

The cover features an abstract geometric design. The top-left corner is filled with several overlapping, diagonal bands of teal and dark teal. The bottom-left corner is a solid, light green triangle. The rest of the cover is white.

# **EFFECTIVE TRANSITIONS IN LIBERIA & TUNISIA:**

**UNDERSTANDING FACTORS  
WHICH IMPACT  
THE COST OF PEACE**

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## Executive Summary

In order to do the most good with limited resources, the peacebuilding field would benefit from better understanding the comparative cost-effectiveness of different approaches to peace. This way, funders and practitioners alike would be better equipped to know where their funds and efforts would have the most impact. Studying cost-effectiveness within the peacebuilding field is made difficult due to the complex nature in which stakeholders operate. What may work in one context may not be transferable to others. There are challenges too, in identifying data on both effectiveness and cost.

Even though efforts to catalogue impact evaluations and cost data are not yet a norm in the peacebuilding field, this report seeks to contribute to cost-effectiveness research by drawing on the structured-focused comparison method to compare and analyze the successful transitions of power in Liberia between 2003-2005 and in Tunisia between 2011-2013. The factors being compared are the timing and costs of interventions, the presence of structural violence and how it contributes to the outbreak of direct violence, the presence of civil society in ushering in change, and the use of nonviolent action. Liberia and Tunisia were selected as the case studies because they are examples of violent conflicts ended and peace being ushered in and maintained. In other words, they are success stories. For this report, success is understood as, a rapid cessation in violence, the acceptance of a formal peace process, and the duration of a minimum of four years of peace.

The purpose of the structured-focused comparison and an analysis of the Liberia and Tunisia case studies is to understand what brought about sustained peace in each place, extract data on the effectiveness of the peace efforts in each country and, to the extent possible, the relevant costs. The ultimate question is, can we say the examples of peace efforts in both countries were not just effective but cost-effective as compared to other approaches to peace?

Liberia presents a case with large levels of violence following two civil wars and a long history of structural violence and inequality. While many peacebuilding actors were present, including ECOWAS, the attempts at peacemaking through talks remained largely unsuccessful until the Accra Peace Talks in 2003. This is due in large part to the role of the Liberian Women's Mass Action for Peace, who mounted a consistent and broad based nonviolent action campaign. The established legitimacy for the women's peaceful movement, allowed them to function in an advisory role leading up to and during the talks, despite not being part of the formal structure of the talks. The women capitalized on the cultural forms of authority present prior to and throughout the conflict to end the war. After the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, along with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the women assisted with the DDR process, and the free and fair elections in 2005. Subsequently, Liberia experienced another peaceful transition of power in January 2018. We can say that Liberia is a peace success story. Can we say that the local, women-led civil society efforts for peace were instrumental? Yes. And economical? Yes.

Tunisia, while similar in its history of structural violence and inequality, had a rapid transition of power from the autocratic rule of Ben Ali to a representational democracy. The large-scale protests which sparked the Arab Spring were built upon a long-standing and pervasive civil society made up largely of the labor and youth movements, these movements were established when Tunisia was a French protectorate. Despite tensions between secularism and Islam in the new government, peace has held. This is due in large part to the brokering of

peace talks at the hands of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a coalition of civil society actors, who stepped in when protests broke out against the transitional government. So, mass violence was averted in large part due to the civil resistance of labor and youth movements on the ground and peace has been maintained. Success? Yes. Low-cost? Yes.

In Liberia and Tunisia, the end to violence and the transitions of power relied heavily on the use of nonviolent action by civil society actors. Nonviolent action is significantly less expensive than military intervention and does not erode a society's infrastructure or contribute to legacy costs. These civil society actors were already present in each context, and this presence has large implications for how peacebuilding funds may be utilized cost-effectively. Instead of starting from scratch after each new conflict, peacebuilders should focus on violence prevention by countering income inequality and structural violence. Although more study is needed, these findings suggest the existence of civil society and the use of nonviolent action appear to have strong implications for successful and efficient transitions.

Being able to compare the cost-effectiveness of different approaches to ending war and building peace is important as funds for peacebuilding are in decline. We need data that can help guide us to do the most good with the least amount of funds.

## Introduction

In recent years, internationally sponsored peacebuilding programming has resulted in some important successes, such as Sierra Leone 1999-2005, as well some notable endeavors warranting further research: Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the 1990s (Paris, 2004). Instances of failure often lead skeptics to claim that the monumental tasks and inherent complexities of peacebuilding in fragile environments exceed the organizational capacity, resource availability, knowledge and political will of the international community. On the other hand, optimists argue that previous peacebuilding shortcomings are merely evidence that the international community needs to redouble its efforts, commit additional resources, and be more efficient in how it implements peacebuilding work (Carothers, 2001).

The for-profit, medical, and education sector, among others, utilize cost-effectiveness research as one method of assessing whether a program will be funded as well as a way of evaluating impact. Using the for-profit sector methods of cost-effective analysis as a guide, cost-effectiveness research would be able to a) establish a causal link between an increase in positive peace<sup>1</sup> and peacebuilding initiatives, b) understand the scope and breadth of an initiatives' impact, and c) analyze available cost data on two or more similar initiatives operating within similar contexts. Understanding peacebuilding cost-effectiveness, particularly when connecting discrete peacebuilding activities to overall societal peace or 'peace-writ-large', is notoriously difficult.<sup>2</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> Just as Galtung delineates among direct, structural, and cultural violence, he uses the terms 'negative' peace to describe the absence of direct violence and the term 'positive' peace to denote the absence of both direct and structural violence (1969).

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance: Cuhadar Gürkaynak, E., B. W. Dayton and T. Paffenholz (2008). Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. *Handbook for Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. D. Sandole, S. Byrne, I. Sandole-Staroste and J. Senehi. London, Routledge 286-300. Anderson, M. B. a. L. O. (2003). *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, MA, The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc: 1-98. Scharbatke-Church, C. (2011). *Peacebuilding Evaluation: Not Yet All it Could Be at*: <http://www.berghof->

breadth and complexity of peacebuilding means that it is unlikely that scholar-practitioners will ever reach a point where they can claim that approach ‘y’ yields more cost-effective than approach ‘z’ under all conditions and contexts. However, the need to make the best use of funds persists.

In a recent study of CEPB, Frontier Design Group called for the development of typology and a corresponding set of common effectiveness measures for the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives. This task, while necessary, is challenging due in part to the need for peacebuilding initiatives to be as dynamic as the contexts and conflicts in which they operate, and are linked to some organizations “theory of change.” Some attempts at increasing transparency of cost and impact evaluations on peacebuilding initiatives have been made, most notably the emergence of the 3IE database<sup>3</sup> which is beginning to aggregate monitoring and evaluation data according to stated goals, region, and type of intervention, using documents generated by peacebuilding organizations. A handful of evaluations even have cost data, perhaps this data will make the future of CEPB possible. These evaluations are often done internally by organizations, not objective third-party institutions, making them difficult not only to aggregate but to substantiate. A standardization of criteria as to what constitutes a peacebuilding initiative, what makes it successful, the levels to which it is was effective, along with cost data are all needed before CEPB can be routinely established in the likes of the for-profit sector. Still, we must attempt to inform expenditure in whichever ways we can in the meantime.

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) utilized statistical analysis and data from the World Bank and the United Nations to evaluate cost-effectiveness on a macro scale, across many countries and regions, using GDP and consumption patterns to estimate how much GDP was lost during war time. They estimate, worldwide, that we experienced a loss of 817 billion US dollars as a result of conflict. Yet only 6.8 billion dollars US were spent worldwide on peacebuilding to counteract this loss (IEP, 2017). Most funding comes from international actors and is focused on funding governance and judicial reform initiatives.

