, legislative, and judicial authority and was tasked with rebuilding a country devastated by war.² To pursue this ambitious task, UNTAET was composed of over 9,000 military personnel, 1,640 police, as well as an extensive civilian component.³ The Administration worked alongside a National Consultative Council and an elected Constituent Assembly, which served to inform policy and provide legitimacy. This allowed UNTAET to take the unprecedented step of negotiating a bilateral treaty on behalf of Timor-Leste. Once concluded, the agreement ensured Timorese access to oil and gas fields previously split between Australia and Indonesia, doubling gross national product, and providing a key source of revenue for the nascent state and its population.⁴

UNTAET successfully repatriated 167,000 refugees from Indonesia within six months of its creation and, by the end of 2000, the East Timor Police Service, the East Timor Defence Force, and the foundations of a judiciary had been established. The Constituent Assembly

¹ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1272*. (UN, 1999) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1272> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

² Peter Galbraith. "The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, Vol. 97. (2003) p.211

³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1272*.

⁴ Galbraith. "The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)." p.211

was elected in August 2001 and approved East Timor's first constitution on 22 March 2002.⁵ The following month, presidential elections were held, leading to the selection of Xanana Gusmao as President.⁶ With the building blocks of a state established and a legitimate national government in power, the Constituent Assembly was transformed into the country's sovereign parliament on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was withdrawn.⁷ A peacekeeping presence remained in the country in the form of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor until 2005, which in turn was replaced with a political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste.⁸ Timor-Leste's post conflict transition was marred by an attempted coup in 2006, which led to the rapid deployment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and another attempt to seize power by the military in 2008.⁹ In both cases, international efforts helped to maintain stability and prevent the spread of armed conflict. UNMIT withdrew in 2012.¹⁰

⁵ UN Peacekeeping. *East Timor – UNTAET: Background*. (UN, 2002) Available at:

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁶ Dwight Y. King. "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 5. (2003)

⁷ UN Peacekeeping. *East Timor – UNTAET: Background*.

⁸ UN Peacekeeping. *UNMIT: Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://unmit.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ BBC. "East Timor: UN ends peacekeeping mission." *BBC News*. (2012) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20873267> (Accessed 11/11/2020)

Year(s): 2013 – 2018.

Location: Tunisia.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Local action and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The National Dialogue Quartet.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The National Dialogue Quartet, a consortium of four major Tunisian civil society organisations, helped to prevent armed conflict and guide their country on a peaceful course in the wake of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution.

The 2010 – 2011 Arab Spring originated in Tunisia, sparking a wave of change and upheaval that ultimately ended in conflict across much of the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia, the protests succeeded in forcing the country’s long-time ruler, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to resign and heralded the introduction of multi-party elections. An interim government took power until elections could be organised, but popular protests continued throughout the year.¹ The October 2011 elections resulted in the formation of a minority government, however by May 2012 divisions between the Islamic and secular wings of Tunisian politics were escalating into limited armed clashes between paramilitary groups.² Renewed protests took place, with some calling for the ratification of a constitution while others demanded the introduction of religious laws. The demonstrations escalated to the verge of civil war following the assassination of a popular opposition leader in July 2013 in an attack attributed to the ruling party.³

Fearing an armed conflict, the leader of the Tunisian General Labour Union first called its 750,000 members to down tools in April 2013, bringing the country to a halt, before

¹ BBC. “Tunisia profile – Timeline.” *BBC News*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107720> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

² Chris Stephen. “The Tunisia quartet: how an impossible alliance saved the country from collapse.” *The Guardian*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/tunisia-quartet-arab-spring-islamist-nobel-peace-prize> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

³ BBC. “Tunisia political crisis deepens after assassination.” *BBC News*. (2013) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21366235> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

employing this tactic at key moments of tensions throughout the peace process.⁴ While protests continued in some areas, the union leader met with representatives of the Tunisian bar association, the Human Rights League, and the president of the Tunisian Confederation of Industry. The four individuals resolved to establish the National Dialogue Quartet (NDQ) and work to mediate a peaceful resolution to the incipient conflict and establish constitutional rule to Tunisia. Its first promulgated a Road Map, calling for parliament to pass a constitution, schedule elections, and appoint a technocratic interim government.⁵ The NDQ then held talks with a range of political parties, gathering enough support for a compromise constitution to be approved. Furthermore, the Quartet identified a suitable interim prime minister acceptable to all parties (an engineer new to politics). Parties from across the political spectrum adhered to the Road Map, and the elections were held in a peaceful environment in 2014.⁶ The NDQ had forged a space for dialogue and then used it to skilfully mediate meaningful agreements which resolved the crisis and laid the framework for Tunisian democracy to take root. The NDQ was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts.⁷

⁴ Stephen. "The Tunisia quartet."

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Hendrik Kraetzschmar. "How the Tunisian national dialogue saved a country from collapse." *The Conversation*. (2015) Available at: <https://theconversation.com/how-the-tunisian-national-dialogue-saved-a-country-from-collapse-48921> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

⁷ The Nobel Prize. *National Dialogue Quartet: Facts*. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/history/> (Accessed 06/12/2020)

Year(s): 1998 – 2002.

Location: West Nile, Northern Region, Uganda.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations supported by donors.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The ongoing insurgency of the Uganda National Rescue Front II in northern Uganda was ended with a peace agreement.

As the Ugandan regime of Idi Amin (1971-79) collapsed, the remnants of his government and military retreated to bases in Sudan and Zaire. Over the course of the 1980s, they established a range of armed groups including the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), which was led by a former minister in Amin's government. The UNRF insurgency earned its leadership a brief period in power as part of a military junta (1985-86). This administration, however, was quickly removed from power by Yoweri Museveni (who remains president today), and the UNRF fled once again over the border.¹ In 1994, the Government of Sudan seized key territory from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan and began helping the Ugandan exiles to launch a fresh insurgency. In 1995, the West Nile Bank Front began its operations against the administration in Kampala and was joined the following year by the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II). The UNRF II was dealt a major blow in the summer of 1997, when Sudanese government and UNRF II troops were defeated by SPLM troops, who captured the main base of operations used by pro-Amin Ugandan forces in Sudan. This severely weakened the various armed groups as military organisations and forced them to shelter behind the lines of Sudanese government security forces, thereby cutting off their access to Uganda entirely.² The losses in Sudan hampered the ability of groups such as UNRF II to pose a genuine military threat to the Government of Uganda, leading approximately 150 personnel to surrender to Ugandan local government

¹ UCDP. *Government of Uganda – UNRF*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/682> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

² UCDP. *Government of Uganda – UNRF II*. (UCDP, 2021) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/691> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

officials following the defeats.³ Despite these developments, a significant cohort of UNRF II personnel continued their insurgency.

In 1998, a local peace committee reached out to the UNRF II and opened a dialogue. These initial talks resulted in a ceasefire in early 1999. Combined with the passing of the 2000 Amnesty Act, which offered amnesty for Ugandans involved in ‘acts of a war-like nature’, this created a climate for more comprehensive negotiations to take place. These talks made slow progress until 19 April 2002, when the entire UNRF II organisation returned to northern Uganda from Sudan after losing the backing of Khartoum.⁴ Under these new circumstances, the belligerents agreed to a formal ceasefire on 15 June.⁵ The negotiations culminated on 24 December 2002 with an agreement allocating 10 government positions for the UNRF II leadership and 700 positions in the Ugandan military for their troops. The remainder disarmed within the framework a donor-backed Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration programme to become tobacco farmers.⁶ These arrangements ended the conflict.

³ Anton Baaré. “Development Aid as Third-Party Intervention: A Case Study of the Uganda National Rescue Front II Peace Process.” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1. (2004) p.23

⁴ Ibid. p.27

⁵ Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Uganda National Rescue Front II, 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/uganda-agreement-UNRFII2002> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

⁶ Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the National Rescue Front II (Yumbe Peace Agreement), 2002. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/uganda-yumbe-agreement2002> (Accessed 22/11/2021)

Year(s): 1997 – 1998.