Part of the formula for more efficient, peacebuilding rests with improving the peacebuilding community’s capacity to systematically assess cost-effectiveness in peacebuilding (CEPB). Indeed, in an age of general reductions in peacebuilding funding by national and multilateral entities, it is imperative that practitioners in the field know how to do more with less by applying evidence-based knowledge as they create, manage, and assess new peacebuilding programming. Such knowledge might include the most cost-effective timing and sequencing of different kinds of peacebuilding activities, the most productive agents of change to be targeted by peacebuilding initiatives, and the type of programing that most often results in sustainable, locally-supported activities.

## Methodology

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handbook.net/documents/publications/scharbatke\_church\_handbook.pdf. Advancing Conflict Transformation. B. Austin, M. Fischer and H. J. Giessmann. Opladan/Framington Hills, Barbara Budrich: 459-482

<sup>3</sup> The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, (3IE) database collects and stores impact evaluations on interventions, both economic and social in nature, within middle to low income countries.

The encouraging news is that researchers can still examine what kind of peacebuilding strategies are most likely to be effective, under specific contexts, and make observations about the linkages. To examine each case, I will utilize the ‘structured-focused case study methodology,’ popularized by Bennet and George. Bennet and George formed structured-focused comparison as a way of aggregating data across contexts and research. It is structured because it seeks to answer the same criteria across case studies and focused because only analyzes certain aspects of the selected cases. This allows for more uniformity in data collection which may contribute to a larger theory, able to provide insight across different and complex contexts. This enables researchers to aggregate data across contexts and initiatives in order to deepen understandings of the complexities of conflict while contributing to the study of CEPB.

The cases of Liberia amid the 2003 peace talks and Tunisia in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, were selected in accordance with current trends in violence to increase applicability across contexts. While overall violence is in decline, as is *interstate* conflict, *intrastate* conflict is on the rise.<sup>4</sup> To compare, from 1946 – 1988, there were 30 interstate conflicts and 65 intrastate conflicts; from 1989-2007, we saw interstate conflicts drop to nine and intrastate conflicts rise to 54 (Correlates of War Dataset, 2016). We also see a lack of formality around violence, with terrorism and guerrilla warfare becoming more prevalent than traditional military interactions (Dunne, 2012). Both cases selected are intrastate or civil wars and have components of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Also, care was given to select cases considered to be effective. For the purposes of this research, effective is defined as: instances where a formal peace agreement was established, a rapid decrease or prevention of major outbreaks of violence occurred, and relative peace persisted for a minimum of 4 years post intervention.

The ‘focusing’ portion of this focused-structured comparison utilizes four variables; the presence of structural violence leading to violence, the role civil society played in the transitions to peace, the use of nonviolent action, and the timing in which transitions led to peace. These four variables allow an insight into the When, Who, What, and Where, of effective peacebuilding, and can contribute to the formation of a theory of cost-effectiveness. While this may not fit into the ideal set of criteria established by the for-profit sector for cost-effectiveness research, it can still contribute to the knowledge bank by establishing a basis to compare with other contexts for theory formation, as well as suggest guiding principles of what may mitigate costs.

## Background of Selected Cases

### *Liberia*

Throughout the history of Liberia, we see a reemergence of different actors controlling national decision making and resource accumulation in very similar ways. Liberia was founded by freed American Slaves, known as Americos, who remained in political power from the country’s founding in 1847 until 1980 (Hegre, Outbuy, and Raleigh, 2009). A coup led by Samuel Doe deposed the Americos in 1980, creating a precedent of violent power transitions. The Liberian Civil War, which is often referred to as “The Great War,” is a combination of two

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<sup>4</sup> Interstate violence is said to occur when the primary warring parties are two opposing governments from different states. Intrastate is a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries (Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research).

civil wars, resulting in two transfers of power. The first occurred when Charles Taylor and his militia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) mounted a coup d'état against Samuel Doe in 1989. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stepped in, delaying Taylor's progress. This caused the first war to stretch until 1996.

In 2000, The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), set out to put an end to President Taylor's establishment. The LURD was formed by Liberian refugees living in Guinea and Sierra Leone who received backing from the Guinean government, as well were rumored to have received support from the United States, Britain, and the United Arab Emirates. Many militia members had been a part of Taylor's forces who felt slighted after the Abuja Peace Accords which ended the first civil war in 1997 and gave Taylor control (Brabazon, 2003).

Violence in Liberia was pervasive and spread through towns and cities, affecting the day to day lives of Liberians in severe ways. Over 200,000 people died (Uppsala Conflict Data Set, 2017) and over one million were displaced as soldiers looted their homes. Civilians were brutally targeted by both the state and opposition forces. There are pervasive reports of citizens whose limbs were amputated or were forced to watch family members being gang raped or killed (Human Rights Watch, 2003). There was no distinction between armed groups and civilians or regard for the innocence of children. Both government and rebel forces removed boys from their homes to join in the fighting. Often, child soldiers were forced to take hard drugs ensuring their loyalty. Citizens had difficulties distinguishing between the actions of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and the governments troops headed by Charles Taylor. Not one of the entities staking claim to the Liberian government and its resources provided the people with a safe and credible option. The fighting resulted in trauma for many civilians and robbed them of the infrastructure necessary to rebuild Liberia, namely electricity, medical, and transportation services.

Throughout the Great War, over a dozen peace agreements were attempted, but all were unsuccessful in promoting stable peace until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana in 2003 (Hayner, 2007). The CPA established a transitional government which gave way to the 2005 democratic election of Africa's first female President, Madame Ellen Sirleaf Johnson. How did such high levels of violence transition into a successful peace agreement while prior attempts led to the recurrence of violence? What were the differences before and after the Accra Agreement which led to the establishment and maintenance of peace?

## *Tunisia*

In December 2011, large scale protests demanding access to jobs and political decision making in Tunisia led to the swift ousting of the repressive President Zine el-Abedin Ben Ali. In response, Ben Ali enlisted national security forces to violently suppress and imprison protesters and shut down the internet. The United Nations estimates that around 700 citizens were injured and 300 killed throughout the short revolution. Utilizing social media and the news channel Al Jazeera, citizens experiencing the uprising in Tunisia were able to alert the international community and shine light on Ben Ali's tactics. Due to this pressure, Ben Ali agreed to generate jobs, reduce media censorship, and reformulate his presidential cabinet. By January 2012, Ben Ali was forced to flee to the country to Saudi Arabia.

The uprising in Tunisia sparked large scale change throughout the Middle East in what would become known as the Arab Spring. However, transitions in neighboring Egypt took much longer, and the country is still experiencing levels of repression and violence. The Tunisian transition has not been without issues, the main sticking point being a whether Tunisia prefers a secularist or an Islamic-based parliament. Commonly, *intracountry* polarization creates danger of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998), but this has not been the case in Tunisia. Instead, Tunisia navigates what academics refer to as the “twin tolerations,” noting the importance of both secular and Islamic ideals in Tunisian society and democracy. What factors were present in Tunisia that allowed for such a swift federal transition to new government? Tunisia offers a glimpse at how war can be averted during the early stages.

## Themes


Now that cases have been selected based on current trends in violence, and the contexts of the transitions in Liberia and Tunisia have been briefly discussed, we must now focus our study by examining six key factors. These variables have been selected from prior literature in the peacebuilding field as important factors that lead to a reduction of violence conflict and war.

### 1 | Cost and Timing

#### *The When*

##### *Lifecycle of a Conflict*

Often, we see different results from seemingly similar peacebuilding initiatives. The study of the timing of certain types of intervention has been a topic of debate in the peacebuilding field since its inception. Studies on intervention timing can offer guidance as to when an initiative would be most cost-effective. To do this, we must first expand our notion of a conflict being limited to the war itself and delve into what is known as the life cycle of conflicts.



(Brahm, 2003)

Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim note that most conflicts follow a similar progression: latent conflict, emergence, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, dispute settlement, and post-conflict peacebuilding (1994). These processes can emerge throughout years, and often exist across generations (Lederach, 2005). They posit a conflict is first simmering beneath the surface, remaining latent until the tensions rise and the conflict emerges. Timing of an intervention is linked not only to effectiveness outcomes, but importantly, they also have implications for cost.

The sooner peacebuilding initiatives occur on the conflict arc, the more cost effective they are (Chalmers, 2004; Dunne, 2004). Preventive methods of peacebuilding have a cost benefit ratio of 17.3-11.2, while peacebuilding methods which intervene once conflict has broken out have a cost benefit ratio of 7.2-4.8. Post conflict peacebuilding and development, while necessary, tend to be the most expensive with a cost benefit ratio of 4.9-2.9 (Dune, 2004, p.33).<sup>5</sup> These measures are conservative when considering the legacy costs associated with war (Chalmers, 2004). Legacy costs, sometimes referred to as “discount rates”, are indirect costs of war over time, which may span generations, like lack of infrastructure or healthcare due to the conflict. These costs can be ‘private’ pertaining to individual or ‘social’ impacting society as a whole. These figures suggest, the penultimate in cost-effective peacebuilding will eventually focus on prevention.



### *Timing and Actors of Mediation and Peace Talks*

The timing of mediations and outside actors entering the conflict are important in both the Tunisian and Liberian contexts. Once conflict has emerged, direct violence is present, causing harm to people, infrastructure, and the larger society. It is during this time that peacebuilders must focus on addressing the victims and the offenders (Lederach, 2005), in hopes of reaching a resolution to mitigate and stop the violence. Unfortunately, if power is not balanced among the warring stakeholders, it is often more difficult to get them “to the (negotiating) table.” Often, the more powerful party does not have an incentive to negotiate with other factions and will continue to abstain from negotiating until all parties are unable to see a future in which fighting will provide them with assured victory. When this is the case, the methods of nonviolence can act as a way of placing public pressure on warring factions by balancing power, making it costlier to continue fighting (Schirch, 2004).

Balance among or between parties results in a “mutually hurting stalemate” when no party has more leverage than another and makes the conflict “ripe” for intervention. The theory

<sup>5</sup> Dunne argues, an accounting method to determine cost-effectiveness within countries is likely to be inaccurate due to data constraints and advocates the use of counterfactual analysis to compare the actual path a conflict economy took versus the trajectory of an economy prior to conflict to determine cost-effectiveness. In this particular study he looked at prior to, during, and after the conflict in 12 states, across Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America.



of the mutually hurting stalemate, rooted in cost-benefit analysis (Zartman, 2001), is a critical window of opportunity when each faction's cost of continuing violence outweighs the incentives to engage in violence, making the factions more likely to engage in negotiations. Diplomacy and mediation allows the mutually hurting stalemate to become a "mutually enticing opportunity" (Zartman, 2001, p. 14). To sequence peacebuilding and mediation efforts in the most cost-effective manner, it is important to know the factors which influence the likelihood and success rate of mediation. Namely, when the role of outsiders in mediations are most beneficial.

1. Outside or "third party" mediators are important. When third party intermediaries offer to host mediation efforts of civil wars, the warring parties accept the opportunity 66% of the time (Melin & Svensson, 2009). This is in stark contrast to the figures which note that warring factions are highly unlikely, once conflict has broken out, to engage in talks amongst themselves.
2. The relationship a third-party mediator has with the country embroiled in civil war is important to the acceptance of mediation. If a country is approached by mediators from a country with which it has had a colonial past, it is less likely to agree to the talks. However, if a third party is geographically close, it is more likely to participate (Melin & Svensson, 2009; Beardsley, 2010; DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011).
3. The number of attempts to engage in negotiations is also statistically relevant. The more attempts made, whether successful or not, the more civil wars were likely to end in a settlement.
4. The longer a war persists, (Melin & Svensson, 2009), and the higher the level of casualties (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna, 2011; Regan & Stam, 2000), have a positive impact on whether negotiations will take place.
5. Regan and Stam (2000), note that mediation has a curvilinear relationship to war. It is more likely to succeed if it takes places during the initial and final stages of conflict, but can actually increase conflict if attempted at the height of conflict.
6. Mediations which focus on the issues that led to the conflict are important for the success of the mediation and longevity of peaceful conditions. (Regan & Aydin, 2006). In other words, meditations which address the underlying issues which led to the conflict are more successful.

As a settlement is reached, peacebuilding initiatives should change focus once again to address the trauma faced by victims of the direct violence, rebuild infrastructure, demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate troops. It is of critical importance that the capacity of individuals to participate in the political and social sphere be a focal point of post conflict peacebuilding to empower the citizenry to hold those in power accountable. Post conflict peacebuilding is a long term, multi-decade tactic, adopted to avoid future outbreaks of violence (Lederach, 2005). Because these interventions spread across an array of institutions, the amount of cost associated with post violence initiatives tend to be higher. Peacebuilding does not end when the fighting stops, or even after mediation has been successful; it must address the roots of the war by establishing equitable structures to support the continuance of positive peace.

## 2 | Structural Violence and Inequality

### *The What*

Johan Galtung delineates three types of violence manifested in society: direct violence, cultural violence, and structural violence, with each type influencing the others, and often all

occurring simultaneously (1969). Direct violence occurs when one can physically see and experience a person being anatomically harmed; this is the form of violence we are accustomed to discussing as violence. Cultural violence is “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form” which may include preventing communities from reaching their potential (Galtung, 1969, p. 167). This study will focus on the role of structural violence. While not immediately visible, structural violence may be built into political institutions, education practices, religious institutions, or anywhere “unequal power leads to unequal life chances” (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Structural violence implements discriminatory practices which may include; unjust laws around but not limited to land ownership, lack of access in the political and decision-making sphere, and nepotism and corruption in government. These practices may result in lack of economic opportunity for some, while advancing others. Through these societal channels, structural violence results in negative consequences for the health and peace of a society. In this way, violence exists even before the first outbreak of direct violence.

Structural violence acts as a precursor to secondary conflict which may present itself on an individual level through substance abuse, suicide, internalized oppression; on a community level through crime, interpersonal violence, and rape; or on a state level through rebel movements, terrorism, revolutions, and civil wars (Schirch, 2015, p. 24). One measurable indicator which can point us toward the existence of structural violence is income disparity. The most robust predictor of war is the income disparity between a society’s most wealthy and least wealthy (Schirch, 2015). Civil wars are more likely in contexts with weak democratic structures, low-income levels, and stagnant or low economic growth, (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). When this “systematic inequality” between identity groups persists over time, an environment is created which encourages the rise of opposition forces (Hegre, Ostby, & Raleigh, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Once violence has broken out, it exacerbates or contributes to a cycle of violence and underdevelopment (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). By looking at a state’s inequality levels, we are able to identify the presence of structural violence and address conflict during the less expensive, latent stage.

### 3 | The Role of Civil Society in Peace Promotion

#### *The Who*

An increasing interest in the ways civil society shapes democracy emerged after World War II, and again after the Cold War. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated, “The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving governments, international organizations, the business community, and civil society” (BBC, 2001). Civil society is recognized as “a public space between the state, the market, and the ordinary household in which people can debate and tackle action” (BBC, 2001). Examples of civil society include religious spaces, service organizations, community centers, or academic institutions. Unfortunately, funding of these organizations can be hard to manage, given the often autocratic spaces they necessarily emerge from and alongside. Funding given by those outside the country often requires passage through state institutions, controlled by and operating in interests of a state government (Beichelt & Merkel, 2014).