Location: Northern Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

UN Regional Group: Western Europe and Others.

Type of Conflict: Horizontal (non-state) Intrastate Conflict, Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): Local people and organisations and the governments of Ireland, the UK, and the USA.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: Negotiations mediated by the Government of USA resulted in the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement/Belfast Agreement, which ended almost three decades of armed conflict and intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland.

Increasing tensions between Northern Ireland's Loyalist and Republican communities escalated into armed conflict in the late 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, a complex low-intensity conflict known as "The Troubles" took place between paramilitary groups, with ostensibly neutral British troops and police who were deployed to manage the conflict also becoming embroiled in the fighting. Efforts to end the conflict began as early as 1973, however it was not until the 1990s that meaningful progress was made.¹ A key figure in the lead-up to the negotiations was Northern Irish politician John Hume, whose consistent work for peace in the region earned him the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize along with David Trimble, leader of the dominant Loyalist political party, who also advocated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.² Multi-party negotiations hosted by a representative of the Government of the USA began in Belfast in 1997 between the governments of Ireland and the UK, along with

¹ Landon E. Hancock. "The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom." *International Studies review*, Vol. 10, No. 2. (2008)

² The Nobel Prize. *The Nobel Peace Prize 1998*. (Nobel Prize, 2020) Available at: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1998/press-release/> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

most of the political parties of Northern Ireland.³ The talks culminated with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (also called the Belfast Agreement) on 10 April 1998.⁴

In addition to ending the armed conflict and laying out terms for disarmament, the Agreement contained comprehensive provisions regarding the future of Northern Ireland. These included the stipulation that although the territory would remain as part of the UK, unification with Ireland was possible if the populations of Ireland and Northern Ireland approved of such a development in referenda. Furthermore, the Agreement established a consociational political assembly in Northern Ireland, which required the approval of both Loyalists and Republicans to pass legislation.⁵ A framework for cooperation and closer relations with Ireland was also established via the formation of the North South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.⁶ Northern Irish citizens were also guaranteed the right to identify as British, Irish, or both, and became entitled to enjoy full citizenship in Ireland and the UK. Although a few relatively minor Republican factions rejected the peace, Northern Ireland has largely been free from conflict since 1998.⁷

³ United States Institute of Peace. "George Mitchell: Building Peace in Northern Ireland." *USIP*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.usip.org/public-education/educators/george-mitchell-building-peace-northern-ireland> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁴ The Belfast Agreement, 1998. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁵ Northern Ireland Assembly. *Evolution of Devolution*. (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2020) Available at: https://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/evolution_of_devolution (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁶ North South Ministerial Council. *Areas of Co-Operation*. (North South Ministerial Council, 2020) Available at: <https://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/areas-of-cooperation> (Accessed 05/11/2020); Conflict Archive on the Internet. *Devolved Government British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC)*. (CAIN, 2019) Available at: <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/conference/> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

⁷ Peace Accords Matrix. *Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement*. (Krox Institute for International Peace Studies, 2020) Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/northern-ireland-good-friday-agreement> (Accessed 05/11/2020)

Year(s): 2014 – present.

Location: Donetsk and Luhansk, (de jure) Ukraine.

UN Regional Group: Eastern Europe.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and a monitoring mission.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been contained to the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk with help from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which deployed a monitoring mission to the region and has facilitated dialogue between the belligerents since the war began.

The February 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine culminated with the removal of the pro-Russian administration and its replacement with a pro-Western government. In the aftermath of the revolution, the new Ukrainian administration abolished many of the rights and privileges enjoyed by the country's sizeable Russian population, many former officials fled to Russia, the Government of Russia declared the transition to be a fascist coup, and Russian armed forces annexed Crimea.¹ The deteriorating situation led to the emergence of several pro-Russian armed groups which, in April 2014, declared the formation of independent republics on territory in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk (bordering Russia) and began receiving support directly from the Government of Russia. By May, the Ukrainian military and a range of militias were engaged with the pro-Russian separatists across eastern Ukraine. With the US and European governments offering varying degrees of support to Ukraine and the Russian military deploying thousands of troops in Ukrainian territory (and stationing many more just across the border), the fighting threatened to escalate into a much greater conflict.²

¹ UCDP. *Ukraine: Donetsk*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/13246> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

² Ibid.