One of the largest strengths of civil society organizations (CSOs) is how fluid and diverse they can be. Often, we see two types of organizations; those which emerge to facilitate a specific

goal, or those which have been present within a society for decades. These organizations operate outside of formal governance structures, but can interact with the state. They are developed to address a need the public faces, but is not currently or adequately addressed by the government. Two examples of civil society are labor unions which organize for workers' rights, or a health workers' union which advocates for affordable healthcare. CSOs may interact with the business sector, but remain in the hands of the public (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). Civil society can contain international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), creating linkages to outside actors. It is this amorphous vitality which allows civil society to respond to the needs at hand. As wars or political structures shift, civil societies can play a distinct role, one unattainable by more rigid democratic or economic structures.

Civil society serves many functions in times of conflict and in times of peace. Civil society provides a haven for people to organize without state intervention. It can also serve as an intermediary between private households and heads of the state. Civil society can speak for the will of the people without high risks of direct harm. Participating in civil society creates space for collaboration which requires individuals to negotiate with one another, to develop tolerance, and build mutual trust. It is during this this negotiation, multiple entities are integrated into a cohesive unit (Merkel, 2000). Once merged, these civil society units have a fluidity which allows them to change roles within society, including becoming a social movement (Beichelt & Merkel, 2014) or participating in multi-track diplomacy (Schirch, 2015). In times of latent conflict or war, civil society is a pre-existing structure where trust and common goals have already been established. This network can be utilized to organize consensus quickly and effectively, shielding many of its participants from maltreatment by the state and creating space for the negotiating of societal power dynamics. This allows for local perspectives to be placed at the forefront of decision making. This makes for more accurate assessment, but also contributes to local buy in.

## 4 | Nonviolence

### *The How*

Much of the literature on violence prevention ironically focuses on military forms of coercion such as outside military intervention, financial and logistical support of armed groups, or violent suppression. Each option requires large and long-term investments by regional or international entities like ECOWAS or the UN, often including an influx of arms. However, coercive methods also include nonviolent action defined as “a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both” (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 9). Two notable nonviolent campaigns include the Satyagraha Movement waged by Mahatma Gandhi against British occupation in India during the 1930s, and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States led by Martin Luther King Jr. during the 1960s.

Just as violent interventions may have varied goals and forms, so too may nonviolent campaigns. Often inaccurately conflated with pacifism (Chenoweth, 2011) or nonviolence through a religious stance (Sharp, 2005), nonviolent actions may be utilized to dismantle oppressive regimes, question unfair or corrupt economic systems, help to develop human rights, and provide a nonviolent alternative in an otherwise violent circumstance (Albert Einstein Institution, 2017). The methods used to wage nonviolent action are extremely varied, but can include boycotting elections, sit-ins, rallies, protests, marches, hunger strikes, or noncompliance

with orders, among others. Each method is aimed at reducing control and legitimacy of decision makers or power holders (Sharp, 2005).

In fact, nonviolent conflict, also referred to as nonviolent action or civil resistance, has higher success rates than violent interventions. An aggregated data project by Stephan and Chenoweth, published in 2008, noted nonviolent action had a 53% success rate compared to a 26% success rate for violent campaigns in major conflicts from 1900-2006 (p. 8). Nonviolent campaigns are also relatively less expensive than violent interventions (Schirch, 2004), making them more cost-effective. The authors observed six mechanisms which help to explain these phenomena.

Firstly, international perception has a large role to play in establishing a movements legitimacy. If a guerrilla movement is deemed as a “terrorist” organization by the international community, it is much more difficult to receive support and political leverage. By utilizing nonviolent action, groups begin to take a moral high ground, where international and locals are able to confidently support the cause. Secondly, by their very nature, nonviolent actions are inclusive and able to incorporate larger amounts of people into a movement. This allows for longer and larger amounts of pressure to be exerted on the targeted oppressor. Thirdly, nonviolent alternatives are more appealing than other militant options to a repressive government. In other words, you as an individual actor are more likely to disrupt the status quo and join a nonviolent movement than one which looks and acts like the existing regime. Fourth, violent regimes are more likely to make concessions to nonviolent campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Most likely, concessions or willingness to negotiate are not due to the benevolence of those in power, but the strategies adopted by the nonviolent actors to target the institutions and power structures which keep the oppressor entrenched (Chenoweth, 2011; Sharp, 2005). Nonviolent actors disengage from the hierarchical relationship with the oppressor and attempt to renegotiate their standing by utilizing the interdependence inherent in the dynamic. For a person or group to remain in power, those being oppressed must be made complicit: nonviolent action allows for individuals to publicly object to this dynamic, and reorganize their relationship to the society.

Another asset of nonviolent action is that the military has a larger tendency to become sympathetic to the cause. Military intervention on behalf of a violent ruler is less likely to take place against nonviolent groups, and members of the military are more likely to defect and join the movement. Stephan and Chenoweth, were also able to look at how third parties, like outside governments or international organizations like the UN, impacted success rates; local nonviolent movements are three times more likely to succeed if supported by the international community (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 20). These findings are noted across regions and cultures (Chenoweth, 2011).

## DATA ANALYSIS

Now that the theoretical framework has been described in detail, each factor will be applied to the contexts of the Second Civil War in Liberia and the revolution in Tunisia.

### Liberia

#### *Liberia / Cost and Timing*

During the talks in Ghana, Charles Taylor was indicted for crimes against humanity in neighboring Sierra Leone. While the international community worried this would dissuade Taylor from engaging in peace talks, some argue his sentence served as a way of balancing power within the peace talks, and in fact would make it more likely to gain political appointment concessions from Taylor. This is what scholars refer to as the hurting stalemate. Also, the consistent pressure from the women throughout the process added a level of transparency to the talks as well.

The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached by addressing the underlying issues of the conflict, the need for employment. Prior talks had focused on securing a ceasefire and not on balancing power dynamics among those present at the talks (Bekoe, 2003). In Accra, rebel leaders were given positions in the transitional government, securing their employment beyond the current war. Another notable difference between past talks and the final talks in Ghana, was the presence of the women (Shulika, 2006). Though a transitional government was established, many of the positions were granted to the vary warlords and government officials responsible for the violence. Knowing that appointing politicians who have a history of inciting violence could prove a problem in the future, the Women's Mass Action for peace did not focus on political positions, but instead only on securing peace long enough for free elections to take place. They got the parties to the table just as the capital Monrovia was in the line of violence, forced the signing of the peace agreement, helped the disbanded soldiers reintegrate into society, and ushered in democracy through voter registration. The women were advantageous in their timing, knowing when the critical moments were to exert pressure and making sure their presence was known at those strategically important moments.

This movement began with just \$10 US (Gbowee, 2011). When the time came for women to attend the peace talk in Ghana, they raised money through local fundraising, from women's organizations, taxi drivers and students alike, to send women to the peace talks in Ghana. A large population of displaced Liberians resided in camps in Ghana, and the movement managed to fund the transport of these refugee Liberians from the IDP camps to the talks in Accra, Ghana. While cost data may have been recorded during the war for the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, it has remained elusive given the restrictions of desk research. It would be greatly beneficial, to cost-effectiveness research, for peacebuilders to catalogue and publish cost and impact data. This would provide metrics for other movements to follow in their footsteps and encourage donors to participate in the funding of like ventures.