The international response to the conflict was led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As early as March 2014, an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission was operating across Ukraine, observing events and promoting dialogue.³ The OSCE also facilitated lengthy talks between Ukraine and Russia in Belarus in August-September 2014.⁴ The negotiations concluded with the signing of the Minsk Agreement, which called for a ceasefire, continued dialogue, and certain reforms.⁵ Although Minsk provided a clear framework for the resolution of the conflict, its key provision, a ceasefire, collapsed within days. In February 2015, the belligerents met again, approving a new package of measures known as Minsk II.⁶ The agreements failed to end the fighting, leading to fresh talks in September 2016, again hosted by the OSCE. The negotiations resulted in an agreement on disengagement and contributed to a reduction in fighting in certain areas, however by 2018 these areas were once again in conflict.⁷ Efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the war have failed. However, the OSCE has maintained dialogue between the belligerents throughout the conflict and has overseen the development of a framework for ending the fighting, should a ceasefire manage to hold.⁸ Authors note: As I update this case on 19 January 2022, the armed conflict in Ukraine remains contained to Donetsk and Luhansk, but Russian troops are massing on the Ukrainian border and recent diplomatic efforts have failed to offer much hope of de-escalation and resolution anytime soon.

³ OSCE. *OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine*. (OSCE, 2020) Available at: <https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁴ International Crisis Group. "Peace in Ukraine (II): A New Approach to Disengagement." *Europe Report No. 260*. (2020) p.1

⁵ Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement), 2014. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ua-ceasefire-2014> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁶ Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 2015. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/ukraine-minsk-implementation15> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁷ Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware, 2016. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/266266> (Accessed 01/12/2020)

⁸ Cindy Wittke. "The Minsk Agreements – more than “scraps of paper?” *East European Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 3. (2019) p.264

Year(s): 2002 – 2013.

Location: Liberia and Sierra Leone.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Conflict Relapse.

Type of Initiative: Legal prosecution.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia and the UN.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: By removing powerful figures with a history of employing violence and armed conflict from the political environment, establishing a historical record of events leading up to and during the war, and bringing the perpetrators of war crimes to justice, a series of transitional justice mechanisms helped to prevent a conflict relapse in West Africa.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), jointly established by the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN, worked from 2002 until 2013 to bring the individuals most responsible for the worst crimes of the war to justice. Of the thirteen people indicted by the court, two died before their trial was complete and nine were convicted, including the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, who had backed the RUF during the war.¹ By removing figures who had actively undermined the peace process such as Sankoh (who was arrested in 2000) and Taylor (who fled to Nigeria in 2003 and was arrested in 2006) from the political environment of West Africa, the likelihood of a conflict relapse was greatly reduced. Indeed, both had repeatedly demonstrated their contempt for a negotiated solution to the conflicts they were involved in and had met international efforts to end the fighting with violence. Furthermore, by publicly documenting the atrocities and crimes committed by such individuals and sending them to serve lengthy sentences abroad (in many cases, for the rest of their lives), the SCSL demonstrated the end of impunity for such crimes in the region, providing a major deterrence to future armed conflicts.²

¹ Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. *The Special Court Trials*. (2020) Available: <http://www.rscsl.org/> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

² Gillian Wigglesworth. "The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone." *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 4. (2008); Owen Bowcott. "War criminal Charles Taylor to serve 50-year sentence in British prison." *The Guardian*. (2013) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/former-liberian-president-charles-taylor-british-prison> (Accessed 14/12/2020); Douglas Farah. "Foday Sankoh Dies." *The Washington*