Peacebuilding expenditures by international actors in Liberia have been rising since the comprehensive peace agreement. In 2013 alone, the cost of peacebuilding efforts in Liberia reached over one billion US dollars (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). If efforts to impact societal change had taken the same form they did leading up to the peace agreement after the rule of Samuel Doe, perhaps the cost of peacebuilding would not have reached such heights. Similarly, if peacebuilding investment had even the fraction of current aid, the wars could have been much less costly both fiscally and in terms of lives lost. Liberia offers an interesting case, in an area where the monetary and societal costs were extremely high, it took relatively little monetary cost to support a local women's movement to secure peace, but requires large amounts of subsequent investment.

### *Liberia / Structural Violence*

There are many instances of structural violence present within Liberia dating back to its inception. The freed slaves who arrived to the West Coast of the African continent carried with them the hierarchies present within the race based economy of the United States. Those who were of lighter skin, referred to as mulattos, held positions of privilege above those with darker skin; all colonists were referred to as Americos (Ciment, 2013). However, all settlers from the United States were considered, by the colonists, superior to the local 'native' communities.

Some notable ways in which Liberian elites consolidated economic, and therefore political power, was through trade. Even though the native population outnumbered the settler population 25 to 1 (Ciment, 2013), the elite Americo merchant class controlled both economic and political decisions for everyone in the country. Land acquisition was one way in which the merchant class maintained control, voting rights were restricted to those who owned at least \$25 of land. This kept most settlers and natives out of the political sphere. Eventually, poverty led many Liberians to become indentured servants both within Liberia and abroad (Ciment, 2013).

International powers had a hand in setting up the discriminatory practices which would eventually contribute to the corruption and unrest at the time of the first civil war. As early as 1871, the Liberian government took a high interest loan from England which led a \$280,000 debt to become a \$650,000 debt. This meant the government was beholden to a trade relationship with England. This is also true of Liberia's economic relationship with the United States as of 1907, when the United States issued a loan of \$1.7 million to the Liberian government.

Liberia has always been rich in resources. The loans mentioned above allowed foreigners to enact detrimental trade policies and paved the way for foreign resource extraction. Harvey Firestone signed a 99-year lease in 1924 for \$0.06 per year per acre, a significant bargain even at the time. Liberia's iron ore was extracted by an American named Landsdell K. Christie with minimal profit going to the Liberian government. These loans, trade relationships, and the selling of resources to foreign business owners exacerbated the structural inequality already present in Liberia and led to the entrenchment and corruption of those with power. Liberia's longest sitting ruler, President Tubman (1944-1971), was known to spend lavishly and doctor elections. It was not until the 1980 coup that elite Americos were taken out of power by an ethnic Krahn leader named Samuel Doe, the first non-Americo leader of Liberia. However, the many years of power consolidation and wealth accumulation by those using the state as a personal piggy bank (Gitau, 2008), meant political structures were not free or fair. Liberia, a country rich in resources, had a legacy of wealth and decision making remaining in the hands of a select few: first the Americo merchants, then the Americo political elites, and eventually Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor.

This concentrated control contributed to structural violence, economic disparity, and led to direct violence (Torre, 2002). These historical examples of structural violence were heavy indicators of what was to come. Land reform and the implementation of free and fair elections could have allowed for a different type of transition, more along the lines of Tunisia, where such heavy investment would not be needed to procure or sustain peace.

### ***Liberia / Civil Society***

Liberia has a rich history of civil society involvement. Churches and mosques have always played an integral role in Liberia. There were also many clubs formed soon after settlement, some of which remain even today. Some of these organizations include: Ladies Benevolent Society, Ladies of Liberia Literary Institute, the Freemasons, the Odd Fellows, and the Good Templars. These societies acted as governing bodies within Liberian society (Ciment,

2013). By the 1970s, African socialism and the Black Power Movement grew in Liberia with the emergence of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia, whose members were often jailed or forced to flee the country. However, these movements tended to stay within specific religious and socioeconomic bounds. The Women's Mass Action for Peace, The Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia, The Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET), and the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) were highly visible in Liberia leading up to the close of the second war (Fuest, 2009). In traditional cultures, present before Liberia was colonized, women were regarded as decision makers and even had power over male community members to veto the decision to go to war (Moran, 2012). The women's organizations and cultural authority was primed to coalesce.

The Liberian Women's Mass Action for Peace was able to accomplish this cohesion. Inclusivity is a key component of this movement. The movement began as Leymah Gbowee and six other women sat together, speaking about how the war was impacting their community. Gbowee began speaking in her church about putting an end to the violence. Within the audience was a Muslim security officer who extended Ms. Gbowee's message of strategic nonviolence into the women's community in local mosques. Before long, women of both religions were conducting meetings in churches and mosques, in cities as well and rural areas, bridging geographic, socioeconomic, and religious divides. This facilitated space for the women to reorganize the way they negotiated with one another, as well as their relationship to the conflict and those driving it. They built trust by focusing on their shared experience of the wars and the fear they had for future generations. The women related to one another by stating, "a bullet does not distinguish between a Muslim or a Christian when it ends a life" (Pray the Devil Back to Hell, 2008). Eventually the movement reached over 50 communities and even incorporated the Liberian refugee population in Ghana. The movement provided a viable alternative to the violent factions.

Not only did the movement serve as an intermediary across religious divides, but it also played an intermediary role between the rebels and the president. The international community was asking both President Taylor and the LURD rebels to attend the peace talks, to no avail. In April 2003, the organized women drafted a demand asking the groups to come to the table to discuss peace. Although he initially ignored them, after extended pressure, Taylor eventually agreed to meet with them. While inherently political, the women's movement avoided the topic of politics altogether. Instead of attacking the actions of the governments or the rebels, they focused on one objective, the parties go to the peace talks to end the war. The women pled for the sake of their children and relied heavily on rhetoric centered on their roles as women to protect their children and society. This type of appeal and dedication to nonviolence, made it impossible for Taylor to paint the women as traitors or to justify violent actions toward them. Taylor agreed to attend the talks. The women then set their sights on the rebels who were residing in neighboring Sierra Leone. The leaders met with them and agreed to attend the peace talks in Ghana.

After the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the women were also intermediaries between the UN and former combatants. The women knew the last attempt by the UN to commence disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation had failed and this attempt must succeed for peace to hold (Gbowee, 2009). The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program in December 2003. When around 3,000 soldiers, many of them children, arrived with weaponry and under the

influence of drugs and alcohol, chaos broke out. Instead of allowing an emergence of fighting and war, the women announced on the radio, in local dialects, that women would oversee the process, making sure the military's concessions were paid, and urged citizens to remain calm. The women successfully worked alongside the UNMIL efforts (Gbowee, 2009).

The women remained vigilant, overseeing democratic elections and campaigning for women's representation within the government. Voter registration, namely among women, doubled and led to the election of Madame Ellen Sirleaf Johnson as Africa's first female president. Women are now more represented in public decision making roles, allowing greater structural equity throughout the country (Shulika, 2016). The women acted as stewards and mothers of Liberian society, a role no rebel or president could deny was legitimate. The movement's capacity relied on its fluidity, to be what was needed, when it was needed.

### *Liberia / Nonviolence*

During the two and half years the campaign was underway, the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace rejected the narrative of the helpless African woman, subjected to rape, to murder of loved ones, to abduction of their sons into drug induced violence, and instead utilized their authority to make decisions as mothers for their country. They employed many forms of nonviolent action by using their bodies, songs, and dances to end violence, bring their sons home, and illicit structural changes within the government (Prasch, 2015).

The women conducted rallies and marches to spread their messages. They sang and danced at the fish market every day throughout their two-and-a-half-year tenure. When demands fell on deaf ears, the women took to the streets to march. They utilized Radio Veritas, a Catholic Liberian station, to call all women to join them in a march toward peace. They adopted slogans like "Women of Liberia Want Peace Now." They also began wearing all white to invoke the image of Esther from the Old Testament in the Bible, who advocated for the safety of her people, and the image of the nonviolent Satyagraha Movement in India. Some women even conducted sex strikes (Moran, 2012), stating that they were aware that men had either explicitly or complicity contributed to the violence and were responsible for its perpetuation. In this way, they incited support from their husbands as allies, displaying their ability to incorporate new members.

When the peace talks in Accra, at first a two-week process, ballooned into three months, the women grew impatient. The hundreds of women present at the talks took matters into their own hands by staging a sit in. They linked arms and barricaded the doors of the peace talks with their bodies; refusing to let the men pass until they reached some type of agreement. When guards attempted to move Leymah Gbowee for "obstructing justice," Leymah drew upon her authority as an African mother to curse the soldiers by beginning to disrobe. Because a woman's body is responsible for creating life, in Liberian culture, for a woman to show her naked body to a man in Liberia, she is telling him that he is no longer worthy of life (Moran, 2012; Pray the Devil Back to Hell, 2008).

The chief mediator and former president of Nigeria, Abdulsalami Abubakar, listened to the women's conditions and brokered an agreement between the women and the men participating in the talk. This outside assistance was particularly useful to the women gaining legitimacy in the international community's eyes. The women agreed to move from their sit-in if the men agreed to reach peace within two weeks. The women used nonviolence to gain political legitimacy and gained international recognition by demanding Abubakar incorporate their wishes



into the talks. The negotiating power shifted from the men in the room to the women in the hallway. The women used two brilliant strategies. First, they were wise to use the cultural narrative of the “powerful mother” as a political strategy, (Moran, 2012) and second, they strategically incorporated nonviolence to assert long lasting political pressure (Hayner, 2007; Prasch, 2015). These resulted in bringing the men to the table, in making sure those men reached an agreement, and in overseeing the reintegration and election process.

## Tunisia

### *Tunisia / Cost and Timing*

Conflict had been simmering within Tunisian society around jobs and economic opportunity since the time of the French protectorate (1881-1956). At the time of the revolution in 2010, Tunisia was experiencing a youth bulge, even the most educated among them were unable to find employment (Chaabani, 2017). Trust in the government had eroded, Ben Ali had been claiming he would stimulate job creation and do away with corruption for years but instead he would enact modernization tactics leaving them worse off than before (Perkins, 2014). Corruption was rampant, job opportunities were only made available for those who were well connected to Ben Ali.

A market vendor, by the name of Mohamed Bouazizi, was denied a permit to sell goods by local authorities and resorted to self-immolation. This act resonated with the underlying frustrations of Tunisians and sparked the mobilization of long existing structures of civil society actors and civil resistance tactics. Civil society and coalitions between the labor and youth movements had reached consensus and advanced to a critical mass of sorts. Social media created a new platform for protesting and allowed for swift mobilization. In essence, the Tunisian’s patience ran out (Muasher, Pierini, and Aliriza, 2016), just as technology was reaching a point where it could be used to mobilize a large number of people to overturn the government.

The international community was able to assist the local actors in a swift yet respectful manner. As the conflict transitioned into de-escalation, the role of the international community in this moment was critical. The Arabic news channel Al Jazeera kept the international community informed, functioned as a watch dog. Free and fair election committees were employed, and the United States and European Union pledged money to help transition Tunisia into a democracy. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet stepped in at a critical moment as well. Drawing on their authority as advocates for the people, they were able to maintain trust in the national government despite centuries of mismanagement and abuse. Given Tunisia’s history with France, it was necessary for the trusted, local entities to remain at the helm of decision making in order for peace to persist.

While funding for the four entities of The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet prior to the revolution has been unavailable, data on investment into the UGTT post transition has been published. The World Bank granted the UGTT a grant of \$240,000 in the hopes it would disburse funds to the labor unions and stimulate economic growth (World Bank, 2014). It should be noted, the World Bank considered the use of these funds as somewhat ineffective. If the cost of organizing prior to the revolution were available to the public, it would be helpful to the advancement of CEPB, especially as conflict is on the rise in the region post Arab Spring.

### *Tunisia / Structural Violence*

Within Tunisia, direct violence was minimal. However, Tunisia's history is rife with structural violence. Though a member of the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia upheld its own governmental system of a monarchy, referred to as the "beys". The bey's courts were run as municipalities, mostly under Sharia law, but subject to the bey's final decisions. Tunisia enjoyed relative peace until the French government leveraged its trade position to establish control in the region.

This leverage often came in the form of financial agreements. The International Finance Commission, a bank headed up by the French, caused an influx in immigration from France, Spain, Italy, and England. The reforms to Tunisia's financial and land structure after the formation of this bank led to heightened levels of inequality between the native Tunisians and the foreign European communities. Tunisia eventually became a protectorate of France in 1883, resulting in French control over all financial decision making and tax collection.

These inequalities are rooted in policy decisions around land redistribution, tax breaks for European immigrants, reconstitution of the agricultural sector to focus on export economies, and the importation of goods from Europe. In 1968, France supplied 60% of Tunisian imports and utilized around 60% of exports. By 1914, 84% of all land owned by non-Tunisians belonged to French settlers. This left the Tunisian economy vulnerable to market shocks.

To diminish the influence of local Sharia and Mosaic governance structures, the French government implemented redistricting initiatives to weaken local decision making. Large levels of racism persisted, with educational opportunities often being discouraged or denied to the Tunisian population. These policies deepened inequalities between Tunisians and European immigrants, a strong indicator of structural violence. Tunisians were denied representation within their government, making these abusive policies difficult to combat.

Even after Tunisian Independence in 1956, Tunisia was still subjected to the legacy of the French protectorate. Prime Minister Bourguiba utilized the formation of the new government and constitution to consolidate power by becoming President, while maintaining his role as Prime Minister. He was elected in 1959, and again in 1964 and 1969. Bourguiba was a staunch secularist, insisting his constituents "modernize" by abolishing Quranic schools, absolving the Sharia courts, and championing women's rights. This was the second sweep of secularism in Tunisian politics, after the French initiatives.

When the European Union was formed, Tunisia's GDP, relying heavily on export and import, bottomed out, leaving President Ben Ali to take on economic reforms prescribed by the IMF. A foreign intervention which came along with severe cuts to public programs and the country relying too heavily on tourism as its main commodity. With the emergence of terrorism in Tunisia, the government's security apparatus swelled to protect the tourism industry. Revenue continued to drop by 13%. This excuse to proliferate security forces further consolidated power.

With one in eight Tunisians being a member of the security forces, suppressing international journalists and silencing dissenters became commonplace. Between 2000 and 2010, government transparency levels dropped substantially from 33<sup>rd</sup> to 65<sup>th</sup> (Transparency International Ranking, 2017). A combination of terrorism and concerns for human rights abuses caused international investors to pull out of the economy, causing further damage to employment rates. The global financial crisis hit in 2008, leading to further debt and inflation within the country. Unemployment reached 15% nationally, with approximately 40% concentrated within youth, a factor which influenced the uprisings in 2015.

This historical progression of structural violence, has elements we see across many regions of the world, mostly areas which were dominated by a foreign power. When economic and political power reside in the hands of a few key players, they have the tendency to make decisions which perpetuate inequality which can lead to violence. More specifically, in the case of Tunisia, the elite merchant class and Europeans created an undiversified economy, focused on what was most profitable to them but also sensitive to global market changes. Furthermore, wealth accumulation among those at the top created dissent by denying a majority of citizens access to the very decision making which was disproportionately and negatively impacting them. If better land reform or banking practices were enacted throughout Tunisia's history, perhaps the government would not have had to take predatory or conditional loans from foreign powers or the IMF, leaving the state indebted and unable to care for its citizens. While Tunisia's transition came to fruition rather inexpensively, it could have been much worse given the history of structural violence.