The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) was mandated to create ‘an impartial, historical record of the conflict’, ‘address impunity; respond to the needs of victims; promote healing and reconciliation; and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.’³ The Commission documented the testimonies of 450 individuals, recorded over 40,000 human rights violations, and located 113 mass graves.⁴ All of its proceedings were broadcast across the country via radio, providing a population scarred by over a decade of war with a detailed account of what had happened and who was responsible. In its 2004 final report, the Commission offered a series of legally binding recommendations. These included confronting the endemic corruption which it diagnosed as the central cause of the war with a new Bill of Rights, increased independence for the judiciary, and the strengthening of parliament.⁵ The SLTRC was followed, at its own recommendation, by a new permanent body which was tasked with continuing its work, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL).⁶ Linking transitional justice processes to direct reductions in armed conflict is somewhat problematic, but in the case of West Africa the prosecution of Sankoh and Taylor demonstrably helped to prevent conflict relapses in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Post. (2003) Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/07/31/foday-sankoh-dies/6e4d2d41-d756-412e-92f3-f802f9b6a91a/> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

³ United States Institute of Peace. *Truth Commission: Sierra Leone*. (2002) Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/11/truth-commission-sierra-leone> (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁴ International Center for Transitional Justice. *Challenging the Conventional: Case Studies – Sierra Leone*. (ICTJ) Available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/challenging-conventional-truth-commissions-peace/sierra_leone.html#01/1 (Accessed 22/10/2020)

⁵ United States Institute of Peace. *Truth Commission: Sierra Leone*. (2002)

⁶ Human Rights Commission Sierra Leone. *History of Human Rights Commission Sierra Leone*. (HRC-SL, 2016) Available at: <http://www.hrc-sl.org/History.aspx> (Accessed 14/12/2020)

Year(s): 1991 – present.

Location: Western Sahara.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict with Foreign Involvement, Risk of an Interstate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: A peacekeeping mission, a monitoring mission, and an international transitional administration.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The UN.

Impact: Limited.

Summary: The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara has helped to prevent renewed armed conflict in Western Sahara since 1991.

The territory of contemporary Western Sahara was administered as the Spanish Sahara by the Government of Spain until 1976, when a UN-assisted peaceful post-colonial transition was supposed to culminate in a popular referendum deciding the political future of the territory. Instead, when Spanish forces withdrew, the governments of Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the area, with Saguia el Hamra in the north becoming Moroccan territory and Rio de Oro in the south being annexed by Mauritania. An armed group from the area called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) contested their claims on the territory and launched an armed struggle for independence.¹ The fighting in Rio de Oro was brought to an end following a coup d'état in Mauritania in 1978, however, the Government of Morocco then laid claim Rio de Oro in addition to Saguia el Hamra and the conflict between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government engulfed the entire territory.² Efforts to resolve the conflict were initially led by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), but in 1985 the UN Secretary-General convinced the King of Morocco to participate in a UN-led peace process and allow the delayed referendum to go ahead.³ Further negotiations resulted in an informal ceasefire in 1989, allowing the United Nations Mission

¹ UCDP. *Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/331> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

² UCDP. *Government of Mauritania – POLISARIO*. (UCDP, 2020) Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/893> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

³ Anna Theofilopoulou. "The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair." *USIP Special Report*, No. 166. (2006) p.3

for the Referendum in Western Sahara (*Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Organización de un Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental*, MINURSO) to be established in April 1991.⁴

The first MINURSO observers arrived in September of that year.⁵

The UN operation was intended to keep the peace for a transitional period, during which time a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General would have complete authority over all matters relating to the referendum. Initially, the referendum was scheduled for January 1992. However, disputes over the criteria for eligibility (the Government of Morocco has moved 350,000 people into the region, thus complicating any election) have prevented it from taking place. Instead, the peace process remains deadlocked and MINURSO's activities are restricted to monitoring compliance with the ceasefire. In 1996, with little progress being made on the terms of the referendum, the civilian and police staff of MINURSO were withdrawn. The military observers remain in place to this day, continuing their work maintaining the ceasefire and facilitating dialogue between the belligerents.⁶ Although a resolution to the conflict remains unlikely, MINURSO has successfully helped to keep the peace and prevent a conflict relapse in Western Sahara for almost thirty years.⁷

⁴ UCDP. *Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)*.