### *Tunisia / Civil Society*

Despite being denied political representatives or perhaps because of this exclusion, civil society has long been robust in Tunisia. Civil society provided a way of operating outside of the existing political structures. Civil society has been strong in Tunisia since before French intervention. Regionally, Tunisia was unique in its commitment to human rights. Slavery was abolished in 1841, and slaves were emancipated by 1846. Other countries in the region would take as long as a hundred years later to reach full emancipation. The religious leaders, the Ulama, adhered to their traditional Quranic forms of governance as much as possible under French control, acting as regional leaders alongside the monarchy and protectorate (Perkins, 2014). In this way, they offered an alternative form of rule.

Not only does Tunisian civil society function as local governance, it also has a history rich in nationwide labor and youth organizations. The Young Tunisian party was formed around the goal of creating a new constitution. The movement even enlisted French natives, to elicit international support and visibility among the French liberals. During the 1930s, the country experienced a youth bulge, with 25% of the population under the age of 28 (Perkins, 2014). We will see a similar pattern emerge almost one hundred years later at the time of the revolution.

Because Tunisia was so dependent on the global economy, the great depression hit Tunisia particularly hard. The longshoremen formed a movement known as the Dustarians. In 1925, the Dustarians and students formed a coalition. After lobbying and pressure, the Dustarians were eventually elected into the executive committee in the government. Although they were unable to attain reforms, representation was an important step towards full Tunisian independence. Many Dustarians were imprisoned by the protectorate and the subsequent leaders in Tunisia. To combat this, the Neo Dusturs adopted a decentralized structure of 450 cells, able to step up when leadership was imprisoned. They also began to avoid being seen only as a labor movement, instead adopting the notion that they were "party of the whole nation" (Perkins, 2014, p. 103). The Neo Dusturs began appealing to sports clubs, international groups, youth organizations, and cultural societies (Perkins, 2014), making the movement widespread and inclusive.

An incident occurred in 1938 when 700 Neo Dusturs were imprisoned by the government. In 1943, over four thousand Tunisians were placed in prison camps (Perkins, 2014). In 1947, the government forces fired openly on the UGTT (Union Generale des Travailleurs

Tunisians) which spurred the protesters to ramp up their organizing and form a business federation with the Union Tunisien de L'artisanat et du Commerce and the Neo Dusturs. These types of coalitions, among the different sectors in Tunisia, would form the civil society foundation that would later lead to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet.

In 1978, one significant demonstration by the UGTT left 47 people dead at the hands of the government forces. This event became known as “Black Sunday.” This raised political awareness around the country about Bourguiba’s repressiveness and led to the formation of the Tunisian League of Human Rights and the formation of The Movement Des Democratistes Sociaux. Repression of protests continued when 37 guerrillas were killed by the state while protesting unemployment on “second Black Thursday” (Perkins, 2014). Several parties emerged, the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty in 1994, the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia in 1998, and the Progressive Democratic Party. After the ouster in 2015, there was an upsurge in labor union entities and membership. The UGTT is currently approaching 750,000 members and stretches as far back as 1946 (Bishara, 2014).

The press was often a key component of public debate and awareness. The Arabic newspapers *al-Hadira*, and *Le Tunisien*, were often used as platforms by local activists. One example was the use of the “Young Tunisians” utilizing the press to call for pan Islamism, the protection of rural land, the revivification of artisanal production, the development of new industry, and the expansion of schooling opportunities (Perkins, 2014). By focusing on the cultural relevance and legitimacy of Islam throughout the Young Tunisian movement, they were able to gain widespread support among the Muslim population and shield themselves from French intrusion.

After the revolution, care was taken by civil society to designate 10,000 election watchers (Rowse, 2015) who oversaw free and fair parliamentary elections. A majority of seats being won by the Islamic party Ennahda (Rowse, 2015; Ghannouchi, 2014). The new government had one year to draft a constitution. Government talks were broadcast across Tunisia to ensure transparency and maintain public support and trust.

Using the long established legitimacy of civil society in Tunisia, the National Dialogue Quartet was able to broker a peaceful transition in 2013 (Deane, 2013). After the election of the Muslim based Ennahda government, two secular leaders were assassinated, Mohamed Brahmi and Chokri Belaid. Some blamed the elected Ennahda government; out of fear that the country would destabilize, the Ennahda leaders graciously stepped down, leaving a precarious political climate (Ghannouchi, 2014).

The National Dialogue Quartet, comprised of the National Dialogue Quartet the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, nominated Mahdi Jomaa to oversee the transitional government and replace the Ennahda government (Bishara, 2014). The National Dialogue Quartet succeeded in creating a peaceful dialogue. As a result of the quartet, an agreement was finalized in January 2014 (Rowse, 2015).

This suggests the encouragement of civil society, namely in the form of labor unions, can serve a strong function in allowing people to organize and negotiate peacefully. It also suggests free and fair election initiatives, access to jobs, and the freedom of the press, bare heavily on a society's ability to transition without the heavy use of direct violence. In short, a strong civil society can act as an alternate guide in times of structural violence. In the case of Tunisia, it

brokered a smooth transition of power, despite the large levels of structural violence present in the state apparatus. It also allowed formed the basis of trust needed for a peaceful transition.

### *Tunisia / Nonviolence*

Not only was civil society long suffering within Tunisia, but also the methods of nonviolence. As early as 1861 and 1864, Tunisian merchants protested to the exportation practices adopted by the French. The price of olive oil and wheat grew considerably. This led the merchants to protest first in the markets and then conduct a march to the palace. There were large scale revolts after a hike in taxes in 1864. The protesters demanded an increase in local judicial practices, and the abolition of the constitution which favored Europeans. In 1911, protests broke out after the killing of a young boy by an Italian immigrant, followed by a boycott of the transportation system. The movement called for equal pay for equal work, limited employment of street cars to the French, and the ability to elect a Tunisian member of the consultative conference. The protests lasted one month before the leaders were arrested and ejected from the country.

Resentful at having to participate in Europe's war and return home to bleak economic opportunities in Tunisia, World War I soldiers began to participate in political activism. Protests broke out in 1919 and continued into 1920. As autocratic rulers remained in power and civil society organizations continued to form, strategic nonviolence continued throughout the twentieth century. By 2008, Tunisians began to gain a critical mass as workers conducted sit-ins, roadblocks, and hunger strikes at the GAFSA Phosphate Company in protest of jobs being issued to only well-connected workers. The Union of Unemployed Students formed a coalition with the unemployed workers from the GAFSA Phosphate Company leading to many arrests at the hands of the security forces (Bishara, 2014).

Despite the government's suppression of the labor and youth movements, the situation comes to a head in December 2010, when Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor, lights himself on fire when officers deny him a permit to sell his goods without a bribe. He died in a hospital weeks later. Protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid, then in the Kasserine and Thala regions. The uprising took on several forms including worker strikes, most notably the shutdown of the government by the lawyers. Before long, the protests had extended from the middle of the country all the way to the Tunisia's coasts.

While Tunisia had long utilized traditional nonviolent action tactics like protests, marches, sit ins, and strikes, the revolution had an additional component of technology. The revolutionaries bypassed Ben Ali's heavy internet censorship laws by utilizing smart phones to organize. A new form of activism emerged known as "hacktivism" disabled and retaliated against censorship by shutting down government websites (Zunes, 2017). The Tunisian youth organized through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms to circumvent Ben Ali's control and organize the uprising. With the use of cell phones and technology, protestors were able to organize meeting places, communicate where to avoid security forces, and maintain a level of transparency with the international community to garner outside support to pressure Ali. When the people called for Ben Ali's resignation, he ordered the military to fire on the crowds, the military refused. This is consistent with Stephan and Chenoweth's notion that it is more likely to dissuade the use of military force through nonviolence.

When Ben Ali and his family fled the country, members of his political regime attempted to assume power, the people took to the streets again (Rowse, 2015). A Ben Ali critic by the

name of Beji Caid Essebsi became the temporary Prime Minister (Marks, 2015). When the newly elected Ennahda government decreased the rights of women when drafting the constitution, thousands of Tunisians protested in the streets again to demand the government do better (Marks, 2015).

Tunisia has a rich history of nonviolent action which employed many members of Tunisian society, from lawyers to those who worked in the markets. It was only fitting their revolution take on a decentralized nonviolent action model. They drew upon their historical use of nonviolent action to gain legitimacy and garner inclusiveness to reach a critical mass. This critical mass along with international pressure allowed for a more peaceful transition.

### Analysis | Compare and Contrast of the Movements

There are strong overlaps of structural violence both in Tunisia and Liberia. Within the history of both contexts, we see some groups being elevated to make decisions about governance while others are being blocked from decision making and economically suppressed through unequal access to resources.

Both instances shared a colonialist presence even though both were never technically colonized. Land ownership, taxation without representation, international business interests, and global market influences all played a critical role in the development of structural violence and inequality. Post transition, both contexts adopted democratic structures and are continuing to decentralize power and institute checks and balances.

In both the Liberian and Tunisian contexts, civil society played a large role in facilitating change by exerting continued pressure on power structures. However, civil society in Tunisia was centered on the role of labor and youth organizations while in Liberia it was built on the women's movement. Within both contexts we see coalition building across divides, Tunisia reaching across labor, youth, and political lines under the shared goal of constitutional and economic reform, and within Liberia across religious, socioeconomic status, and literal country borders to call for the cessation of direct violence. Within both contexts, these civil society actors worked actively within the bounds of their cultures. In Liberia, women drew upon their cultural authority as protectors and mothers, able to veto war. In Tunisia, the persistence and longevity of the labor movement was the heaviest entity pushing for the people, a quality it was able to utilize during the transition. Similarly, the civil society organizations highlighted here remained focused on their unchanging goals, but simultaneously managed to adjust to the needs of the moment.

The use of nonviolent actions was a course of action able to be instituted under oppressive rule both in Tunisia and Liberia, with minimal support from outsiders. In Tunisia, civil society relied heavily on protests, strikes, and marches. While this was true in Liberia as well, the women also served as advisors and educators throughout UNMIL's disarmament and demobilization efforts and remained present throughout the election. Strategic nonviolence did, although not completely, shield individuals in both scenarios from state violence, acting as a buffer between the activist communities and the repressive government forces. Within Liberia and Tunisia, there were instances where the military was sympathetic to the movements. Both movements utilized international recognition and legitimacy to further their cause. However, the use of technology in Tunisia made this recognition immediate, whereas it wasn't until the peace talks in Accra the women's movement gained international recognition.

The timing of both interventions was critical. However, each intervention occurred during different stages in their prospective ‘conflict arcs.’ Within Liberia we see strong evidence that a “hurting stalemate” occurred as the women built upon the international community’s plea for the rebels and Taylor to attend talks by exerting continued pressure at the same critical moment Taylor was indicted for war crimes. However, in Tunisia, we see a long building of conflict over many decades, finally coming to a head when Ben Ali was overturned. In Tunisia it was not an instance of a ‘hurting’ stalemate which led to the successful transition. Instead Ali is forced to resign with momentum belonging solely to the protestors. However, we do see a hurting stalemate of sorts as the government becomes polarized and seeks the guidance of the quartet. This takes place during the ‘de-escalation phase’ of the conflict. Within both cases, we do see evidence that a third-party mediator is an asset to peaceful transitions. Also, outsiders played key roles in facilitating the peace talks both in Liberia and in Tunisia. Not only did international actors serve as facilitators of these meetings, outsiders acted as witnesses to the tactics of the repressive government and helped give international exposure to the voices of the protesters.

Both transitions built upon organizations and sentiments rooted in the societies in which they operated. The Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace utilized church networks and a cultural authority as mothers to build consensus and communicate in a way that was not immediately threatening to the warring factions. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet drew upon decades of protests born out of the labor movement and a cultural balance between Islam and secularism. However, the length of the movements, versus the lengths of the violence is peculiar. In the Liberian context, the peace movement lasted just two and a half years while the war had been raging for many. In Tunisia, the protests began many decades ago while it was a French protectorate and the transition took mere months.

The types of movements are of particular relevance to the underlying issues present within the conflicts. In Liberia, the heaviest levels of violence were directed at women and it was they who became the catalysts for change. Within Tunisia, the labor and youth movements coalesced to tackle economic reform which impacted their abilities to find work. Present within both contexts as well, is the sentiment that these transitions were made possible by the levels of exasperation which had reached an all-time high or tipping point, paving the way for consensus building and action.

## Conclusion

This study has sought to answer the when, who, what, and where of successful peacebuilding activities for the furtherment of cost-effectiveness research of peacebuilding initiatives. It has done this by highlighting two successful cases in Tunisia and Liberia through the structured focused comparison of four factors; the timing of the intervention based on the lifecycle of the conflict, the presence of structural violence, the role of civil society, and the utilization of strategic nonviolence. The contexts explored were the transitions of power within Liberia leading up to and during the close of the second civil war and the conditions which promulgated the Tunisian uprising in 2011, leading to the Arab Spring.

Although quite different contextually, both cases showed that structural violence led to income disparity and the impetus to initiate change. Although not initially, Liberia and Tunisia eventually adopted the strategy of nonviolent action which led to the expulsion of autocratic leaders. This was due in large part to the presence of longstanding civil society structures and

leveraging international support at key moments in the conflicts. Although more study is needed, these findings suggest the existence of civil society and the use of nonviolent action appear to have strong implications for successful transitions, namely due to their tendency to be inclusive and trustworthy. It also implies that if we expand our definition of conflict to include structural violence, we could shift from more expensive post-conflict peacebuilding methods to more cost-effective preventative measures (Schirch, 2004).

In short, using income inequality as a litmus test to target areas of structural violence, we may be able to better avoid the exorbitant costs of war on a state and personal level. Peacebuilding initiatives which combat structural violence may focus on job creation, education, and land reform. Also, capacity building and nonviolent action are two lesser expensive options than largescale interventions because they utilize local knowledge to more accurately assess needs and utilize local labor making consensus building and efficacy more feasible. These cases also imply, international actors were critical to these movements success by acting as facilitators or by exerting pressure on autocratic rulers.

Assessing cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives remains an elusive undertaking. However, the structured-focused comparison method is useful to further explore the linkages of these variables to other contexts and develop a theory on where and what types of initiatives would be cost-effective. The further development of data collection geared toward cost-effectiveness indicators would be greatly beneficial to the field of peacebuilding.

The analysis in this report sought to identify which variables are present during effective transitions from war to peace and which actors can play positive, effective roles. Answering both these questions moves us in the direction of understanding what approaches might be most cost-effective.

## Limitations and Implications for Future Research

Care should be taken to understand each context in which one is operating. Because the Tunisian Quartet and Liberian Women's Mass Action for Peace contributed to peace in these communities, does not necessarily mean these methods are immediately transferable to others. More research is needed to aggregate other instances of transition across these focused independent variables; cost as it relates to timing of interventions, the existence of structural violence, the role of civil society leading up to and beyond transitions from structural or direct violence, the use of nonviolent action, timing of interventions. It must also be noted these peacebuilding initiatives are operating in conjunction with other visible and invisible factors and actors which may have influence over the outcomes being attributed by the international community to these initiatives. However, with enough study, we could begin to see larger trends and focus resources within accordance of those trends.

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## Biography



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