⁵ MINURSO. *Chronology of Events*. (UN, 2022) Available at: <https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events> (Accessed 16/01/2022)

⁶ MINURSO. *Background*. (UN, 2020) Available at: <https://minurso.unmissions.org/background> (Accessed 03/12/2020)

⁷ UCDP. *Morocco: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)*.

Year(s): 2008 – 2009.

Location: Zimbabwe.

UN Regional Group: Africa.

Type of Conflict: Risk of a Vertical (state-based) Intrastate Conflict.

Type of Initiative: Diplomacy and the mediation of a peace agreement.

Main Implementing Organisation(s): The African Union, Southern African Development Community, and the Government of South Africa.

Impact: Lasting.

Summary: The diplomatic intervention of the Southern African Development Community and South African President Mbeki helped to avert an armed conflict in Zimbabwe following a contested election in 2008.

When the 2008 elections were held in Zimbabwe, the country was suffering from a decade-long economic crisis, food and fuel shortages, and a cholera epidemic.¹ President Robert Mugabe, who had been in power since 1980, was facing growing opposition; his proposed constitutional amendments had been resoundingly defeated in a referendum, while the violent conduct of his administration was met with condemnation at home and abroad.² The opposition won the parliamentary contest, but the first round of the presidential election proved inconclusive, leading to a run-off. As the Zimbabwean people waited to return to the polls, security services and militias loyal to Mugabe launched a brutal crackdown.³ As the polls drew nearer, Mugabe openly threatened widespread violence should he lose the election. His rhetoric was given an extra sting when British intelligence discovered a major arms shipment *en route* to Harare from China.⁴ While the opposition movement maintained a peaceful campaign, it too began organising militias and preparing for a violent resolution of the conflict.⁵ Thus, Zimbabwe stood at the precipice of a major civil war.

¹ Human Rights Watch. *Zimbabwe: Events of 2008*. (HRW, 2009) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/zimbabwe#206466> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

² Bryan Sims. *Zimbabwe: a conflict history*. (Peace Insight, 2015) Available at: <https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2015/08/zimbabwe-conflict-history/> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

³ Chris McGreal. "This is no election. This is a brutal war." *The Guardian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁴ Obonye Jonas, David Mandiyanike, & Zibani Maundeni. "Botswana and Pivotal Deterrance in the Zimbabwe 2008 Political Crisis." *The Open Political Science Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1. (2013) p.2

⁵ Ibid. p.3

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) convened an extraordinary summit in response to the escalating crisis, attended by opposition candidates and officials from Mugabe's government, which culminated with a joint statement calling for the elections to go ahead peacefully.⁶ This was followed by a visit to Zimbabwe by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who served as the official mediator of the SADC for the conflict in Zimbabwe.⁷ After weeks of negotiations mediated by Mbeki, the parties signed the Global Political Agreement, which expressed the shared commitment to the prevention of violence and established a Government of National Unity (GNU) in which Mugabe retained the presidency and the opposition candidate became prime minister.⁸ The African Union backed the Agreement, viewing the transitional administration as an effective means of containing the conflict until fresh elections (mandated in the Agreement) could be held in a free and fair environment monitored by international observers.⁹ In February 2009, the GNU came to power and managed to curtail some of the worst hardships affecting the Zimbabwean population.¹⁰ Although tensions remained high in Zimbabwe, the timely diplomatic intervention prevented the outbreak of war in 2008.

⁶ IRIN News. "SADC disappoints civil society." *The New Humanitarian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2008/04/14> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁷ James Sturcke. "Mbeki visits Zimbabwe in mediator role." *The Guardian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/18/zimbabwe.southafrica> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁸ Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, on Resolving the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe, 2008. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/zimbabwe-resolving-challenges2008> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

⁹ Martin Revayi Rupiya. "A review of the African Union's experience in facilitating peaceful power transfers: Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Libya and Sudan." *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2012) Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/a-review-of-the-african-unions-experience-in-facilitating-peaceful-power-transfers-zimbabwe-ivory-coast-libya-and-sudan/> (Accessed 25/11/2020)

¹⁰ Martha Mutisi. "Beyond the signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Implications for Intervention." *ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief*, No. 4. (2011) p.3